JUDGMENT : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State laying a challenge to the judgment of acquittal dated 03.11.1993 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No.2, Sriganganagar, in Sessions Case No. 39/1992 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Rajesh Kumar @ Chili & Ors.) whereby the accused-respondent, namely, Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu was acquitted of the charges against him under Sections 3 02 & 201 IPC and Section 3 /25 (1)(b) of ARMS ACT ; accused-respondents Harichand, Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli and Banwarilal were acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 3 02 read with Sections 3 4 , 120-B & 201 IPC, while extending all the accused-respondents the benefit of doubt. 1.2. At the outset, it has been brought to the notice of this Court that accused-respondent No.2-Banwarilal and accused-respondent No.4- Harichand have expired, as reflected in the orders dated 22.05.2024 & 27.02.2020, respectively, whereby, the instant appeal to the extent of the said deceased respondents was dismissed, as having abated. Thus, the present appeal is surviving only qua accused-respondents (surviving), namely, Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu, and Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli, and the present adjudication is being made accordingly. 2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 1992 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 1995. 3. Brief facts of the case, as placed before this Court by the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant- State, are that on 02.01.1992 at around 10:45 p.m., one Nanakchand (complainant) gave a verbal information before Police Station, Kotwali, Sriganganagar, stating that on the said date i.e. 02.01.1992, his brother, namely, Ashok was engaged in the business of sale of Ayurvedic medicines, and that, accused-respondent Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli, his father i.e. accused- respondent Harichand (now deceased) and Dr.Chandrabhan, were also engaged in the same business. 3.1. It was further stated that about 12 days prior to the said information, accused-respondents, namely, Rajesh & Harichand and Dr. Chandrabhan alongwith the complainant’s brother Ashok were on a business tour at Degana. After reaching at home from the said business tour, the complainant was informed by his brother Ashok that while they were on business tour, Rajesh, Harichand and Dr. Chandrabhan alongwith the complainant’s brother Ashok were on a business tour at Degana. After reaching at home from the said business tour, the complainant was informed by his brother Ashok that while they were on business tour, Rajesh, Harichand and Dr. Chandrabhan indulged into a fight with Ashok while asking as to why Ashok conducted a medicine selling camp with the said persons, and while saying so, the accused persons threatened to kill the complainant’s brother i.e. Ashok. 3.1.1. It was further stated that 8-9 days prior to the said date, at Ganganagar Railway Station, accused-Harichand (now deceased), caught the neck of the younger brother (Gopal @ Kalu) of the complainant, while saying that Ashok i.e. younger brother the complainant and Gopal @ Kalu used to intervene in the business (sale of medicines) of the accused-respondents, and asked him (Gopal @ Kalu) to tell Ashok not to make any such intervention in future, otherwise, as threatened by the accused-respondents, his brother Ashok would be killed. The said incident was narrated to the complainant & his brother Gopal @ Kalu himself. 3.2. As per the complainant, on the date of the incident in question i.e. 02.01.1992, in the evening, his brother Ashok went out on his motorcycle, and when he did not return till 9:00 p.m., the complainant & his brother (Gopal @ Kalu) alongwith one of their relatives i.e. Roshan Lal Kataria, went to search for Ashok; during course of such search, they went towards the house of accused-Harichand. 3.2.1. It was also stated that when they reached near Pola Factory, the complainant party heard the sound of firing, whereupon, they rushed towards the place of the said firing; through the light coming from the electric pole, they saw accused-Rajesh, his uncle Chandrabhan, one other person and one Jugraj Singh Suthar, carrying a person in a street nearby, by dragging him. One person, out of the accused party, went towards the southern side on a motorcycle. When the complainant party reached the said spot, they saw that the dead body of the complainant’s brother Ashok was lying in a bloodstained condition. Thereafter, the members of the accused party fled away from the spot. 3.3. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was registered at the Police Station, Kotwali, Ganganagar under Sections 3 02 , 379, 34, 120-B IPC and the investigation commenced accordingly. Thereafter, the members of the accused party fled away from the spot. 3.3. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was registered at the Police Station, Kotwali, Ganganagar under Sections 3 02 , 379, 34, 120-B IPC and the investigation commenced accordingly. After investigation, no offence was made out against Chandrabhan and names of accused-respondents Rakesh Kumar and Banwarilal was added, whereafter, a chargesheet was presented against accused-respondents Rajesh Kumar, Harichand, Banwarilal and Rakesh under Sections 3 02 , 201, 120-B, 34 IPC. A chargesheet was also presented against the accused-respondent Rakesh under Section 25 of the ARMS ACT , before the concerned Court. The charges after being framed, were read over to the accused-respondents, who denied the same and claimed trial, and the trial commenced accordingly. 3.4. Owing to the nature of offences charged, the matter was committed to the Court of Sessions, where from the case was transferred to the learned Trial Court for the necessary trial. 3.5. During the course of trial, the statements of 17 witnesses (PW 1 to PW. 17) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.59) and articles (Article 1 to 3) were exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; in defence, no witness was produced and documents (Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.12) were exhibited, for examination; whereafter, the accused-respondents were examined under Section 3 13 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question. 3.6. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, having found that the prosecution failed to establish its case beyond all reasonable doubts, extended the benefit of doubt to the accused-respondents and consequently acquitted the accused-respondents of the charges vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 03.11.1993. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State has preferred the present appeal. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submitted that there existed prior enmity between the accused-respondents and the deceased. It was contended that approximately 8–9 days prior to the incident, accused Harichand (now deceased) had issued a threat to the complainant’s younger brother, Gopal @ Kalu, directing him to warn Ashok (now deceased) against any future interference, failing which Ashok would be killed. This incident was duly narrated by the complainant, Nanakchand, in the First Information Report (Ex.P.2), thereby clearly indicating that the accused-respondents were actuated by a motive to commit the alleged offence. 4.1. This incident was duly narrated by the complainant, Nanakchand, in the First Information Report (Ex.P.2), thereby clearly indicating that the accused-respondents were actuated by a motive to commit the alleged offence. 4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that Madanlal Arora (PW-14) deposed that accused-respondent Rakesh was involved in an altercation with the deceased on 06.12.1991 near the bus stand. It was also submitted that accused-respondent Harichand had issued a threat to Gopalchand alias Kalu (brother of the deceased), directing him to inform Ashok (the deceased) not to interfere in their business dealings, failing which he would be eliminated. These two incidents, it was urged, clearly establish that the accused-respondents were harbouring the requisite motive to eliminate the deceased, which ultimately culminated in the commission of the alleged offence. 4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the complainant, Nanakchand, explicitly stated in the information furnished to the police that, upon Ashok (the deceased) not returning home at night, he, along with Roshan Lal and Gopalchand, set out in search of him. It was further stated that, upon hearing the sound of gunfire, they proceeded towards the Pola factory, where they witnessed accused-respondent Rakesh, his uncle Chandraman, Jugraj Singh Suthar and one other individual dragging a body. Upon reaching the spot, they discovered the blood-soaked dead body of Ashok lying at the scene of the incident. 4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor also contended that there were two eyewitnesses to the incident in question, namely, Suresh (PW- 1) and his nephew Sanjay (PW-2). Both witnesses have unequivocally deposed that on 02.01.1992, accused-respondent Rakesh arrived at the shop of Suresh (PW-1) along with Ashok (the deceased), and was subsequently joined by accused- respondents Rakesh and Banwarilal. It was further stated that they consumed liquor at the shop, following which an altercation ensued, during the course of which accused-respondent Rakesh shot by a firearm at the deceased. 4.4. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that during the course of investigation, a bloodstained bullet was recovered from the scene of the incident, which was subsequently sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for examination. Upon analysis, it was found that the bullet bore human blood of Group B. 4.4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that a 0.32 bore pistol was recovered at the instance of accused-respondent Rakesh, in the presence of recovery witness Dalbir Singh (PW-13). 