JUDGMENT : PRANJAL DAS, J. 1 . Heard Mr. K.A. Mazumdar, learned counsel assisted by Mr. S.A. Islam, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. K.Baishya, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. The present revision petitioner, namely, Kutub Ali @ Kutub Uddin faced prosecution under Section 417 IPC in a complaint case being CR Case No.404/2003 , before the Court of learned CJM, Hailakandi and after completion of trial, he was found guilty of an offence under Section 417 IPC and sentenced to Rigorous Imprisonment (R.I) for 6(six) months and imposed with a fine of Rs.1000/- in default, (S.I for 7 days) 3. The complaint was filed with an allegation that the revision petitioner and the daughter of the informant developed intimacy followed by physical relationship on a promise of marriage, as a result of which she became pregnant and later gave birth to a baby girl. It was alleged that the promise of marriage was false and thereby, the petitioner cheated the informant’s daughter. 4. Aggrieved by his conviction and sentence, the accused/petitioner preferred an appeal before the Court of learned Session Judge, Hailakandi registered as Criminal Appeal No.4/2008 but he was not successful in the said appeal which was dismissed upholding the conviction under Section 417 and the sentence was also upheld, holding that the same cannot be said to be hard or excessive. 5. Aggrieved by this failure in the second tier, the revision petitioner has filed the instant criminal revision invoking the powers under Section 397 /401 Cr.PC seeking interference with his conviction and sentence. 6. The TCR in original was procured and available for perusal while adjudicating this revision. 7. The learned counsel has painstakingly taken the court through the materials on record, including the depositions, the impugned judgments of the court's below and submitted that the prosecution case suffered from several infirmities and that the story of the prosecutrix was not believable. 8. It is submitted that the complaint was lodged 6 (six) months after the alleged relationship of the petitioner and the prosecutrix ; that, there is also an aspect of a dispute between the families; it has emerged from the victim’s testimony that another person was residing in their house and that there is a possibility of that person being responsible for the pregnancy of the girl. 9. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner denies the relationship and the pregnancy altogether. 10. It is also submitted that he has faced the process of this criminal prosecution ever since the alleged incident in 2003 and thereby, suffered substantial prejudice. 11. In support of his contentions, the learned petitioner counsel has relied upon a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Raju Krishna Shedbalkar Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. in Criminal Appeal No. 577 of 2024 and another decision of this Court rendered in Criminal Revision Petition No.265/2012 12. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State who succinctly submitted that during the trial, only four witnesses were examined and two of them were in the nature of hearsay. The prosecution submits that admittedly no medical documents pertaining to pregnancy are on record as well. However, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State supports the concurrent findings of fact by the learned courts below with regard to the conviction. 13. I have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions on both the sides. Also perused decisions cited at the Bar. 14. Before proceeding further, it may be mentioned herein about the well settled position that a criminal revision against conviction is not a second criminal appeal in disguise; rather, the scope of such an adjudication is limited to or determining whether the impugned judgments suffer from any error of jurisdiction; material irregularity, gross error of law and such other factors. The scope of appreciation of evidence is rather limited. 15. The penal provision of Section 417 /415 IPC under which the petitioner faced trial and was convicted may be reproduced herein below : “415. Cheating - Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. “417. “417. Punishment for cheating - Whoever cheats shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.” 16. In the position of law that prevailed in the earlier years, it was not held that, a physical relationship upon a supposedly false promise of marriage would amount to cheating, as the said offence of cheating falls in the chapter of offences against Property. However, with the passage of time, the position of law changed and several decisions emerged which accepted that under one of the limbs of Section 415 , such an act can also amount to cheating. 