Order : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. By way of filing this instant petition under Section 397 read with Section 401 Cr.P.C., the petitioners have challenged the order dated 27.07.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sirohi, in Sessions Case No. 6/2012, arising out of FIR No. 148/2011 registered at Police Station Sheoganj, District Sirohi, whereby the learned trial court proceeded to frame charges against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 306 , 406, and 120-B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE . 2. Brief facts of the case are that the complainant, Mahaveer Singh, lodged an FIR through an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the petitioners at Police Station Sheoganj, District Sirohi, alleging that his brother, Jitendra Singh, who was engaged in the business of operating trucks financed through Shriram Finance, Anadra Chouraha, Sirohi, committed suicide on 11.08.2011 after allegedly consuming a poisonous substance. A suicide note was discovered beneath his bed on 10.08.2011, wherein it was stated that the deceased was demanding Rs.3,70,000/- from accused Pintukumar, which remained unpaid. It was further alleged that Pintukumar, in conspiracy with his partner Hameed Khan, misappropriated the proceeds from Truck No. GJ-1-AY- 8305 and issued repeated threats, driving the deceased to mental distress. The deceased had reportedly sold the said vehicle to Bharat Kumar Bhand, after which threats continued from Pintukumar and Hameed Khan, prompting the act of suicide. The suicide note further implicated accused Jitendra Sharma @ Jainam and Madan Mohan Sharma, both employees of Shriram Finance, Anadra Chouraha, Sirohi, alleging that they dishonestly misused Rs.40,000/- given by the deceased for repayment of the truck loan and instead misappropriated the amount for personal use. On a second occasion, Rs.40,000/- was again given to them, out of which only a receipt for Rs.39,500/- was issued, and Rs.500/- was allegedly pocketed. They also misled the deceased by stating that if a truck owner dies, the loan is waived and a No Objection Certificate is issued without dues —a claim found to be untrue after his death. On the basis of these allegations, a criminal case was registered and investigation commenced. The suicide note was seized, witness statements were recorded, and relevant documents including agreements and papers from Shriram Finance were collected. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet under Sections 306 , 406, and 120-B IPC was filed against the accused, which was later committed to the Sessions Court. The suicide note was seized, witness statements were recorded, and relevant documents including agreements and papers from Shriram Finance were collected. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet under Sections 306 , 406, and 120-B IPC was filed against the accused, which was later committed to the Sessions Court. Feeling aggrieved by the impugned order dated 27.07.2012, whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Sirohi, proceeded to frame charges against the petitioners for the offences punishable under Sections 306 , 406, and 120-B of the INDIAN PENAL CODE , the petitioners have approached this Court by way of the present revision petition, assailing the said order as being contrary to law and facts on record. 3. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone through the materials available on record. 4. Upon a careful consideration of the material available on record, including the contents of the suicide note and the nature of allegations levelled in the complaint, this Court is of the prima facie view that the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC appear to be lacking. It is well settled that the act of suicide, though deeply tragic, cannot ipso facto invite criminal liability upon others unless there exists a proximate, direct, and active instigation or abetment to commit such an act. In this regard, Section 107 of the INDIAN PENAL CODE defines abetment as follows: “A person abets the doing of a thing, who— First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.” A plain reading of the above provision makes it abundantly clear that abetment must be directly connected to the doing of a particular act, and in the context of Section 306 IPC, “that act” must necessarily refer to the ultimate consequence —namely, the commission of suicide by the deceased. The instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aid must therefore pertain specifically to that fatal act. It is not sufficient that the accused may have caused mental distress or engaged in general misconduct; unless such conduct is demonstrably linked to inciting or facilitating the commission of suicide, the legal threshold for abetment is not met. The abetment must be aimed at the consequence itself, and not merely form part of a background of strained relations or financial discord. Thus, any alleged wrongful acts must be scrutinized through the lens of whether they were designed to compel or drive the deceased to the extreme act of self-destruction, and not merely whether they amounted to civil or interpersonal disputes. In the absence of such targeted mens rea and causative nexus with the suicidal act, criminal liability under Section 306 IPC cannot be attracted. 5. A plain reading of the suicide note does not reveal any express or implied act of instigation by the accused- petitioners that can be construed as a deliberate or active provocation driving the deceased to end his life. The deceased has stated that he was mentally disturbed for several months following certain financial disputes, and that he had been consistently demanding an amount of Rs.3,70,000/- from accused Pintukumar, a portion of which he had borrowed from third parties. The deceased further mentioned that the said amount was not returned to him, and that he was subjected to persistent reminders and threats regarding the ownership and sale of the truck in question, allegedly involving Pintukumar, his partner Hameed Khan, and Pintukumar's mother. 6. However, mere financial disputes or repeated demands for repayment—however pressing or insistent—cannot be elevated to the level of criminal instigation within the meaning of Section 107 IPC. The threats mentioned in the note, at best, reflect mental pressure emanating from commercial or civil discord; they do not demonstrate any overt act aimed at compelling or provoking the deceased to commit suicide. There is a categorical absence of any reference in the suicide note to physical abuse, coercion, blackmail, or conduct that can be termed as incitement to end life. The deceased himself has stated, "????