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2025 DIGILAW 1412 (ALL)

Paras Nath Sahu v. State of U. P.

2025-12-12

ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN

body2025
JUDGMENT : 1. The present Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as to ‘Cr.P.C.’) has been filed by the appellants/accused Paras Nath Sahu and Umesh against the judgment and order dated 29.06.2012 passed by the Sessions Judge, District Pratapgarh, in Sessions Trial No. 273 of 2009 (State Vs. Paras Nath Sahu and another) arising out of Crime No. 143 of 2008, wherein they have been convicted and sentenced for punishment for the substantive offence under Section 304-B I.P.C. for imprisonment of life, under Section 498-A I.P.C. for three years rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 3000/- to each and in default of fine, one-year additional imprisonment and one-year of rigorous imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 2000/- to each, under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and in default of fine six months’ additional imprisonment. The benefit of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to concurrent running of all the said sentences of conviction has also been granted to the appellant by the Ld. Trial Court. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION 2. The case of the prosecution as elaborated by the learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment is briefly enumerated as herein under: 2.1 The complainant, Banshilal Gupta (P.W.-1), son of Mohanlal Gupta, resident of Shivani Ka Purwa, Vihar, Police Station Baghrai, District Pratapgarh, filed a written report ( Exhibit- Ka-1) at Police Station- Baghrai on August 19, 2008, at 9:00 AM, leading to registration of a F.I.R. ( Exhibit-Ka-3), stating inter-alia that he had arranged the marriage of his daughter, Sangeeta Devi, aged 21 years, with Umesh (Appellant No.2), son of Paras Nath Sahu, (Appellant No.1), resident of village Dandwa, Namdevpur, Police Station Baghrai, District Pratapgarh. 2.2 It was stated therein that ever since the wedding, which had been about three years ago, the daughter's husband, Umesh, and his father, Paras Nath, constantly harassed and physically abused Sangeeta, demanding dowry and asked her to go and bring a gold chain and money, which her daughter repeatedly told to her mother, brother and relatives. It was also stated by the defacto- complainant that his son-in-law(Umesh/Appellant No.2) is a habitual alcoholic. It was also stated by the defacto- complainant that his son-in-law(Umesh/Appellant No.2) is a habitual alcoholic. 2.3 It was also stated in the said F.I.R. that on August 19, 2008, at around 6:30 AM, his another son-in-law, Banwari Lal, son of Chedilal, a resident of Mangalpur, Police Station- Baghrai Disrict-Pratapgarh came to his house and informed that his daughter Sangeeta (since deceased) had been burned to death by her husband Umesh and her father-in-law Paras Nath, due to demands of dowry and the dead body is lying in her matrimonial home. 2.4 The complainant along with his son-in-law (Banwari lal)accompanied by other relatives arrived at the place of incident, wherein they came to learn that the incident had taken place last night. 3. Based on the aforesaid written report ( Exhibit-Ka-1) filed by Banshilal Gupta (P.W.-1), Head Constable Sanjay Shukla at Police Station- Baghrai registered a chik preliminary information report ( Exhibit-Ka-3) regarding this incident, which he referred in General Diary, Entry No. 4 and filed a permanent case dated 19.08.2008 at 9:15 AM ( Exhibit-Ka-4) 4. The inquest report of the deceased-Sangeeta Devi was prepared by Ram Kewal Tripathi, Nayab Tehsildar, Manikpur. On his instructions, the Sub-Inspector of the concerned police station seized the deceased's belongings from the crime scene, including an empty 5-liter kerosene cane, a matchbox and loose matchsticks soaked in kerosene, which were lying near the body. He also seized a green and purple colored shirt, an iron tongs, and strands of hair scattered near the body, and prepared a seizure memo ( Exhibit-Ka-13) . He prepared the sample seal ( Exhibit-Ka-6) , letter of Reserve Inspector ( Exhibit-Ka-7) letter of Constable ( Exhibit-Ka-8) , Photographs ( Exhibit- Ka-9) and CMO report ( Exhibit-Ka-10) , and after duly sealing the dead body, sent the same to the District Hospital, Pratapgarh for post-mortem examination. 5. Postmortem of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Padmakar Singh (P.W.-3), who also prepared and signed the postmortem report (Exhibit-Ka-2). 6. During investigation, the Investigating Officer/Circle Officer Sadar, Ms. Rashmi Mishra recorded the statement of the witnesses and on the pointing out of the complainant (P.W.-1), and after investigating the place of occurrence, site plan (Exhibit-Ka-12) was prepared. 5. Postmortem of the dead body was conducted by Dr. Padmakar Singh (P.W.-3), who also prepared and signed the postmortem report (Exhibit-Ka-2). 6. During investigation, the Investigating Officer/Circle Officer Sadar, Ms. Rashmi Mishra recorded the statement of the witnesses and on the pointing out of the complainant (P.W.-1), and after investigating the place of occurrence, site plan (Exhibit-Ka-12) was prepared. After completing the formalities of investigation, the Investigating Officer filed the charge-sheet on 10.09.2008, against the appellants (i) Paras Nath Sahu and (ii) Umesh, under Sections 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. and 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act ( Ex. Ka- 11 ). PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 7. The case came to be committed to the Sessions Court vide an order dated 24.08.2009 and to the charges framed against both the appellants on 02.11.2009, both of them pleaded not guilty and claimed Trial. 8. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, have examined seven witnesses. The details of the witnesses being: - 9. Apart from the oral evidence led by the prosecution, various documents have also been exhibited and proved running from Exhibit. Ka-1 to Exhibit. Ka-12. 10. Thereafter, the statement of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. on 14.07.2011 and additional statements of the accused/appellant were recorded on 01.05.2012, wherein they denied the fact of being involved in the present incident and setting ablaze of the deceased- Sangeeta. In their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in additional statements, both the accused persons have admitted that marriage of the deceased-Sangeeta and appellant no. 2 -Umesh was solemnized three years ago, however, they denied allegations made by the complainant/father of the deceased in the F.I.R. and allegations made by the P.W.