JUDGMENT : N. UNNI KRISHNAN NAIR, J. Heard Mr. Pritam Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. Token Ete, learned Addl. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1; and Mr. Ramjir Rakshap, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2. 2. By way of instituting the present proceeding, the petitioner has presented a challenge to an order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, directing the Officer in-charge, Women Police Station, Seppa, to register a case under appropriate sections of law and conduct investigation and submit a final report thereof under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , basing on a complaint so made before the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, by the respondent No. 2, herein, invoking the provisions of Section 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 . 3. The brief facts requisite for adjudication of the issue arising in the present proceeding, is noticed as under: As projected in the criminal petition, the petitioner and the respondent No.2, herein, were in a live-in-relationship. The petitioner, herein, was a married person. A misunderstanding having arisen between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2, herein; the respondent No. 2 lodged an First Information Report(FIR) against the petitioner before the Officer in-charge, Seppa Police Station. It is contended in the criminal petition that the said First Information Report(FIR) after a preliminary inquiry, was not registered by the police on account of delay in lodging of the same. It is also contended in the petition that the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2 had started some time in the month of November, 2019, and that the respondent No. 2, herein, had projected herself, at the relevant point of time, to be a minor. It is also contended in the petition that the respondent No. 2 had lodged a divorce petition before the District Court, Bomdila, which was registered as Divorce Case No. 26/2023 and notices therein, have been issued and the petitioner had also filed his written statement in the matter. It is also contended in the petition that the respondent No. 2 had lodged a divorce petition before the District Court, Bomdila, which was registered as Divorce Case No. 26/2023 and notices therein, have been issued and the petitioner had also filed his written statement in the matter. After the said development, the respondent No. 2 had lodged a complaint case before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Seppa, which was registered as Complaint Case No. 04/2023. However, the same was withdrawn. Subsequently, the respondent No. 2 approached the Court of learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang at Bomdila, on 10.01.2024, by way of filing a complaint case and the same was registered as Complaint Case No. 01/2024. In the said complaint, it was alleged that the Officer in-charge, Seppa Police Station, had not registered her First Information Report(FIR) inspite of the same disclosing commission of a cognizable offence. The learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, recorded the statement of the complainant i.e. respondent No. 2, herein, under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , on 10.01.2024, itself. After recording the statement of the complainant/ respondent No. 2 under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , and on perusal of the copy of the said complaint along with its annexures appended thereto; it is alleged that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, had taken cognizance of the said complaint case and thereafter, had passed the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, directing the Officer in-charge, Women Police Station, Seppa, to register a case basing on the complaint lodged by the respondent No. 2, herein. It is further contended in the criminal petition that in terms of the directions passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang at Bomdila, vide the order, dated 17.01.2024; Seppa Women Police Station Case No. 02/2024, under Sections 376/326/506 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 , has been registered and the matter is presently under investigation. 4. 4. Being aggrieved by the said order, dated 17.01.2024, as passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024 and the registration of Seppa Women Police Station Case No. 02/2024; the petitioner has instituted the present proceeding. 5. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner, by taking this Court through the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, has submitted that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, having recorded the statements of the complainant i.e. respondent No. 2, herein; had taken cognizance of the same as provided under the provisions of Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , and accordingly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel that the cognizance of the matter having been taken, it was not open to the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, to direct for registration of a First Information Report(FIR) by the police invoking the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 6. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel, has also submitted that the cognizance of the complaint having been taken by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila; he was required to proceed with the same and take further steps as would be called for in the matter under the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 7. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel, has further submitted that the investigation as contemplated under the provisions of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , is different from that which is so contemplated under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . It is also submitted by the learned counsel that the Magistrate would be empowered to take recourse to the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , and direct for registration of a First Information Report(FIR) at the pre-cognizance stage only. However, once cognizance is taken in the matter, the Magistrate has to follow the procedures envisaged in Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The Magistrate upon taking cognizance of Section 202 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , can direct for an investigation to be made, either, by a police officer, or, any other person. The Magistrate upon taking cognizance of Section 202 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , can direct for an investigation to be made, either, by a police officer, or, any other person. However, such investigation is only for helping the Magistrate to decide whether or not, there is a sufficient ground for him to proceed further in the matter. 8. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel, by referring to the provisions of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , more particularly, the culminating words of Sub-section(1) of Section 202 , has submitted that the investigation as contemplated under Section 202 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , which is permissible to be resorted to on the Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 200 of the Code, of a complaint preferred before him, is solely for the purpose of determining as to whether there is a sufficient ground for proceeding further in the matter. 9. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel, has further submitted that in the event, the Magistrate is of the view that an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , is required to be so directed; he is not required to examine the complainant on oath, because, in-as-much as, at that stage, he was not taking cognizance of any offence. The learned counsel has also submitted that in the case on hand, the examination of the complainant, on oath, having been taken and the same being reduced in writing; it is to be construed that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had taken cognizance of the matter and accordingly, the directions so issued vide the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, for registration of a case by invoking the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , would not be sustainable and the investigation that would be contemplated in the matter, would be the one provided under the provisions of Section 202 (1) of the Code. Accordingly, it is submitted by Mr. Taffo, learned counsel, that the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, would call for an interference from this Court. 10. In support of his submissions, Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner, has relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (i). 10. In support of his submissions, Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner, has relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (i). Mohd. Yousuf v. Asfaq & anr. , reported in (2006) 0 Supreme(Raj.) (ii). Kailash Vijayvargiya v. Rajlakshmi Chaudhuri & ors ., reported in (2023) 4 Supreme 328 ; and (iii). an unreported judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. SAS Infratech Pvt. Ltd. v. The State of Telangana [Crl. Appeal No. 2574/2024; Order, dated 14.05.2024] 11. In the above premises; Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that this Court would be pleased to interfere with the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, and direct the learned Special Judge, POCSO, to proceed in the matter under the provisions of Section 202 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , in view of the fact that he had already taken cognizance of the matter. 12. Per contra, Mr. Ete, learned Addl. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, has submitted that the complaint as lodged by the respondent No. 2, herein, having disclosed the commission of a cognizable offence; accordingly, the Magistrate was within his powers to direct for an investigation in the matter under the provisions of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 13. Mr. Ete, learned Addl. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, has submitted that the contention of Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the complainant i.e. respondent No. 2, herein, having been examined and the substance thereof, reduced to writing, it has to be construed that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had taken cognizance of the Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, and accordingly, the power to order for an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , which is available only at the pre-cognizance stage, could have been resorted to, cannot be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the matter. 14. Mr. Ete, learned Addl. 14. Mr. Ete, learned Addl. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, has submitted that the examination of the complainant i.e. respondent No. 2, herein; under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , was conducted to verify the veracity of her allegations and assess the materials for arriving at a satisfaction as to whether an investigation by the police, is called for. It has been submitted by the learned Addl. P.P. that the same does not constitute taking cognizance but is a procedural step to facilitate investigation. 15. Mr. Ete, learned Addl. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, by referring to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram reported in (2015) 9 SCC 609 , has submitted that only on account of examination of the complainant, it cannot be construed that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the same and the issue is required to be examined on a case to case basis. The learned Addl. P.P. has further submitted that a direction under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , being permissible at the pre-cognizance stage of a complaint, to be issued for investigation to the police concerned; the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, has not committed any error in passing the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, in the matter, and accordingly, the same would not call for any interference. 16. I have heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record. I have also carefully perused the decisions relied upon by the learned counsels appearing for the parties. 17. The provisions of Sub-section(1) of Section 33 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 , being relevant, is extracted hereinbelow: “ 33. Procedure and powers of Special Court.