4.4.2. Upon analysis, it was found that the bullet bore human blood of Group B. 4.4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that a 0.32 bore pistol was recovered at the instance of accused-respondent Rakesh, in the presence of recovery witness Dalbir Singh (PW-13). 4.4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the examination of the barrel residue revealed that the two 0.32 calibre bullets had been fired from the 0.32 bore pistol recovered during the investigation; thereby further corroborating and strengthening the prosecution’s case. 4.5. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Dr. K.N. Markhande (PW-4), who conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased, deposed that there were two lacerated wounds, one being an entry wound and the other an exit wound, located on the neck of the deceased, which, in his opinion, were consistent with injuries caused by a gunshot. 4.6. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that accused- respondent Banwari Lal sustained an injury on the index finger of his left hand, which was caused due to the discharge of a pistol, thereby clearly establishing his presence at the scene of the incident. It was further contended that the name of Banwari Lal was erroneously recorded as Chandraman in the First Information Report (Ex.P.2), as both individuals bear a close resemblance in physical appearance. 5. Per Contra, Mr. Bhanwar Singh Rathore and Mr. Koshlendra Vallabh Vyas, learned counsel for the accused-respondents while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submitted that even though the prosecution has alleged motive on the part of accused-respondents for committing the crime in question, no evidence was brought on record to substantiate the said motive. 5.1. Learned counsel further submitted that two key witnesses, namely Roshan Lal and Gopalchand—who had accompanied the complainant in search of Ashok (the deceased)—were not examined before the Court. The non-production of such material witnesses, who allegedly witnessed the accused-respondents fleeing from the scene of the incident after committing the alleged offence, casts serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution’s version. 5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution case primarily hinges upon the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses, namely Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2); however, the complainant- Nanakchand failed to mention their names as eye-witnesses in the FIR (Ex.P. ). 5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the prosecution case primarily hinges upon the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses, namely Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2); however, the complainant- Nanakchand failed to mention their names as eye-witnesses in the FIR (Ex.P. ). It is also to be noted that their statements are riddled with several material contradictions, which have been duly and rightly taken into consideration by the learned Trial Court while recording the acquittal of the accused-respondents. Learned counsel proceeded to point out certain key inconsistencies, inter alia, the following: a) That both the witnesses failed to name accused-respondent Harichand in their statements recorded under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. b) That in their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C., both witnesses stated that only a single shot was fired by accused-respondent Rakesh; however, during their deposition before the learned Trial Court, they materially improved their version by stating that two shots were fired. c) That Sanjay (PW-2) deposed that accused-respondent Banwarilal, while abusing the deceased Ashok, held him by the hand and escorted him outside; whereas Suresh (PW-1) contradicted this version by stating that accused-respondent Banwarilal held Ashok by the neck and took him outside. d) That Sanjay (PW-2) further stated that after some time, accused-respondent Rajesh went outside to urinate, and was followed by Rakesh, whereupon both accused-respondents conversed for a while outside the premises; however, this version finds no corroboration in the testimony of Suresh (PW-1). e) That Sanjay (PW-2), in his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., claimed that he did not know the accused-respondents prior to the incident and came to know the name of the deceased as Ashok only because the accused referred to him by that name; whereas in his testimony before the learned Trial Court, he stated that he was acquainted with the accused-respondents. 5.2.1. Learned Counsel further submitted that it is significant to note that the statements of the said witnesses under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded on 30.01.1992, after an inordinate and unexplained delay, and the prosecution has failed to offer any satisfactory explanation for such delay. It was further contended that Sanjay (PW-2) was a child witness, aged 12 years at the time of the incident, and therefore, the possibility of him being a tutored witness cannot be ruled out—more so in light of the considerable lapse of time prior to the recording of his statement. 