17. Without burdening the judgment with any unnecessary narration, one may straightaway refer to the decision of the leading case of Deepak Gulati Vs. State of Haryana , reported in (2013) 7 SCC 675 , in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, inter alia, that if a woman consents to physical relationship by way of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage, which was false from the inception, then such a consent could be a vitiated consent within a meaning of Section 90 IPC and such an act would also amount to cheating within the meaning of Section 415 IPC. 18. Generally speaking, also, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various decisions, mere breach of promise would certainly not amount to cheating But if the person makes a promise, which is false from the inception, in his mind which he never intended to fulfill and induces the other person to act upon it, then such an act of the accused can amount to an offence of cheating as well. In this regard, reference can be made to one such important decision Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. , reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736 . 19. In Deepak Gulati (Supra), two important tests have emerged from the principles laid down – i) that the promise of marriage made by the accused was a hoax and it was false right from the time of making it ; that the accused made the promise knowing that he had no intention to fulfill it; that the promise was made the sole intention of securing the consent of the woman to sexual intercourse or such physical relationship. ii) The consent of the woman given for such physical relationship or sexual intercourse was done so primarily relying on such promise. 20. In a situation like this, only, if the aforesaid two tests are fulfilled in favor of the prosecution, then the accused can be said to be guilty of cheating within a meaning of Section 415 IPC, which is punishable under Section 417 IPC with imprisonment of either discrimination up to 1 (one) year or fine or both. 21. Now, in the background of this position of law, it remains to be seen as to whether the finding of the learned Courts below that the alleged criminal act of the revision petitioner fulfilled this criteria and amounted to cheating to justify his conviction under 417 IPC. Admittedly, there are no medical documents, though it has emerged from the testimony of the prosecutrix that she gave birth to a baby girl whose name has also been mentioned in her deposition. 22. From the evidence and materials, the following three things have to be ascertained - i) whether there was a promise of marriage; ii) whether the parties engaged in sexual intercourse pursuant to such promise; iii) most importantly whether such promise, if any, was a false promise from the inception. 23. The prosecutrix as PW-2 has testified in her examination-in- chief about having physical relation with the petitioner on more than one occasion. She has also testified about the petitioner/convict assuring her that he will marry her and on one occasion, upon his request for such an act, she testified that she agreed because of the said offer of marriage. 24. Subsequently also, they had physical relationship as testified by her and eventually, she became pregnant. In her cross- examination, it is revealed that though the petitioner used to visit their house, but in the earlier years, they did not have physical relationship. 25. In cross examination also, she has stated about the petitioner and she having physical relationship on more than one occasion. She has denied all the suggestions about not having such physical relationship. The other witnesses, including the informant/mother of the prosecutrix are admittedly not eyewitness to such private acts. The informant has stated about love affair of her daughter and the petitioner and their physical relationship followed by pregnancy. 26. She has denied all the suggestions about not having such physical relationship. The other witnesses, including the informant/mother of the prosecutrix are admittedly not eyewitness to such private acts. The informant has stated about love affair of her daughter and the petitioner and their physical relationship followed by pregnancy. 26. The prosecutrix as PW-2 has also stated about her pregnancy in her examination-in-chief and subsequently, giving birth to a female child, who was aged two years at the time of her deposition. She has denied the suggestion about the pregnancy and reiterated about the same. She also denied that her pregnancy was due to any illicit relationship with one Giasuddin, who used to stay in their house. 27. She also reiterated in cross-examination that the child born to her was from the side of the accused. P W-3, though not an eyewitness, has broadly stated that on assurance of marriage, the parties had physical relationship due to which she became pregnant. PW-4 also stated on similar lines. 28. In a criminal Revision against conviction, the scope of interference with concurrent findings of fact is somewhat limited; unless they are found to be perverse, i.e. based on no evidence. 29. Despite the lack of medical documents, I hold that the learned courts below did not err in their finding about the petitioner and the prosecutrix having physical relationship by way of sexual intercourse and the same leading to her pregnancy. 30. Thus, even if it is held that there was no error in the findings of the learned courts below on the issue of promise of marriage; physical relationship between the parties; pregnancy of the prosecutrix - the most important question having a bearing on outcome of the revision is as to whether the said promise of marriage, which was admittedly not fulfilled by the petitioner was merely a breach of a promise or it was a fraudulent or deceptive promise which the revision petitioner had no intention to fulfill right from the beginning. 