-(1) A Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or upon a police report of such facts. (2) The Special Public Prosecutor, or as the case may be, the counsel appearing for the accused shall, while recording the examination-in-chief, cross-examination or re- examination of the child, communicate the questions to be put to the child to the Special Court which shall in turn put those questions to the child. (2) The Special Public Prosecutor, or as the case may be, the counsel appearing for the accused shall, while recording the examination-in-chief, cross-examination or re- examination of the child, communicate the questions to be put to the child to the Special Court which shall in turn put those questions to the child. (3) The Special Court may, if it considers necessary, permit frequent breaks for the child during the trial. (4) The Special Court shall create a child-friendly atmosphere by allowing a family member, a guardian, a friend or a relative, in whom the child has trust or confidence, to be present in the court. (5) The Special Court shall ensure that the child is not called repeatedly to testify in the court. (6) The Special Court shall not permit aggressive questioning or character assassination of the child and ensure that dignity of the child is maintained at all times during the trial. The Special Court shall ensure that the identity of the child is not disclosed at any time during the course of investigation or trial: Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Special Court may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, the identity of the child shall include the identity of the child's family, school, relatives, neighbourhood or any other information by which the identity of the child may be revealed. (8) In appropriate cases, the Special Court may, in addition to the punishment, direct payment of such compensation as may be prescribed to the child for any physical or mental trauma caused to him or for immediate rehabilitation of such child. (9) Subject to the provisions of this Act, a Special Court shall, for the purpose of the trial of any offence under this Act, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session, and as far as may be, in accordance with the procedure specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (2 of 1974) for trial before a Court of Session.” 18. A perusal of the provisions of Sub-Section(1) of Section 33 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 , reveals that the Special Court is empowered to take cognizance of any offence under the said Act even on a complaint, facts which constitutes such offence, being received. 19. In view of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of T.N. v. V. Krishnaswami Naidu , reported in (1979) 4 SCC 5 , it has to be construed that the term “Magistrate” as finding mention in the provisions of Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , would also in view of the provisions of Sub-section(1) of Section 33 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 , include the learned Special Judge, POCSO. 20. It is not disputed by the learned counsels for the parties that the learned Special Court would have the power to consider the complaint so received, on taking cognizance thereof, by following the procedure as mandated under Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 21. Having noticed the above position, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , more particularly, Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , and the provisions of Section 200 and 202(1), being relevant, is extracted hereinbelow: “ 156. Police officer's power to investigate cognizable case.- ************************************************************************************* (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above- mentioned. (iv) The Magistrate has no power to take cognizance of an offence on basis of private complaint that resulted in submission of the report under section 173 consequent upon reference under section 156(3) when once he has accepted negative police report and closed the proceedings; P.V. Krishna Prasad v. K.V.N. Koteshwara Rao, (1991) Cr LJ 341.” “ COMPLAINTS TO MAGISTRATES 200. Examination of complainant.-A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses- (a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or (b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192: Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.” ********************************************************************************************************* “ 202. Postponement of issue of process.- (1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding: Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made- (a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions; or (b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section 200. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, lake evidence of witness on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, lake evidence of witness on oath: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. (3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant.” 22. A perusal of Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , would go to reveal that the Magistrate empowered under Section 190 of the Code, has the power to order for an investigation in terms of the provisions of Sub-Section(1) of Section 156 of the Code. Section 190 of the Code mandates that an empowered Magistrate may take cognizance of any offence, inter alia, upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes such offence in addition to taking such cognizance basing upon a police report of such facts and/or upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. 23. Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , mandates that a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on a complaint, shall examine, upon oath, the complainant and witnesses, if any, and the substance of such examination, shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses and also by the Magistrate. 24. The provisions of Sub-Section(1) of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , empowers the Magistrate to postpone the issue of process against the accused, and, either enquire into the case by himself, or, direct for an investigation to be made by a police office, or, any other such person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not, there is a sufficient ground for proceeding. The purport of investigation as contained in the provisions of Sub-section(3) of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , and that so involved in the provisions of Sub-section(1) of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , is totally different. 25. The purport of investigation as contained in the provisions of Sub-section(3) of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , and that so involved in the provisions of Sub-section(1) of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , is totally different. 