Research › Search › Judgment

Gauhati High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1383 (GAU)

Pallavi Sarmah v. State of Assam

2025-08-19

MANISH CHOUDHURY

body2025
JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. 1. This criminal petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita [ BNSS ], 2023 is preferred by two petitioners seeking setting aside and quashing of the proceedings of Police Report Case [PRC] no. 638/2023, presently pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup [M], Guwahati. 2. The facts stated by the petitioners in this petition can be narrated, briefly, at first. 3. The marriage between the petitioner no. 1 and the petitioner no. 2 was solemnized on 25.04.2019 as per Hindu rites, rituals and customs at Guwahati in presence of family members, friends, relatives and well-wishers. The marriage was subsequently registered on 03.06.2019 before the Marriage Officer, Kamrup [Metro] under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act. After solemnization of the marriage, the parties started to live together at Guwahati. However, disputes and discords started arising between them and as a result, the petitioner no. 1 had left her matrimonial home on 01.03.2023. 4. On 23.03.2023, the petitioner no. 1 lodged a First Information Report [FIR] before the Officer In-Charge, All Women Police Station, Panbazar alleging cruelty upon her by her husband, that is, the petitioner no. 2 and the said FIR was registered as All Women Police Station Case no. 18/2023 for the offence under Section 498A, INDIAN PENAL CODE [IPC]. The case was investigated into. After completing investigation into the case, All women Police Station Case no.18/2023, the Investigating Officer [I.O.] of the case laid a charge-sheet under Section 173[2], CrPC vide Charge-Sheet no. 17/2023 on 25.04.2023 finding a prima facie case against the petitioner no. 2. On submission of the charge- sheet, the case has been registered as PRC no. 638/2023 and the proceedings started before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup [M] at Guwahati [‘the Trial Court’, for short]. 4.1. In the interregnum, the petitioner no. 1 instituted a case, F.C.[Civil] Case no. 125/2024 against the petitioner no. 2 under Section 13[1][ia] of the HINDU MARRIAGE ACT seeking dissolution of her marriage with the petitioner no. 2 by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is further stated that the petitioner no. 1 also filed an application before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup [M] at Guwahati under Section 12 of the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT and the said case has been registered as Domestic Violence Case no. 70/2023. 4.2. 2 by a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. It is further stated that the petitioner no. 1 also filed an application before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup [M] at Guwahati under Section 12 of the DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT and the said case has been registered as Domestic Violence Case no. 70/2023. 4.2. When those proceedings were going on, efforts including counseling, were made to resolve the marital disputes and discords between the parties. But, all such efforts did not materialize into restitution of the conjugal life of the parties. The petitioners had realized that for reasons of incompatibility and the irreconcilable differences and discords existing between them, the best possible way is to proceed for a voluntary and mutual divorce. The petitioners therefore, decided to seek for dissolution of their marital relationship through a decree of mutual divorce. For that purpose, they entered into a Deed of Agreement on 04.08.2025 setting forth the terms and conditions for their mutual and voluntary divorce. As per the conditions of the Deed of Agreement, the petitioner no. 2-husband agreed and had undertaken to pay an amount of Rs.10,00,000/- to the petitioner no. 1-wife towards full and final settlement in lieu of all past, present and future claims, including maintenance [interim or permanent], alimony, streedhan, litigation costs, or any other monetary or property related claims. It has been further agreed that as part of settlement, the parties would jointly file a criminal petition for quashing and setting aside of PRC no. 638/2023. 5. It is averred that as part of the agreement, the petitioner no. 2 has already paid an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- to the petitioner no. 1. On 04.08.2025 itself, the petitioner no. 1 moved a petition before the Family Court for withdrawal of the case, F.C.[Civil] Case no. 125/2024. Thereafter, on 06.08.2025, both the petitioners had jointly filed a petition seeking mutual divorce under Section 13B of the HINDU MARRIAGE ACT , 1955 and the said application was registered as F.C.[Civil] Case no. 992/2025. As there was no possibility of reconciliation and the marriage has been irretrievably broken down, the petitioners had sought for waiver of the six months’ cooling-off period. 6. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that on 14.08.2025, the learned Family Court has passed a decree of divorce, thereby, dissolving the marriage between the parties. 992/2025. As there was no possibility of reconciliation and the marriage has been irretrievably broken down, the petitioners had sought for waiver of the six months’ cooling-off period. 6. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioners that on 14.08.2025, the learned Family Court has passed a decree of divorce, thereby, dissolving the marriage between the parties. It is stated that the petitioner no. 1 is also going to withdraw the said case D.V. Case no. 70/2023. 