JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1.This is a defendant’s writ petition arising out of a suit for partition under Section 176 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short, ‘ZA & LR Act’). 2. The suit for partition was instituted by Smt. Parwati, widow of Ram Narain, against Ramgopal, her late husband’s brother, claiming a half share in the suit property (hereinafter referred to as ‘land in dispute’) on foot of a bhumidhari right that she inherited from her late husband, Ram Narain, upon his demise. She sought a decree of partition and separate possession of her half share. A written statement was filed by Ramgopal before the Sub-Divisional Officer, where the suit has been instituted, resisting the plaintiff’s claim on ground that Parwati was not Ram Narain’s lawfully wedded wife, and for the said reason, through a devise made by Ram Narain, Parwati was given a life estate alone in the land in dispute. She had no right to seek partition or separate possession. A copy of Ram Narain’s Will dated 10.01.1961 was filed along with the written statement and a typewritten copy thereof has been annexed to the writ petition. 3. The Trial Court framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi) : (1) Whether the plaintiff, Parwati, and defendant No.1, Ramgopal, are co-tenure holder bhumidhar in possession of the land in dispute? (2) What are the shares of the plaintiff, Parwati, and defendant No.2 (sic), Ramgopal, in the disputed land? (3) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? (4) Whether the plaintiff has the right to seek partition? (5) Whether the plaintiff has the right to alienate the land in dispute by Gift, Will, Mortgage etc.? (6) Whether the defendant’s case is barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act? (7) Whether the document mentioned in paragraph No.14 of the W.S. is forged and illegal? 4. The Trial Court answered Issue No.1 in the affirmative; Issue No.2, holding that the plaintiff and the defendant had a half share, as recorded during the consolidation proceedings; Issues Nos.3 and 4 have been decided together in terms of the remark that the plaintiff is a recorded co- tenure holder and there is nothing written in the Will about partition. The Trial Court answered Issue No.1 in the affirmative; Issue No.2, holding that the plaintiff and the defendant had a half share, as recorded during the consolidation proceedings; Issues Nos.3 and 4 have been decided together in terms of the remark that the plaintiff is a recorded co- tenure holder and there is nothing written in the Will about partition. The answer to the issues is not explicit; Issue No.5 has been answered holding that since the plaintiff is a bhumidhar with transferable rights, she has every right to alienate, but if the Will were proved, the right would end; Issue No.6 has been answered, holding that the suit is not barred by Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (for short, ‘the CH Act’); and, Issue No.7 has been decided, holding that though it was not necessary for the Will to be registered, but the fact that for 33 years, after its execution, no rights were asserted on the basis thereof, renders it suspicious. There is a remark to the effect also in answering this issue that there is nothing said about division of crops. The Trial Court held that the plaintiff had a half share in the land in dispute and passed a preliminary decree to that effect on 28.02.1994. 5. The defendant, Ramgopal, carried an appeal to the Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur from the preliminary decree passed by the Sub- Divisional Officer. This appeal came up for hearing before the Additional Commissioner, Kanpur Division, Kanpur, being Appeal No.127 of 1994 on 20.01.1995. It was allowed by the Additional Commissioner and the suit dismissed. 6. The plaintiff carried a second appeal to the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad, which was registered as Second Appeal No.35 of 1994-95 before the Board. The Board, by the judgment and decree impugned dated 14.01.2016, allowed the second appeal, set aside the Additional Commissioner’s decree and restored that of the Trial Court. 7. Aggrieved, this writ petition has been instituted by the heirs and LRs of the defendant, Ramgopal under Article 226 of the Constitution. It need be mentioned here that Ramgopal, the original defendant, apparently passed away sometimes after the judgment in the second appeal was delivered or after it was reserved by the Board, and before the institution of this writ petition. It need be mentioned here that Ramgopal, the original defendant, apparently passed away sometimes after the judgment in the second appeal was delivered or after it was reserved by the Board, and before the institution of this writ petition. His heirs and LRs have, therefore, instituted this writ petition, representing his estate and are arrayed as petitioner Nos.1/1 to 1/5/2. The heirs of Ramgopal, who have actually instituted this writ petition in his right, are seven in number and shall be collectively referred to as ‘the defendant’, unless the context requires otherwise. 