25. While the Magistrate at the pre-cognizance stage, is empowered to direct for an investigation as contemplated under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , however, on taking cognizance of the matter i.e. in the post-cognizance stage; the investigation that would be mandated, would be that which is so contemplated under the provisions of Sub-section(1) of Section 202 of the Code. The investigation under Sub-section(3) of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , mandates that such investigation would conclude in the submission of a report under Section 173 of the Code. The investigation as contemplated under Sub-section(1) of Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , is only for the purpose of bringing on record, material to enable the Magistrate to ascertain as to whether there is a sufficient ground for proceeding further with the complaint. 26. The issue arising in the present proceeding, is as to whether before passing of the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, or, while passing the said order, dated 17.01.2024; the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, can be construed to have taken cognizance of the offence so involved in the complaint so instituted by the respondent No. 2, herein. 27. Mr. Taffo, learned counsel for the petitioner, has categorically contended that the statement of the complainant having been recorded, it has to be without any further doubt held that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had taken cognizance of the offence and accordingly, it was not permissible in view of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding the field to direct for an investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . 28. Per contra, it is the contention of Mr. Ete, learned Addl. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, that mere examination of the complainant and reducing in writing, the same; would not amount to taking of cognizance by the Magistrate. 29. The said issue was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Sukumar (supra). On consideration of the said issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had drawn the following conclusions: “ 10. P.P., Arunachal Pradesh, that mere examination of the complainant and reducing in writing, the same; would not amount to taking of cognizance by the Magistrate. 29. The said issue was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Sukumar (supra). On consideration of the said issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had drawn the following conclusions: “ 10. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh this Court explained the meaning of the word "cognizance" holding that: (SCC p. 90, para 34) "34. In legal parlance cognizance is 'taking judicial notice by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter judicially'." 11. Section 200 CrPC contemplates a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint to examine the complaint and examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any. Then normally three courses are available to the Magistrate. The Magistrate can either issue summons to the accused or order an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 CrPC. Upon consideration of the statement of the complainant and the material adduced at that stage if the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds to proceed, he can proceed to issue process under Section 204 CrPC. Section 202 CrPC contemplates "postponement of issue of process". It provides that the Magistrate on receipt of a complaint of an offence, of which he is authorised to take cognizance may, if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself, or have an inquiry made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or an investigation made by a police officer, or by some other person for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. If the Magistrate finds no sufficient ground for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint by recording briefly the reasons for doing so as contemplated under Section 203 CrPC. A Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence when he decides to proceed against the person accused of having committed that offence and not at the time when the Magistrate is just informed either by the complainant by filing the complaint or by the police report about the commission of an offence. A Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence when he decides to proceed against the person accused of having committed that offence and not at the time when the Magistrate is just informed either by the complainant by filing the complaint or by the police report about the commission of an offence. 12. "Cognizance" therefore has a reference to the application of judicial mind by the Magistrate in connection with the commission of an offence and not merely to a Magistrate learning that some offence had been committed. Only upon examination of the complainant, the Magistrate will proceed to apply the judicial mind whether to take cognizance of the offence or not. Under Section 200 CrPC, when the complainant is examined, the Magistrate cannot be said to have ipso facto taken the cognizance, when the Magistrate was merely gathering the material on the basis of which he will decide whether a prima facie case is made out for taking cognizance of the offence or not. "Cognizance of offence" means taking notice of the accusations and applying the judicial mind to the contents of the complaint and the material filed therewith. It is neither practicable nor desirable to define as to what is meant by taking cognizance. Whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence or not will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. 13. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.4, considering the scope of the expression "cognizance" it was held as under: (SCC p. 499, para 19) "19. The expression 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It merely means 'become aware of' and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, It connotes to take notice of judicialty. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone." 14. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.5, while considering what the phrase "taking cognizance" means, approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, wherein it was observed that: (R.R. Chari cases, AIR p. 210, para 9) "9. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in R.R. Chari v. State of U.P.5, while considering what the phrase "taking cognizance" means, approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee, wherein it was observed that: (R.R. Chari cases, AIR p. 210, para 9) "9. ...'What is "taking cognizance" has not been defined in the Criminal Procedure Code and I have no desire now to attempt to define it. It seems to me clear, however, that before it can be said that any Magistrate has taken cognizance of any offence under Section 190(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Code, he must not only have applied his mind to the contents of the petition, but he must have done so for the purpose of proceeding in a particular way as indicated in the subsequent provisions of this Chapter-proceeding under Section 200 , and thereafter sending it for enquiry and report under Section 202 . When the Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the subsequent sections of this Chapter, but for taking action of some other kind e.g. ordering investigation under Section 156(3), or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of the investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence.' (Supt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs cases, SCC OnLine Cal, para 8)" (emphasis supplied) 15. Elaborating upon the words of the expression "taking cognizance" of an offence by a Magistrate within the contemplation of Section 190 CrPC, in Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy this Court held as under: (SCC p. 257, para 14) "14. ...But from the scheme of the Code, the content and marginal heading of Section 190 and the caption of Chapter XIV under which Sections 190 to 199 occur, it is clear that a case can be said to be instituted in a court only when the court takes cognizance of the offence alleged therein. The ways in which such cognizance can be taken are set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1). Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Whether the Magistrate has or has not taken cognizance of the offence will depend on the circumstances of the particular case including the mode in which the case is sought to be instituted, and the nature of the preliminary action, if any, taken by the Magistrate. Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding sections in Chapter XV to the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning to Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, he has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156 (3), he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence." 16. The contention of the appellant is that the act of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate precedes the examination of the complainant under Section 200 CrPC and the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd. 10 wherein this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 471, para 10) "10. In the instant case, the appellant had filed a detailed complaint before the Magistrate. The record shows that the Magistrate took cognizance and fixed the matter for recording of the statement of the complainant on 1-6-2000. Even if we assume, held to have taken cognizance of the offence. One should not confuse taking of cognizance with issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate peruses the complaint with a view to ascertain whether the commission of any offence is disclosed. The issuance of process is at a later stage when after considering the material placed before it, the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out. It is possible that a complaint may be filed against several persons, but the Magistrate may choose to issue process only against some of the accused. The issuance of process is at a later stage when after considering the material placed before it, the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out. It is possible that a complaint may be filed against several persons, but the Magistrate may choose to issue process only against some of the accused. It may also be that after taking cognizance and examining the complainant on oath, the court may come to the conclusion that no case is made out for issuance of process and it may reject the complaint." (emphasis supplied) In our considered view, the above decision is of no assistance to the appellant. A perusal of the above decision would show that this Court has emphasised upon the satisfaction of the court to the commission of the offence as a condition precedent for taking cognizance of the offence. However, in the facts of the said case, the Court was of the view that the cognizance was taken by the Magistrate once the Magistrate applied his mind to the contents of the complaint and on the satisfaction that prima facie case existed. 17. In the present case, the complaint was filed on 9-5-2007 and the matter was adjourned to 15-5-2007 and on that date on request for inquiry, the matter was adjourned to 18-5- 2007. On 18-5-2007, the statement of complainant was recorded in part and the order- sheet for 18-5-2007 reads as under: "Complainant is present with Shri N.V. Advocate. Cognizance taken under Section 200 CrPC read with statement of complainant is recorded in part. Now 5.35 p.m. hence on request call on 23-5-2007." On 23-5-2007, the complainant was present and his statement was recorded and the same was marked as Ext. P-1 and Annexures A to G were referred. On request, the matter was adjourned to 24-5-2007 on which date the complainant filed application under Section 200 CrPC seeking amendment to the complaint by adding Paras 11(a) and 11(b) and the said application was allowed. The amended complaint was filed and one witness was examined for the complainant on 2-6- 2007. On 21-6-2007, the Magistrate passed the detailed order recording his satisfaction to proceed against the appellant (A-1) and also observing that there are no sufficient grounds to proceed against Smt H.R. Leelavathi and ordered issuance of summons to Accused 1-appellant herein. The amended complaint was filed and one witness was examined for the complainant on 2-6- 2007. On 21-6-2007, the Magistrate passed the detailed order recording his satisfaction to proceed against the appellant (A-1) and also observing that there are no sufficient grounds to proceed against Smt H.R. Leelavathi and ordered issuance of summons to Accused 1-appellant herein. Before examination of the complainant, the court was yet to make up the mind whether to take cognizance of the offence or not. It is wrong to contend that the Magistrate has taken cognizance of the case even on 18-5-2007 when the Magistrate has recorded the statement of the respondent complainant in part and even when the Magistrate has not applied his judicial mind. Even though the order dated 18-5-2007 reads "cognizance taken under Section 200 CrPC"; the same is not grounded in reality and actual cognizance was taken only later.” 