Order : ANOOP KUMAR DHAND, J. 1. The instant arbitration application has been filed under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity, ‘Arbitration Act’) seeking appointment of an arbitrator to adjudicate/resolve the dispute between the parties arising out of the agreement dated 22.11.2018. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that both the parties had entered into an agreement wherein, Clause 14 was inserted which states that in case any disputes/differences arise between them in connection with any matter relating to the agreement, the matter would be referred to the arbitrator, who shall decide the dispute between them as per the provisions contained under the Arbitration Act. Learned counsel further submits that both the parties agreed that seat and venue of the arbitration shall be at Jaipur. 3. Learned counsel submits that now the dispute has arisen between the parties with regard to imposition of the Goods and Services Tax liability upon the petitioner hence, under these circumstances, the petitioner issued a notice to the respondent for giving consent for settlement of dispute through arbitration at Jaipur. Learned counsel further submits that as per the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “ Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. ”, reported in (2017) 7 Supreme Court Cases 678, the dispute can be referred to an arbitrator in terms of the agreement where the parties to the agreement has agreed to settle their dispute at the seat and place mentioned therein hence, under these circumstances, the appropriate orders be passed for settlement of the dispute arising between the parties by appointing an arbitrator. 4. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent opposed the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the petitioner, as neither the agreement in question was executed at Jaipur nor the properties are situated at Jaipur. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that mere mentioning of the fact that the seat and venue of the arbitration would be at Jaipur, would not give jurisdiction to this Court to appoint an arbitrator to settle the disputes or differences arisen between the parties. 5. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that mere mentioning of the fact that the seat and venue of the arbitration would be at Jaipur, would not give jurisdiction to this Court to appoint an arbitrator to settle the disputes or differences arisen between the parties. 5. Learned Senior Counsel submits that as per Section 42 of the Arbitration Act, the jurisdiction lies with the Hon’ble Bombay High Court and the word “Court” has been well defined under Section 2 (e) of the Arbitration Act. 6. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that no fruitful purpose would be achieved by the petitioner by compelling the respondent to approach the arbitrator, in case, the arbitrator is appointed by this Court for settlement of their disputes, rather both the parties would feel inconvenient to travel from Mumbai to Jaipur. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the judgment dated 24.03.2022 passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “ M/s Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd. Versus Aditya Kumar Chatterjee SLP (C) No.17397-17398/2021. 7. Learned Senior Counsel submits that in view of the submissions made herein above, this application is liable to be dismissed. 8. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on record. 9. This fact is not in dispute that the agreement dated 22.11.2018 was executed between the parties at Mumbai. This fact is also not in dispute that the assets of the parties are also situated at Mumbai. The dispute between the parties is of imposition of the GST liability upon the petitioner which is disputed by him. This fact is also not in dispute that both the parties are signatory to the aforesaid agreement wherein Clause 14 of the agreement deals with the provisions of the arbitration, which reads as under: “This Agreement shall be governed in accordance with the Laws of India. In case of any dispute/s or difference/s arising between the Parties in connection with any matter relating to this Agreement including termination thereof then the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the rules made thereunder as amended/modified/ substituted from time to time. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of sole arbitrator which shall be appointed by the GCTPL. The seat and venue of arbitration shall be Jaipur and it shall be conducted in English language. The Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of sole arbitrator which shall be appointed by the GCTPL. The seat and venue of arbitration shall be Jaipur and it shall be conducted in English language. The decision of the sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on the Parties.” 10. A bare perusal of the Clause 14 of the Agreement clearly indicates that parties have agreed on the fact that in case dispute/s or difference/s occur between them, the matter would be referred to the arbitrator in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. This fact is also not in dispute that both the parties have given their consent that the seat and venue of the arbitration shall be at Jaipur. 