JUDGMENT : SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND, J. This appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law : (1) Whether the learned appellate Court was right in holding that the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable? (2) Whether the learned appellate Court erred in law without formulating any point for determination or without discussing any evidence on record in the appeal in accordance with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? (3) Whether the learned appellate Court was right in holding that the Exhibit – 1 (Sale Deed) is inadmissible in evidence? 2. The appellant Md. Julhaz Ali was the plaintiff who brought up Title Suit No. 13/2014 against the defendants No. 1. Golesha Bewa, 2. Md. Mazibar Rahman and 3. Md. Asgar Ali. 17 (Seventeen) proforma defendants were also arrayed in the suit. Title Suit No. 13/2014 was for a decree for recovery of khas possession and permanent injunction. 3. A parcel of land ad measuring 1 Katha appertaining to P.P. No. 139 under Dag No. 318 of village – Kamarpara under Pachim Sialmari Mouza, described in Schedule A of the plaint, was purchased by the plaintiff on 04.05.2005 vide registered Sale Deed No. 23 and his name was mutated in the land records. Thereafter, the plaintiff acquired right, title and interest and was in continuous possession of the aforementioned land. 4. It is contended that the plaintiff had earlier filed Title Suit No. 162/2013 before the Munsiff, Mangaldai for recovery of khas possession for land measuring 2 Bighas 2 Kathas 10 Lechas against the same defendants. 5. However, the defendants threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences and forcefully encroached into the present suit land on 06.02.2014. The plaintiff immediately went to the police station and thereafter to the court of the Executive Magistrate for relief. 6. It is further contended that the defendants trespassed into 15 lechas of their land abutting the roadside, out of one katha of land in front of the plaintiff's house, obstructing the plaintiff's path of ingress into and egress out of the plaintiff's land. Threatened by the defendant's assertive infringement, the plaintiff fled from his house along with his wife and children. The defendants raised concrete posts to construct a house right on the plaintiff's entrance. Threatened by the defendant's assertive infringement, the plaintiff fled from his house along with his wife and children. The defendants raised concrete posts to construct a house right on the plaintiff's entrance. This impelled the plaintiff to file this suit for recovery of Khaas possession and permanent injunction along with prayer for prohibitory injunction for further construction and mandatory injunction to clear the entrance to the plaintiff's residential house. This parcel of land is described under the Schedule-B of the plaintiff. This suit proceeded ex-parte against the defendants as the defendants failed to file written statement within the period of limitation. Findings of the learned Trial Court 7. It was held by the Trial Court that:- “A) Plaintiff as p.w.1 in his evidence supports his case and there is nothing to be reiterated herein. Plaintiff exhibited the sale deed as EXT-1 through which plaintiff has purchased the suit land. Ext-2 is the certified copy of Zamabandi and EXT-3 is the revenue receipt, Ext-4 &5 are the revenue receipts. In the said Ext-2(Zamabandi), in note 'jha', there is an entry that Zulhaz Ali(plaintiff) entered as a pattadar by way of purchase. B) In the result, the suit is decreed without contest with cost plaintiff is entitled to right, title and interest over the suit land. Plaintiff is also entitled for a decree for recovery of Khas possession of the suit land by demolishing the structure erected on the suit land(schedule-B) and by evicting the defendants therefrom and the plaintiff is also entitled for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, his heirs, agents workmen in interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the suit land in future Prepare a decree accordingly. 8. Against this judgment and order in T.S. No. 13/2014, the defendants Gulesha Bewa and Majibur Rahman filed an appeal registered as T.A. 02/2015. The defendants No. 1 & 2 averred through the appeal that the learned Trial Court committed grave error while relying on the pleadings in the plaintiff as the registered sale deed was not proved by the plaintiffs by adducing evidence of the registering authority, as per Section 67 of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , 1872. 9. The defendants have questioned the genuinity of the registered sale deed bearing No. 23 dated 04.05.2005. 