JUDGMENT : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J:- 1. The complainant is in appeal against the judgment dated 22.12.2021 passed by Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Hindaun City in Sessions Case No.322/2016 acquitting respondent No.2 Harkesh S/o Shribhan (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent’). 2. The brief facts are that on recovery of the dead body of Ramkesh (deceased) an F.I.R. No.470 dated 02.07.2016 under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC was lodged at Police Station Hindaun City at the instance of Ramniwas uncle of deceased. During investigation, respondent, Suraj, Somveer, Ramavtar and Ravita wife of the deceased were nominated as accused. Apart from the respondent, all other co-accused were minor and faced the trial under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and were acquitted. The charges under Sections 302 and 201 of IPC were framed. In the statement u/s 313 of Cr. PC, 1973, it was stated to be case of false implication. The case of prosecution was based upon the extra judicial confession of wife of the deceased made before her in-laws and recovery of blood stained towel, gloves at the instance of the respondent. The allegations are that there was illicit relationship between the wife of the deceased and the respondent, the call details were relied upon to substantiate that both made calls to each other on the date of the incident and were in the same tower location. One earring of the wife of the deceased and a motorcycle was recovered from the respondent. 3. The trial court on considering the facts and appreciating the evidence concluded that the prosecution failed to complete the chain of circumstances for conviction on circumstantial evidence. Giving the benefit of doubt the respondent was acquitted. Hence, the present appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the rope recovered from the neck of the deceased, the towel and the gloves recovered at the instance of the respondent had human blood stains of Group-A. 4.1. The argument is that call details between the respondent and the wife of the deceased on the day of incident and both the mobiles being in the same tower location proved that both the accused with a common intention killed the deceased. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned judgment, submits that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is limited.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned judgment, submits that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is limited. It is contended that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to prove case against respondent and the case was set up only on suspicion. Learned counsel relied upon the order dated 07.01.2023 passed by the Principal Magistrate, Juvenile Justice Board, Karauli in Case No.43/2016, whereby the co-accused were acquitted. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 7. The law is well settled that for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the chain is to be completed and a missing link shall prove fatal to the case of prosecution. Reference be made to the decision of Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 , wherein it was held:- “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the following observations were made:- Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict, and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 8. The death of deceased as per Exhibit P-7—Post-mortem Report (‘PMR’) was asphyxia. Rope was recovered from neck of the deceased, towel and gloves were recovered from kachi kui (kacha well) at the instance of the respondent. The recovered articles had blood stains of human blood Group-A. Exhibit P-15 is the recovery memo whereby one of the earrings (jhumki) of the wife of deceased and a motorcycle was recovered at the instance of the respondent. The prosecution produced call details of mobile numbers stated to be of the respondent and the wife of the deceased. The record of the mobile company was produced to show that there were calls exchanged on both the mobile numbers on the date of incident and both the mobile phones were in the same tower location. 9. The human blood stains on the rope, towel and gloves of Group-A does not prove that the blood stains on the recovered articles were of deceased. No DNA test was undertaken to prove that the blood stains on the recovered articles were that of the deceased, even the RH factor of the blood group was not determined. 10. The recovery of the towel and the gloves at the instance of the respondent was after three days of the incident that too from the place, not the exclusive possession of the respondent. 11. One of the earrings recovered alleged to be of the wife of the deceased does not enhance the case of the prosecution.
10. The recovery of the towel and the gloves at the instance of the respondent was after three days of the incident that too from the place, not the exclusive possession of the respondent. 11. One of the earrings recovered alleged to be of the wife of the deceased does not enhance the case of the prosecution. The ownership of the earring was not proved and there is no evidence or statement of wife of the deceased that the earring belonged to her. 12. Reliance on the call details of mobile numbers and those being in the same tower location on the date of incident has lacuna. The mobiles were never seized and no documentary evidence was adduced that these two belonged to the respondent and the wife of the deceased. There is no call recording with regard to the content of the calls between the two mobiles numbers. The mobiles being used in the same tower location is not a conclusive proof of these being at the same spot as coverage range of the tower was not proved. 13. The scope of interference in the appeal against the judgment of the acquittal is enunciated by the Supreme Court in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] and held:- “40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.
If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 14. The view taken by the trial court is a plausible one. The impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from no factual or legal error much less perversity, calling for no interference by this Court. The appeal is dismissed and the judgment dated 22.12.2021 is affirmed.