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “ Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd.” (supra) has dealt with the issue involved in this application with regards to the jurisdiction, which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that under the law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in the courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration agreement. The neutral venue may not in the class sense have jurisdiction, therefore, no part of the cause of action has arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Section 16 to 21 of the CPC would be attracted. In arbitration law, the moment the word “seat” is determined, the matter is required to be decided at the place where the seat and venue is mentioned. 12. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “ Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd.” (supra) has discussed the definition of the words “Court” and “Place of Arbitration” as defined under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, the report of the Law Commission and the amended provisions of the Arbitration Act, in Para Nos. 8 to 18 as under : “8. The relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are set out hereinbelow: “2. 8 to 18 as under : “8. The relevant provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are set out hereinbelow: “2. Definitions .—(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires— (e) “ Court ” means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having, jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject- matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes; (2) Scope. —This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India. 20. Place of arbitration .—(1) The parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. (2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties. (3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Arbitral Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or other property. 31. Form and contents of arbitral award. —(1)-(3) (4) The arbitral award shall state its date and the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with Section 20 and the award shall be deemed to have been made at that place.” 9. The concept of juridical seat has been evolved by the courts in England and has now been firmly embedded in our jurisprudence. Thus, the Constitution Bench in BaLco v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. has adverted to “seat” in some detail. Para 96 is instructive and states as under: (SCC pp. 605-06) “96. Section 2 (1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as under: Definitions. Thus, the Constitution Bench in BaLco v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. has adverted to “seat” in some detail. Para 96 is instructive and states as under: (SCC pp. 605-06) “96. Section 2 (1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as under: Definitions. —(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires — (a)-(d) (e) “ Court ” means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject- matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes; “We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of the arbitration™ cannot be confused with “subject-maiter of the suit”. The term “subject-matier” in Section 2 (1) (e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2 (1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 2 0 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 2 0 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process.” For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts would have jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is located.” (emphasis in original) 10. Paras 98 to 100 have laid down the law as to “seat” thus: (Bharat Aluminium case, SCC pp. 606-08) “98. We now come to Section 20 , which is as under: ‘ 20. Place of arbitration .—(1) The parties are free to agree on the place of arbitration. (2) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (1), the place of arbitration shall be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties. (3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the Arbitral Tribunal may, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place it considers appropriate for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspection of documents, goods or other property.” A plain reading of Section 2 0 leaves no room for doubt that where the place of arbitration is in India, the parties are free to agree to any “place” or “seat” within India, be it Delhi, Mumbai, etc. In the absence of the parties’ agreement thereto, Section 2 0(2) authorises the tribunal to determine the place/seat of such arbitration. In the absence of the parties’ agreement thereto, Section 2 0(2) authorises the tribunal to determine the place/seat of such arbitration. Section 2 0(3) enables the tribunal to meet at any place for conducting hearings at a place of convenience in matters such as consultations among its members for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties. 99. The fixation of the most convenient “venue” is taken care of by Section 2 0(3). Section 2 0 has to be read in the context of Section 2 (2) which places a threshold limitation on the applicability of Part I, where the place of arbitration is in India. Therefore, Section 2 0 would also not support the submission of the extra- territorial applicability of Part I, as canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellants, so far as purely domestic arbitration is concerned. 