-2 mother of the deceased. In their additional statements, they have also denied the opinion of the Doctor- Padmakar Singh, P.W.-3 and claimed that this is the false case against them with the ulterior motive to harass them. They also chose to lead defence evidence. 11. However, none of the accused/appellants produced any defence witnesses in their favour. 12. In their additional statements, they have also denied the opinion of the Doctor- Padmakar Singh, P.W.-3 and claimed that this is the false case against them with the ulterior motive to harass them. They also chose to lead defence evidence. 11. However, none of the accused/appellants produced any defence witnesses in their favour. 12. After hearing the arguments of both the sides and on basis of the evidence available on record, the Learned Trial Court returned a finding that the oral and documentary evidence placed before the Court by the prosecution were found adequate for successfully proving the entire chain of whole evidence from beginning to end in a coherent manner. The Trial Court rejected the defence version made during trial that the wife committed suicide because of her husband being alcoholic. The Trial Court also rejected the version of the defence that the dowry accusation was presumably to be customary in their culture for the son-in-law to get upset and demand something. The version of the defence that the present incident was a suicide case, as no one came from the parental home of the deceased to invite her for Raksha Bandhan was also repelled by the Ld. Trial Court. The doctor's opinion was believed to be correct to the effect that the deceased received ante-mortem injuries and she was burnt after her death. The Ld. Trial Court meticulously after shifting through the evidence brought on record, went on to conclude that since the surrounding objects were not burned, and the body was superficially burnt from head to toe, the same indicated that the burning occurred after death and concluded that the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. to be totally false and without any supporting evidence. 13. Along-with analyzing the evidence available on record, the Learned Trial Court has also decided the case on the basis of three ingredients needed to attract the penal provisions of Section 304- B I.P.C. Those points being (i) that the death must have occurred within seven years of the marriage; (ii) that the death of the deceased may have occurred in unusual and unnatural circumstances and (iii) demand of dowry has been made just before the death. According to the learned Trial Court, the chain of all these three point formed an unbreakable chain pointing towards the culpability of the appellant, since the death occurred within 3 years of the marriage, and the death of the deceased being found in unnatural circumstances as the body was found burnt in a location where surrounding objects were not burnt and no plausible explanation or evidence was led by the appellants to discharge the presumption under Section 113 B read with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. Thus, the Ld. Trial Court recorded its full satisfaction for holding the guilt of both the appellants and as such awarded the maximum punishment of imprisonment for life under Section 304-B I.P.C., three years under Section 498- A I.P.C. and one year under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT 14. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid conclusion of the learned Trial Court, the present appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 967 of 2012 came to be filed by the appellants- Paras Nath Sahu (Appellant No. 1) and Umesh (Appellant No. 2). 14.1 In the first bail application filed by the appellants along with the present appeal, the appellant no. 1- Paras Nath Sahu being father-in-law and old aged, was granted bail but the Court rejected the prayer for grant of bail to the appellant no. 2- Umesh vide common order dated 21.03.2013. The second bail application of the appellant no. 2 was rejected for want of prosecution vide order dated 26.03.2015 and the third bail application came to be rejected vide order dated 13.04.2022, by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on the ground that before death of the deceased-wife of the appellant no. 2, she was administered poison and thereafter, she was burnt to death, which was clear from the viscera report. The Coordinate bench concluded that, since as per the postmortem report burn injury was found on the body of the deceased and the burden of proof was on the appellant no. 2 according to the provision of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which could not be discharged. The fourth bail application of the appellant no. 2 was rejected vide order dated 05.04.2024 on the ground of absence of any new ground. 14.2 However, the fifth bail application of the appellant no. 2-Umesh (husband) was filed but while arguing the bail application, Mr. The fourth bail application of the appellant no. 2 was rejected vide order dated 05.04.2024 on the ground of absence of any new ground. 14.2 However, the fifth bail application of the appellant no. 2-Umesh (husband) was filed but while arguing the bail application, Mr. R.P. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant has also pressed that since the paper book has been prepared and the actual period of incarceration of the appellant no. 2 was more than 15 years and 2 months (or 18 years 7 months including remission) as per the Custody Certificate issued by the Jail Authorities, therefore, the appeal may be heard and decided on its merits and prayed that the 5 th bail application may be dismissed as being not pressed. Consequently, the bail application was dismissed being not pressed and the appeal has been heard on its merits. 14.3 It was also informed by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that during the pendency of the present appeal, the appellant no.1 (Paras Nath Sahu) has left for his heavenly abode and as such although the present common appeal has been filed by both the appellants, however, for all technical purposes the appeal qua the deceased appellant no.1 may be construed as abated. 14.4 Thus, according to him the present appeal may be considered qua the appellant no.2 (Umesh) only. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES 15. Sri R.P. Mishra, learned Advocate assisted by Sri Aditya Mishra, Advocate for the appellant has submitted that the impugned judgment dated 29.06.2012 is illegal, perverse and have been passed only on surmises and conjectures. He has submitted that there is no evidence on record regarding cruelty of the deceased for demand of dowry, as there is no injury on the body of the injured. It is next contended that there is also no evidence regarding demand of dowry immediately before the incident nor there is any injury on the body of the deceased, so as to attract the provisions of Section 304B I.P.C. It is next contended that there are several contradictions and infirmities in the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 and there is no definite opinion regarding the death of the deceased. According to the learned counsel, the appellant has been made liable merely on the basis of suspicion and as such is entitled to be acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. According to the learned counsel, the appellant has been made liable merely on the basis of suspicion and as such is entitled to be acquitted from all the charges levelled against him. It is lastly contended that there is no definite opinion regarding administering of poison, as there is no medical report nor any visible sign which suggest that the poison was administered to the deceased by the contesting appellant. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued above sentence being highly excessive and not in commensurate with degree of offence. He has also sought to draw the attention of this Court to the evidence of P.W.-3 Dr. Padmakar Singh, who has conducted postmortem of the dead body of the deceased and according to the learned Counsel, the postmortem report clearly mentions that the cause of death could not be ascertained and as such viscera was preserved, however, it was mentioned in the postmortem examination report that the deceased has received burn injury after her death, which according to him is contradictory to each other. Thus, he submits that since the appellant is being connected to the offence of murder, due to invocation of the provisions of presumption under Section 113-B read with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, therefore, it is his submission that a reading of the prosecution witnesses and the material brought on record, reveals that there are various missing links and as such the appellant cannot be convicted in the absence of the completion of chain, which is a sine quo non for any case to be proved by circumstantial evidence. Thus, he prays for setting aside of the judgment dated 29.06.2012 passed by the Sessions Judge, Pratapgarh in Sessions Trial No. 273 of 2009 and prays for the acquittal of the appellant in the present case and in the alternative prays for leniency, as the appellant- Umesh has already spent more than 18 years and 7 months in Jail, though Section 304B I.P.C. prescribes a minimum punishment of 7 years only and he has an old mother and a young girl child of marriageable age, born out of the wedlock with deceased to support. Further, there is no criminal history and he has a sense of repent for not saving his wife. 17. Further, there is no criminal history and he has a sense of repent for not saving his wife. 17. Per contra, Sri S.P. Singh, learned A.G.A. for the State has submitted that the deceased committed suicide at her matrimonial home as she was administered poisonous substance (Aluminum Phosphide) and the deceased died under unnatural circumstances. He has submitted that it is also the statement of the doctor/PW-3 that the body was burned after the death. It is further submitted that the prosecution has fully established that the death of the deceased was done under unnatural circumstances, within three years of the marriage and soon before her death, she was subjected to harassment and cruelty due to demand of dowry and as such the appellant has been rightly convicted under Section 304B I.P.C. and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and on perusal of the judgment, it reveals that the prosecution has clearly established the charges levelled against the appellant and the prosecution has been successful in proving the guilt beyond any reasonable doubt, against the appellant and as such, he has been rightly convicted and sentenced to the maximum punishment under Section 304-B of the I.P.C. Thus, he prays for dismissal of the appeal. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 18. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the materials on record. 19. The present appeal has been filed against conviction of the appellants under the following provisions: 20. Section 304B I.P.C. is relating to Dowry Death, which is a social and cultural menace, which ensues from the ill practice of dowry in our society. The cultural practice of dowry has assigned a secondary status to women leading to various social ills, which often forces her to continue in abusive marriages either due to family or peer pressure or at times due to her own accord. No doubt, various laws have been enacted providing equal level playing ground for women in all sphere of life, whether it is education, employment or property rights, however, the urge to curb and rein in this dowry practice was needed, which led to the enacting of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Even this Dowry Prohibition Act, which made the offering or accepting of dowry illegal, remained ineffective as the practice of dowry thrived unabated, irrespective of the caste or class. Even this Dowry Prohibition Act, which made the offering or accepting of dowry illegal, remained ineffective as the practice of dowry thrived unabated, irrespective of the caste or class. It was in this supervening background that Section 498A I.P.C. came to be inserted in the year 1983, which made the ill-treatment of women by her husband or in-laws, a punishable offence. Apparently, the said insertion also did not make much wonders, leaving the legislature to enact more stringent and heavier provision for curbing the said menace of dowry, leading to the insertion of Section 304B in the Indian Penal Code, which made dowry death punishable for a minimum sentence of 7 years and also a maximum punishment for life and raised a presumption against the person for all kinds of unnatural deaths, if the same has been occasioned within seven years of marriage, under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. Both these Sections were inserted in the year 1986 and ever since then, contrary to the ordinary fundamental cannon of criminal jurisprudence of ‘presumption of innocence’ that prosecution ought to proof the case beyond reasonable doubt stands transformed to ‘presumption of guilt,’ if certain conditions are fulfilled as per Section 304-B of the I.P.C. for culpability of the accused person. The law states that a foundational fact has to be merely proved against the accused person and by virtue of the legal presumption, the burden of proof stands shifted to the accused to prove his innocence by explanation and evidentiary proof, in view of Section 113 B of the Indian Evidence Act. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kashmir Kaur & Ar. V/s State of Punjab, reported in 2012(13) SCC 627 ; after tracing the law and various judgments on dowry death, culled out the following principles at paragraph 16 of the said judgment as follows: “ 16. From the above decisions the following principles can be culled out: (a) To attract the provisions of Section 304B IPC the main ingredient of the offence to be established is that soon before the death of the deceased she was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand of dowry. (b) The death of the deceased woman was caused by any burn or bodily injury or some other circumstance which was not normal. (c) Such death occurs within seven years from the date of her marriage. (b) The death of the deceased woman was caused by any burn or bodily injury or some other circumstance which was not normal. (c) Such death occurs within seven years from the date of her marriage. (d) That the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (e) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry. (f) It should be established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before her death. (g) The expression (soon before) is a relative term and it would depend upon circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. (h) It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section113B of the Evidence Act. (i) Therefore, the expression “soon before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate or life link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. In other words, it should not be remote in point of time and thereby make it a stale one. (j) However, the expression “soon before” should not be given a narrow meaning which would otherwise defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act and should not lead to absurd results. (k) Section 304B is an exception to the cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence that a suspect in the Indian Law is entitled to the protection of Article 20 of the Constitution, as well as, a presumption of innocence in his favour. The concept of deeming fiction is hardly applicable to criminal jurisprudence but in contradistinction to this aspect of criminal law, the legislature applied the concept of deeming fiction to the provisions of Section 304B. The concept of deeming fiction is hardly applicable to criminal jurisprudence but in contradistinction to this aspect of criminal law, the legislature applied the concept of deeming fiction to the provisions of Section 304B. (l) Such deeming fiction resulting in a presumption is, however, a rebuttable presumption and the husband and his relatives, can, by leading their defence prove that the ingredients of Section 304B were not satisfied.(m) T he specific significance to be attached is to the time of the alleged cruelty and harassment to which the victim was subjected to, the time of her death and whether the alleged demand of dowry was in connection with the marriage. Once the said ingredients were satisfied it will be called dowry death and by deemed fiction of law the husband or the relatives will be deemed to have committed that offence.” 22. Keeping the above principles in mind, this Court proceeds to marshall the evidence and material brought on record by the prosecution, so as to examine the culpability of the appellant under Section 304B I.P.C., 498A I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 23. PW-1 (Bansi Lal) is the father of the deceased and PW-2(Kalawati) is the mother of the deceased. PW-1 is the de- facto complainant of the FIR and has stated that he got his daughter (deceased-Sanageeta Devi) married to Umesh (Appellant No.2) about three years prior to the incident. He stated that there was no dowry demand during the marriage, however, on the next day of marriage, on the occasion of Khichdi (ritual performed on the next day of marriage), the Convict-Umesh (Appellant No.2) demanded Rs. 10,000/- and a Gold chain, wherein PW-1 expressed his inability to meet the said demand with folded hands. It has also been stated that when PW-1 approached the father of the Convict- Umesh, even his father/ co-convict (now deceased during pending appeal), he came for a rude shock as he supported his son and told PW-1 to meet the demand of convict-Umesh, wherein again he expressed his inability with folded hands. According to PW-1, it was with great pampering and effort that convict- Umesh performed the Khichdi ritual and then took the bride/deceased to her matrimonial home. According to PW-1, it was with great pampering and effort that convict- Umesh performed the Khichdi ritual and then took the bride/deceased to her matrimonial home. The said witness has also stated that when his daughter came back from her matrimonial home after 15 days, she told her father/PW-1, mother/PW-2 and her brother about taunting for not bringing the dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and Gold Chain. According to PW-1, his daughter was harassed and beaten at her matrimonial home for not brining the said dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and Gold Chain, which was disclosed to him, whenever she visited her parental home and even when PW-1 personally visited the matrimonial home of the deceased. The said witness has also stated that his deceased-daughter had gone merely seven days before from her parental home to her matrimonial before the said incident, wherein after she was burnt to death in the intervening night of 18/19.08.2008. He has exhibited the Tehrir ( Exhibit- Ka—1 and confirmed the date of incident. The version of this witness remained intact, although, he has been put to extensive cross- examination. There appears to be no inconsistency in the statement made by the said witness. 24. Similarly, PW-2(Kalawati) is the mother of the deceased. She has stated that her daughter was married to convict-Umesh three years before the incident. She also supported the version of demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and a Gold Chain and deposed that the deceased have been continously harrassed by her in-laws for that said reason. She stated that her deceased daughter had told her that she was being beaten for not brining the said dowry. In her examination in-chief, this witness states: 25. The statement of both the witness appears to be natural and their statement remained intact, although they were subjected to extensive cross-examination. Both the witness stood the test of veracity and this Court does not find any reason to disbelieve the version of the parents, who had lost their beloved 21 years old married daughter, in the hands of menance of dowry. 