8. The plaintiff, Parwati, passed away pending the second appeal before the Board and her heir and LR, Smt. Kamla Kushwaha, was substituted on record. Here, Smt. Parwati’s estate is represented by respondent Nos.1/1, Smt. Kamla Kushwaha, her LR, heir and daughter. Parwati, represented by her L.R., shall be called, ‘the plaintiff’. 9. Heard Mr. Shashi Kant Shukla, learned Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Udayan Nandan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and Mr. Sanjay Kumar Ray, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents Nos. 3 and 4, representing the State. No one appeared for the Gaon Sabha. 10. Upon hearing learned Counsel for parties, what we find is that the remark in the judgment of the Board of Revenue that the Will was not registered tends to show that the Board overturned the judgment of the Additional Commissioner on the premise that an unregistered Will created no rights in favour of the legatee. 11. A reading of the provision to Section 169 of the ZA & LR Act shows that under the unamended provisions of Section 169(3) of the ZA & LR Act, all that was required is that the Will had to be made in writing and attested by two witnesses. When we say unamended here, we mean to refer to Section 169(3) of the ZA & LR Act as it stood before the amendment made by U.P. Act No. 27 of 2004 with effect from 23.08.2004. It was with effect from 23.08.2004 that U.P. Act No. 27 of 2004 amended sub-Section (3) of Section 169 of the ZA & LR Act to provide that a Will relating to agricultural land governed by the said Act had to be in writing, attested by two witnesses and registered. The requirement of registration, therefore, came in with effect from 23.08.2004. The requirement of registration, therefore, came in with effect from 23.08.2004. There was no such requirement earlier. 12. In the present case, the Will is a document dated 10.01.1961 and the testator, Ram Narayan son of Lallu died some time before 28.07.1992, as the written statement was filed on that date in the suit before the Sub-Divisional Officer, taking a defence based on the Will of 1961. 13. The difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of this Court In re – Sobhnath Dube; In the Matter of the Goods of Late Kashinath Dube, 2015 SCC OnLine All 7548: 2015 (128) RD 507 on one hand, and, that in Jahan Singh v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2017 All 247 , on the other, about the retrospective application of the amended provisions of Section 169(3) of the ZA & LR Act to a will executed before the amendment, but which takes effect later after U.P. Act No.27 of 2004 came into force, would not be at all relevant in this case. The reason is that the Will was one dated 10.09.1961 and the testator died some time before 28.07.1992. The result would be that the Will would take effect before U.P. At No. 27 of 2004 came into effect on 23.08.2004. Therefore, so far as the Will, that is subject matter of action here, is concerned, there can be no cavil that it never required compulsory registration by dint of the amended provisions of sub-Section (3) of Section 169 of the ZA & LR Act. 14. Much later, a Division Bench of this Court in Pramila Tiwari v. Anil Kumar Mishra, AIR 2024 All 227 held the provisions of Section 169(3) of the ZA & LR Act, as amended by U.P. Act No.27 of 2004, to the extent these provided for compulsory registration of wills relating to agricultural land, void on ground that these were repugnant to Section 17 read with Section 40 of the Registration Act, 1908, a central legislation. Therefore, on any view of the law applicable, the Will, subject matter of action here, is not required to be compulsorily registered. The Board of Revenue in proceeding on the premise that the unregistered Will here is not legally enforceable, a finding that has been recorded rather in the passing and in words lacking certitude, cannot be countenanced. Therefore, on any view of the law applicable, the Will, subject matter of action here, is not required to be compulsorily registered. The Board of Revenue in proceeding on the premise that the unregistered Will here is not legally enforceable, a finding that has been recorded rather in the passing and in words lacking certitude, cannot be countenanced. The Will dated 10.01.1961 does not require compulsory registration by dint of Section 169(3) of the Act of 1950. It is held, accordingly. 15. Admittedly, the testator in this case Ram Narain, a bhumidhar with transferable rights, could devise a life estate in favour of his wife, Smt. Parwati with a reversion to his blood relatives. The principle that a bhumidhar can bequeath his bhumidhari rights by Will, granting a limited right and a lifetime interest to the legatee in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jagan Singh (Dead) through LRs v. Dhanwanti and another, (2012) 2 SCC 628 , is well settled. The Will in this case, propounded by the defendant, if proved in accordance with law, cannot be held an invalid bequest on ground that it grants a lifetime estate alone to the legatee, Ram Narain’s widow, under Section 169(3) of the ZA & LR Act. 16. This brings us to the most important question, whether the defendant’s defence in the suit that the Will dated 10.01.1961, being one granting a life estate to the plaintiff, Parwati, did not entitle her to seek partition, was open to be determined by the Revenue Court, the said claim never being raised during consolidation proceedings held under the CH Act. There is no cavil that there were consolidation operations in the village that went through full course and came to be de-notified under Section 52 of the CH Act before the suit was instituted. In those proceedings, the plaintiff, Parwati, was recorded in the khata, along with Ramgopal, as bhumidhar to the extent of a half share or a moity. 