JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging Ext.P1 order of externment passed against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [KAA(P) Act for the sake of brevity]. By the said order, the petitioner was interdicted from entering the limits of the Revenue District, Malappuram, for a period of one year from the date of the receipt of the order. 2. The records available before us reveal that, it was after considering the recurrent involvement of the petitioner in criminal activities, the District Police Chief, Malappuram submitted a proposal for the initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007 before the authorised officer, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Thrissur Range. For initiation of proceedings, the petitioner has been classified as a “known rowdy” as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act, 2007. 3. The authority considered 4 cases in which the petitioner was involved for passing the order of externment. The last case considered for passing the impugned order of externment is crime No.557/2024 of Vengara Police Station registered, alleging commission of offences punishable under Section 392 IPC. 4. Heard Sri. M.H. Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the Ext.P1 order was passed on improper consideration of facts and without proper application of mind. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the order of externment, and hence, the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the externment is snapped. The learned counsel further submitted that, out of the cases considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the impugned order, the last two cases are under investigation. According to the counsel, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.557/2024. But prior to the registration of the said crime, another case was registered against the petitioner as crime No.242/2023 of Thamarassery Police Station and in the said case, the formal arrest of the externee was recorded only on 12.07.2024 while he was in custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. But prior to the registration of the said crime, another case was registered against the petitioner as crime No.242/2023 of Thamarassery Police Station and in the said case, the formal arrest of the externee was recorded only on 12.07.2024 while he was in custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, though the petitioner got bail in the last case registered against him on 17.07.2024, he got bail in the last but one case, i.e., in crime No.242/2023 only on 11.09.2024. However, in the impugned order, the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the last but one case is not adverted to, and it is not mentioned that the bail conditions imposed in the said case were not sufficient to deter the externee from involving in criminal activities. Moreover, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned order was passed in a casual manner without arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction, and hence warrants interference. 6. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority after proper application of mind and upon arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the learned Government Pleader, there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order, and hence, the petitioner could not be heard to say that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment was snapped. According to the learned Government Pleader the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court while granting bail to the externee in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity as well as in the last but one case were duly considered by the jurisdictional authority and it was after being satisfied that those conditions are not sufficient to restrain the externee from repeating criminal activities, the externment order was passed. It was further submitted that all the procedural safeguards were complied with while passing the order of externment against the petitioner, and hence, no interference is warranted. 7. On perusal of the records, it is gatherable that the last prejudicial activity considered by the jurisdictional authority to pass Ext.P1 order of externment is crime No.557/2024 of Vengara Police Station, registered against the petitioner alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 392 IPC. 7. On perusal of the records, it is gatherable that the last prejudicial activity considered by the jurisdictional authority to pass Ext.P1 order of externment is crime No.557/2024 of Vengara Police Station, registered against the petitioner alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 392 IPC. The last prejudicial activity was committed on 14.06.2024, and in the said case, the petitioner was arrested on 24.06.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner was released on bail on 17.07.2024. Thereafter, it was on 27.09.2024, the District Police Chief, Malappuram, forwarded the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P)Act against the petitioner. Subsequently, a notice was issued to the petitioner on 09.10.2024 to show cause why action under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act should not be initiated against him. For affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard personally, he was further directed to appear in person on 17.10.2024. However, the petitioner did not appear on the said date. Hence, another notice was issued to the petitioner directing him to appear on 24.10.2024. But even then, the petitioner opted not to appear before the jurisdictional authority or to file a written representation to the jurisdictional authority. It was thereafter, the jurisdictional authority passed the order of externment on 29.10.2024, whereby the petitioner was restrained from entering the limits of the Revenue District, Malappuram, for a period of one year from the date of receipt of the order. 8. The sequence of events narrated above reveals that there is no inordinate delay in passing the impugned order. Admittedly, the last prejudicial activity was committed on 14.06.2024, and the petitioner, who is arrayed as the 3rd accused in the said case, was arrested on 24.06.2024, and he was granted bail only on 17.07.2024. However, while he was in judicial custody in the said case, his formal arrest was recorded in the last but one case registered against him as crime No.242/2023 of Thamarassery Police Station, and he was released on bail in the said case only on 11.09.2024. After his release on bail in the said case, on 27.09.2024, i.e., without much delay from the date of his release from jail, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act was mooted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram. After his release on bail in the said case, on 27.09.2024, i.e., without much delay from the date of his release from jail, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act was mooted by the District Police Chief, Malappuram. As the petitioner was in judicial custody till 11.09.2024, and there was no imminent apprehension