26. Further, PW-4 (Constable Sanjai Kumar Shukla) is the witness, who proved the FIR ( Exhibit Ka-3 ) having been recorded on the basis of Tehrir given by PW-1 and recorded in his own handwriting in the G.D. ( Exhibit- Ka-4 ). 26. Further, PW-4 (Constable Sanjai Kumar Shukla) is the witness, who proved the FIR ( Exhibit Ka-3 ) having been recorded on the basis of Tehrir given by PW-1 and recorded in his own handwriting in the G.D. ( Exhibit- Ka-4 ). PW-5 (Ram kewal Tripathi) is the Naib Thesildar, who has proved the Inquest report ( Exhibit- Ka-5 ) to have been written in his own hand- writing. The said witness along with other witnesses, visited the crime spot and on his instruction recovery memo was prepared by the concerned Police station and the dead body was sent for post-mortem. The said report mentions the date, time and place of dead body. It also mentions that one kerosene oil plastic empty jerking, match box and strewn match sticks, unburnt hair, one shirt green colour, etc. were recovered from the crime spot ( Exhibit Ka-13 ). As far as the status of the body is concerned, the said report mentioned that the body was found lying on its stomach on the floor, with one bed-sheet covering the body. Altogether six panchs have signed the panchayatnama. One of the panch was of the opinion that the deceased had been killed and then burnt, whereas other panchs opined that the deceased committed suicide by setting herself on fire and mentioned that the body was recovered after breaking open the door, which was locked from inside. 27. The next, witness examined by the prosecution was PW-6 (Rashmi Mishra), who is the Investigating Officer of the present case and she has entered the witness box and gave statement related to recoveries ( Exhibit Ka-13 ) made, site plan drawn ( Exhibit Ka-12 ) and statement of witnesses recorded during investigation. She has collected various documents, including police photos, post-mortem report, Inquest report etc. She has also given statement related to sending of viscera to the forensic lab, Lucknow and obtaining the same on 12.01.2009. According to the said witness, the site plan was drawn on the marking of the Convict, wherein it was shown that the dead body was lying in a passage, which had two doors, which were both closed and it was the south door, which was broken open by people and body was recovered from the passage through the said door. 28. 28. Therefore, the following uncontroverted facts evolve from the aforesaid version of PW-1 and PW-2: I. The marriage of deceased with the convict-Umesh was three years old and as such the incident of death was within seven years of marriage. Besides, the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2, the said statement has not been controverted in the cross-examination, nor this Court finds any dispute relating to the years of Marriage. Further, both the convicts i.e. appellant no.1 and 2 have admitted to the said fact of having the marriage between the deceased and appellant no.2 (Umesh) being solemnized three years ago. Thus, since the death of the deceased is within 3 years of marriage, thereby the main condition prescribed under Section 304B i.e. death, within seven years of marriage stands fulfilled. II. The dead body of the deceased was found in a passage of the house at her matrimonial home, as proved by the Inquest report (Exhibit Ka-5) and site plan (Exhibit-Ka-12) III. There was demand of dowry immediately (seven days)before the incident of death as proved by PW-1 and PW-2. Although, the learned Counsel for the appellant has tried to create a doubt by pointing out the discrepancy in the said statement, in as much as PW-1 stated that the factum of coming of the daughter to her parental home, seven days prior to the said incident and telling about the demand of dowry, was not told to the police during investigation, but has been stated in the evidence recorded in the Court. This Court does not find the said inconsistency to be material, as the same has to be understood in the context the depositions were made. The said inconsistency cannot be termed as improvement of the version of PW-1 as it was reiteration of the fact that the dowry demand had been existing since the beginning of the marriage and remained unfulfilled for this three years of marriage until the death of the deceased. IV. The said inconsistency cannot be termed as improvement of the version of PW-1 as it was reiteration of the fact that the dowry demand had been existing since the beginning of the marriage and remained unfulfilled for this three years of marriage until the death of the deceased. IV. This Court is conscious that the usage of the word “soon” in Section 304-B I.P.C. ought not to be interpreted in terms of days or months or years, but as necessarily should indicate that the demand of dowry should not be stale or an aberration of the past, but rather should be a continuing cause for the death under Section 304B of the I.P.C. Once the presence of this concomitants are established or shown or proved by the prosecution even to their foundational effect by preponderance of possibility, the initial presumption of innocence is faded and replaced by an assumption of guilt by the deeming provision of law, thereby shifting the burden of proof upon the guilty to dislodge his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as per Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, which inter-alia states as herein under: 113B. Presumption as to dowry death. -- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death Explanation. For the purposes of this section, dowry death shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). 29. As far as the explanation and evidence led by the convict to dispel the presumption raised against them under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned, this Court finds that statement recorded of the convicts under Section 313 Cr.P.C, both of them have admitted the factum of the marriage having been three years old. 29. As far as the explanation and evidence led by the convict to dispel the presumption raised against them under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is concerned, this Court finds that statement recorded of the convicts under Section 313 Cr.P.C, both of them have admitted the factum of the marriage having been three years old. Although, a ground has been raised that some money was sought as a loan from the father of the de- ceased from convict no.1 and the deceased was adamant to get the demand of her father fulfilled and since the said demand could not be met, she committed suicide, however this Court finds that besides the stray allegations nothing has been brought on record to prove the said allegations. No defence witnesses has entered the witness box to prove the version of the convict persons. The demand of dowry of Rs. 10,000/- and gold chain existed even before seven days of death of the de-ceased i.e. soon before her death. 