17. In the supplementary counter affidavit, a copy of the CH Form 41, relating to Mauza Tajpur, has been filed as Annexure No. SCA-1. In the joint khata of parties, Parwati widow of Ram Narain and Ramgopal son of Lallu, are recorded in Column 8 as bhumidhar to the extent of a half share each. Final consolidation forms were drawn on this basis. In the joint khata of parties, Parwati widow of Ram Narain and Ramgopal son of Lallu, are recorded in Column 8 as bhumidhar to the extent of a half share each. Final consolidation forms were drawn on this basis. CH Form 41 and CH Form 45 are also annexed to the supplementary counter affidavit. A perusal of CH Form 45 again shows that in the joint khata of parties, Parwati widow of Ram Narain and Ramgopal son of Lallu are recorded as co-sharers. The two apparently hold a half share each in the khata. In the six yearly khatauni for the fasli years 1389-1394 again Parwati widow of Ram Narain and Ramgopal son of Lallu are recorded as bhumidhar alone, giving rise to the inference that the two of them hold a half share in the khata that Parwati inherited from her husband, Ram Narain. 18. It is true that Ram Narain inherited the land in dispute from his father, Lallu, along with his brothers. There is no concept of a Joint Hindu family property in tenure land governed by the ZA & LR Act. The ZA & LR Act predicates a uniform civil code for all citizens and, therefore, a bhumidhar, upon the demise of his predecessor-in-title, succeeds to the bhumidhari as his own property and not one that is a Joint Hindu family property or coparcenary. At the same time, a bhumidhar, who has inherited property from his predecessors, can devise by Will a limited estate, as claimed to be done in the present case, in Parwati’s favour, by Ram Narain. 19. The question that then arises is, if during consolidation operations, Parwati, who was admittedly recorded as a co-sharer along with her deceased husband’s brother, Ramgopal, in the khata, was not challenged about her right by filing an objection under Section 9 of the CH Act, questioning her rights as a bhumidhar recorded to the extent of a half share by Ramgopal, can Ramgopal now say that she has a life estate alone under Ram Narain’s Will, when she seeks partition. There is admittedly nothing to show in the rights recorded during consolidation, or right through the proceedings under the CH Act, until the drawing up of the final consolidation records that might suggest that Parwati had a life estate alone as a bhumidhar. 20. It was submitted with formidable force by Mr. There is admittedly nothing to show in the rights recorded during consolidation, or right through the proceedings under the CH Act, until the drawing up of the final consolidation records that might suggest that Parwati had a life estate alone as a bhumidhar. 20. It was submitted with formidable force by Mr. Shashi Kant Shukla that a co-sharer during consolidation, who is at peace with others, would not oblige those others to file objections under Section 9 of the CH Act and seek partition of the khata upon pain of loosing their right to partition on account of the bar under Section 49 of the CH Act. The reason is, as Mr. Shukla rightly submits, that co-sharers, who are living at peace during consolidation proceedings, would not loose their right to seek partition at a later point of time, when the animus to separate comes into existence. A partition suit by one of the co-sharers, who have remained joint with their share recorded during consolidation proceedings, until denotification under Section 52 of the CH Act, would have a right at any time to seek partition and sue for it. We agree that a suit for partition by a co-sharer of a joint holding, that has suffered consolidation under the CH Act, would not be barred by Section 49. 21. In support of his submission, Mr. Shukla has placed reliance upon a Bench decision of this Court in Ram Briksha v. Dy. Director of Consolidation and others, 2017 SCC OnLine All 4417: 2017 (6) ALJ 610 . Reference was made to a Larger Bench by a learned Single Judge, where three questions, directly bearing on the issue, were involved. These questions were answered in Ram Briksha (supra) in the following terms : Issue No. I 63. Whether use of words “could or ought to have been taken” in latter part of Section 49 of the Act, compulsorily forces the co-sharers, who are living jointly, peacefully and have no grievance against their father/brother/co-sharer, whose name is recorded in representative capacity, or they were willing to live jointly, due to situation of their family, i.e. (father and minor son), (mother and minor