Judgment : CHANDRA SHEKHAR SHARMA, J. 1. The present Civil First Appeal has been filed challenging the judgment and decree dated 24.05.2016 passed by Additional District Judge, Gulabpura, district Bhilwara in Civil Original Case No.18/2012 (Chandra Prakash Vs. Shanker Lal & Ors.) whereby the suit preferred by the respondent-plaintiff for Specific Performance of the Contract and Permanent Injunction was decreed. Instant appeal is reported to be barred by 453 days. An application (Inward No.01/22) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed seeking condonation of the delay in filing the instant Civil First Appeal. 2. The factual matrix, as it lies within a narrow compass, is that respondent-plaintiff filed a suit against the appellant- defendant for specific performance of sale agreement dated 30.12.2011. The learned trial court after framing the issues and having heard learned counsel for the parties, vide judgment and decree dated 24.05.2016 decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-plaintiff. Aggrieved against the impugned judgment and decree, the appellant-defendant preferred the instant appeal which is reported to be barred by 453 days. 3. The appeal was presented before this Court on 18.11.2017. Though the appeal was barred by limitation, however, no application at the time of presentation of appeal was filed. The appeal was kept pending for removal of defects as pointed by the Registry for almost 4½ years. Number of opportunities were granted to the learned counsel for the appellant for removal of the defects, but no steps were taken by him. It was in the year 2022, when on 21.04.2022, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the instant appeal was presented. Only in a cursory manner, following reason has been assigned in para No.2 of the said application: “2. That the appellant is a villager and lives in the village Kania at Kanakpur Tehsil Hurda and above mentioned suit is pending in the Additional District Court, Gulabpura District Bhilwara. The appellants appointed an advocate to contest the suit and the advocate appointed by the appellant gave instruction to the appellant that there is no need to appear on every hearing of the case and that whenever it will be required, he will duly inform him so the appellant was not present for every hearing. The appellants appointed an advocate to contest the suit and the advocate appointed by the appellant gave instruction to the appellant that there is no need to appear on every hearing of the case and that whenever it will be required, he will duly inform him so the appellant was not present for every hearing. That after the evidence of the defendant no.1, other defendants' witness was due, therefore the advocate of the appellant also told the appellant that whenever the matter will come in final argument or will be decided, he will inform him but the matter was decided against him on 24.05.2016. The appellant had not been regularly attending the court and was not informed by the advocate. And when the appellant contacted the advocate, he informed that suit was decreed and judgement was passed against him then the appellant consulted the advocate and he came to know that the appeal can be filed in the HIGH COURT at Jodhpur and court fees is also required to file this appeal. After that, he arranged some money and after advice, filed this appeal. Due to the above stated reason, the appeal could not be filed within time.” 4. An additional affidavit in support of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has also been filed by the learned counsel for the appellant, extract of which reads as under: “2.That it is most respectfully submitted that the decision dated 24.05.2016 of civil suit no. 18/12 passed by the ADJ Gulabpura, District Bhilwara of the above case came to my knowledge in the month of September 2017(Bhadwa month), when I approached my advocate whom I had appointed to fight and inquire about the case. I am an aged person living in the village and I don't remember the exact date of the decision/meeting of the Advocate.” 5. Reply to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has been filed by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, which reads as follows: “1. That the appellant Shankar Lal has filed the appeal by giving challenged to the judgment dated 24.05.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gulabpura, Bhilwara. In that the present application for condonation of delay in filling appeal has been filed. That the appellant Shankar Lal has filed the appeal by giving challenged to the judgment dated 24.05.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge, Gulabpura, Bhilwara. In that the present application for condonation of delay in filling appeal has been filed. The only ground to condone the delay in filling appeal, has been taken by the appellant that he was not intimated by his Advocate about the judgment dated 24.95.2016 and due to that he could not file appeal in time. The aforesaid ground is not plausible. The judgment was passed in his presence. No facts have been indicated as to what action he has taken for not intimation by his counsel. Only the ground has been taken just to seek condonation of delay. Therefore, the application deserves to be dismissed. 2. That more so pursuant to the judgment dated 24-01-2016, the execution was filed by the present respondent No.1 Chandra Prakash, the decree was executed and the sale deed was also executed in his favour by the executing court. Thereafter on the basis of the execution of decree, the executing court asked the Tehsildar to do the needful. Pursuant to that the mutation was opened and the same has been ended by inserting the name of the present respondent No.1 Chandra Prakash. In the revenue record also, the name of the present respondent No.1 Chandra Prakash has been entered. Therefore, the judgment dated 24.05.2016 has already been executed way back. The appellant just to keep the matter alive, has filed the present appeal for no justification. Once the judgment dated 24.05.2016 itself has been executed and all the formalities have been completed, now nothing remains in the appeal itself, therefore, the delay in filing the appeal, may not be condoned.” 