31. To determine any question of whether any promise including a promise of marriage is a fraudulent one from the inception - there has to be materials satisfying the Court to come to such a conclusion that the promise was indeed a hoax and a false one. 31. To determine any question of whether any promise including a promise of marriage is a fraudulent one from the inception - there has to be materials satisfying the Court to come to such a conclusion that the promise was indeed a hoax and a false one. On the touchstone of this principle, now it remains to be seen as to whether the learned Courts below were right in such a finding. 32. Before proceeding further, a reference may be made to a judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Mahesh Kharia Vs. State of Assam , reported in 2023 SCC Online Gau 3669 in which this Court, on the basis of materials, was convinced that the promise of marriage was indeed a hoax. One of the factors that led the Court to come to this opinion was that in a village “bisar”, the accused out rightly denied the relationship and refused to own the pregnancy. 33. Every case stands on its own facts and every judgment is the precedent for what it actually lays down. Coming back to the incident case, within the limited mandate of this revisional jurisdiction, I once again peruse the materials to find an answer to that most important question now. 34. Upon perusing, the following statements/prosecution materials can be enunciated as below – i) In her examination-in-chief, the prosecutrix deposed that when she told the petitioner/accused about the pregnancy, he told her not to think about it and assured to marry her ; ii) It is emerged from the testimony of PW-1 that her son complained about the incident before the local Masjid committee and thereafter, the committee asked her daughter about the details and the petitioner was told to marry her daughter within two months but as her daughter was not married she filed the case. iii) It has emerged from the deposition of PW-4 about some assurance from the petitioner after the incident that he shall marry the prosecutrix after some months. 35. From the examination of the accused under 313 Cr.PC after the prosecution evidence during the trial also, no explanation has emerged from his side, giving any reasons as to why he could not marry the prosecutrix. 36. 35. From the examination of the accused under 313 Cr.PC after the prosecution evidence during the trial also, no explanation has emerged from his side, giving any reasons as to why he could not marry the prosecutrix. 36. On the basis of these materials, this Court comes to the considered opinion that the promise made by the petitioner regarding the physical relationship with the girl was an insincere promise which he did not intend to fulfill and the promise was made to secure her consent for her sexual intercourse, which saddled the girl with a pregnancy and a child. 37. Therefore, upon considering the entire matter and in the backdrop of the aforesaid discussion, I come to the considered finding that the conviction of the revision petitioner under section 417 IPC does not require any interference and the same is upheld and confirmed. As regards the sentence, it is already mentioned earlier that the offence is punishable with imprisonment of either description up to one year or fine or both. The amount of fine is not quantified. 38. It cannot be overlooked and brushed aside that the maximum prison sentence for the offence is one year and the revision petitioner has had the pendency of a criminal proceeding over his head for last so many years since 2003. Therefore, it may not be fair at this stage to confirm a prison sentence. 39. Therefore, modifying the sentence imposed by learned court's below, instead of the said sentence, the revision petitioner is hereby imposed with a fine of Rs.10,000/- [in default S.I for three months] for his conviction under Section 417 . The fine amount of Rs.10,000/- upon being realized shall be paid as compensation to the prosecutrix in terms of Section 357(1)(b) Cr.PC. 40. Considering the fact that the act of the revision petitioner settled the prosecutrix with an unwed pregnancy and now single parenthood of a minor girl, I am inclined to invoke the principles enunciated in 357A(3) Cr.PC by holding that the fine amount will not be sufficient compensation. Therefore, the Learned Secretary, DLSA, Hailakandi is requested to conduct a stipulated enquiry and award suitable victim compensation to the prosecutrix, especially for some solace for her and the child. 41. A copy of this judgment and order shall be send to the Learned Secretary, DLSA, Hailakandi for needful along with relevant documents. 42. Return TCR. 43. Therefore, the Learned Secretary, DLSA, Hailakandi is requested to conduct a stipulated enquiry and award suitable victim compensation to the prosecutrix, especially for some solace for her and the child. 41. A copy of this judgment and order shall be send to the Learned Secretary, DLSA, Hailakandi for needful along with relevant documents. 42. Return TCR. 43. Accordingly, the criminal revision petition stands dismissed subject to the above modification of sentence and disposed of on the aforesaid terms.