son), (brother and minor brother) and (some co-sharer was student and had gone abroad for study and fully depends upon other co-sharers) etc., to file an objection under Section 9 of the Act for separation of his share? A. Because of the words “could or ought to have been taken” in latter part of Section 49 of the Act, same does not compulsorily force the co-sharers, who are living jointly, peacefully and have no grievance against their father/brother/co-sharer whose name is recorded in representative capacity or they were willing to live jointly due to situation of their family and who have not filed an objection under Section 49 of the Act for separation of their share inasmuch as under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, it is the statutory obligation cast upon the authorities and the incumbent, who has been holding the property in question in the representative capacity to get the records corrected and in case in designed manner the obligation in question has not been discharged by Consolidation Authorities as well as by the incumbent holding the property in the representative capacity, men in such a situation Section 49 of the Act would not at all be attracted and such situation would be covered under the contingency of planned fraud to drop the name of other co-sharers from the revenue records. Issue No. II 64. Whether by operation of law, the parties can be thrown into litigation against their will need and by not raising claim to land or partition and separation of the chak their right to property can be taken away in spite of protection available under Article 19(1) (f) and now Article 300-A of the Constitution? A. The answer is that a party cannot be thrown in litigation against their will/need and by not raising claim to land of, partition and separation of chak, their rights to property cannot be taken away under the protection provided for under Article 19(1)(f)/Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Issue No. III 65. Whether, in spite of well settled legal principle in respect of joint property, right of a co-sharer will come to an end under Section 49 of the Act, on the notification under Section 52, due to not claiming partition of his share and separate chak in his name, although, mere had been no ouster from joint property? Whether, in spite of well settled legal principle in respect of joint property, right of a co-sharer will come to an end under Section 49 of the Act, on the notification under Section 52, due to not claiming partition of his share and separate chak in his name, although, mere had been no ouster from joint property? A. The rights of the co-sharers will not at all come to an end under Section 49 of the Act, on the notification under Section 52 due to not claiming partition of his share and separate chak in his name and till there is no ouster from the joint property his right in the property will continue to exist. 22. The position of the law, which Mr. Shukla emphasizes, is well settled and he is right in stating the principle that he urges, but the question is that this is not a case, where the plaintiff has been non-suited because she did not file objections under Section 9 of the CH Act. There was not even an issue, if her suit seeking partition is barred by Section 49 of the CH Act. To the contrary, Issue No.6, framed here, is not about the suit for partition being barred by Section 49, but the defendant’s defence, based on the Will, being barred under the aforesaid provision. 23. There is little cavil that if Parwati and Ramgopal did not file objections under Section 9 of the CH Act while the consolidation operations were current and before the denotification under Section 52, because they did not want to partition at that time, the plaintiff’s cause of action to sue for partition, when one of the co-sharers intended to separate, cannot be held barred by Section 49. But, this is a case where applying these principles are besides the point. It is not a simple case where parties have a moiety in the joint khata, which the plaintiff wants partitioned. 24. To the contrary, there is an underlying dispute of pure title between parties, which has necessarily arisen during consolidation, but not objected to by the defendant. That dispute is that whereas the plaintiff says that she has inherited intestate a half share in the khata, being her deceased husband's share, Ramgopal, the defendant says that Parwati does not have an absolute bhumidhari estate to the extent of the moiety that she claims. That dispute is that whereas the plaintiff says that she has inherited intestate a half share in the khata, being her deceased husband's share, Ramgopal, the defendant says that Parwati does not have an absolute bhumidhari estate to the extent of the moiety that she claims. He asserts that it is not an estate that she has inherited intestate from her husband, but one taken under the Will dated 10.01.1961. The Will has given her a life estate alone, as distinguished from an absolute and unlimited bhumidhari. The dispute, therefore, is not about the plaintiff’s moiety in the joint khata, but the nature of her right, to wit, whether it is unlimited and absolute or just a life estate, which she cannot seek partition of or assign or bequeath. 