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2025 DIGILAW 1406 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Irfan Khan S/o Raheem Baksh

2025-07-11

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, SUNIL BENIWAL

body2025
Judgment : 1. In the instant criminal leave to appeal under Section 378 (III) & (I) Cr.P.C. preferred by the appellant-State, a challenge is laid to the judgment of acquittal dated 16.05.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases & Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bikaner (in short, ‘Trial Court’), in Sessions Case No.55/2015 (CIS No.239/2015) - State of Rajasthan Vs. Irfan Khan & Ors., whereby the accused respondents, namely, Irfan Khan and Kapil @ Gopi were acquitted of the charges against them under Sections 302 , 201, 120B IPC & Sections 3(2)(V), 3(2)(vi) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act; and accused- respondent Smt. Arti has been acquitted of the charges against her under Sections 302 , 201 & 120B IPC. 1.1. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the year 2015 and the present appeal has been pending since the year 2024. 2. Brief facts of the present case, as placed before this Court by Mr. C.S. Ojha, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant-State, are that on 08.05.2015 at around 05:30 PM, FIR No. 114/2015 was registered at Jai Narayan Vyas Colony Police Station under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. The FIR was lodged after a male dead body, aged about 25–30 years, was found in a naked state with a decapitated neck in the Sudarshan Nagar drain, behind Nagnechi Temple. 2.1. On inspection, bloodstains were found on the nearby bridge, suggesting the body was thrown into the drain from there. The body was found stuck to a stone about 100 feet from the bridge. The FSL team was called to the spot, and the unidentified body was sent to PBM Hospital mortuary. Initial investigation indicated that unknown person(s) had murdered the deceased by beheading and disposed of the body to destroy evidence and conceal identity. 2.2. After investigation, the charge-sheet was presented against the accused-respondents Irfan Khan and Kapil under Sections 302 , 201 and 120-B IPC and Section 3 of the Scheduled Caste and The Scheduled Tribes (prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and against accused-respondent Aarti under Section 302 , 201 and 120-B IPC, the same were read over to the accused-respondents, who denied the same and claimed trial, and the trial commenced accordingly. 2.3. 2.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 16 witnesses (P.W. 1 to P.W. 16) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P. 1 to 62) got exhibited on behalf of the prosecution, and in defence, documents (Ex.D. 1-2) were exhibited; Articles (Article 1 to 22) were also presented before the Court. The accused-respondents were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in question. 2.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court, while finding that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, acquitted the accused-respondents Irfan Khan and Kapil of the charges against them under Sections 302 , 201, 120-B IPC and Sections 3(2)(v), 3(2)(vi) of the Scheduled Caste and The Scheduled Tribes (prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and accused-respondent Aarti of the charges under Sections 302 , 201 and 120-B IPC, vide the impugned judgment of acquittal dated 16.05.2023, while extending them the benefit of doubt; against which, the present appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submits that the learned Trial Court has erred in law and on facts in acquitting the accused-respondents vide the impugned judgment dated 16.05.2023. It is submitted that the prosecution had led sufficient and credible evidence to establish the identity of the deceased, the motive behind the offence, the last-seen circumstance, and the recovery of material evidence connecting the accused-respondents to the crime. 3.1. It is submitted that the deceased was identified by his brother, Shravan (P.W.15), based on a distinct tattoo mark on his hand. The existence of the said tattoo was also affirmed by the deceased’s mother, Bhiki (P.W.7), thus conclusively establishing the identity of the deceased Mahavir. 3.2. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the motive for the crime was the extramarital relationship of accused-respondent Aarti with co-accused Irfan Khan and Kapil. It is urged that this illicit relationship led to a conspiracy to eliminate Aarti’s husband, Mahavir. The existence of this affair has been supported by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses during trial, thereby establishing a clear motive for the offence. 3.3. It is urged that this illicit relationship led to a conspiracy to eliminate Aarti’s husband, Mahavir. The existence of this affair has been supported by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses during trial, thereby establishing a clear motive for the offence. 3.3. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that, as per the statement of Bhiki (P.W.7), the owner of Akbar Hotel, Akbar, had informed her that the deceased Mahavir was last seen in the company of accused-respondents Irfan Khan and Kapil in a taxi during the early hours (around 2–3 a.m.) of the night in question. This "last seen together" circumstance directly links the accused to the deceased shortly before the commission of the crime. 3.4. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that, pursuant to information provided by accused-respondent Irfan Khan, the skull of the deceased was recovered from the drain (Ex.P.7), and the site was duly documented through Naksha Mauka (Ex.P.8). Additionally, blood-stained clothes were recovered at the instance of accused-respondent Kapil, further strengthening the prosecution’s case. 3.5. Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that the knife used to sever the deceased’s head from his body was recovered during investigation and marked as Ex.P.16. This recovery is a critical piece of evidence indicating the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased and the means adopted in the commission of the offence. 3.5.1. It is also submitted that the recovery of the skull (Ex.P.7) and the subsequent matching of the same with the decapitated torso through forensic and medical examination establishes a consistent chain of circumstances. The medical and FSL reports, read in conjunction with witness testimonies, lend significant corroboration to the prosecution case. 3.6. Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that the manner in which the dead body was disposed of—i.e., in a naked state, with the neck severed, and thrown into the drain—clearly indicates an attempt to destroy evidence and obstruct the course of justice, thereby attracting the provisions of Section 201 IPC. The recovery of the body 100 feet away from the bridge and the presence of bloodstains on the bridge further corroborate the prosecution’s version that the crime scene was deliberately shifted and manipulated by the accused-respondents to escape detection. 3.7. Learned Public Prosecutor further urged that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence, including motive, last seen together, recovery of incriminating articles, and medical and forensic corroboration. 3.7. Learned Public Prosecutor further urged that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence, including motive, last seen together, recovery of incriminating articles, and medical and forensic corroboration. The circumstances, when taken together, form a complete chain pointing unerringly to the guilt of the accused-respondents and exclude any plausible hypothesis of innocence. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused-respondents, while opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant- State, submits that the learned Trial Court has passed a well- reasoned and legally sustainable judgment of acquittal after properly appreciating the evidence on record, and the same does not warrant any interference in appellate jurisdiction. 4.1. At the outset, it is submitted that the entire case of the prosecution rests upon circumstantial evidence, and it has miserably failed to establish a complete, coherent, and unbroken chain of circumstances that unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and are inconsistent with any other hypothesis than that of guilt. In the absence of such a chain, the accused are entitled to acquittal, as reiterated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , (1984) 4 SCC 116 . 4.2. Learned counsel submits that the identity of the deceased was not conclusively established. Although the prosecution claims that the deceased was identified by a tattoo on the hand, said to have been recognized by P.W.15 and P.W.7, this claim is contradicted by the evidence of the Investigating Officer (P.W.10), who stated that no such mark was found on the recovered body, and by Dr. Anwar (P.W.5), who conducted the post-mortem (Ex.P.47) and made no mention of any tattoo. In a case involving a decapitated and decomposed body, such inconsistencies make the identification highly doubtful. 4.3. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution failed to establish identity through scientific or forensic means. The jaw and molar tooth from the recovered head/skull were sent for examination (Ex.P.30), but the FSL report recorded that no DNA could be extracted. Additionally, no blood group sample was collected from the torso during post-mortem. As a result, it became impossible to scientifically link the skull and the torso or to establish that they belonged to Mahavir. This critical lapse undermines the very foundation of the prosecution’s case. 4.3.1. Additionally, no blood group sample was collected from the torso during post-mortem. As a result, it became impossible to scientifically link the skull and the torso or to establish that they belonged to Mahavir. This critical lapse undermines the very foundation of the prosecution’s case. 4.3.1. He also submits that as per the testimony of Umed Singh (PW.4) skull recovered at the instance of the accused-respondent Irfan, was not sealed before sending it to PSM Hospital. 4.4. Learned counsel further submits regarding the “last seen” theory, that the prosecution has relied on hearsay evidence. P.W.7 claimed that Akbar, the owner of a hotel, last saw the deceased with the accused-respondents in a taxi during the night in question. However, Akbar was never examined by the prosecution. In the absence of direct testimony, this statement made PW.7 cannot be relied upon to support a material link in the chain of circumstances. 4.5. With regard to the motive, learned counsel submits that the allegation of an extramarital relationship between accused Aarti and co-accused Irfan and Kapil is unsupported by any credible evidence. The prosecution has failed to produce any independent witness, documentary proof, or call detail records to substantiate such a relationship. Mere insinuations, unsupported by material evidence, cannot constitute motive in a case of this nature. 