Judgment / Order : MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL, J. 1.This writ petition is filed by the petitioner-workman seeking a direction to the respondents to release his service benefits as also the post retiral benefits treating him to be continue in service with interest at the rate 9% per annum. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that while serving as a Conductor with the respondent-Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, the petitioner was served with a charge-sheet dated 10.08.1999 with allegation of carrying passengers without ticket wherein, an order of dismissal from service was passed on 28.11.2002. The application filed by the respondent-Corporation under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act , 1947 (for short, ”the Act of 1947”) seeking approval of the order of dismissal came to be dismissed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (for short, “learned Industrial Tribunal”) vide order dated 28.02.2024. Alleging that despite dismissal of the application filed under Section 33 (2)(b), the respondents did not pay him the service benefits till he attained the age of superannuation, i.e., 30.09.2015 and thereafter, the retiral benefits, this writ petition is filed. 3. Reiterating the averments made in the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that rejection of the application filed by the respondent-Corporation under Section 33 (2)(b) seeking approval of the order of dismissal amounts to as if no order of dismissal was ever passed and in view thereof, he is entitled for all the service benefits as also post retiral benefits on attaining the age of superannuation on 30.09.2015. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed and the respondent- Corporation be directed to release the aforesaid benefits with interest at the rate 9% per annum. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, relying on a coordinate Bench order of this Court dated 11.02.2025 passed in the case of Shyam Lal Sharma Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Others: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10520/2021 , would submit that since the petitioner did not work from the date the dismissal order was passed till he attained the age of superannuation, he is not entitled to get any actual benefit for this period on the principle of “No Work No Pay”; but, notional benefits only. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be disposed of in terms thereof. Heard. Considered. 5. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be disposed of in terms thereof. Heard. Considered. 5. The relevant facts are not in dispute and are in very narrow compass. The learned Industrial Tribunal, vide its order dated 28.02.2024, dismissed the application filed by the respondent- Corporation under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act of 1947 seeking approval of the dismissal order dated 28.11.2002. 6. Now the question is of entitlement of the petitioner for reinstatement, payment of consequential service benefits and retiral dues. 7. So far as retiral dues are concerned, entitlement of the petitioner for the same is not disputed even by the learned counsel for the respondents. Further, since, the petitioner has retired in the interregnum on attaining the age of superannuation, there is no occasion of his reinstatement after rejection of the application under Section 33 (2)(b) vide order dated 28.02.2024. 8. Objection of the learned counsel for the respondents qua the entitlement of the petitioner for payment of actual monetary benefits from the date of dismissal of service till he attained the age of superannuation is based solely on the order dated 11.02.2025 passed by a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Shyam Lal Sharma (supra) wherein, it was held as under: “7. Perusal of the record indicates that a charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner for taking certain passengers without ticket and after holding some inquiry, a decision was taken by the respondents to terminate the services of the petitioner and accordingly, a decision was taken on 24.05.2002 in this regard. After that an application under Section 33 (2)(B) of the Act of 1947 was submitted by the respondents before the Tribunal seeking approval of the termination order of the petitioner. The aforesaid application submitted by the respondents was rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 19.02.2021, meaning thereby, that approval was not granted against the termination order of the petitioner, subsequently, the said order passed by the Tribunal was assailed by the respondents before this Court by way of filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 8805/2021, however, the same was also rejected by this Court vide order dated 30.01.2025, hence, under these circumstances, the order passed by the Tribunal has attained finality. 8. 8. Looking to the fact that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Conductor on 08.04.1983 and thereafter, his services were terminated on 24.05.2002, the petitioner has not worked in the intervening period, till the date of attaining the age of superannuation, but, subsequently, the approval against the termination order of the petitioner was denied by the Tribunal vide order dated 19.02.2021, hence, under these circumstances, the petitioner is entitled to get actual service benefits with effect from date of his appointment till the date of passing of the order dated 24.05.2002 and he would be entitled to get notional benefits with effect from the same date, till the date of retirement i.e. 30.09.2016. 