JUDGMENT : K. Surender, J. This appeal is filed by the State-Central Bureau of Investigation, aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent/accused for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 2. Briefly, the case of the prosecution is that PW.1- Mr.J.Laxman Rao-the defacto complainant, who is a contractor in the Military Engineer Services (for short ‘MES’) lodged complaint with the SP, CBI, Hyderabad, on 02.12.2000 at about 9.00 A.M, alleging that the accused had demanded Rs.20,000/- as bribe for clearing his final bill of C.A.No.75 and for accepting the tender (file No.8617). An FIR in the above case was registered immediately for the offences under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A trap was laid immediately on the same day. The trap party caught the accused when he accepted an amount of Rs.20,000/- from PW.1 in the presence of PW.2-an independent mediator and accompanying witness. After concluding investigation, a charge sheet was filed for the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) R/w.13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act on the allegation that the accused had demanded and accepted a bribe of Rs.20,000/-. 3. The learned Special Judge examined PWs.1 to 11, marked Exs.P1 to P32, and also marked MOs.1 to 7 on behalf of prosecution. The accused examined DWs.1 to 6 and marked Exs.D1 to D49. 4. The learned Special Judge found that the prosecution failed to make out a case against the accused on the following grounds. i) PW.1 admitted that he received the total amount under Ex.D7 in respect of contract file No.58, but the final contract bill in respect of contract file No.75 was pending for rectification works. ii) PWs.3 and 4, including PW.10 who investigated the case and laid the charge sheet, also admitted that unless the defects are rectified, the final bill cannot be passed. The alleged version of PW.1 that although he completed and rectified the defects shown under appendix A, his final bill is still pending, is incorrect, because Ex.P18-a letter issued by PW.1 shows that the rectification mentioned under Ex.P8 was on 15.03.2001, which is after three months of the trap. iii) The claim of PW.1 that the final bill amount pertaining to contract No.58 was pending, is false as per the evidence of DW.1 and Ex.D7. It is proved that PW.1 received the total amount pertaining to contract No.58. iii) The claim of PW.1 that the final bill amount pertaining to contract No.58 was pending, is false as per the evidence of DW.1 and Ex.D7. It is proved that PW.1 received the total amount pertaining to contract No.58. PW.1 alleged that the final bill is pending in respect of contract No.58, but he has already received the amount. iv) What is mentioned in the complaint by PW.1 that the final bill pertaining to contract file No.75 was pending with the Accused Officer as on the date of trap, i.e., 02.12.2000, is not proved because PW.1 rectified the defects as shown under Ex.P8, on 15.03.2001. v) Except for the contents in the complaint of PW.1 stating that the Accused Officer demanded a bribe in November, 2000 and that he contacted his higher officials, there is no other evidence. vi) PWs.1 and 2 both admitted that the Accused Officer provided cool drinks to them and then he went twice into his house to return the empty glasses, after drinking the cool drinks. vii) There is every chance of having a positive test for the presence of Phenolphthalein conducted at the house of the Accused Officer, and there is every chance of PW.1 keeping the tainted amount beneath the pillow cover, as PW.1 was sitting very near to the pillow cover, as per the Ex.P5 sketch. viii) It is mentioned in Ex.P2 that the team members’ hands were washed after the demonstration, but it is not mentioned that the hands of PW.1 are washed. ix) It is mentioned in Ex.P2 that a precaution was taken to ensure that PW.1 shall not carry anything except the tainted amount. However, it is no where mentioned that PW.1 was carrying a cell phone with him, nor is the phone number provided in it. When a precaution was taken, PW.1 should not have been carrying any other material. Therefore, PWs.1 and 2, stating that PW.1 contacted the house of Accused Officer with his cell phone creates a doubt. x) As per the evidence of PWs.1, 2, and 9, the broken glass was also collected, which is marked as M.O.5. It is only a broken glass, not the top of a glass table. PWs.1, 2, and 9 deposed that when the Accused Officer became violent, his right hand and his right thigh were cut. x) As per the evidence of PWs.1, 2, and 9, the broken glass was also collected, which is marked as M.O.5. It is only a broken glass, not the top of a glass table. PWs.1, 2, and 9 deposed that when the Accused Officer became violent, his right hand and his right thigh were cut. xi) However, it is not proved that the Accused Officer interfered while PW.9 was discharging his official duties, nor is it established how the Accused Officer sustained injuries to his right hand fingers, when he broke a glass with his left fingers, or how his right thigh sustained injuries. xii) It is an admitted fact that on the same day, PW.1 lodged another complaint, i.e., on 02.12.2000. As per the evidence of PW.8, another trap was laid in respect of V.Nageshwar Rao (PW.11), who is also MES officer. PW.1 admitted that on the same day, i.e., on 02.12.2000, he also lodged a complaint against V.Nageshwar Rao (Crime No.30(A) of 2000) before the SP, CBI, along with Ex.P1-complaint. xiii) From the evidence of PW.8, who is the trap laying officer in Crime No.30(A) of 2000 against PW.11, PW.1 was present with him in the forenoon. xiv) It is elicited in the cross-examination of PW.1 that he was carrying only Rs.20,000/-, and same was used in this crime for laying a trap. Then, how did he provide Rs.10,000/- in Crime No.30 (A) of 2000 for laying a trap? As per the admission made by PW.8, unless the complainant procures the amount, they will not lay a trap. xv) when PW.1 was present with PW.9 (TLO) from 9.00 a.m. up to 7.00 p.m., can it be accepted that he appeared before PW.8 in the forenoon? As deposed by him, one person cannot appear at two places at the same time-it is impossible. xvi) PW.9 admitted that he received Ex.P1 complaint from SP, CBI at 9.00 A.M. itself, and he registered the FIR Ex.P25 at the same time. When PW.9 admitted that he received the complaint and registered the FIR at 9.00 A.M., it indicates that there was no chance for pre-verification due to the absence of any time gap. Furthermore, as per the admission made by PW.9, PW.1 was with him from 9.00 A.M. onwards up to 7.00 P.M. in the evening. When PW.9 admitted that he received the complaint and registered the FIR at 9.00 