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2025 DIGILAW 1406 (ALL)

Ashish Yadav v. State Of U. P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Panchayati Raj Lko.

2025-12-10

INDRAJEET SHUKLA, RAJAN ROY

body2025
JUDGMENT : INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J. 1. Heard Shri Alok Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State. 2. By means of this special appeal an order passed on 26.11.2025 by learned Single Judge in Writ - A No. 13339 of 2025 has been challenged.The said order reads as under:- "Short affidavit filed today on behalf of State is taken on record. Learned counsel for petitioner prays for and is granted two weeks time to file response thereto. List this case in 2nd week of January, 2026 as fresh." 3. The order impugned is purely an interlocutory order of a procedural nature which does not decide any issue whatsoever. Two weeks time was sought by the learned counsel for the appellant himself which was granted and the matter was posted in the 2nd week of January, 2026 as fresh. 4. The Special Appeal has been filed under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. The appeal under aforesaid provision is maintainable against a judgment or final order or an order having the trappings of finality. The nature of the order which is impugned herein does not fall in any of these categories. We may in this regard rely upon a judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. Vs. Chunilal Nanda and Ors. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 399 , wherein term 'judgment' occurring in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent pertaining to another High Court was taken into consideration. The principle laid down in the said judgment applies in this case on all its fours. Para 15 and 16 of the said judgment reads as under:- " 15. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories: (i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in the main case. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly affects the final decision in the main case. (iii) Orders which finally decide a collateral issue or question which is not the subject-matter of the main case. (iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the case till its culmination in the final judgment. (v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and obligations of the parties." 16. The term 'judgment' occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in Section 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule 1 of CPC, but also other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii) above, are, therefore, "judgments" for the purpose of filing appeals under the Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories (iv) and (v) are not "judgments" for purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent. 5. The orders impugned herein falls in the category of Clause (iv) of Para 15 of the said judgment and does not fall in category (i) to (iii) of the above quoted Paragraph 15 and 16 of the judgment in Midnapore' case (supra). Likewise, is the law propounded by a Full Bench of this Court in a case reported in (2015) 4 UPLBEC 2673 ; Ashutosh Shrotriya and Ors. Vs. Vice-Chancellor, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar University and Ors., para 27 of which is relevant. In view of the above discussion, no appeal lies under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 against the order impugned herein. This appeal is not maintainable. 6. As regards reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on para 12 of a decision reported in AIR 2004 SC 1975 ; Deoraj Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , firstly, when the appeal itself is not maintainable there is no question of considering the application of the said judgment. This appeal is not maintainable. 6. As regards reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on para 12 of a decision reported in AIR 2004 SC 1975 ; Deoraj Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , firstly, when the appeal itself is not maintainable there is no question of considering the application of the said judgment. Even otherwise, as, the learned counsel for the appellant insists that we consider the application of the said judgment, we are of the opinion that the same has no application to the case at hand for the reason, in the said case it has been observed - "Situations emerge where the granting of an interim relief would tantamount to granting the final relief itself. And then there may be converse cases where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner though all the findings may be in his favour. In such cases the availability of a very strong prima facie case -- of a standard much higher than just prima facie case, the considerations of balance of convenience and irreparable injury forcefully tilting the balance of case totally in favour of the applicant may persuade the Court to grant an interim relief though it amounts to granting the final relief itself. Of course, such would be rare and exceptional cases. The Court would grant such an interim relief only if satisfied that withholding of it would prick the conscience of the Court and do violence to the sense of justice, resulting in injustice being perpetuated throughout the hearing, and at the end the Court would not be able to vindicate the cause of justice. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the Court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent." 7. Obviously such would be rare cases accompanied by compelling circumstances, where the injury complained of is immediate and pressing and would cause extreme hardship. The conduct of the parties shall also have to be seen and the Court may put the parties on such terms as may be prudent." 7. As would be evident from the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court the aforesaid recitals apply to a case where withholding of an interim relief would tantamount to dismissal of main petition itself; for, by the time the main matter comes up for hearing there would be nothing left to be allowed as relief to the petitioner. The case at hand is not such a case as the order which is impugned in the writ petition is one of suspension and according to the learned counsel for the appellant the said suspension order states that a charge sheet will be served subsequently but it has not been issued nor served upon the appellant, meaning thereby, there are no chances of disciplinary proceedings being completed before the 2nd week of January, 2026 when the writ petition has been posted. 8. As regards the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that charge sheets issued to the appellant-petitioner prior to his suspension have also been challenged and as they are veritably no charge sheet in the eyes of law, therefore, if the stay is not granted and disciplinary proceedings are concluded, then, the aforesaid observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Deoraj (supra) will apply, we wish to disagree for the reasons already given. We are almost in the midst of December, 2025. The Writ Court has posted the writ petition in the 2nd week of January, 2026. There are no chances of the disciplinary proceedings being over by then in view of what has been noticed hereinabove. 9. In view of the aforesaid, we are of the considered opinion that against such an order an appeal would not lie under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952. It is open for the appellant to press all the grounds for seeking interim relief on the next date fixed in 2nd week of January, 2026, but, the special appeal is not maintainable. 10. Accordingly, the special appeal is dismissed as not maintainable.