4.6. Learned counsel also submits that the recoveries made during the investigation—including the skull (Ex.P.7), blood- stained clothes, and knife (Ex.P.16), are procedurally flawed and evidentially weak. 4.6.1. Learned counsel further submits that both the knife and the spectacles allegedly recovered during investigation were found under highly suspicious circumstances. It is pointed out that the knife, at the time of recovery, bore no inscription of the numbers “7”, “8”, and “6”, yet the knife produced before the Court had these markings, thereby raising a serious apprehension of tampering or substitution of material evidence. Additionally, both the knife and the spectacles were recovered from open and publicly accessible places, undermining the credibility of the recovery. It is also contended that the spectacles were not shown to the deceased’s mother (P.W.7) or brother (P.W.15) for identification, which further weakens the evidentiary value of the recovery and renders it unreliable for the purpose of establishing any link to the deceased. 4.7. It is also contended that the spectacles were not shown to the deceased’s mother (P.W.7) or brother (P.W.15) for identification, which further weakens the evidentiary value of the recovery and renders it unreliable for the purpose of establishing any link to the deceased. 4.7. Therefore, in light of the prosecution’s failure to establish the identity of the deceased, the cause of death, the motive, and any direct or reliable connection between the accused and the alleged offence, it is respectfully submitted that the learned Trial Court rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the accused-respondents. The judgment of acquittal is well-reasoned, supported by the record, and not perverse. Accordingly, the present appeal is devoid of merit and deserves to be dismissed. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 6. This Court observes that the instant appeal arises out of FIR No. 114/2015 registered at the Jai Narayan Vyas Colony Police Station on 08.05.2015 under Sections 302 and 201 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , 1860, pursuant to the recovery of a nude, decapitated male corpse from a drain near Sudarshan Nagar, Jodhpur. Following investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the accused-respondents under Sections 302 , 201, and 120-B IPC and Section 3 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Upon full-fledged trial, the learned Trial Court, vide judgment dated 16.05.2023, acquitted all accused-respondents, extending them the benefit of doubt. Aggrieved thereby, the State has preferred the present appeal under Section 378(3) Cr.P.C. 7. This Court observes that the case of the prosecution is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that to sustain a conviction on such evidence, the circumstances must form a complete and unbroken chain, leading exclusively to the guilt of the accused and excluding every possible hypothesis of innocence. This principle was authoritatively laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , (1984) 4 SCC 116 . In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish such a conclusive and cogent chain of circumstances. 8. This Court further observes that the identity of the deceased, which is the foundational requirement in a case of homicide, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish such a conclusive and cogent chain of circumstances. 8. This Court further observes that the identity of the deceased, which is the foundational requirement in a case of homicide, has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged identification of the deceased on the basis of a tattoo mark by Bhikhi, mother (P.W.7) and Shravan, brother (P.W.15) stands contradicted by the deposition of the Investigating Officer (P.W.10), who explicitly stated that no such mark was present on the body. The post-mortem report (Ex.P.47) also makes no mention of any such distinctive feature. In a case involving a decomposed and decapitated body, conclusive scientific identification assumes paramount importance, which is conspicuously absent in the present matter. 9. This Court also observes that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the deceased through DNA profiling or forensic evidence. As per the FSL report (Ex.P.30), no DNA could be extracted from the molar tooth of the recovered skull, and more importantly, no blood sample was collected from the torso during post-mortem. Further, as per P.W.4, the skull was not sealed when it was sent to the PSM Hospital, violating basic evidentiary protocols. These lapses significantly undermine the reliability and admissibility of scientific evidence. 10. This Court observes that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (Criminal Appeal NO.1672 of 2019, decided on 15.07.2025 ) , and Karandeep Sharma @ Razia @ Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, (Criminal Appeal No.(s) 630-631 of 2018, decided on 04.03.2025 ) , has enunciated binding and exacting standards governing DNA evidence. Relevant portions of the judgments are reproduced hereunder: In Kattavellai , the Hon’ble Court held: 44. This lack of a common procedure to be followed, is concerning. As such, we issue the following directions which shall be followed henceforth, in all cases where DNA Evidence is involved: 1. The collection of DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift and appropriate packaging including a) FIR number and date; b) Section and the statute involved therein; c) details of I.O., Police station; and d) requisite serial number shall be duly documented. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. The document recording the collection shall have the signatures and designations of the medical professional present, the investigating officer and independent witnesses. Here only we may clarify that the absence of independent witnesses shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of such evidence, but the efforts made to join such witnesses and the eventual inability to do so shall be duly put down in record. 