25. Now, this is a pure question of title, which had to be raised during consolidation proceedings by the party, who thought that the nature of the other's estate was incorrectly recorded by the Consolidation Authorities. Even if one of the parties thought that the Consolidation Authorities did not err in recording the nature of their respective estates, it has to be seen the way the Consolidation Authorities have recorded the rights or shares of both parties, vis-a-vis the nature of their right and title in the khata. A plain reading of CH Form-11, which comes at a quite late stage of the consolidation proceedings, in this case shows that in the said CH Form, as already noticed, the plaintiff, Parwati, and defendant, Ramgopal, were shown in Column-8 as shareholders of a moiety. 26. Column 8 in CH Form-11 carries the following particulars, according to the specified form in the rules : The name of the tenure holder with details of shares if partitioned on the basis of shares. The entry of a half share in Column 8 for the plaintiff and the defendant clearly shows that the two of them held a moiety each, though they might not have decided to partition by metes and bounds. That decision was taken much later, when the suit was filed. 27. However, in the nature of consolidation proceedings, title of a person has to be recorded. It is at the cynosure of these proceedings, quite apart from the creation of compact chak. That decision was taken much later, when the suit was filed. 27. However, in the nature of consolidation proceedings, title of a person has to be recorded. It is at the cynosure of these proceedings, quite apart from the creation of compact chak. It is for this reason that all issues of title, amongst the chak holders, that arise during consolidation, have been entrusted exclusively to be decided under the CH Act, be it Section 9-A or 12 thereof. The same position about the plaintiff and the defendant holding a moiety each in the khata is reflected in C.H. Form 45, again, subject to the right of the parties to seek a partition of their share, whenever they willed. 28. The jurisdiction is all encompassing. It is also much settled for a principle that a dispute relating to title about tenure land covered by the ZA & LR Act, if not raised after the issue of a notification under Section 4(1) of the CH Act, cannot, afterwards, be raised. Section 49 of the CH Act envisages a constructive bar to the adjudication of rights by a Civil or Revenue Court, not limited to rights arising out of consolidation proceedings, but the declaration and adjudication of the rights of tenure holders in respect of land falling in an area, for which, a notification under Section 4(2) of the CH Act has been issued. In fact, in the scheme of things, the CH Act envisages a final settlement of all rights relating to land of a tenure holder, which is subject to consolidation proceedings, also constructively, if not raised, before proceedings for carvation of compact chak commence. 29. One of the early and most eloquent authorities on the point is Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Alld. and others, 1969 SCC OnLine All 394 : 1970 RD 413 . In Rishal Singh (supra), it was held by Hari Swarup, J. : 5. 29. One of the early and most eloquent authorities on the point is Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Alld. and others, 1969 SCC OnLine All 394 : 1970 RD 413 . In Rishal Singh (supra), it was held by Hari Swarup, J. : 5. Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act/hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force the declaration of adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying within an area for which a notification has been issued under Section 4 or adjudication of any right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to right in such land or with respect to any other matters for which the proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act’. Interpreting this section along with Section 5 of the Act, the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Adhar Singh v. Ram Roop Singh ( [1968 A.W.R. 14 SC.] ) held: ‘Section 49 excludes the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in respect of lands covered by the notification, under Section 4, or with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act’. Admittedly the opposite parties could have taken the plea before the consolidation authorities under Sections 9 and 9-A of the Act to the effect that they were the exclusive owners of the plots and that the petitioner had no right therein. It is also not denied that no such action was taken. The adjudication on this point is therefore, barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. Section 9-A(1)(ii) provides that where no objections are filed the Asstt. Consolidation Officer shall, after making such enquiry, as he may deem necessary, correct the mistakes. Section 10 of the Act deals with the preparation and maintenance of the revised annual register in accordance with the order passed under Section 9-A of the Act. Section 9-A(1)(ii) provides that where no objections are filed the Asstt. Consolidation Officer