30. From a perusal of the conclusions so drawn by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Sukumar (supra), it is clear that on mere examination of the complainant under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , a Magistrate cannot be said to have ipso facto taken the cognizance. It was held that the Magistrate was merely gathering the material on the basis of which he will decide whether a prima facie case is made out for taking cognizance of the offence or not. It was further held that cognizance of offence means taking notice of the acquisition and applying the judicial mind to the contents of the complaint and material filed therewith. It was also emphasized that whether the Magistrate has taken cognizance or not, will depend upon the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The judicial pronouncements as placed on record by the learned counsels for the parties goes to reveal that when on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate applies his mind for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the succeeding Sections in Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ; he is said to have taken cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . If instead of proceeding under Chapter XV, the Magistrate has, in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken action of some kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation or ordering investigation by the police under Sub-section(3) of Section 156 of the Code; he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 31. Mere recording of the statement of the complainant, would not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. Having noticed the settled position of law in this connection; the order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, is being examined. 32. On an examination of the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, it is not revealed that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had contemplated to take cognizance of the matter and proceed thereon, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . The learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had only examined the veracity of the allegations raised in the complaint and had assessed the materials available for the purpose of arriving at a satisfaction that a direction is called for an investigation in this connection under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . It is also relevant to note that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, in his order, dated 17.01.2024, has recorded that the complaint as preferred by the respondent No. 2, herein; was for a direction upon the Officer in-charge, Seppa Police Station, to register a case and carry-out proper investigation. 33. The said order, dated 17.01.2024, having not reflected that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had taken cognizance and/or contemplated taking cognizance of the offence, involved; this Court is of the considered view that following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Sukumar (supra); it cannot be held that the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, had taken cognizance of the matter on mere recording of the statement of the complainant i.e. respondent No. 2, herein. 34. 34. The operative portion of the impugned order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, being relevant, is extracted hereinbelow: “ Section 30 of POCSO Act empower: this Court for taking cognizance under POCSO Act upon receiving the complaint of facts which constitutes such offence, or upon a police report of such facts. In present case besides offences under POCSO Act others offences are also reflected and all of the offences requires proper investigations and collection of evidences and custodial interrogation. It is further observed that though the FIR was filed before OC PS Seppa but as the offences are against victim who is a woman/child and as such the investigation is required to be carried on by the women police station Seppa. Hence OC WPS Seppa is directed to register a case under appropriate sections of law and conduct investigation and submit final report as provided under section 173 CrPC OC WPS Seppa is further directed to submit report regarding proceeding of investigation on every fortnight to this court until completion of investigation.” 35. A perusal of the said order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, goes to reveal that the Magistrate on examination of the materials on record, had come to a conclusion that the offence as reflected in the complaint, would call for a proper investigation and collection of evidence as well as custodial interrogation of the accused. 36. Accordingly, having arrived at the said conclusion; a direction was issued to the Officer in-charge, Women Police Station, Seppa, to register a case under appropriate sections of law and conduct investigation into the matter and submit a final report as provided under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . It is to be noted that such a direction was so issued at the pre-cognizance stage in-as-much as, as held hereinabove; the materials available on record, does not disclose taking cognizance by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, in the matter. 37. It is to be noted that such a direction was so issued at the pre-cognizance stage in-as-much as, as held hereinabove; the materials available on record, does not disclose taking cognizance by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, Bomdila, in the matter. 37. As noticed hereinabove, basing on the directions so passed vide order, dated 17.01.2024, by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024; a case being Seppa Women Police Station Case No. 02/2024 under Sections 376/326/506 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Harassment Act, 2012 , has already been registered. 38. In view of the above conclusions; this Court is of the considered view that the order, dated 17.01.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge, POCSO, West Kameng, Pakke Kesang, East Kameng & Tawang, at Bomdila, in Special Case POCSO Complaint Case No. 01/2024, would not call for any interference from this Court. 39. Accordingly, the criminal petition is held to be bereft of any merit and consequently, the same stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.