(cid:4)? ?? ??? ??(cid:4)? ??? ?? ???? ?? ????? ??" ("I have taken this step of my own volition"), which further negates any theory of inducement or coercion. 7. The deceased himself has stated, "????(cid:4)? ?? ??? ??(cid:4)? ??? ?? ???? ?? ????? ??" ("I have taken this step of my own volition"), which further negates any theory of inducement or coercion. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs State of West Bengal , [ (2010) 1 SCC 707 ] , has authoritatively held that conviction under Section 306 IPC requires a positive act of instigation or intentional aid on the part of the accused. Mere harassment, mental distress, or financial pressure—absent a direct or active act leading the deceased to commit suicide—does not meet the threshold require for establishing abetment. The Court categorically observed that: “Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained… It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option…” In the present case, applying the aforesaid principle, the allegations do not disclose such instigating or active conduct which would bring the petitioners within the purview of Section 306 IPC. 8. It is equally pertinent to note that no prior complaint, written or oral, appears to have been lodged by the deceased or his family members alleging physical mistreatment, threats of violence, or any other form of sustained harassment that could reasonably be inferred to have led him to take this extreme step. In such circumstances, where the suicide was a culmination of accumulated financial stress and mental burden, the invocation of criminal culpability under Section 306 IPC—without the foundational requirement of mens rea or clear instigatory conduct—is legally unsustainable. 9. This Court also takes judicial notice of the principle that not every act of insistence, verbal altercation, or pressure for repayment of money can amount to abetment of suicide. The insistence made by the accused for return of money or the continuation of financial obligations may, at most, give rise to a civil cause of action, but cannot be viewed through the lens of criminal abetment unless the prosecution can establish a clear nexus between such insistence and the mental state of the deceased directly leading to the suicide. 10. It is now trite to state that the mere act of raising a demand for repayment of a borrowed amount—howsoever frequent or insistent—does not ipso facto amount to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. 10. It is now trite to state that the mere act of raising a demand for repayment of a borrowed amount—howsoever frequent or insistent—does not ipso facto amount to abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. Abetment, as contemplated under the statutory scheme, necessitates a deliberate, proximate, and culpable conduct on the part of the accused, which either instigates, facilitates, or compels the commission of suicide. A creditor asserting his legal right to recover dues from a debtor cannot be per se branded as an abettor of suicide, unless it is demonstrably established that such demand was accompanied by acts of unlawful coercion, humiliation, or harassment of such an aggravated nature that it stripped the victim of all viable alternatives except to resort to self-destruction. 11. In the context of a debtor-creditor relationship-whether involving an individual lender or a financial institution—the obligation to repay is inherently recognized, and correspondingly, the right to demand repayment is legally protected. The assertion of this right, in the absence of any accompanying illegality, abuse, or threatening conduct, cannot be construed as abetment. Even if the pressure exerted is perceived by the debtor to be burdensome or emotionally unsettling, such perception— without objective evidence of unlawful or unreasonable duress—does not elevate the conduct to the threshold of criminal culpability. The law does not expect individuals, howsoever distressed, to surrender to despair. Even assuming the existence of overbearing or excessive pressure, the aggrieved party always has recourse to lawful remedies—civil or criminal—to vindicate his rights. Resorting to suicide cannot, in such cases, be attributed to the alleged actions of the creditor unless the conduct in question was so oppressive and cruel that it completely eclipsed the mental volition of the victim. In the present case, there is an absence of any such extreme or exceptional circumstance. The deceased’s action, though tragic, appears to be the result of internalized financial anxiety rather than any criminal inducement or provocation attributable to the petitioners. 12. This Court is not unmindful of the legal position that the present proceedings arise at the stage of framing of charge and not upon conclusion of trial or conviction. It is well-settled that at this juncture, a meticulous appreciation or dissection of the evidentiary record is not warranted, and the Court must proceed primarily on a prima facie view of the material available. It is well-settled that at this juncture, a meticulous appreciation or dissection of the evidentiary record is not warranted, and the Court must proceed primarily on a prima facie view of the material available. However, it is equally imperative to ensure that the process of law is not weaponized in a manner that causes undue harassment to individuals who are made to undergo a full-fledged criminal trial in the absence of foundational facts or core ingredients constituting the alleged offence. In the present case, the solitary piece of material forming the fulcrum of the prosecution’s case is the suicide note, the evidentiary worth of which shall ultimately be tested at the stage of trial. Yet, the content of the said note—when perused in its entirety—even at a preliminary stage, does not rise above the threshold of mere grievance or mental distress emanating from financial transactions. Once it is judicially discerned that the substratum of the suicide note lacks the requisite incitement or instigation as defined under Section 107 IPC, it becomes manifest that compelling the petitioners to undergo the rigours of a protracted criminal trial would not only be unwarranted but would also amount to inflicting avoidable prejudice, verging on infringement of their fundamental and civil liberties. In such situations, courts are duty-bound to prevent the abuse of judicial process and to secure the ends of justice by intervening at the stage of charge, particularly when it is evident that the allegations do not, even if taken at face value, disclose the essential elements of the offence alleged. 