2. The Investigating Officer shall be responsible for the transportation of the DNA evidence to the concerned police station or the hospital concerned, as the case may be. He shall also be responsible for ensuring that the samples so taken reach the concerned forensic science laboratory with dispatch and in any case not later than 48-hours from the time of collection. Should any extraneous circumstance present itself and the 48-hours timeline cannot be complied with, the reason for the delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary. Throughout, the requisite efforts be made to preserve the samples as per the requirement corresponding to the nature of the sample taken. 3. In the time that the DNA samples are stored pending trial appeal etc., no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without express authorisation of the Trial Court acting upon a statement of a duly qualified and experienced medical professional to the effect that the same shall not have a negative impact on the sanctity of the evidence and with the Court being assured that such a step is necessary for proper and just outcome of the Investigation/Trial. 4. Right from the point of collection to the logical end, i.e., conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall be maintained wherein each and every movement of the evidence shall be recorded with counter sign at each end thereof stating also the reason therefor. This Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be appended as part of the Trial Court record. Failure to maintain the same shall render the I.O. responsible for explaining such lapse. In Karandeep Sharma , the Hon’ble Court underscored that: 39. The first flaw in the prosecution case on the aspect of DNA profiling is that the expert who conducted the DNA examination was not examined in evidence and the DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer(PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner. The first flaw in the prosecution case on the aspect of DNA profiling is that the expert who conducted the DNA examination was not examined in evidence and the DNA report was merely exhibited in evidence by the Investigating Officer(PW-14) who undeniably is not connected with the report in any manner. This Court in the case of Rahul v. State of Delhi, Ministry of Home Affairs, while dealing with the issue concerning evidentiary value of DNA report, has held that DNA profiling reports cannot be admitted in evidence ipso facto by virtue of Section 293 CrPC and it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the techniques of DNA profiling were reliably applied by the expert. The relevant excerpts from the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:— “36. The learned Amicus Curiae has also assailed the forensic evidence i.e. the report regarding the DNA profiling dated 18-4- 2012 (Ext. P-23/1), giving incriminating findings. She vehemently submitted that apart from the fact that the collection of the samples sent for examination itself was very doubtful, the said forensic evidence was neither scientifically nor legally proved and could not have been used as a circumstance against the appellant- accused. The Court finds substance in the said submissions made by the Amicus Curiae. The DNA evidence is in the nature of opinion evidence as envisaged under Section 45 and like any other opinion evidence, its probative value varies from case to case. 38. It is true that PW 23 Dr B.K. Mohapatra, Senior Scientific Officer (Biology) of CFSL, New Delhi had stepped into the witness box and his report regarding DNA profiling was exhibited as Ext. PW 23/A, however mere exhibiting a document, would not prove its contents. The record shows that all the samples relating to the accused and relating to the deceased were seized by the investigating officer on 14-2-2012 and 16-2-2012; and they were sent to CFSL for examination on 27-2-2012. During this period, they remained in the malkhana of the police station. Under the circumstances, the possibility of tampering with the samples collected also could not be ruled out. Neither the trial court nor the High Court has examined the underlying basis of the findings in the DNA reports nor have they examined the fact whether the techniques were reliably applied by the expert. Under the circumstances, the possibility of tampering with the samples collected also could not be ruled out. Neither the trial court nor the High Court has examined the underlying basis of the findings in the DNA reports nor have they examined the fact whether the techniques were reliably applied by the expert. In the absence of such evidence on record, all the reports with regard to the DNA profiling become highly vulnerable, more particularly when the collection and sealing of the samples sent for examination were also not free from suspicion. (emphasis supplied)” 10.1. In the present case, it is manifest that these mandatory protocols were egregiously flouted: the skull was dispatched unsealed; no blood sample was drawn from the headless torso; and no chain-of-custody documentation was maintained. These lapses vitiate the integrity and reliability of the entire forensic process. Applying the Supreme Court’s strict standards, the Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish a scientifically valid link between the recovered remains and the deceased. 