JUDGMENT Jobin Sebastian, J. An order of detention dated 28.12.2024 passed under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity) against one Joji, S/o. Shaji, is under challenge in this writ petition. The petitioner herein is the mother of the detenu. After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government vide order dated 17.02.2025 has confirmed the order, and the son of the petitioner has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of detention. 2. As revealed from the records, the proposal for initiation of proceedings under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act was submitted by the District Police Chief, Ernakulam Rural. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known rowdy' as defined under Section 2(p)(iii) of the KAA(P) Act. For passing the order of detention, the authority reckoned 7 cases in which the detenu got involved. The case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.1093/2024 of Kuruppampady Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 110, 296(b), 115(2), 126(2), 351(2), 309(6) r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”) and Section 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (prevention of attrocities) Act. 3. We heard Sri.M.H.Hanis, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority without proper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in passing the impugned order after the alleged commission of the last prejudicial activity and the said delay will snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the detention order. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order without seriously taking note of the fact that the detenu was already on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court while granting bail to the petitioner was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority and passed the impugned order in a hasty manner. According to the counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court while granting bail to the petitioner was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority and passed the impugned order in a hasty manner. The counsel further urged that, initially, on 15.11.2024, though the SHO, Kuruppampady Police Station, forwarded a report recommending initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act against the petitioner, to the Superintendent of Police, Ernakulam Rural, the sponsoring authority, the said report was returned by the latter for rectifying some defects found in the said report. Thereafter, on 02.12.2024, the SHO, Kuruppampady Police Station re-submitted the report after rectifying the shortcomings. But the copy of the said report was not served on the detenu. According to the learned counsel, the non-service of the copy of the said report of the SHO to the detenu is fatal, and the impugned order is liable to be interfered with on the said sole ground. The learned counsel further submitted that, though on behalf of the detenu, he prepared a representation for being forwarded to the Government and sent to the Jail Superintendent concerned, the latter in turn sent back the said representation to the counsel for the petitioner himself without sending the same to the Government. According to the counsel, the said malfeasance on the part of the Jail Superintendent will seriously affect the constitutional as well as statutory right of the detenu and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The learned counsel further contended that though several grounds for setting aside the impugned were raised in the representation submitted before the Advisory Board and the Government, the representation was not properly considered by the Government and in the reply given by the Government intimating the fate of the representation, the reasons for discarding those grounds are not detailed. 5. In response, the learned Government Pleader contended that the order of detention was passed after proper application of mind and arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the failure to serve the detenu with a copy of the SHO’s report is of minimal consequence, as the jurisdictional authority did not rely on that report in issuing the impugned order, but instead based its decision on the proposal submitted by the Superintendent of Police. The learned Government Pleader submitted that the failure to serve the detenu with a copy of the SHO’s report is of minimal consequence, as the jurisdictional authority did not rely on that report in issuing the impugned order, but instead based its decision on the proposal submitted by the Superintendent of Police. Moreover, the learned Government Pleader conceded that the representation prepared on behalf of the detenu by his counsel and sent to the Jail Superintendent, which was meant for forwarding to the Government, was sent back to the counsel for the petitioner. However, another representation, which is the verbatim reproduction of the representation sent to the Jail Superintendent, was duly forwarded to the Advisory Board by the detenu and hence, as the matter was already seized of by the Advisory Board if at all the representation was forwarded to the Government, the latter could not act upon it and had to wait till the opinion of the Advisory Board was obtained. According to the learned Government Pleader, therefore, no prejudice is caused to the detenu due to the non-forwarding of the representation to the Government, especially when, after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government thoroughly verified the said opinion as well as considered the representation forwarded to the Advisory Board independently. The Government Pleader further submitted that the Government duly intimated the detenu about the fate of the representation which he had submitted and hence no prejudice is caused to the detenu. 6. The records reveal that the detenu was classified as a “known rowdy”, considering his recurrent involvement in 7 cases. The case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.1093/2024 of Kuruppampady Police Station, alleging the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 110, 296(b), 115(2), 126(2), 351(2), 309(6) r/w 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short “BNS”) and Section 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (prevention of attrocities) Act. The detenu, who is arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case, was arrested on 19.10.2024. Thereafter, it was on 15.11.2024, he was released on bail on conditions. It is true that the sponsoring authority was not quick in mooting the proposal immediately after the commission of the last prejudicial activity by the detenu. The detenu, who is arrayed as the 1st accused in the said case, was arrested on 19.10.2024. Thereafter, it was on 15.11.2024, he was released on bail on conditions. It is true that the sponsoring authority was not quick in mooting the proposal immediately after the commission of the last prejudicial activity by the detenu. However, the said delay is justified as the detenu was arrested two days of the occurrence of the last crime and he was in judicial custody till 15.11.2024. As the petitioner was in judicial custody, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding the immediate commission of any offence by the detenu and therefore, the inaction of the sponsoring authority in mooting the proposal forthwith after the commission of the last prejudicial activity is justifiable. Moreover, after the release of the detenu on bail without much delay, on 04.12.2024, a proposal was forwarded by the Superintendent of Police, Ernakulam Rural, to the jurisdictional authority for the initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act. Subsequently, the detention order was passed on 28.12.2024 without any unreasonable delay. The sequence of the events clearly shows that there is no delay either in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention was snapped. 