100. True, that in an international commercial arbitration, having a seat in India, hearings may be necessitated outside India. In such circumstances, the hearing of the arbitration will be conducted at the venue fixed by the parties, but it would not have the effect of changing the seat of arbitration which would remain in India. The legal position in this regard is summed up by Redfern and Hunter, The Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (1986) at p. 69 in the following passage under the heading “The Place of Arbitration”: ‘The preceding discussion has been on the basis that there is only one “place” of arbitration. This will be the place chosen by or on behalf of the parties; and it will be designated in the arbitration agreement or the terms of the reference or the minutes of proceedings or in some other way as the place or “seat” of the arbitration. This does not mean, however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its meetings or hearings at the place of arbitration. International commercial arbitration often involves people of many different nationalities, from many different countries. In these circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an Arbitral Tribunal to hold meetings—or even hearings —in a place other than the designated place of arbitration, either for its own convenience or for the convenience of the parties or their witnesses.... It may be more convenient for an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a hearing in another country—for instance, for the purpose of taking evidence.... It may be more convenient for an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a hearing in another country—for instance, for the purpose of taking evidence.... In such circumstances, each move of the Arbitral Tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat of arbitration changes. The seat of the arbitration remains the place initially agreed by or on behalf of the parties.’ This, in our view, is the correct depiction of the practical considerations and the distinction between “seat” [ Sections 2 0(1) and 20(2)] and c “venue” [ Section 2 0(3)]. We may point out here that the distinction between “seat” and “venue” would be quite crucial in the event, the arbitration agreement designates a foreign country as the “seat”/“place” of the arbitration and also selects the Arbitration Act, 1996 as the curial law/law governing the arbitration proceedings. It would be a matter of construction of the individual agreement to decide whether: (i) the designated foreign “seat” would be read as in fact only providing for a “venue”/“place” where the hearings would be held, in view of the choice of the Arbitration Act, 1996 as being the curial law, OR (ii) the specific designation of a foreign seat, necessarily carrying e with it the choice of that country’s arbitration/curial law, would prevail over and subsume the conflicting selection choice by the parties of the Arbitration Act, 1996.” (emphasis in original) 11. In an instructive passage, this Court stated that an agreement as to the seat of an arbitration is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause as follows: (Bharat Aluminium case, SCC p. 621, para 123) “123. Thus, it is clear that the regulation of conduct of arbitration and challenge to an award would have to be done by the courts of the country in which the arbitration is being conducted. Such a court is then the supervisory court possessed of the power to annul the award. This is in keeping with the scheme of the international instruments, such as the Geneva Convention and the New York Convention as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law. It also recognises the territorial principle which gives effect to the sovereign right of a country to regulate, through its national courts, an adjudicatory duty being performed in its own country. This is in keeping with the scheme of the international instruments, such as the Geneva Convention and the New York Convention as well as the UNCITRAL Model Law. It also recognises the territorial principle which gives effect to the sovereign right of a country to regulate, through its national courts, an adjudicatory duty being performed in its own country. By way of a comparative example, we may reiterate the observations made by the Court of Appeal, England in C v. D 4 wherein it is observed that: (Bus LR p. 851G, para 17) ‘17. It follows from this that a choice of seat for the arbitration must be a choice of forum for remedies seeking to attack the award. In the aforesaid case, the Court of Appeal had approved the observations made in A v. B 5 wherein it is observed that: ‘....an agreement as lo the seal of an arbitration is analogous 10 an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for a remedy ... as to the validity of an existing interim or final award is agreed to be made only in the courts of the place designated as the seat of arbitration.” (emphasis in original) 12. The Constitution Bench’s statement of the law was further expanded in Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbHO. After referring to various English authorities in great detail, this Court held, following the Constitution Bench, as follows: (SCC p. 58, para 134) “134. It is accepted by most of the experts in the law relating to international arbitration that in almost all the national laws, arbitrations are anchored to the sear/place/situs of arbitration. Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration (5th Edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2009), in Para 3.54 concludes that “the sear of the arbitration is thus intended to be its centre of gravity”. In BALCO3 (BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.) it is further noticed that this does not mean that all proceedings of the arbitration are to be held at the sear of arbitration. The arbitrators are at liberty to hold meetings at a place which is of convenience to all concerned. This may become necessary as arbitrators often come from different countries. Therefore, it may be convenient to hold all or some of the meetings of the arbitration in a location other than where the seat of arbitration is located. The arbitrators are at liberty to hold meetings at a place which is of convenience to all concerned. This may become necessary as arbitrators often come from different countries. Therefore, it may be convenient to hold all or some of the meetings of the arbitration in a location other than where the seat of arbitration is located. In BALCO3, the relevant passage from Redfern and Hunter has been quoted which is as under: (SCC p. 598, para 75) ‘75. ... “The preceding discussion has been on the basis that there is only one “place” of arbitration. This will be the place chosen by or on behalf of the parties; and it will be designated in the arbitration agreement or the terms of reference or the minutes of proceedings or in some other way as the place or “seat” of the arbitration. This does not mean, however, that the Arbitral Tribunal must hold all its meetings or hearings at the place of arbitration. International commercial arbitration often involves people of many different nationalities, from many different countries. In these circumstances, it is by no means unusual for an Arbitral Tribunal to hold meetings—or even hearings in a place other than the designated place of arbitration, either for its own convenience or for the convenience of the parties or their witnesses.... It may be more convenient for an Arbitral Tribunal sitting in one country to conduct a hearing in another country — for instance, for the purpose of taking evidence.... In such circumstances each move of the Arbitral Tribunal does not of itself mean that the seat of arbitration changes. The seat of arbitration remains the place b initially agreed by or on behalf of the parties.” [Naviera case’ (Naviera Amazonica Peruana S.A. v. Compania Internacional De Seguros Del Peru), Lloyd’s Rep p. 1211 These observations have also been noticed in Union of India v. McDonnell Douglas Corpn.3” (emphasis in original) 13. This Court reiterated that once the seat of arbitration has been fixed, it would be in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction clause as to the courts which exercise supervisory powers over the arbitration. (See para 138.) 14. In Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of lndia, this statement of the law was echoed in several paragraphs. This judgment makes it clear that “juridical seat” is nothing but the “legal place” of arbitration. (See para 138.) 14. In Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union of lndia, this statement of the law was echoed in several paragraphs. This judgment makes it clear that “juridical seat” is nothing but the “legal place” of arbitration. It was held that since the juridical seat or legal place of arbitration was London, English courts alone would have jurisdiction over the arbitration thus excluding Part I of the Indian Act. (See paras 36, 41, 45 to 60 and 76.1 and 76.2.) This judgment was relied upon and followed by Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. v. Gupta Coal India Lid.'Y (See paras 45 and 48.) In Union of India v. Reliance Industries Lid."!, this Court referred to all the earlier judgments and held that in cases where the seat of arbitration is London, by necessary implication Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is excluded as the supervisory jurisdiction of courts over the arbitration goes along with “seat”. 15. In a recent judgment in Eitzen Bulk A/S v. Ashapura Minechem Lid.'2, all the aforesaid authorities were referred to and followed. Para 34 of the said f judgment reads as follows: (SCC pp. 520-21) “34. As a matter of fact the mere choosing of the juridical seat of arbitration attracts the law applicable to such location. In other words, it would not be necessary to specify which law would apply to the arbitration proceedings, since the law of the particular country would apply ipso jure. The following passage from Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration contains the following explication of the issue: ‘It is also sometimes said that parties have selected the procedural law that will govern their arbitration, by providing for arbitration in a particular country. This is too elliptical and, as an English court itself held more recently in Breas of Doune Wind Farm it does not always hold true. What the parties have done is to choose a place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice brings with it submission to the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration. What the parties have done is to choose a place of arbitration in a particular country. That choice brings with it submission to the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law on arbitration. To say that the parties have “chosen” that