JUDGMENT : ANANDA SEN, J. By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 07.12.2016 passed by respondent No.3, whereby the petitioner was dismissed on being found guilty. Further, he prays to quash the Appellate Order dated 31.03.2017 passed by respondent No.2, whereby the order of penalty is confirmed. 2. Undisputed facts of this case are that petitioner joined Bank of India as Probationary Officer on 24.09.1987 as Junior Management Grade-I. He was promoted as Middle Management Grade-II on 01.05.1998. He was further promoted to Middle Management Grade-III on 01.12.2007. After he was transferred from Ghaghra Branch to Mumbai Service Branch some irregularities was detected for which, a memorandum was issued on 11.05.2015 and the petitioner was asked to explain. The petitioner submitted his explanation on 06.06.2015, thereafter on 31.12.2015 the disciplinary authority issued article of charges related to lack of due diligence in sanctioning loan and allowing cash withdrawal from cash credit account and failure to maintain the norms of the Bank. The petitioner submitted a written statement on 07.01.2016 denying the charges. Thereafter a departmental proceeding was initiated. On 03.03.2016 a preliminary hearing was made where the petitioner pleaded innocence and the proceeding continued. After submission of the inquiry report on 14.10.2016, the disciplinary authority issued show cause, which was replied on 26.10.2016 by the petitioner and lastly, the disciplinary authority imposed punishment of dismissal upon the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal against the order of punishment which was also dismissed. 3. Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that as the successor Branch Managers failed in discharging their duties in the matter of follow-up in the event of loan becoming NPA and for the failure of the successor Branch Manager, the petitioner has been targeted and punished. The petitioner in the process of disbursement of loan has followed all the prescribed norms, practice and procedure. The allegation levelled against him are unfounded and baseless. He further submitted that most of the charges are nonest and none of the allegation against the petitioner was established in the enquiry. The decision of the Inquiry Authority, Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority is bad and improper. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Bank has suffered huge financial loss for the act of the petitioner. He further submitted that most of the charges are nonest and none of the allegation against the petitioner was established in the enquiry. The decision of the Inquiry Authority, Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority is bad and improper. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Bank has suffered huge financial loss for the act of the petitioner. The petitioner has got no legs to stand and the petitioner has been rightly held guilty and awarded major penalty of dismissal. The order of dismissal was passed after giving adequate and appropriate opportunity to the petitioner to the represent himself. The principle of natural justice has been followed in this case. As the charges were serious the Disciplinary Authority has rightly imposed major penalty of dismissal. 5. From the materials available on record, I find that article of charges contains mainly three charges i.e. (i) Sanctioning loans in gross violation of Bank lending norms, systems and procedures, (ii) Using official position in recklessly, sanctioning and disbursing credit limits and (iii) In gross violation of banks’ lending norms sanctioning credit facilities. From inquiry report, I find that a detailed inquiry has been conducted in respect of all the charges levelled against the petitioner. There are witnesses who have been examined and documents which have been exhibited by the witnesses. The Inquiry Officer has addressed all the points of charges and came to a conclusion that the charges against the petitioner stands proved. I find no illegality and irregularity committed by the Inquiry Officer. Further, when I go through the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority, I find that the Disciplinary Authority has given adequate opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The whole process of disciplinary proceeding was conducted in a fair manner. Thus, there is no lapses in the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority. 6. This Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot act as an appellate Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others vs Rajendra Kumar Dubey ” reported in (2021) 14 SCC 735 has held as under: “21.1. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will first discuss the scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction with respect to disciplinary proceedings. It is well settled that the High Court must not act as an appellate authority, and reappreciate the evidence led before the enquiry officer. We will advert to some of the decisions of this Court with respect to interference by the High Courts with findings in a departmental enquiry against a public servant. 21.2. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 ] , a three- Judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is not the function of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction to review the evidence, and arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may, however, interfere where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. If, however, the enquiry is properly held, the departmental authority is the sole judge of facts, and if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a writ petition.” 7. Further the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ State of Rajasthan and Others vs. Bhupendra Singh ” reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908 , while referring to its earlier judgements has endorsed and reiterated the views and observations made in those judgements. Paragraphs 23, 24 and 26 of the judgement in the case of Bhupendra Singh (supra) read as under: “23. Paragraphs 23, 24 and 26 of the judgement in the case of Bhupendra Singh (supra) read as under: “23. The scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Constitution’) in a case of the present nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , a 3-Judge Bench stated: ‘ 7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.’ (emphasis supplied) 24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal strength in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249 . Three learned Judges of this Court stated as under in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557 : ‘ 21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [ AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150 ]. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. xxx 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan [ AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR 64 ]. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. xxx 26. For these reasons we are of opinion that the High Court was wrong in setting aside the dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.’ (emphasis supplied) 26. In Union of India v. K.G. Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794 , it was opined: ‘ 14. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the court should not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it was illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 : [1947] 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision. 15. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigations it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.’ (emphasis supplied) 8. Further, I find that misconduct committed by the petitioner is of a grave nature. An employee of a Bank is expected to maintain higher standard of honesty as he is dealing with public money. He is expected to protect the interests of the bank also. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad ” , reported in (2025) 3 SCC 601 at para 20 has held as under:- 20. It is well-settled that the Bank officers are expected to maintain a higher standard of honesty, integrity, and conduct. In para 17 of the decision of this Court in Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain [Damoh Panna Sagar Rural Regional Bank v. Munna Lal Jain, (2005) 10 SCC 84 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 567] , it was held thus : (SCC pp. 95-96) “17. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. 95-96) “17. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Central Bank of India v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [Central Bank of India v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik, (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] , there is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulting in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Taking into consideration the fact of this case and judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cited above, in my view the punishment inflicted upon the petitioner commensurate with the proved misconduct. There is no illegality in the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In view of the aforesaid facts, this writ petition is dismissed.