7. One of the main contentions taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, initially, on 15.11.2024, though the SHO, Kuruppampady forwarded a report to the Superintendent of Police, Ernakulam Rural, recommending initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act against the petitioner, the said report was returned by the sponsoring authority for rectifying some defects found in the said report. Thereafter, on 02.12.2024, the SHO, Kuruppampady Police Station, resubmitted the report after rectifying the shortcomings. According to the counsel, the copy of the said report was not served on the detenu, and the non-service of the copy of the said report of the SHO to the detenu is fatal. We are not oblivious that it is incumbent upon the jurisdictional authority to serve a copy of the detention order, as well as the grounds of detention, to the detenu along with the documents relied upon by it in passing the order. We are not oblivious that it is incumbent upon the jurisdictional authority to serve a copy of the detention order, as well as the grounds of detention, to the detenu along with the documents relied upon by it in passing the order. As evident from the records, it was after obtaining the report of the SHO concerned that the sponsoring authority, i.e., the Superintendent of Police Ernakulam, forwarded the proposal to the jurisdictional authority to initiate proceedings under KAA(P) Act. Moreover, it is gatherable that on verification of the report of the SHO, some shortcomings were noted by the Superintendent of Police and accordingly, the report was returned to the SHO to rectify the flaws in the said report. Subsequently, a fresh report was submitted rectifying the shortcomings, and it was after considering the said report, the Superintendent of Police mooted the proposal. Anyhow, it was not based on the report of the SHO, the jurisdictional authority acted upon; instead, it was based on the proposal submitted by the Superintendent of Police, the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order of detention. Even the detenu is not having a case that the copy of the proposal submitted by the Superintendent of Police was not served on him. In short, it is liable to be held that the non-service of the copy of the report of the SHO pales into insignificance, particularly when the same is not a relied-upon document. 8. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the detenu is that, on behalf of the detenu, he prepared a representation for being forwarded to the Government and sent the said representation to the Jail Superintendent concerned for forwarding the same after obtaining the signature of the detenu. However, instead of forwarding the same to the Government, the Jail Superintendent sent back the said representation to the counsel for the detenu. According to the learned counsel, the said malfeasance on the part of the Jail Superintendent will certainly affect the constitutional as well as statutory rights of the detenu. We do agree that it is an indefeasible right of a detenu to file representations before the Government as well as the Advisory Board challenging an order of detention passed against him. Therefore, the Jail Superintendent ought to have forwarded the representation sent to him by the counsel for the detenu to the Government after obtaining the signature of the detenu. Therefore, the Jail Superintendent ought to have forwarded the representation sent to him by the counsel for the detenu to the Government after obtaining the signature of the detenu. A postal envelope containing the address of the counsel for the detenu and a copy of the representation addressed to the Government containing a thumb impression purportedly that of the detenu are produced by the learned counsel for the appellant to show that the representation prepared by him and sent to the jail Superintendent intended to be forwarded to the Government was returned to the counsel by the jail Superintendent after obtaining the thumb impression of the detenu instead of forwarding the same to the Government. The afore-mentioned postal envelope and the copy of the representation purportedly bearing the thumb impression of the accused, which is handed over by the counsel for the petitioner at the time of hearing of this petition and the genuineness of which is not disputed by the Government Pleader, shall form part of the record of this case. 9. Now, the crucial question to be considered is whether the said lapses will infringe the constitutional right of the detenu. While considering the said question, it is to be noted that a representation, which is the verbatim reproduction of the representation prepared by the counsel for the accused for being forwarded to the Government, was sent to the Advisory Board directly by the petitioner. After considering the said representation, the Advisory Board formed an opinion. The said opinion was forwarded to the Government with the representation addressed to the Advisory Board. The Government in the matter of approving the detention, considered the representation forwarded by the Advisory Board as if it is one addressed to the Government. Thereafter, the Government independently considered the representation, and the fate of the representation was communicated to the detenu. Hence, it cannot be said that the constitutional right of the detenu is infringed in any manner. More pertinently, even if the representation was received by the Government, the Government could not have considered it, as the matter was already seized by the Advisory Board. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the detenu was in no way prejudiced by the malfeasance on the part of the jail Superintendent in sending back the representation to the counsel for the detenu instead of forwarding the same to the Government. 10. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the detenu was in no way prejudiced by the malfeasance on the part of the jail Superintendent in sending back the representation to the counsel for the detenu instead of forwarding the same to the Government. 10. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the detenu is that though several serious grounds were raised in the representation submitted by the detenu, in the reply sent by the Government, intimating the fate of the representation, only two grounds were seen considered by the Government. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that from the copy of the reply sent by the Government to the petitioner, which is produced for verification, it can be seen that the fate of the representation is duly intimated. The main grounds raised in the representation submitted by the detenu and the decision taken on those grounds are substantially indicated in the said reply. More pertinently, there is no law that an order rejecting the representation submitted by the detenu must be a speaking order. All that is necessary is that there should be real and proper consideration of representation by the Government and the Advisory Board, and the fate of the representation shall be intimated to the detenu. The same is seen properly done in this case. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will not sustain. 11. Another contention canvassed from the side of the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority, while passing the order, did not take notice of the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the last case registered against him. According to the counsel, the jurisdictional authority failed to consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time when he was granted bail. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority to pass an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority to pass an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the detenu from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the petitioner was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the conditions clamped on the detenu are not sufficient to restrain him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will also fail. 12. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary procedural requirements before passing an order under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.