shall, after making such enquiry, as he may deem necessary, correct the mistakes. Section 10 of the Act deals with the preparation and maintenance of the revised annual register in accordance with the order passed under Section 9-A of the Act. Any order passed under Section 9-A of the Act is appealable under Section 11 of the Act and the same becomes final and not liable to be questioned in any court of law. If no appeal is filed the order of the Asstt. Consolidation Officer remains final. Subjection (3) of Section 9-A provides that the Asstt. Consolidation Officer while acting under sub-section (1) of Section 9-A of the Act shall be deemed to be a court of competent jurisdiction notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. It may be that the Asstt. Consolidation Officer is not a court in the strict sense of the term but for the purposes of determining the rights of the parties to the land which is brought under consolidation he is deemed to be a court and any order passed by him directing the making of corrections or not ordering any corrections in the event it is not necessary will be deemed to be final and not questionable in any civil or revenue court. This is the effect of Section 49 read with Section 5 of the Act. 6. After the proceedings under Section 9-A of the Act are over, the land which is subject to consolidation scheme is brought into the common consolidation pool and thereafter the land distributed to various persons who have contributed to the pool. The Chaks are thereafter formed and proceedings are taken for finalisation of the chaks. After the Chaks are ultimately formed information is given by form No. 25 and thereafter the entries are made in the revenue records under Section 27 of the Act and form No. 45 is prepared to show the names of the parties and the consolidated areas which they have been allotted. After the consolidation comes to an end the rights of the parties get crystallised and new areas get allotted to the Chak-holders. These also become final. 30. After the consolidation comes to an end the rights of the parties get crystallised and new areas get allotted to the Chak-holders. These also become final. 30. In Rakesh Kumar Minor u/g Smt. Shanti Devi v. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others, 1972 SCC OnLine All 81 : 1972 RD 326 , it was held by Satish Chandra, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for the Division : 6. .... Sec. 49 by its first clause declares that adjudication of rights of tenure-holders shall be done in accordance with the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act while the second clause thereof debars civil or revenue court from entertaining any suit or proceeding with respect to rights which could or ought to have been so adjudicated. The defence in the present suit raises a question as to adjudication of right with respect to the plots in dispute. Such a defence cannot be entertained by the revenue court if “a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act” with respect to the rights now sought to be questioned. 7. When Consolidation proceedings commenced the plaintiff was entered as a co-tenant. The defendant did not say that they were unaware of the consolidation proceedings or the state of entries at that time. Har Swarup had died in 1936. The cause of action for adjudication of the question whether his widow inherited any share in the family properties arose on his death. After his death the defendant could have instituted a suit for the adjudication of the plaintiff's title. On commencement of Consolidation proceedings he could have raised a dispute about it by filing an objection under Sec. 9 of the Act. There is nothing upon which it could be held that the defendant could not have taken proceedings under the Act for the adjudication of the plaintiff's right or title. If he could, then Sec. 49 bars the civil or Revenue court from entertaining such a question of title. 8. The plaintiff's suit is of course not barred because it proceeds to enforce the entries made in Consolidation proceedings. The cause of action for the present suit arose after the closure of the consolidation proceedings, as is apparent from the plaint. The plaint is not asking for any disturbance of the entries made during the Consolidation operations. 8. The plaintiff's suit is of course not barred because it proceeds to enforce the entries made in Consolidation proceedings. The cause of action for the present suit arose after the closure of the consolidation proceedings, as is apparent from the plaint. The plaint is not asking for any disturbance of the entries made during the Consolidation operations. It is the defence which raises questions the acceptance of which will mean the setting aside and cancellation or ignorance of the entries made in consolidation proceedings; and that is, under the circumstance of the case, not permissible. Sec. 49 was a clear bar to this plea in defence. 