regarding repetition of any offence by the petitioner, the short delay occurred in mooting the proposal is only justifiable. Moreover, an externment order under the KAA(P) Act is having significant bearing on the personal as well as fundamental rights of an individual. Therefore, some minimum time is required to collect the details of the cases in which the petitioner is involved and to comply with the procedural formalities. Therefore, we are of the view that the delay occurred in this case is only justifiable, and it could not be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the impugned order is snapped. Notably, unlike in the case of an order of detention passed under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act, even if some delay has occurred in passing an order of externment, the same has no serious bearing as the consequences of both the orders are different. Because an order of detention is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. We are cognizant that Section 15 of the KAA(P) Act also visits the person concerned with an intrusion on his personal liberty within the limit of Article 21 especially when the said order restrains a citizen from his right to travel in any part of India. However, when a detention order under Section 3 of KAA(P) Act is compared with an order of externment passed under Section 15(1) of KAA(P) Act, the latter visits a person with lesser deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the nature of proceedings under Sections 3 and 15 is inherently different. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ] . Moreover, an order under Section 15 of KAA(P) Act can be treated only as equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. In this regard, we are fortified by the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and others [ 2011 (1) KHC 852 ] . Moreover, an order under Section 15 of KAA(P) Act can be treated only as equivalent to a condition imposed in a bail order, especially when the same only curtails the movement of the petitioner. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the minimal delay in mooting the proposal and in passing the externment order after the date of the last prejudicial activity has no serious impact at all, and the same is only liable to be discarded. 9. The learned counsel further submitted that out of the cases considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the impugned order, the last two cases are under investigation. According to the counsel, the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is crime No.557/2024. But prior to the registration of the said crime, another case was registered against the petitioner as crime No.242/2023 of Thamarassery Police Station and in the said case, the formal arrest of the externee was recorded only on 12.07.2024 while he was in custody in connection with the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. Moreover, though the petitioner got bail in the last case registered against him on 17.07.2024, he got bail in the last but one case, i.e., in crime No.242/2023, only on 11.09.2024. However, in the impugned order, the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the last but one case is not adverted to, and it is not mentioned that the bail conditions imposed in the said case were not sufficient to deter the externee from involving in criminal activities. 10. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law which precludes the jurisdictional authority to pass an order of externment against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of externment is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the externee from involving in criminal activities. However, when an order of externment is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the externee from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity and in the last but one case is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the conditions clamped on the externee in the last bail order are also not sufficient to restrain him from repeating criminal activities. It is true that the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time of granting bail to the petitioner are not extracted in Ext.P1 order. However, there is no requirement of law that the bail conditions imposed must be extracted as such in the order; instead, what is required is proper application of mind by the jurisdictional authority regarding the sufficiency of bail conditions. In the case at hand, the sufficiency of bail conditions imposed on the petitioner is seen properly considered and the externment order is seen passed after being satisfied that those conditions are insufficient to restrain the externee from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will not sustain. 11. Another contention pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, apart from the FIR registered, there are no documents to show that the petitioner has committed the offence mentioned in the last case registered against him. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that there is no law that in order to initiate a proceeding under KAA(P) Act, a final report must be filed in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that there is no law that in order to initiate a proceeding under KAA(P) Act, a final report must be filed in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. We do agree that in order to initiate proceedings under KAA(P) Act, apart from registering an FIR, something more to show the complicity of the accused in the commission of the offence is required. However, in the case at hand, from the documents produced from the side of the petitioner, it is gatherable that a report incorporating the petitioner as the 3rd accused in crime No.557/2024 of Vengara Police Station has been filed before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Malappuram and in the said report, it is specifically mentioned that from the investigation so far conducted and from the statement of the witnesses recorded the involvement of the petitioner in the commission of the offence is revealed. Moreover, a perusal of records reveals that during the investigation, complicity of more accused persons was also revealed in the commission of the offence, and the investigating officer has filed a report before the jurisdictional Magistrate to incorporate Section 395 IPC in the FIR and to delete Section 392 IPC. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the petitioner could not be heard to say that apart from registering an FIR, there is nothing to prove the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the offence in the last case registered. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will also fail. 12. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary requirements before passing an order under Section 15(1) (a) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the externment order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 15(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner. 13. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.