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material threadbare. 7. The moot question before this Court is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay caused in filing the present appeal should be condoned or not? 8. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is in the interest of general welfare that a period of limitation is prescribed bring the litigation to a final conclusion. 8. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is in the interest of general welfare that a period of limitation is prescribed bring the litigation to a final conclusion. The object is to ensure finality by setting a fixed lifespan for every legal remedy, since it serves no purpose to allow disputes to remain pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e. human beings, who are mortals. 9. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a right not exercised or the remedy not availed for a long time ceases to exist. This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring the remedy rather than the right with the passage of time. 10. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case, this Court is concerned about the appeal only, in context with the limitation, as it being barred by time, and if at all, the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned. 12. The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause that prevents a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. 13. Now, coming to the facts of the present case, and in view of the factual matrix stated hereinabove, the following facts emerge:: 1. Date of impugned judgment 24.05.2016 2 The appeal was presented on (No application for condonation was filed along with file) 18.11.2017 3 Appeal was delayed by 453 days 4 Application filed on 21.04.2022 5 Execution filed on 30.07.2016 14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the averments made in the instant application and the chronology of the events in the preceding para, this Court finds that the only ground urged by the appellant for condonation of delay is that he was not informed by his counsel about the judgment. The explanation offered is vague, general in nature, and devoid of material particulars. It does not disclose “sufficient cause” as contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 . 15. It is not in dispute that the decree has already been executed and the rights of the respondent have crystallized through completion of execution proceedings and corresponding mutation in the revenue records. Further, no protest was raised during such execution by the appellant. Therefore, it is evident that the appellant has approached the Court belatedly and without exercising due diligence. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that no sufficient cause has been made out for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. 16. Additionally, the appellant moved an application before the Executing Court on 11.05.2022 seeking disbursement of the decreetal amount deposited by the respondent/decree-holder, which was subsequently withdrawn by the appellant without any protest or reservation. This conduct, coupled with the fact that the present appeal has been filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of 453 days, clearly reflects a mala fide intent. Having unconditionally accepted the benefits of the decree, the appellant deserves to be estopped from assailing the same. This conduct, coupled with the fact that the present appeal has been filed after an inordinate and unexplained delay of 453 days, clearly reflects a mala fide intent. Having unconditionally accepted the benefits of the decree, the appellant deserves to be estopped from assailing the same. The conduct of the appellant in approbating and reprobating simultaneously is impermissible in law and cannot be countenanced by this Court Accordingly, the present appeal not only lacks bona fides but also constitutes an abuse of the process of law and deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits. 17. It is a settled principle of law that generally justice should not be denied merely on technical grounds but if the filing of appeal suffers from inordinate delay, such delay ought not to be condoned unless the applicant is able to satisfy the court that he was prevented by “sufficient cause” from prosecuting the case. Since no sufficient reasons have been put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant to explain the delay in filing the present appeal which is barred by 453 days, it appears that the appellant was negligent in pursuing his case. Thus, in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or even an appropriate explanation, the present application for condonation of delay deserves to be dismissed. 18. The principle is further reinforced by the maxim ‘Vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt’, meaning ‘the law assists those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights’. This maxim aptly applies in the present case. It is a well-settled principle that a party cannot remain inactive or negligent and later seek the indulgence of the court without showing sufficient cause for the delay. The law does not permit the indefinite extension of limitation merely on grounds of leniency or sympathy, especially where no reasonable or justifiable explanation is offered. 19. The present application (Inward No.01/22) for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is hereby rejected. 20. As a consequence, the Civil First Appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation. 21. Stay application as well as any other pending application, if any, stand(s) disposed of. 22. No order as to costs.