7. In the above backdrop, the petitioners have approached this Court by the instant criminal petition invoking the inherent powers of this Court under Section 528 , BNSS , for quashing and setting aside of the entire proceeding of PRC no. 638/2023, which arose out of All Women Police Station Case no.18/2023. 8. The offence under Section 498A, IPC [presently, Section 85 , BNS ] is not compoundable as per the provision of Section 320 , CrPC [presently, Section 359 , BNS S ]. 9. It is settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 , Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [‘CrPC’ or ‘the Code’, for short] is distinct and wider in amplitude than the powers available to the criminal courts under Section 320 , CrPC to the compound offences. The compoundable offences are mentioned in Section 320 , CrPC. The inherent powers under Section 482 , CrPC have no statutory limitation and the inherent powers can be invoked to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process. 10. There is no doubt to the legal position that the provisions contained in Section 528 , BNSS are pari materia to the provisions of Section 482 CrPC. In other words, the powers under Section 528 , BNSS are akin to the powers under Section 482 , CrPC. 11. With regard to the powers under Section 320 vis-à-vis Section 482 of the Code, the Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab , reported in [2012] 10 SCC 303 , has observed and held as under :- 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : [i] to secure the ends of justice, or [ii] to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question[s] is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding. 12. After considering the decision in Gian Singh [supra], the Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab , reported in [2014] 6 SCC 466 , has observed in the similar manner and the relevant parts of the said judgment are extracted hereunder :- 29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings : 29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure : [i] ends of justice, or [ii] to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307, IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307, IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307, IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime. 13. In Parbatbhai vs. State of Gujarat , [2017] 9 SCC 641 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under :- 16.1. Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 , the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised [i] to secure the ends of justice, or [ii] to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance. 14. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Naraya n reported in [2019] 5 SCC 688 , the Supreme Court has further observed as under :- 15. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance. 14. In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Naraya n reported in [2019] 5 SCC 688 , the Supreme Court has further observed as under :- 15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under : 15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; 15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh [supra] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; 15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc. 16. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was under progress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of a settlement. The allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also in commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offence and the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the High Court and solely on the basis of a settlement between the accused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedents of the accused. 15. The position which emerges is that criminal prosecution having overwhelming and predominantly civil character, more particularly, arising out of matrimonial relationship should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes and differences themselves. The case in hand is one arising of matrimonial relationship and the parties have stated that they have settled their disputes and differences. 16. Having regard to the materials brought on record including the terms and conditions incorporated in the Deed of Agreement executed on 04.08.2025, it is evident that both the petitioners have undertaken not to continue further with any proceedings against each other. The petitioners have undertaken not to pursue any litigations which are pending between them, and to proceed further in their lives separately and independently forgetting their acrimonious relationship for good. As the petitioners have decided to bury their hatchet by giving a quietus to all the disputes and discords, this Court is of the considered view that further proceedings of PRC no. 638/2023 is not going to serve any fructuous purpose. Rather, the same would prolong mental agony to the petitioners. 17. In the above backdrop, the quashing and setting aside of the criminal proceeding is going to have better social impact, rather than its denial, and it would facilitate the petitioners to proceed further with their respective lives without any kind of baggage from their past. Therefore, in such exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 , BNSS , the criminal proceeding of PRC no. 638/2023, presently pending before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup [M], Guwahati, is quashed and set aside and quashed. Consequently, the FIR lodged in connection with All Women Police Station Case no. 18/2023 and the Charge-Sheet no. 17/2023 submitted and registered in connection with All Women Police Station Case no. 18/2023 are also quashed and set aside. 18. The criminal petition is allowed in the afore-stated terms. No cost.