A.M., it indicates that there was no chance for pre-verification due to the absence of any time gap. Furthermore, as per the admission made by PW.9, PW.1 was with him from 9.00 A.M. onwards up to 7.00 P.M. in the evening. xvii) It is an admitted fact that PW.1 made an application for enlisting himself in D class under Ex.D15, whereas PW.1 denied making the application for D class but admitted that he made an application for work. xviii) As per the evidence of DW.3, PW.1 made Ex.D15-application enclosing some documents-Ex.D16 and he produced Income Tax clearance certificates valid upto 29.03.2000. He also enclosed a list of works carried out at other public departments. Exs.D29, D31, D33, and D34 are letters addressed by the Chief Engineer regarding the genuineness of the documents enclosed by PW.1 along with Ex.D15. The Chief Engineer received replies under Ex.D30, D35, and D32, wherein it was mentioned that the person who attested the Xerox copies, named G.Dayanand, filed along with Ex.D15, does not exist in their office. Additionally, it was stated that M/s.Dandapani traders do not have any registration with the Superintendent Engineer, Public Health and Municipal Engineering. The contact numbers mentioned by PW1, stating that he had a license from the Andhra Pradesh Electrical Licensing Board with License No. A/1022/3-1896, did not pertain to Sri T. Sridhar Goud. From Exs. D29, D30, D31, D32, D33, D34, and D35, it is evident that PW1 submitted false documents with false attestations, which were attested by G. Dayanand. However, no such person existed, and these documents were enclosed with Ex.D15 in an attempt to be enlisted in D class. Upon verification, they were found to be false. xix) PW.9 (TLO) admitted that he got seized the final bill from the Office of the Accused Officer. As per his own admission and as per the evidence of PW.10, the Officer who laid the charge sheet also deposed that he got seized the final bill pertaining to contract file No.75, but the said file is filed in the Court mentioning that PW.8 seized it. If really the final bill pertaining to the file No.75 of PW.1 was with the Accused Officer on 02.12.2000, they might have found the same in the shelf or the table drawer of the Accused officer, but nothing was found. If really the final bill pertaining to the file No.75 of PW.1 was with the Accused Officer on 02.12.2000, they might have found the same in the shelf or the table drawer of the Accused officer, but nothing was found. Even the house of the Accused Officer was searched, but no incriminating material pertaining to the contract file No.75 or file NO.8617 were recovered from his house. PW.10 deposed that by the time he took the charge, the final bill was seized, but it was seized by somebody else, but not in this crime. The absence of the final bill in the possession of the Accused Officer on 02.12.2000 will also prove that he was not aware of the final bill. When it is not with him, the question of demanding a bribe does not arise. 5. In Mallappa and others v. State of Karnataka,, [(2024) 3 Supreme Court Cases 544] the Honourable Supreme Court summarised the principles under which appeals against acquittals can be interfered with. At para-42 of the Judgment, it was held as follows; “42. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarised as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive —inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the trial court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a reappreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the trial court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the trial court.” 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of T.N ., (2021) 3 SCC 687 , held as hereunder:— “20. Mainly it is contended by Shri Nagamuthu, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the view taken by the trial court is a “possible view”, having regard to the evidence on record. It is submitted that the trial court has recorded cogent and valid reasons in support of its findings for acquittal. Under Section 378 CrPC, no differentiation is made between an appeal against acquittal and the appeal against conviction. By considering the long line of earlier cases this Court in the judgment in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 ] has laid down the general principles regarding the powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Para 42 of the judgment which is relevant reads as under: (SCC p. 432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 7. The learned counsel appearing for the CBI submits that the execution of contract is admitted and on the date of the trap also there was a demand by the appellant, that too on a piece of paper. The said demand was in the presence of PW.2, who is an independent mediator. The amount pending towards the final payment of the contract executed is not disputed. The final bill was deliberately stopped. The conduct of the accused on the date of trap would reflect the demand and acceptance of the bribe, and enraged by the entry of the CBI personnel, the accused acted in a violent manner. All these facts would only go to show that the accused had demanded and accepted the bribe on the date of demand. 8. The Learned Counsel appearing for the accused has argued on the very same reasonings given by the learned Special Judge while recording the acquittal of the accused. 9. Having gone through the record and also the reasons narrated by the Special Judge, as discussed above, the conduct and approach of PW.1 to entrap the accused and other officers in the very same departments give rise to doubt about the complainant’s claim regarding the demand and acceptance of bribe. The allegation of demand for bribe pertaining to the contract file No.75 was not proved. Material facts were suppressed by PW.1 and all the claims made by PW.1 during the course of trial were proved to be false with supporting documents. 10. The interference of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can occur only when the finding of the trial Court is either not based on record or is due to an illegal or incorrect consideration of evidence. 10. The interference of the appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal can occur only when the finding of the trial Court is either not based on record or is due to an illegal or incorrect consideration of evidence. Even if two views are possible, and the view taken by the trial Court is probable, merely because another view is possible, the view taken by the trial Court in favour of the accused can only sustain. 11. There are no grounds to interfere with the findings of the learned Special Sessions Judge. 12. Accordingly, Criminal Appeal is dismissed.