13. As regards the charge framed under Section 406 IPC, it is to be noted that the offence of criminal breach of trust is defined under the said provision as follows: “Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits ‘criminal breach of trust’. A plain reading of the above statutory provision reveals that two essential elements must be satisfied to attract the rigours of Section 406 IPC: (i) entrustment of property or dominion over property, and (ii) dishonest misappropriation, conversion, or use of such property in violation of trust. In the present case, however, there is not even a whisper in the material on record suggesting any entrustment of specific property to the petitioners, much less any dishonest misappropriation thereof. The grievance of the complainant appears to revolve around the non-refund or alleged misapplication of funds advanced in the course of financial transactions relating to a truck. Such monetary dealings, evidently arising out of civil-commercial arrangements, cannot—in the absence of clear fiduciary entrustment and culpable intent—be stretched to fit the contours of criminal breach of trust. 14. Merely because certain receipts were allegedly not issued in full, or that a part of the amount was not utilized strictly for the purpose for which it was advanced, cannot— without a demonstrable breach of legal duty, dishonest conversion, or diversion of entrusted property—justify the invocation of criminal law. There is no allegation that the petitioners were ever entrusted with property in a fiduciary capacity or that they were bound by any legal directive regarding its use, which they wilfully violated. At best, the dispute reflects a civil liability, not a criminal breach. The appropriate remedy for such claims of financial impropriety would lie in instituting a civil suit for recovery or damages, and not in the invocation of the penal provisions of Section 406 IPC, which are meant to address clear cases of criminal misappropriation arising from a position of trust. 15. As regards the charge framed under Section 120-B IPC, which pertains to criminal conspiracy, the same also appears to be legally unsustainable in the absence of foundational facts substantiating the core ingredients of the alleged substantive offences. In order to invoke the provisions of Section 120-B IPC, the prosecution must, at the very threshold, demonstrate a prima facie case that there existed an unlawful agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act or to accomplish a legal act by illegal means. However, in the present case, no cogent material has been placed on record to suggest the existence of a prior meeting of minds or any overt act committed in furtherance of such conspiracy. 16. However, in the present case, no cogent material has been placed on record to suggest the existence of a prior meeting of minds or any overt act committed in furtherance of such conspiracy. 16. It is well settled that conspiracy cannot exist in the abstract. When the alleged acts constituting the substantive offences under Sections 306 and 406 IPC are themselves found to be lacking in essential ingredients, it becomes legally incongruent to sustain a charge of conspiracy to commit such offences. If the commission of the principal offence itself does not prima facie emerge from the facts, the question of conspiracy to commit that offence becomes wholly academic and unsustainable in law. The mere fact that multiple persons are named in a suicide note or that their conduct gave rise to a sense of grievance does not, in the absence of clear and independent material, satisfy the rigorous requirement of a conspiratorial design or unlawful agreement. Section 120-B cannot be pressed into service as a substitute for deficient substantive charges, and must necessarily be supported by evidence of concerted action aimed at a common illegal objective. In the present case, the record is completely bereft of any such material linking the petitioners in a conspiratorial framework; hence, the invocation of Section 120-B IPC stands vitiated in law and in logic. 17. In cases where the foundational ingredients of the charged offences are conspicuously absent even on a prima facie appraisal, or where the ultimate fate of the trial is clearly foreseeable based on the existing material, it becomes incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its revisional jurisdiction with judicial foresight and intervention. The Court must not remain a passive onlooker in the face of manifest injustice or procedural abuse. Rather, where the continuation of proceedings would amount to a futile exercise, causing undue hardship and prejudice to the accused, the Court is duty-bound to accord due weight to a plea for discharge and effectuate a just, fair, and expeditious resolution. The majesty of criminal law lies not merely in its rigorous application, but in its judicious restraint against unwarranted prosecution. In such circumstances, early judicial intervention becomes essential to uphold the sanctity of legal process and protect individuals from being subjected to the rigours of a trial devoid of legal foundation. 18. The majesty of criminal law lies not merely in its rigorous application, but in its judicious restraint against unwarranted prosecution. In such circumstances, early judicial intervention becomes essential to uphold the sanctity of legal process and protect individuals from being subjected to the rigours of a trial devoid of legal foundation. 18. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 27.07.2012, to the extent it directs the framing of charges under Sections 306 , 406, and 120-B IPC against the petitioners, suffers from legal infirmity and appears to be based on an erroneous appreciation of the material placed on record. The continuation of criminal proceedings in the absence of foundational ingredients constituting the alleged offences would amount to abuse of the process of law and cause grave prejudice to the petitioners. 19. Accordingly, the instant revision petition is allowed. The order dated 27.07.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge ,Sirohi in Sessions Case No.6/2011, is hereby quashed and set aside. 20. The petitioners are discharged of the charges. They shall be let free, if not required in any other case. 21. The record be sent back forthwith.