particular law to govern the arbitration is rather like saying that an English woman who takes her car to France has “chosen” French traffic law, which will oblige her to drive on the right-hand side of the road, to give priority to vehicles approaching from the right, and generally to obey traffic laws to which she may not be accustomed. But it would be an odd use of language to say this notional motorist had opted for “French traffic law”. What she has done is to choose to go to France. The applicability of French law then follows automatically. It is not a matter of choice. Parties may well choose a particular place of arbitration precisely because its lex arbitri is one which they find attractive. Nevertheless, once a place of arbitration has been chosen, it brings with it its own law. If that law contains provisions that are mandatory so far as arbitration is concerned, those provisions must be obeyed. It is not a matter of choice any more than the notional motorist is free to choose which local traffic laws to obey and which to disregard.” 16. It may be mentioned, in passing, that the Arbitration and Conciliation, 1996 has been amended in 2015 pursuant to a detailed Law Commission Report. The Law Commission specifically adverted to the difference between “seat” and “venue” as follows: “40. The Supreme Court in BaLco3 decided that Parts I and II of the Act are mutually exclusive of each other. The intention of Parliament that the Act is territorial in nature and Sections 9 and 34 will apply only when the seat of arbitration is in India. The seat is the “centre of gravity” of arbitration, and even where two foreign parties arbitrate in India, Part I would apply and, by virtue of Section 2 (7), the award would be a “domestic award”. The Supreme Court recognised the “seat” of arbitration to be the juridical seat; however, in line with international practice, it was observed that the arbitral hearings may take place at a location other than the seat of arbitration. The Supreme Court recognised the “seat” of arbitration to be the juridical seat; however, in line with international practice, it was observed that the arbitral hearings may take place at a location other than the seat of arbitration. The distinction between “seat” and “venue” was, therefore, recognised. In such a scenario, only if the seat is determined to be India, Part I would be applicable. If the seat was foreign, Part T would be inapplicable. Even if Part I was expressly included ‘it would only mean that the parties have contractually imported from the Arbitration Act, 1996, those provisions which are concerned with the internal conduct of their arbitration and which are not inconsistent with the mandatory provisions of a the [foreign] Procedural law/Curial law.” The same cannot be used to confer jurisdiction on an Indian Court. However, the decision in BALcO3 was expressly given prospective effect and applied to arbitration agreements executed after the date of the judgment. 41. While the decision in BALCO? is a step in the right direction and would drastically reduce judicial intervention in foreign arbitrations, the problematic. Commission feels that there are still a few areas that are likely to be problematic. (i) Where the assets of a party are located in India, and there is a likelihood that that party will dissipate its assets in the near future, the other party will lack an efficacious remedy if the seat of the arbitration is abroad. The latter party will have two possible remedies, but neither will be efficacious. First, the latter party can obtain an interim order from a foreign court or the Arbitral Tribunal itself and file a civil suit to enforce the right created by the interim order. The interim order would not be enforceable directly by filing an execution petition as it would not qualify as a “judgment” or “decree” for the purposes of Sections 13 and 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (which provide a mechanism for enforcing foreign judgments). Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under Sections 13 and 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, in the event that the former party does not adhere to the terms of the foreign order, the latter party can initiate proceedings for contempt in the foreign Court and enforce the judgment of the foreign Court under Sections 13 and 44-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Neither of these remedies is likely to provide a practical remedy to the party seeking to enforce the interim relief obtained by it. That being the case, it is a distinct possibility that a foreign party would obtain an arbitral award in its favour only to realise that the entity against which it has to enforce the award has been stripped of its assets and has been converted into a shell company. (ii) While the decision in BALCO? was made prospective to ensure that hotly negotiated bargains are not overturned overnight, it results in a situation where courts, despite knowing that the decision in Bhatia International' is no longer good law, are forced to apply it whenever they are faced with a case arising from an arbitration agreement executed pre-BALCO?. 42. The above issues have been addressed by way of proposed amendments to Sections 2 (2), 2(2-A), 20, 28 and 31.” 