9. As the petitioner has not worked in this intervening period, he is not entitled to get monetary benefits on the basis of principle of ‘No Work No Pay’.” 9. Thus, in the aforesaid case, the employee was held not entitled for actual service benefits even after rejection of an application filed by the employer under Section 33 (2)(b) on the principle of “No Work No Pay”. However, their Lordships have held in the case of T.N. State Transport Corporation Vs. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam: (2001) 9 SCC 99 as under: “ 16. From the conspectus of the views taken in the decisions referred to above the position is manifest that while the employer has the discretion to initiate a departmental inquiry and pass an order of dismissal or discharge against the workman the order remains in an inchoate state till the employer obtains order of approval from the Tribunal. By passing the order of discharge or dismissal de facto the relationship of employer and employee may be ended but not the de jure relationship for that could happen only when the Tribunal accords its approval. The relationship of employer and employee is not legally terminated till approval of discharge or dismissal is given by the Tribunal. In a case where the Tribunal refuses to accord approval to the action taken by the employer and rejects the petition filed under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act on merits the employer is bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and give him all the consequential benefits. If the employer refuses to grant the benefits to the employee the latter is entitled to have his right enforced by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. If the employer refuses to grant the benefits to the employee the latter is entitled to have his right enforced by filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no rational basis for holding that even after the order of dismissal or discharge has been rendered invalid on the Tribunal’s rejection of the prayer for approval the workman should suffer the consequences of such invalid order of dismissal or discharge till the matter is decided by the Tribunal again in an industrial dispute. Accepting this contention would render the bar contained in Section 33 (1) irrelevant. In the present case as noted earlier the Tribunal on consideration of the matter held that the employer had failed to establish a prima facie case for dismissal/discharge of the workman, and therefore, dismissed the application filed by the employer on merits. The inevitable consequence of this would be that the employer was duty-bound to treat the employee as continuing in service and pay him his wages for the period, even though he may be subsequently placed under suspension and an enquiry initiated against him.” 10. Further, a Constitution Bench has, in the case of Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and Others: (2002) 2 SCC 244 , while dealing with an identical situation, held as under: “ 14. Where an application is made under Section 33 (2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33 (2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of the employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement………………….” 11. From the aforesaid precedential law, it is crystal clear that on rejection of an application filed by the employer under Section 33 (2)(b) of the Act of 1947, no separate order of reinstatement is required and the workman shall be treated to be continued in service as if no order of dismissal/discharge was ever passed with entitlement of salary and other consequential benefits. 12. It may also be profitable here to take note of the fact that relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of T.N. State Transport Corporation (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has, in the case of Radhey Shyam Chipa Vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur and Another: DB Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.304 of 2005 , held that once the application under Section 33 (2)(b) stands dismissed, right of the workman to get reinstated with all consequential benefits including payment of salary can be enforced even by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without relegating the workman to the alternative remedy available under the Act of 1947. 13. Since, the order in the case of Shyam Lal Sharma (supra) holding the workman disentitled for actual payment on the principle of “No Work No Pay” has been passed oblivious of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, it can safely be held to be “per incuriam” and laying down no binding precedent. 14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 15. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. The respondents are directed to pay to the petitioner all the service benefits from the date of passing the dismissal order dated 28.11.2002 till he attained the age of superannuation and thereafter, the retiral benefits. The arrears shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 15. The writ petition is allowed accordingly. The respondents are directed to pay to the petitioner all the service benefits from the date of passing the dismissal order dated 28.11.2002 till he attained the age of superannuation and thereafter, the retiral benefits. The arrears shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The needful be done within a period of twelve weeks from today failing which the interest shall be leviable at the rate of 9% per annum after the expiry of the period of twelve weeks and the officer(s) responsible for delay would bear the enhanced interest component. 16. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.