11. This Court also observes that the prosecution’s reliance on the "last seen" theory is legally untenable. The evidence of P.W.7, attributing to a third party (Akbar) the last sighting of the deceased with the accused-respondents, is purely hearsay in nature. Akbar, the alleged last seen witness, was never examined by the prosecution. In the absence of his testimony, the said link in the chain of circumstances remains speculative and inadmissible in evidence. 12. This Court further observes that the alleged motive, i.e., an illicit relationship between accused Aarti and co-accused Irfan and Kapil, is not substantiated by any credible or corroborative evidence. The prosecution failed to produce any call detail records, independent witnesses, or documentary proof to validate the assertion. This Court finds that mere conjectures or unverified allegations cannot constitute a legally sustainable motive in criminal prosecution. 13. This Court also takes note of the procedural infirmities surrounding the recoveries. The knife (Ex.P.16), allegedly recovered from an open place, was initially recorded as having no markings. However, the knife produced during trial bore the numbers “7”, “8”, and “6”, raising serious concerns of tampering. Further, spectacles recovered from a public area were neither linked to the deceased through any witness nor identified by the mother (P.W.7) or brother (P.W.15). The knife (Ex.P.16), allegedly recovered from an open place, was initially recorded as having no markings. However, the knife produced during trial bore the numbers “7”, “8”, and “6”, raising serious concerns of tampering. Further, spectacles recovered from a public area were neither linked to the deceased through any witness nor identified by the mother (P.W.7) or brother (P.W.15). The rope allegedly recovered was also not sent for forensic examination, as admitted by the Investigating Officer (P.W.12), and the mobile phone allegedly recovered from accused-respondent Irfan Khan was never produced before the Court. These lapses materially diminish the evidentiary worth of the recoveries. 14. This Court further notes that the prosecution failed to examine material witnesses, including Ramchandra, the independent witness to the recovery of the torso, and the FSL team that conducted the on-site forensic inspection. The non- examination of such critical witnesses creates a serious dent in the prosecution’s narrative and weakens the evidentiary substratum of the case. 15. This Court further observes that the testimony of P.W.7, the mother of the deceased, is riddled with contradictions. In Ex.P.21, she stated that accused-respondents Irfan and Kapil were present at the police station when the missing report was lodged. However, in her cross-examination, she claimed that she had called them to the police station from her mobile. This discrepancy on a key factual point undermines the credibility of her deposition regarding the conduct of the accused and the sequence of events following the alleged disappearance of the deceased. 15.1. Moreover, P.W.7’s testimony is relied upon not only for identification of the deceased based on an unverified tattoo mark but also as the source of the “last seen” theory attributed to Akbar, who was never examined. In the absence of scientific corroboration and the presence of internal inconsistencies, her testimony cannot be considered wholly reliable. Given that the prosecution’s case is entirely circumstantial, such infirmities in a key witness gravely affect the probative value of the evidence and justify the benefit of doubt extended to the accused-respondents. 16. This Court is of the considered view that in a case founded entirely on circumstantial evidence, any material inconsistency in the testimonies of key witnesses weakens the chain of circumstances. 16. This Court is of the considered view that in a case founded entirely on circumstantial evidence, any material inconsistency in the testimonies of key witnesses weakens the chain of circumstances. When such contradictions pertain to vital facts like identity of the deceased, motive, or last seen, and the prosecution fails to dispel the resulting doubt, the benefit must necessarily enure to the accused. 17. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka ( Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011 , decided on 12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010 decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-: Mallappa & Ors. (Supra): “36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as: (i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary; (ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge; (iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed; (iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal; (v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts; (vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court.” Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. (Supra): “38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of CrPC as follows: “8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: (a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; (b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 18. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-respondents, which in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 19. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited, and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no interference by this Court in the instant appeal. 20. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit case warranting any interference by this Court. 21. Accordingly, the application seeking leave to appeal is hereby dismissed 21.1. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S., each of the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused-respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 21.2. All pending applications stand disposed of.