5.2.2. It was further contended that Sanjay (PW-2) was a child witness, aged 12 years at the time of the incident, and therefore, the possibility of him being a tutored witness cannot be ruled out—more so in light of the considerable lapse of time prior to the recording of his statement. 5.2.2. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the material contradictions in the testimonies of the eyewitnesses, coupled with the inordinate delay in recording their statements, the credibility of their evidence is rendered doubtful, thereby weakening the prosecution’s case. 5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that Nanakchand (PW-3) did not mention the presence of Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW- 2) at the scene, nor did the latter two mention seeing Nanakchand there. This inconsistency among key prosecution witnesses casts serious doubt on their presence at the spot and undermines their claim of being eyewitnesses to the incident. 5.4. Learned counsel also submitted that the conduct of the two eyewitnesses, Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2), appears unnatural and inexplicable, as despite allegedly witnessing the incident, they merely closed their shop and returned home without informing the family or reporting the matter to the police. Hence, reliance on their testimonies would be legally unjustified. 5.5. Learned counsel further submitted that the shop of Suresh (PW-1), where the accused-respondents allegedly consumed liquor with the deceased and the incident occurred, was not subjected to police investigation—a fact corroborated by both Suresh (PW-1) and the Investigating Officer, Veervardhan (PW-7). 5.6. Learned Counsel also submitted that though the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P. 1) depicts dragging marks at the place of incident, Dr. Markhande (PW-4), who conducted the post-mortem, found no corresponding injuries or torn clothes on the deceased to suggest dragging. This inconsistency casts doubt on the sequence of events as alleged by the prosecution. 5.6.1. Learned counsel also submitted that regarding the Naksha Mauka, that the last line appears to have been subsequently added in different ink, indicating manipulation of the investigation. Furthermore, as per the Investigating Officer Veervardhan (PW-7), the photographs of the spot taken by Sarwan Kumar (PW-12) were not produced in Court, thereby undermining the credibility of the prosecution’s case. 5.7. Learned Counsel further submitted that the statements of the prosecution witnesses were taken after a long delay of 10-12 days, as has been stated by the Madanlal (PW.14). 5.8. 5.7. Learned Counsel further submitted that the statements of the prosecution witnesses were taken after a long delay of 10-12 days, as has been stated by the Madanlal (PW.14). 5.8. Learned counsel for the accused contended that the time of the incident was deliberately misstated as 10 o'clock in the FIR lodged by PW-3 Nanakchand. It was argued that the incident occurred prior to 10 a.m., and the FIR was lodged only after the police had arrived at the scene and called Nanakchand for recording the report. In support, reliance was placed on the testimonies of IO Veervardhan (PW.7) and K. Narasimha Rao (PW. 17), wherein the latter admitted to having received a call from City Kotwali regarding the murder at around 9:00–9:15 a.m. on 02.01.1992. 5.9. Learned counsel further submitted that PW-3 Nanakchand was well acquainted with all the accused, including Banwari and Rakesh, who resided in Manas Mandi and were related to him, as evident from the prosecution's own version. Thus, it cannot be said that Nanak Chand did any mistake in identifying the accused. 5.9.1. Learned counsel also submitted that even if it is accepted that PW-3 Nanakchand mistakenly identified Chandrabhan as Banwarilal, the mention of Rakesh’s name in the Titamba statement remains unexplained by the prosecution. 5.10. Learned counsel also submitted that, as evident from Ex.P.11, no road light connection was provided nor any wiring laid by the Municipal Council at the place of incident. Therefore, the claim of the presence of light at the scene, as alleged in the prosecution's version, stands falsified. 5.11. Learned counsel further submitted that the circumstances surrounding the recovery of the pistol also cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s version. As per the prosecution, the keys to the shop from which the pistol was allegedly recovered were found beneath bricks outside the premises; however, post-recovery, there is no mention regarding the lock or keys, nor has the prosecution conclusively established that the recovery was made at the instance of accused-respondent Rakesh. 