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2025 DIGILAW 1394 (RAJ)

Bhikha Ram Meena S/o Shir Ram Kishan v. Union of India through Ministry of Railway, New Delhi

2025-07-09

MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL

body2025
JUDGMENT : MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 09.02.2001 dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the order dated 07.01.2000 dismissing the appeal preferred by him against the order dated 11.10.1999 imposing the penalty of “removal from service” upon him with a direction to the respondents to reinstate him back in service with all consequential benefits. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that Late Bhikha Ram Meena the Predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners (for short ”the delinquent employee”), while working as a Constable in the Railway Protection Force, was served with a charge-sheet under Rule 153 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 (for short “the Rules of 1987”) vide memorandum dated 15.07.1998 containing three charges. After holding the enquiry, the enquiry officer found him guilty of the charges No.1 and 2. A Copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the delinquent employee by the respondents along with show-cause-notice dated 16.08.1999. After considering the material on record, the delinquent employee was inflicted with the penalty of “removal from service”. The appeal as also the revision preferred thereagainst by the delinquent employee were dismissed. 3. Assailing the orders impugned, learned counsel for the delinquent employee submitted that the charge-sheet was issued by an incompetent authority, i.e., by the Assistant Security Commissioner. Inviting attention of this Court towards the provisions of Rule 152.1 of the Rules of 1987, she submits that it could have been issued either by the appointing authority or any authority otherwise empowered by the general or special order. She submits that the Assistant Security Commissioner was neither his appointing authority nor, was the authority otherwise empowered. She further submits that charge-sheet was not signed by the authority issuing it. Further, inviting attention of this Court towards the memorandum dated 15.07.1998 wherein, he was given 15 days time to file response to the charge-sheet, she submitted that vide order dated 16.07.1998, the disciplinary authority fixed the first date of the departmental enquiry as 27.07.1998, i.e., prior to expiry of the period of 15 days which has vitiated the entire enquiry proceeding. Lastly, referring to the statement of PW-2-Shri Aditya Nigam, she contends that he has categorically stated that the delinquent employee has informed him on 06.04.1998 that as he had picked up a quarrel with some outsiders, he was leaving for his village. Lastly, referring to the statement of PW-2-Shri Aditya Nigam, she contends that he has categorically stated that the delinquent employee has informed him on 06.04.1998 that as he had picked up a quarrel with some outsiders, he was leaving for his village. She submits that in view thereof, it could not have been held that he was wilfully absent from duty. She, therefore, prays that the orders impugned be quashed and set aside and, in view of his death, he be treated to be continue in service from the date of his dismissal and the petitioners be granted all consequential benefits. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the charge-sheet was issued by the competent authority. He, in this regard, relies upon Rule 152.2 read with Schedule III of the Rules of 1987 which envisage that a disciplinary authority, competent to impose a minor punishment, may institute disciplinary proceeding for imposing any of the major punishments notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent to impose the latter punishment. He submits that since, the Assistant Security Commissioner was competent to impose the minor penalty upon the delinquent employee, he could have issued the subject charge-sheet. Denying the contention of the learned counsel for the delinquent employee, he submits that the charge-sheet was duly signed by the disciplinary authority which also reflects his name. With regard to the allegation of initiation of departmental enquiry before the expiry of the period of 15 days, the time granted to the delinquent employee to file reply, learned counsel submitted that he has participated in the enquiry without making any request for extension of time to file reply or raising any protest. Learned counsel further submits that enquiry was completed in accordance with the statutory provisions following the principles of natural justice. He contends that although, the charge No.1 pertaining to willful absence of the delinquent employee from duty is found to be well proved from the evidence on record and reappreciation of evidence is not permissible for this Court under its writ jurisdiction; even otherwise, statement of PW-2 Shri Aditya Nigam does not come to his rescue. He, therefore prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. He, therefore prays for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Heard. Considered. 