31. Much later in the day, in Shri Ram and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad and others, 2011 SCC OnLine All 417 : (2011) 112 RD 734 , one of the questions, that were referred for consideration to the Division Bench by a learned Single Judge, was to the following effect : (IV) Whether the provisions of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act have an over riding effect over all other Acts for the time being in force keeping in view the provisions of Section 49 and have the exclusive jurisdiction to decide right, title and interest of claimants relating to land tenures upon a notification under Section 4 or not? 32. In answering Question No. IV, it was opined by their Lordships of the Division Bench in Shri Ram (supra) : As noted above, Section 5(2) of the Act, 1953 provides for abatement of all proceedings for the correction of records and every suit and proceedings in respect of declaration of rights or interest in any land laying in the area, or for declaration or adjudication of any other right in regard to which proceeding can or ought to be taken under this Act, pending before before any Court or authority whether of the first instance or of appeal, reference of revision. A plain reading of Section 49, indicates that after the issuance of notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 for declaration and adjudication of right of tenure-holder or adjudication of any other right, the forum is the consolidation court and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to rights in such land. A plain reading of Section 49, indicates that after the issuance of notification under sub-section (2) of Section 4 for declaration and adjudication of right of tenure-holder or adjudication of any other right, the forum is the consolidation court and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings with respect to rights in such land. Section 49 of the Act, contains two prohibitions, firstly for an area which has been notified under sub-section (2) of Section 4, no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings during currency of notification under Section 4(2) and secondly, even after consolidation proceedings are over, no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of rights in such land for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Section 49 of the Act, 1953 came up for consideration before this Court and the Apex Court in several cases. The judgment of the Apex Court in Sita Ram v. Chhota Bhonde, 1990 RD, 439 had elaborately considered Section 49 of the Act, 53. Following was laid down by the apex Court in the aforesaid judgement. “From a perusal of Section 49 it is evident that declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect land lying in an area for which a notification has been issued under Section 4(2) and adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act, had to be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act only and the jurisdiction of the civil or revenue courts to entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to any other matter for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act, has been taken away. The language used in Section 49 is wide and comprehensive. Declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in the area covered by the notification under Section 4(2) of the Act and adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under the Act, would cover adjudication of questions as to title in respect of the said lands. This view also finds support from the other provisions of the Act and the amendments that have been introduced therein.” 33. This question was also considered by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Mishra v. Chandrika Pandey (Dead) by Lrs., (2009) 3 SCC 720 . Though the facts in Madan Mohan Mishra (supra) show that after issue of notification under Section 4 of the CH Act had attained finality and the plaintiff, who was appellant before the Supreme Court, filed another suit for a decree of injunction, and, in the alternative, for the recovery of possession, the bar under Section 49 of the CH Act was held all encompassing. It was remarked by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Mishra : 20. Jurisdiction of the civil court not only in respect of the matters which are specified therein but also the matters which could and ought to have been the subject- matter of the proceedings under the said Act is barred. The words of the said section are absolutely clear and unambiguous. 23. In Audhar v. Chandrapati [ (2003) 11 SCC 458 ] a Division Bench of this Court upon noticing Section 49 of the 1953 Act, opined that Section 49 of the 1953 Act confers exclusive jurisdiction under the Act and the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred, stating: (SCC pp. 463-64, paras 17-19) “17. … The authorities under the Consolidation Act of 1953 could justifiably conclude their proceedings under that Act despite pendency of second appeal against the order of the first appellate court declaring the proceedings in the civil suit to have abated. 18. We find that the main issue on facts is concluded against the appellants. The lands in the khatas in question are found to be tenancy lands of the classes ‘bhumidhari’ and ‘sirdari’. They are not sir or khudkasht lands. Under the special mode of succession provided under the tenancy law widow Akashi inherited absolute title to 1/4th share of her husband and she could execute a valid gift deed in favour of her daughters. 