5.11.1. Learned counsel further submitted that none of the shopkeeper of the nearby area been produced before the court who can prove that the shop from where the pistol was recovered is in the possession of the accused. 5.11.2. Learned counsel also submitted that the said recovery had two motbirs, namely, Dalbir Singh and Ramesh Kumar, however, the recovery witness Ramesh Kumar has not been presented by the prosecution. 5.11.2. Learned counsel also submitted that the said recovery had two motbirs, namely, Dalbir Singh and Ramesh Kumar, however, the recovery witness Ramesh Kumar has not been presented by the prosecution. 5.12. Learned Counsel further submitted that in view of the numerous material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the prosecution's case, it has failed to establish the guilt of the accused-respondents beyond all reasonable doubt, and therefore, the learned Trial Court has rightly recorded the judgment of acquittal. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 7. This Court observes that the genesis of the prosecution's case is the alleged prior enmity between the accused and the deceased arising from business rivalry in the sale of Ayurvedic medicines. It was contended that threats were extended to the deceased by the accused persons, including Harichand (now deceased), and that these threats manifested into the commission of the alleged offence. However, as rightly noted by the learned Trial Court, mere existence of motive, unaccompanied by reliable and cogent evidence, is not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 8. This Court further observes that the very foundation of the prosecution’s case, namely, the First Information Report (Ex.P.2), suffers from serious discrepancies. The FIR states the time of the incident as around 10:00 p.m. on 02.01.1992, but the evidence of the Investigating Officer (PW-7) and witness K. Narasimha Rao clearly reveals that a telephonic message regarding the murder was received by the police station as early as 9:00–9:15 p.m. This temporal inconsistency casts grave doubt on the spontaneity and authenticity of the FIR. 9. This Court also observes that two key witnesses, namely, Roshan Lal and Gopalchand, who allegedly accompanied the complainant Nanakchand during the discovery of the deceased's body and were said to have seen the accused dragging the body, were not examined by the prosecution. Their absence from the witness box, despite being material witnesses, invites an adverse inference and significantly undermines the prosecution’s case. 10. This Court observes that the primary prosecution witnesses, Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2), who claimed to be eyewitnesses to the actual shooting, are not reliable. Their names were not mentioned in the FIR, and their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded only after an unexplained delay of nearly four weeks. 10. This Court observes that the primary prosecution witnesses, Suresh (PW-1) and Sanjay (PW-2), who claimed to be eyewitnesses to the actual shooting, are not reliable. Their names were not mentioned in the FIR, and their statements under Section 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded only after an unexplained delay of nearly four weeks. Such belated statements reduce their probative value and suggest that their testimonies may not be natural or trustworthy. 10.1. This Court further observes that the depositions of PW-1 and PW-2 are riddled with contradictions on material particulars. These include inconsistencies regarding: 1) The number of shots fired (initially stated as one, later improved to two); 2) The role of Banwarilal (whether he held the deceased by the hand or neck); 3) The sequence of events, including who went out and when; 4) Their prior familiarity with the accused; 5) Their failure to mention each other's or the complainant’s presence at the scene. These discrepancies are not minor but go to the root of their credibility. 10.2.This Court observes that Sanjay (PW-2), being only 12 years old at the time of the incident, was a child witness. The possibility of tutoring or fabrication of his account cannot be ruled out, especially considering the delay in recording his statement and the substantial improvements made in his deposition before the Court as compared to his earlier version. 11. This Court further observes that the conduct of PW-1 and PW-2 is unnatural and inconsistent with human behaviour. Despite allegedly witnessing a murder committed in close quarters, they did not alert the police or inform the victim’s family, and instead closed their shop and went home. This unusual conduct renders their version doubtful and lacking in spontaneity. 12. This Court further observes that the prosecution failed to inspect or seize the shop where the alleged incident of shooting took place, despite both the eyewitnesses and the Investigating Officer confirming its existence. Such an omission constitutes a serious procedural lapse and creates a gap in the investigative chain. 