30. The next question which falls for our consideration is the cause of death because Section 304B of the I.P.C. inter-alia states: 304B. Dowry death. -- (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 31. As far as the cause of death of the deceased is concerned, there appears to be two versions in the Inquest report. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 31. As far as the cause of death of the deceased is concerned, there appears to be two versions in the Inquest report. The first being, wherein one of the panchs has stated that the deceased was killed and thereafter set on fire, whereas on the other hand most of the panchs have stated that it was a suicide case, wherein the deceased after closing the door from inside, set herself on fire. To understand both the proposition, this Court has examined two documents i.e. (i) Inquest Report (Exhibit-Ka-5) and (ii) Site Plan ( Exhibit- Ka-12 ) and the relevant deposition of the witnesses. The inquest report mentions the status of the dead body, which says that the body had only a petticoat on her, while she was lying dead by the side of her stomach on the ground. The kerosene Jar of 5 Litres along with strewn matches and matchbox was also found from the spot near the dead body. Presumably, the second version of suicide is to be believed, the manner in which the dead body was found i.e. in a semi-nude condition (for no one would become nude and put herself on fire) and the location of the dead body from where it was recovered i.e. in the passage locked by two doors, one in the north and the other in the south, creates a serious doubt on the suicidal story. Although, the panchs have indicated in their panchayatnama, that they have seen the dead body after breaking open the south door, but nothing has been told about the north door as to whether it was locked from inside or outside. Further, it can be seen from the Site-plan that the passage is located near the kitchen and two rooms and a verandah. Generally, kerosene oil is stored in the kitchen, then why if anyone wants to commit suicide would carry the kerosene oil to a passage (not even a room) and then lock the two doors of the passage (in kitchen or in room, there is only one door and it would had been easy to lock one door, than two as is found in passage) and become semi-nude and commit suicide by burning hereself to death. Further, the recovery of the kerosene oil jar and the strewn matches on the floor and the kerosene oil spread over the said passage speaks that in case it was a suicide there would had not been unburnt match stick or jar or any clothes left in the said passage as they would had also been burnt altogether, as fire does not discriminate any thing or any one and it spreads equally to all corners. The selective burning of the body and the fire not spreading anywhere in the room, shows that it cannot be a suicide case. Moreover, it was quite strange that even the noise of the deceased while burning alive or committing suicide was not heard by any of its neighbour, although it has come in the site-plan that there are many houses adjoining to the crime spot. There appears to be something amiss and flawed in the story of suicide built around the dead body and most importantly, if the story of suicide had any legs, it would had been any of the convicts, who would had informed the father of the deceased (PW-1) in the first place and/or had rushed the victim/deceased to doctor, in whatever condition, which is not the present case and would had been relevant evidence under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. 32. Thus, this Court is led to rule out the suicidal theory and is prompted to look further for the real cause of death. At this stage the evidence of PW-3(Dr. Padmakar Singh), the doctor who conducted the post-mortem becomes handy and throws some light. The post-mortem report (Exhibit- Ka-2), mentions that there are superficial to deep burn present over face, head, neck and upper part of chest, left axilla and shoulder arm and forearm and upper part of arm and no other ante-mortem injuries are seen. It concludes by stating inter-alia that “even after careful post mortem, cause of death could not be ascertained, so vicera is being preserved” . However, PW-3 in his examination-in-chief has stated that the deceased had burn injuries after her death and there was no cross-examination on the said point. The said witness was recalled for further examination under Section 311 Cr.P.C, and he, therafter explained the reasons as to why he stated in his previous examination that the burn injuries were after the death of the deceased. The said witness was recalled for further examination under Section 311 Cr.P.C, and he, therafter explained the reasons as to why he stated in his previous examination that the burn injuries were after the death of the deceased. He very well stated in his cross-examination that since there was no line of redness there could not be any death due to burn and even the lungs did not had carbon particles, which showed that the deceased did not die due to burn injuries, although, he admits that these all facts have not been mentioned by him in the post-mortem report( Exhibit-Ka-2 ). 33. Although, the witness deposed that the death was caused prior to the deceased having put on fire, however the cause of death was still unknown and it is at this juncture that the viscera report from the forensic laboratory comes into the picture, which mentions vide its report dated 12.01.2009 that poisonous material “Aluminium phosphate” was found in the body of the deceased. The said forensic report has not been exhibited, however, in view of the express provisions of Section 293 of Cr.P.C., which allows certain reports from government scien- tific experts to be used as evidence in legal proceedings without the expert having to appear in the Court to testify can be read as evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Kumar & Anr. v/s State of NCT of Delhi, reported in (2008) 4 SCC 493; after referring to various judgments on the issue, held that as per provisions contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. it is not obligatory that an expert, who furnishes opinion on the scientific issue of the chemical ex- amination of substance should be necessarily made to depose in proceedings before the Court. In the case in hand, the forensic report has been admitted during the recording of evidence of In- vestigating officer (PW-6). Such a document can also be marked on admission in view of Section 293 Cr.P.C. and used as evidence in the trial. Further, this Court finds that the defense has not even filed any application to summon the expert to dis- prove the same nor object to the manner the said forensic report has been admitted by the Investigating Officer. Such a document can also be marked on admission in view of Section 293 Cr.P.C. and used as evidence in the trial. Further, this Court finds that the defense has not even filed any application to summon the expert to dis- prove the same nor object to the manner the said forensic report has been admitted by the Investigating Officer. In any case, we find that the learned Trial Court has not solely relied on the forensic report to convict the appellant. Even if, the said report is left out of consideration, the learned Trial Court has held the appellants to be guilty in view of unimpeachable evidence of other witnesses. 