19. They are not sir or khudkasht lands. Under the special mode of succession provided under the tenancy law widow Akashi inherited absolute title to 1/4th share of her husband and she could execute a valid gift deed in favour of her daughters. 19. The present legal position as it stands during pendency of the second appeal before the High Court is that the civil court's decree declaring the gift deed as invalid has not attained finality because during pendency of proceedings before the first appellate court after remand by the High Court, proceedings under the Consolidation Act of 1953 had commenced and the jurisdiction of the civil court stood ousted. We, therefore, find no merit in any of the contentions advanced on behalf of the appellants.” 24. Yet again in Narender Singh v. Jai Bhagwan [ (2005) 9 SCC 157 ] this Court, upon noticing GND, stated the law, thus: (SCC p. 160, paras 10-11) “10. The learned counsel for the respondents is right in his reply that the lands being exclusively recorded in the name of the father, the sons who claim joint ownership in the lands could and ought to have approached the authorities under the Act for getting them jointly recorded in the revenue papers. Such proceedings for recording them as joint owners having not been initiated under the Act of 1953, the High Court was right in invoking bar against such plea in the suit in accordance with Section 49 of the Act. We find that the contention advanced and accepted by the High Court gets full support from the following observations of this Court in Sita Ram [Sita Ram v. Chhota Bhondey, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 556] : (SCC p. 564, para 13) ‘13. In the instant case Respondent 1 was claiming an interest in the land lying in the area covered by notification issued under Section 4(2) on the basis that he is the son of Chhota, brother of Nanha and that the lands were recorded in the name of Nanha in a representative capacity on behalf of himself and his other brothers. This claim which fell within the ambit of Section 5(2) had to be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities. This claim which fell within the ambit of Section 5(2) had to be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities. Since it was a matter falling within the scope of adjudicatory functions assigned to the consolidation authorities under the Act the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit in respect of the said matter was expressly barred by Section 49 of the Act and the suit of the appellant was rightly dismissed on that ground.’ 11. The argument that revenue entry in the name of the father should have been treated as in representative capacity for the sons is misleading. Whether the father was karta and manager of the family and as such could be recorded in representative capacity for all co-owners in the family was also a question of title which fell within exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act.” 25. The jurisdiction of the civil court, therefore, is clearly barred as it is evident that subject-matter of both the suits is agricultural lands only. It is not, therefore, necessary for us to go into the question with regard to the effect of a prayer made in a suit for setting aside the deed of gift in terms of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or otherwise. 34. What, therefore, in our opinion, bars the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court into examining the nature of parties’ right, title and interest in the land in dispute is the fact that the defendant, who propounds the Will to establish a life estate for the plaintiff, never did so during consolidation proceedings, when he could and ought have done it, attracting the bar under Section 49 of the CH Act. While the suit would not be barred for the relief of partition in accordance with the determination of shares made by the Consolidation Authorities, reflected in the final consolidation forms and other proceedings, it would not be open to the Revenue Court to investigate and determine the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s title on the basis of Will dated 10.01.1996 that the defendant propounds to limit the plaintiff’s interest to a life estate in the land in dispute. The Revenue Court’s jurisdiction to investigate the extent of the plaintiff’s right and title to the land in dispute, based on the Will propounded by the defendant, would be barred by Section 49 of the CH Act. 35. The Revenue Court’s jurisdiction to investigate the extent of the plaintiff’s right and title to the land in dispute, based on the Will propounded by the defendant, would be barred by Section 49 of the CH Act. 35. As already remarked, the suit for partition of the parties’ shares in accordance with the determination made by the Consolidation Authorities can proceed and a final decree too can be passed in accordance with the preliminary decree. The Board of Revenue has, therefore, committed no error in restoring the Trial Court’s decree. 36. No other point was pressed. 37. In the result, this petition fails and stands dismissed 38. There shall be no order as to costs.