JUDGMENT : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the appellant-State against the judgment of acquittal dated 20.09.1996 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, No.1, Alwar in Session case No.22/1988 arising from FIR No.60/1988 registered at Police Station Kotwali, Alwar. 2. The appeal was filed against the acquittal of three accused arrayed as respondents. During pendency of the appeal, accused - Sanjay Kumar and Mukesh Kumar died and the appeal qua them was abated. The appeal survives against acquittal of Rajendra @ Raju Tilakdhari S/o Basudev (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondent’). 3. The facts as per the prosecution are that on 07.02.1988 on discovering the dead body of Pratap Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’) near the backside entry of Nagar Parishad, PW-5 Trilok Singh (brother of the deceased) filed a complaint. The injuries were inflicted by the sharp-edged weapon on the neck of the deceased. During investigation, four accused were nominated. The charges were framed under Sections 148, 302 and in alternate Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. One of the accused – Dinesh Kumar died during trial. In the statement made under Section 313 Cr.PC, the accused stated it to be a case of false implication and the trial was claimed. 3.1. The prosecution examined nineteen witnesses and three were claimed to be eye-witnesses. The trial Court considered the facts and appreciated the evidence to conclude that the prosecution failed to prove the case to the hilt and acquitted the respondent giving benefit of doubt. Hence, this appeal by State. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor contends that PW-4 Jassumal, PW-5 Sohan Singh and PW-17 Dalchand were the eye-witnesses and their testimonies were consistent in asserting that the respondent had killed the deceased. The contention is that blood- stained ‘Tanchiya’ (sharp edged weapon like Kulhari, hereinafter referred to as ‘Kulhari’) was recovered at the instance of respondent Rajendra @Raki and the trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the scope of interference in appeal against acquittal is limited. There was no evidence proving deceased was killed by the respondent. The argument is that the eye-witnesses were planted by the prosecution. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 7. The star witness of the prosecution PW-4 claimed, that he can recognize the accused but did not know their names. There was no evidence proving deceased was killed by the respondent. The argument is that the eye-witnesses were planted by the prosecution. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 7. The star witness of the prosecution PW-4 claimed, that he can recognize the accused but did not know their names. The trial Court rightly considered that neither any identification parade was conducted nor the accused were recognized by the witnesses in Court. PW-4 Jassumal stated that after the incident names of the accused were told to him by PW-5 Sohan Singh. 7.1. PW-5 Sohan Singh asserted to have seen the accused but had not identified them in Court. As per his deposition, the names of the accused were revealed to him five to six days before the incident at the shop of Raju when in his presence accused were addressing each other by name. PW-5 faltered in cross-examination and admitted that the shop of Raju was closed for fifteen to sixteen days prior to the incident. The testimony of PW-1 Sadhu (employee at the shop of the deceased) was also to the effect that shop of Raju was closed since long. 7.2. PW-17 Dalchand was held to be an interested witness being neighbour of the deceased, having good relations with family of the deceased and his testimony was held not to be reliable. PW17 stated that at the time of the incident PW-5 Sohan Singh was walking ahead of him, PW-4 Jassumal came from the side of Gopal Talkies and Dhara also reached at spot and the incident was narrated to him. It would be relevant to note that in the complaint the presence of PW-4, PW-5 and PW-17 on the spot of the incident was not mentioned. 8. As per prosecution PW-17 Dalchand was present at the spot of incident. It would be apposite to note that he had not reported matter to police inspite of fact that there was telephone at Gopal Talkies and nearby Petrol Pump rather left for his sister’s house immediately. During trial PW-17 had not identified the accused. 9. The spot of incident was in a densely populated area having number of shops and petrol pumps, yet the prosecution failed to examine independent witnesses. 10. The recovery of blood-stained kulhari from the respondent does not enhance the case of the prosecution. During trial PW-17 had not identified the accused. 9. The spot of incident was in a densely populated area having number of shops and petrol pumps, yet the prosecution failed to examine independent witnesses. 10. The recovery of blood-stained kulhari from the respondent does not enhance the case of the prosecution. The recovery was made after thirty six hours of the incident and that to from a sewerage outside the public toilet. 11. Another aspect is that the blood-stain on the kulhari was of blood-group ‘B’ but the blood-group of the deceased was not brought on record. In other words, prosecution failed to prove that the blood-stains on the Kulhari recovered were of the deceased. 12. The law is well settled that the scope of interference in the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [(2024) 8 SCC 149] held:- “40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka , (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.PC as follows: “8. xxx xxx xxx 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. The view taken by the trial Court is plausible, suffers from no factual or legal error much less perversity calling for interference in the appeal. No case is made out for interference. 14. The appeal is dismissed. The judgment dated 20.09.1996 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge No.1, Alwar is affirmed.