13. This Court further observes that the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.1) mentions dragging marks near the scene, allegedly indicating that the deceased’s body was dragged. However, the post-mortem report and the medical testimony of Dr. K.N. Markhande (PW-4) do not show any corresponding injuries or torn clothes. This inconsistency casts doubt on the claim that the body was dragged and raises suspicion about manipulation of the scene. However, the post-mortem report and the medical testimony of Dr. K.N. Markhande (PW-4) do not show any corresponding injuries or torn clothes. This inconsistency casts doubt on the claim that the body was dragged and raises suspicion about manipulation of the scene. 13.1. This Court observes that the authenticity of the Naksha Mauka is also under question, as its last line appears to have been written in different ink, indicating interpolation. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to produce the photographs of the scene taken by PW-12, which could have served as crucial corroborative evidence. 14. This Court also observes that the prosecution’s claim that the accused were identified while dragging the deceased under a streetlight is contradicted by Ex.P.11, a document issued by the Municipal Council, which confirms that no streetlight or electric wiring existed at the alleged spot. This contradiction negates the very basis on which identification of the accused at the crime scene is asserted. 15. This Court also observes that the recovery of the alleged murder weapon, a 0.32 bore pistol, is shrouded in serious doubt. The recovery was purportedly made at the instance of accused Rakesh from a shop whose keys were found under bricks outside the premises. However, the prosecution did not establish whether the shop was in the accused’s possession, nor did it produce any shopkeepers or nearby witnesses to substantiate the same. 15.1. This Court observes that the ballistic examination linking the recovered bullets to the 0.32 bore pistol lacks evidentiary certainty due to procedural lapses. The chain of custody of the bullet and the weapon was not conclusively proved, and the entire recovery itself stands on a questionable foundation. 15.2. This Court further observes that although two recovery witnesses were cited, only one (Dalbir Singh PW.13) was examined. The non-examination of the second panch witness (Ramesh Kumar) and the lack of evidence about the key-lock linkage further weakens the credibility of the recovery. 16. This Court further observes that the mention of the name “Rakesh” in the initial titamba report, despite the eyewitnesses allegedly identifying him much later, remains unexplained. This anomaly, coupled with the mistaken identity of Banwarilal as “Chandrabhan,” points to post hoc manipulations and further erodes the integrity of the prosecution’s version. 17. 16. This Court further observes that the mention of the name “Rakesh” in the initial titamba report, despite the eyewitnesses allegedly identifying him much later, remains unexplained. This anomaly, coupled with the mistaken identity of Banwarilal as “Chandrabhan,” points to post hoc manipulations and further erodes the integrity of the prosecution’s version. 17. This Court further observes that the cumulative effect of all these discrepancies, non-examination of material witnesses, contradictory statements of key eyewitnesses, procedural lapses in investigation and recovery, delay in recording statements, and mismatch between the medical and ocular evidence, makes the prosecution’s case highly doubtful and incapable of standing the test of criminal jurisprudence. 17.1. This Court is of the considered view that in circumstances such as the present, judicial scrutiny must be guided by the quality rather than the quantity of the testimonies adduced. Where significant contradictions are apparent in the statements of the alleged eye-witnesses, particularly concerning material aspects required to establish the culpability of the accused- respondents, the benefit of such doubt must necessarily enure to the advantage of the accused-respondents. 18. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce therelevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 decided on 12.02.2024 ) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024 ) , as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024 ) , as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 19. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of Rakesh Kumar @ Pappu under Sections 3 02 & 201 IPC and Section 3 /25 (1)(b) of ARMS ACT ; accused-respondents Harichand, Rajesh Kumar @ Chilli and Banwarilal under Sections 3 02 read with Sections 3 4 , 120-B & 201 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 20. 20. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 21. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 22. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. 22.1. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., each of the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 22.2. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.