6. The first contention of the learned counsel for the delinquent employee assailing the validity of the orders impugned is that the charge-sheet was issued by an incompetent authority as it was neither his appointing authority nor, otherwise empowered by a general or special order. Rule 152 of the Rules of 1987 reads as under:- 152. Authority to institute proceedings : 152.1 The appointing authority or any authority otherwise empowered by general or special order, may- (a) institute disciplinary proceedings against any enrolled member. (b) direct a disciplinary authority to institute disciplinary proceedings against any enrolled member of the Force on whom the disciplinary authority is competent to impose, under these rules, any of the punishments specified in rules 148 and 149. 152.2 A disciplinary authority competent under these rules to impose any of the minor punishments may institute disciplinary proceedings for the imposition of any of the major punishments notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent, under these rules, to impose any of the latter punishments. 7. Thus, it is apparent that under Rule 151.2 of the Rules of 1987, the authority, as contended by learned counsel for the delinquent employee, authorized to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a member of the force is either the appointing authority or any authority otherwise empowered by general or special order; however, Rule 152.2, authorizes a disciplinary authority though, not competent to impose any of the major punishments, to initiate the disciplinary proceeding for the imposition of any of the major punishments if, he is authorized, under the Rules, to impose any of the minor punishments. 8. Under Schedule III appended with the Rules, an Assistant Security Commissioner is authorized to impose the minor punishments as prescribed under Chapter XII of the Rules of 1987 upon all the enrolled members of the force and therefore, this Court finds him to be competent to have issued the charge-sheet to the delinquent employee even for imposition of major punishments. Therefore, the first submission raised by the learned counsel for the delinquent employee does not merit acceptance. 9. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the delinquent employee as to the charge-sheet having not been signed by the disciplinary authority issuing it, is being noted only for rejection. Therefore, the first submission raised by the learned counsel for the delinquent employee does not merit acceptance. 9. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the delinquent employee as to the charge-sheet having not been signed by the disciplinary authority issuing it, is being noted only for rejection. A perusal of the charge-sheet submitted by the delinquent employee as Annexure-1 along with memo of the writ petition, reflects that it is duly signed by Shri S. Maharaj, who, indisputably, was Assistant Security Commissioner, Kalyan. 10. The orders of punishment and rejection of the appeal as also of revision have also been assailed by the delinquent employee on the ground that before the expiry of period of 15 days granted to him to file response to the charge-sheet, the departmental enquiry was initiated. The letter dated 16.07.1998 issued by the disciplinary authority, submitted by the delinquent employee along with the memo of charge-sheet, reflects that the first date of the departmental enquiry was fixed as 27.07.1998, i.e., before the expiry of the period of 15 days but, this Court finds substantial force in the submission made by learned counsel for the respondents that the delinquent employee never requested for extension of time to file reply; rather, cross-examined the departmental witnesses and participated in the process of enquiry without raising any protest. Even otherwise, learned counsel for the delinquent employee could not demonstrate any prejudice caused to his defense on account of fixation of the first date of departmental enquiry before the expiry of the period of 15 days. In the above-mentioned circumstances, this Court is not persuaded to record a finding that fixation of the departmental enquiry prior to the expiry of period of 15 days has caused any prejudice to the defense of the delinquent employee or has vitiated the enquiry proceeding whereagainst, even otherwise, there is no allegation of it being in infraction of any statutory provision or in violation of the principles of natural justice. 11. 11. The last contention raised by learned counsel for the delinquent employee based on statement of PW-2-Shri Aditya Nigam would not hold this Court for long for the reasons; firstly, it is trite law that this Court, in its writ jurisdiction, does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by the enquiry officer, affirmed by the disciplinary authority, the appellate authority and the revisional authority in absence of any allegation of the same being perverse. Secondly, the allegation against the delinquent employee in charge No.1 is of exhibiting serious misconduct by remaining absent from 11.02.1998 till 05.04.1998, i.e., for a period of 54 days in an unauthorized manner without any intimation. The PW-2-Shri Nigam has stated in his deposition that on 06.04.1998, the delinquent employee informed him orally that 15-16 persons were looking for him and he has escaped to his village. By no stretch of imagination, it could be construed as valid and reasonable explanation for his unathorized absence from duty from 11.02.1998 to 05.04.1998; rather, it fortifies the allegation against him. 12. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion is that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the delinquent employee assailing the validity of the orders impugned are without any substance and deserve to be rejected. 13. Resultantly, this writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.