9. The defendants have questioned the genuinity of the registered sale deed bearing No. 23 dated 04.05.2005. It is contended that the ex-parte judgment was passed without according an opportunity to the defendants and depriving the defendants from adducing evidence and contesting the suit. 10. It is further contended that this suit is between the family members, as the defendant No. 2 and the plaintiff are brothers being sons of late Jabbar Ali. It is further contended that the pleadings have not been substantiated by the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and therefore the suit was liable to be dismissed as the family members were contemplating to settle their dispute amicably. Findings of the learned Appellate Court of first instance 11. It was held by the learned Appellate Court that:- “A) Moreover, from the Ext.1 it appears that the same is not the original registered sale deed but it is a certified copy of the same. A certified copy is a secondary evidence. As per EVIDENCE ACT the parties are duty bound to produce the best evidence in support of their contentions. The original registered sale deed would have been the best evidence to prove the contentions of the plaintiffs. But the plaintiffs had failed to produce the original registered sale deed. On the other hand the plaintiffs have also failed to show any ground for producing the secondary evidence. Secondary evidence should have been admissible if the plaintiffs had shown the existence of any condition as laid down in Section 65 of EVIDENCE ACT but the plaintiffs have failed to do so. Under the facts and circumstances Ext. 1 cannot be held to be admissible. On the other hand, from the evidence of PW1, the plaintiff Julhas All it appears that at the time of institution of the suit the defendants were in possession of the suit land by constructing houses etc. B) It is a well founded legal proposition that courts cannot allow reliefs beyond the scope of the suit and the parties must specifically state about the relief which he claims. B) It is a well founded legal proposition that courts cannot allow reliefs beyond the scope of the suit and the parties must specifically state about the relief which he claims. From bare perusal of the plaint it appears that the plaintiff has not claimed his right, title and interest on the suit land but his claims were for recovery of khas possession evicting the defendant by demolishing the houses and other construction from the suit land, a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from entering the suit land after recovery of khas possession, decree of mesne profit and other reliefs which entails the suit of the plaintiff not maintainable in the present form. C) Hence, apparently from the discussions aforesaid it appears that the plaintiffs/respondents have failed to prove the case as pleaded, by producing substantial evidence. Under the aforesaid premises plaintiffs/respondents are not entitled to any decree as prayed for. As such the judgment and decree passed by the learned lower court is set aside. The appeal is allowed on contest without cost.” 12. The learned counsel for the appellant laid stress in his argument that the ex-parte order was passed after the Trial Court scrutinized the evidence and after examination and after recording the evidence of four witnesses. Moreover, the appeal has been preferred by only two respondents, whereas, the other respondents have not preferred the appeal against the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court. 13. It is further contended that the Appellate Court of first instance ought to have remanded the matter to the Trial Court as the order was an ex-parte order. 14. The defendants, however, did not pray for vacation of the ex-parte order and preferred an appeal instead, as the defendants had no substantiating evidence to rebut the plaintiff's claim. Decision 15. The second substantial question of law is answered in the negative as the learned Appellate Court had indeed formulated points for determination. The learned Appellate Court has framed a point for determination, and discussed on the point and passed the final order. 16. The learned Appellate Court of the first instance has correctly rejected the certified copy of the sale deed. The learned Appellate Court has framed a point for determination, and discussed on the point and passed the final order. 16. The learned Appellate Court of the first instance has correctly rejected the certified copy of the sale deed. The Exhibit-1 sale deed was registered on 04.05.2005, whereas, the certified copy appears to have been certified by the S.R. Mangaldai as late as 03.04.2009.This therefore cannot be the copy of the sale deed which is usually immediately handed over by the Office of the Sub-registry at the time of registration, to obtain the original sale deed after submitting the receipt on a given period of time, considering the span of time of the registration of the sale deed on 04.05.2005. It would be apt to reiterate that the learned Appellate Court has correctly held that the copy of the sale deed marked as Exhibit-1 cannot be accepted as evidence as the Secondary evidence has not been proved as per the Section 65 of the EVIDENCE ACT . The secondary evidence has not been proved as per proper procedure of law and therefore this answers the third substantial question of law that the learned Appellate Court has not erred by holding that Exhibit-1 sale deed is inadmissible in evidence. This also answers the first substantial question of law that the suit of the plaintiff was indeed not maintainable. 17. Moreover, it has been correctly held by the learned Appellate Court that without claiming for his right title and interest, the plaintiff has directly prayed for recovery of khas possession by evicting the defendant after demolishing the houses constructed on the suit land. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Appellate Court ought to have remanded the case for evidence, has no legs to stand. 18. Appeal is hereby dismissed as the appeal is bereft of merits. No order as to costs. 19. Send back the original Trial Court Records as well as the records of the Appellate Court of first instance.