17. In amendments to be made to the Act, the Law Commission recommended the following: “Amendment of Section 20 12. In Section 20 , delete the word “Place” and add the words “Seat and Venue” before the words “of arbitration”. (i) In sub-section (1), after the words “agree on the” delete the word “place” and add words “seat and venue”. (ii) In sub-section (3), after the words “meet at any” delete the word “place” and add word “venue”. [Note.—The departure from the existing phrase “place” of arbitration is proposed to make the wording of the Act consistent with the international usage of the concept of a “seat” of arbitration, to denote the legal home of the arbitration. The amendment further legislatively distinguishes between the “[legal] seat” from a “[mere] venue” of arbitration.] Amendment of Section 31 17. In Section 31 (i) In sub-section (4), after the words “its date and the” delete the word “place” and add the word “seat”. 18. The amended Act, does not, however, contain the aforesaid amendments, presumably because the BALCO? judgment in no uncertain terms has referred to “place” as “juridical seat” for the purpose of Section 2 (2) of the Act. In Section 31 (i) In sub-section (4), after the words “its date and the” delete the word “place” and add the word “seat”. 18. The amended Act, does not, however, contain the aforesaid amendments, presumably because the BALCO? judgment in no uncertain terms has referred to “place” as “juridical seat” for the purpose of Section 2 (2) of the Act. It further made it clear that Sections 2 0(1) and 20(2) where the word “place” is used, refers to “juridical seat”, whereas in Section 2 0(3), the word “place” is equivalent to “venue”. This being the settled law, it was found unnecessary to expressly incorporate what the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has already done by way of construction of the Act. 13. The respondent is bound by the terms and conditions of the agreement and shall be estopped to challenge the same in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above mentioned case. 14. The judgment relied by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent in the case of “ M/s Ravi Ranjan Developers Pvt. Ltd.” (supra) has no applicability to the facts and circumstances of this case, as both the parties never agreed to settle their dispute at the Calcutta High Court inspite of there being a provision of settlement of their dispute at the seat of arbitration at Calcutta. Both the parties had approached the Court at Muzaffarpur, Bihar. In that eventuality, the Hon‘ble Apex Court has held that the Courts at Calcutta were not having any jurisdiction to entertain the dispute occurred between the parties. 15. In view of the above, this Court deems it just and proper to appoint Justice Ashok Kumar Gaur (Retd.), Resident of 30, Tagore Nagar, Opp. Regale Restaurant, Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Mob. No.9414071848) as Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate/resolve the dispute between the parties. 16. The appointment of the Sole Arbitrator is subject to declaration being made under Section 12 of the Arbitration Act with respect to the independence and impartiality and ability to devote sufficient time to complete the arbitration proceedings within the prescribed period. 17. Regale Restaurant, Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Mob. No.9414071848) as Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate/resolve the dispute between the parties. 16. The appointment of the Sole Arbitrator is subject to declaration being made under Section 12 of the Arbitration Act with respect to the independence and impartiality and ability to devote sufficient time to complete the arbitration proceedings within the prescribed period. 17. The arbitration fee of the Sole Arbitrator shall be payable in accordance with the provisions contained in the Manual of Procedure of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2009, as amended by the Manual of Procedure for Alternative Dispute Resolution (Amendment), 2017 vide notification dated 23.03.2017 read with 4th schedule appended to the Arbitration Act or as determined by the Arbitrator with consensus of the parties. 18. The Registry is directed to intimate the sole Arbitrator Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ashok Kumar Gaur (Retd.), Resident of 30, Tagore Nagar, Opp. Regale Restaurant, Ajmer Road, Jaipur (Mob. No.9414071848) for his approval and declaration, in terms of Section 11 (8) read with Section 12 (1) of the Arbitration Act. 19. All issues raised by the parties before the Arbitrator shall be considered in accordance with law. 20. Since, as per Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, the arbitration proceedings are required to be concluded within the scheduled time, as stipulated therein, it is expected from the parties to appear before the Arbitrator on 04.08.2025 or on any other date as informed by the Arbitrator, subject to agreement by the parties. Furthermore, the parties shall provide their respective E-mail/contact number/ mobile number and/or also of their authorized representatives/Lawyers appearing on their behalf before the Arbitral Tribunal, in order to facilitate the Arbitrator to send information/communication to the parties, whenever required. The information send by the Arbitrator, on such address/ E-mail/ cellphone of the parties or to their authorized representatives/ Lawyers, shall be treated as sufficient communication unless same is not changed. 21. Accordingly, the present Arbitration Application stands allowed.