34. In view of the above, for the cause of death, we have the following proposition; firstly the story of suicide appears to be fallacious in view of other supervening circumstances. Secondly, the Inquest report and the panchs points towards the deceased sustaining fatal burn injuries. However, thirdly, the evidence of PW-3 (Doctor), points towards the death having been occasioned prior to burning, which means death was not due to burning and fourthly, the forensic report says that poisonous particles of Aluminium phosphate was found in the dead body of the deceased. 35. Therefore, by joining the dots, we have the following analogy for the cause of death in the present case. In consideration of the overall evidence brought on record, the death was primarily due to consumption of ‘Aluminium Phosphate’ and thereafter, the body of the deceased was tried to be burnt, so as to pass off as a suicide case (suicide because the door was found latched from inside). Having said so, the appellant would had been also tried for causing disappearance of evidence of offence, punishable under Section 201 I.P.C., which fetches a punishment of upto seven years. However, we see that the said charges were not levelled against the convicts and rightly so, because there has been no investigation or any evidence led by the prosecution as to whether the administration of the poisonous substance ‘Aluminium phosphate’ was voluntary or involuntary. Further, even the viscera report was not proved as per law, which obviously would go to the benefit of the accused persons. Further, even the viscera report was not proved as per law, which obviously would go to the benefit of the accused persons. Apparently, the learned Trial Court in absence of any cogent evidence or investigation on the point of administration of poisonous substance to the deceased causing her death has rightly restricted itself to the theory of death having been otherwise than under normal circumstances, an important ingredients to attract the penal provision of Section304B of the I.P.C. 36. The moment, we arrive at a proposition that the death of the deceased- Sangeeta Devi has occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death", and therefore, such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Further, nothing was pointed out to hold that the conclusion arrived by the Ld. Trial Court was perverse or was there any illegality or irregularity. 37. For all the aforesaid reasons and taking into account all the above supervening factors, the evidence brought on records clearly established the legal requirements for an offence falling under Sections 304B and 498A of the I.P.C. with the aid of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act to be conclusively proved against the appellant and the conviction, therefore, do not call for any interference. Thus, the judgment as far as the conviction by the learned Trial Court under Section 304-B I.P.C., 498-A I.P.C. and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibiton Act is concerned the same are upheld. 38. Now, the question arises as to whether this Court can reduce the appellant’s sentence and if so, to what extent, as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant, keeping in view the prayer of leniency and the Evidence brought on record. 39. 38. Now, the question arises as to whether this Court can reduce the appellant’s sentence and if so, to what extent, as urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant, keeping in view the prayer of leniency and the Evidence brought on record. 39. This issue has engaged the attention of this Court, as well as the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several cases, which arose out of Section 304B read with 498A I.P.C. and wherein the Supreme Court while interpreting the expression ‘may’ mentioned in Section 304B I.P.C. held that it is not mandatory for the Courts in every case to award life imprisonment to the accused, once he is found guilty of offence under the said provision. It was held that the Courts could award sentence in exercise of it discretion between seven years to life imprisonment, depending on the facts of each case, which must not be less than 7 years and the extreme punishment of life terms should be awarded in ‘rare cases’ but not in all cases as a routine. In the case of Hem Chand Vs State of Haryana, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the Trial Court had awarded life term to the accused under Sections 304B read with 498A I.P.C., however, the Supreme court reduced the sentence to 10 years and held as under: “7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that: “Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B IPC would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman what all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 IPC. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr Usha Rani PW 6 and Dr Indu Lalit PW 7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr Dalbir Singh PW 13 who also examined the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re- post-mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 IPC have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.” 40. The said proposition of law was consistently followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka Vs M.V Manjunathe gowda & Anr. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 183; and G.V. Siddaramesh vs State of Karnataka, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 152 ; wherein in both the cases the life term was reduced to 10 years. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Om v. State of Haryana, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 577 ; considering the aforesaid judgments as precdents reduced the life term awarded by the Trial Court and the High Court to a term of 10 years, while recording that Courts below did not assign any reasons as to why the case was found to be a rare case for conviction under Section 304B I.P.C. 41. Further, there is another aspect of the matter in as much as the Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Union of India v. V. Sriharan, reported in (2016) 7 SCC 1; was dealing with an issue, as to whether imprisonment for life in terms of Section 53 read with Section 45 of the I.P.C. means imprisonment for the rest of the life of the convict or the same can be reduced. The Constitutional Bench after referring to the various precedents, including Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2008) 13 SCC 767; has answered the same in paragraph nos. 104 and 105 of the said judgment i.e. V. Sriharan (Supra), in the following words: " 104. That apart, in most of such cases where death penalty or life imprisonment is the punishment imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the convict concerned will get an opportunity to get such verdict tested by filing further appeal by way of special leave to this Court. By way of abundant caution and as per the prescribed law of the Code and the criminal jurisprudence, we can assert that after the initial finding of guilt of such specified grave offences and the imposition of penalty either death or life imprisonment, when comes under the scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High Court, it is only the High Court which derives the power under the Penal Code, which prescribes the capital and alternate punishment, to alter the said punishment with one either for the entirety of the convict's life or for any specific period of more than 14 years, say 20, 30 or so on depending upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise of judicial conscience befitting such offence found proved to have been committed." (emphasis added) "105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court." (emphasis added) 42. Moreover, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2023) 9 SCC 817 ; after considering both of the aforementioned judgments of V. Sriharan (Supra) and Swamy Shraddananda (2) (Supra); in paragraph no. 14, has held that: “14. Hence, we have no manner of doubt that even in a case where capital punishment is not imposed or is not proposed, the constitutional courts can always exercise the power of imposing a modified or fixed-term sentence by directing that a life sentence, as contemplated by “secondly” in Section 53IPC, shall be of a fixed period of more than fourteen years, for example, of twenty years, thirty years and so on. The fixed punishment cannot be for a period less than 14 years in view of the mandate of Section 433-A Cr.P.C.” (emphasis supplied) 43. Therefore, in view of the mandate of the Constitutional Bench in the case of V. Sriharan (Supra) and later clarified in the case of Shiva Kumar (Supra), there is no iota of doubt in the mind of this Court, as being a Constitutional Court, that a punishment of life imprisonment can be converted into a fixed term keeping in view, the facts and circumstances of a particular case, with the only caveat that the said fixed term cannot be less than 14 years. 44. 44. As far as the present case is concerned, considering the aforesaid proposition of law and the overall facts and circumstances, keeping in view the evidence brought on record, by virtue of which the appellants were convicted, we in our considered view need to set a chord of balance between the culpability of the convict on the basis of evidence collected and brought on record on the one hand with the amount of punishment inflicted due to the said culpability. This Court does not find any plausible reason appended by the learned Trial Court as to why the maximum punishment of life imprisonment had been awarded to the appellants in this present case. No doubt, the crime committed is one of the most heinous crime and does not calls for any leniency, keeping in view that notwithstanding the stringent law, dowry death is rampant and it refuses to recede, even after four decades it was enacted. 45. However, this Court besides its role to set an example for the society is to also strike a balance with the right of the individual convict and his apparent responsibilities. It has come on record, by virtue of the custody certificate, filed on records that the convict has already spent more than 15 years and eight months (18 years and 7 months, including remission) in jail, though Section 304B of the I.P.C. prescribes a minimum punishment of 7 years only. The appellant no.1, who was the father of the appellant no.2 has since been deceased during the pendency of the present Appeal. It has also come on record that the appellant no.2 has an old mother and a young girl child of marriageable age, born out of the wedlock with the deceased to support. 46. Thus, keeping in view the totality of the facts and considering the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and there being no criminal background and adverse history against the convict/appellant no.2- Umesh , we consider that the ends of justice would be met in this case, if the maximum sentence of life under Section 304B of the I.P.C is reduced to the period already undergone, i.e. actual sentence of 15 years and 8 months. However, the sentence under Section 498A I.P.C., and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, including the fine amount imposed shall remain unaltered. CONCLUSION 47. However, the sentence under Section 498A I.P.C., and Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, including the fine amount imposed shall remain unaltered. CONCLUSION 47. As sequel to the above, the present appeal as far as the appellant no.1 (Paras Nath Sahu) is concerned stands abated and as far as the appellant no.2 (Umesh) is concerned is dismissed on the point of conviction under Sections 304B, 498A of the I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act; however, on the point of sentence, the Appeal is partly allowed to the extent of sentence of 15 years and 8 months, i.e.the period already undergone. 48. However, the entire amount of fine awarded by the Trial Court shall be deposited by the appellant, within four weeks from the date of his release, in default, he shall be liable to undergo the same punishment of imprisonment, as the learned Trial Court has awarded. 49. Having said so, it is directed that the appellant- Umesh may be released forthwith, having already undergone the sentence of punishment under the present Sessions Trial No. 273 of 2009 (State Vs. Paras Nath Sahu and another) arising out of Crime No. 143 of 2008, if he is not needed in any other case(s). 50. There shall be no order as to cost(s).