ORDER : SANJEEV KUMAR SHARMA, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. Vanlalhriata, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the sole respondent/Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). 2. The petitioners have prayed for setting aside the Order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl in NCB Crime No. 5/2024 under Section 21 (c)/22(c) of the ND&PS Act, 1985 in Criminal Petition No. 19/2025. By the impugned Order dated 13.01.2025, the period of completion of the investigation by the enforcement agency has been extended by another 90 days, beyond the initial 180 days provided for completion of the investigation for seizure of drugs of commercial quantity, as per Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985. In Bail Application No. 26/2025, the petitioners had prayed for grant of default bail in terms of Section 187 (3) & (4) of the BNSS , which is similar to the repealed Section 167 (2) of the Cr.PC. 3. The petitioners’ case is that the petitioners had been arrested on 24.07.2024 in connection with the recovery of 2.804 kgs of suspected heroin and 14.082 kgs of suspected Methamphetamine from a Bolero Pik-up, bearing registration No. TR-05/C1813 at the outskirt of Dulte village, Khawzawl District. 4. The petitioners’ case is that the Special Court, vide the impugned Order dated 13.01.2025, had allowed the application of the respondent/NCB, Agartala Zonal Unit under Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, for extension of the period of investigation by another 90 days, without giving any opportunity to the petitioners to oppose the prayer for extension of the period of investigation, after the initial 180 days had expired for completing the investigation. 5. The petitioners’ counsel submits that at the time when the Special Court had considered the application submitted by the Public Prosecutor for grant of extension of time for investigation, the presence of the petitioners was not procured by the Special Court, either personally or through video conferencing, to enable the petitioners to make a challenge to the application for extension. 6. 6. He submits that the grant of extension of time given by the Special Court to the respondent, to complete the investigation without affording an opportunity to the petitioners to make a challenge to the same, took away the indefeasible right of the petitioners to apply for default bail under Section 167 (2) Cr.PC, which is also provided under Section 187 (3) & (4) of the BNSS , which in turn has to be read in conjunction with Section 36A (4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985. 7. He submits that in view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya Vs. State of Gujarat , reported in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 794 , the impugned Order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Special Court, ND&PS Act in NCB Crime No. 5/2024 should be set aside and the petitioners should be released on default bail, as the petitioners has been in custody for more than 180 days. 8. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Special Public Prosecutor for the NCB fairly submits that as the petitioners had not been produced before the learned Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl at the time of consideration of the application submitted by the respondent, for extension of the period of investigation beyond 180 days, by another 90 days and as no opportunity of being heard had been provided to the petitioners, with regard to the said application, the impugned order cannot survive in terms of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) 9. The learned Special Public Prosecutor however submits that charge-sheet had been filed on 11.04.2025 against the petitioners and the other co-accused and as such, default bail should not be given on the basis of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) 10. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 11. The learned Special Public Prosecutor however submits that charge-sheet had been filed on 11.04.2025 against the petitioners and the other co-accused and as such, default bail should not be given on the basis of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) 10. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 11. In the case of Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) , the issue to be decided by the Supreme Court was as to whether the application made by the Police, for extending the period of investigation by another 90 days, beyond the 180 days period for completing the investigation, could be allowed in terms of Section 20 (2) of the Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2015 Act’), without giving any opportunity to the accused therein to oppose the prayer for extension of the investigation period, as the same would take away the right of an accused to apply for default bail. 12. Section 20 (1), (2), (3) & (4) of the 2015 Act are reproduced herein below as follows: “ 20. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law, every offence punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a 'cognizable offence' within the meaning of clause (c) of section 2 of the Code and 'cognizable case' as defined in that clause and shall be construed accordingly. (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modifications that in sub- section (2), - (a) the reference to "fifteen days" and "sixty days", wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to "thirty days" and "ninety days", respectively; (b) after the existing proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:- "Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the. Special Court shall extend the said period upto one hundred and eighty days on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days.". (3) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act. (3) Nothing in section 438 of the Code shall apply in relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of having committed an offence punishable under this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond, unless – (a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application of such release; and (b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Special Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused is not guilty of committing such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 13. A perusal of Section 20(2) of the 2015 Act shows that Section 167 of the Cr.PC would be applicable in relation to offences involving the 2015 Act and that the references to 15 days and 60 days wherever they occur in Section 167 of the Cr.PC would have to be construed as references to 30 days and 90 days respectively. Section 20(2) of the 2015 Act further provides that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of 90 days, the Special Court shall extend the said period upto 180 days on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the said period of 90 days. 14. Section 167 (2) of the Cr.PC and Section 187 (3) & (4) of the BNSS , 2023 are also reproduced herein below as follows: “ Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 167. 14. Section 167 (2) of the Cr.PC and Section 187 (3) & (4) of the BNSS , 2023 are also reproduced herein below as follows: “ Section 167 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty four hours.- (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that— [(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding— (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] [(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage;] (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. [Explanation I.—For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.] [Explanation II.—If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be.] [Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution.] [(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub-inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where an order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub - section (2): Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be.]” “ Section 187 (3) & (4) of the BNSS , 2023 187. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty four hours. (3) The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this sub-section for a total period exceeding— (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter. (4) No Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the audio-video electronic means.” 15 . A perusal of the provisions of Section 167 (2) of Cr.PC and 187(3) & (4) of the BNSS shows that the Magistrate cannot authorise the detention of an accused beyond 90 days in relation to offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of 10 years or more and 60 days, where the investigation relates to any other offence. 16. 16. Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985 states as follows: “(4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) thereof to “ninety days”, where they occur, shall be construed as reference to “one hundred and eighty days”: Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days.” A perusal of the above provision shows that in respect of offences involving commercial quantity, the reference in sub-section 2 of Section 167 Cr.PC, with regard to 90 days, wherever they occur, shall be construed as reference to 180 days. As such, in terms of Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985, investigation has to be completed within the initial 180 days or else the accused has the right to default bail after the expiry of 180 days. However, the proviso to Section 36 -A (4) provides that if the investigation cannot be completed within 180 days, the Special Court may extend the said period upto 1 year, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. 17. In view of the above, it is quite apparent that Section 20(2) of the 2015 Act and Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985 are similar, except in relation to the time period given for completion of the investigation and the number of days that can be given by the Court, extending the period of investigation. As such, this Court is of the view that the ratio decidendi in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) is applicable to the facts of this case. 18. The Supreme Court in Jigar@ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (supra) while considering 2 other Judgments of the Supreme Court, i.e., Sanjay Dutt Vs. As such, this Court is of the view that the ratio decidendi in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) is applicable to the facts of this case. 18. The Supreme Court in Jigar@ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (supra) while considering 2 other Judgments of the Supreme Court, i.e., Sanjay Dutt Vs. State through C.B.I., Bombay (II) , reported in (1994) 5 SCC 410 and in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others , reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 , held that Section 167 (2)(b) of Cr.PC provides that judicial custody can be extended on the production of the accused, either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage. Thus, the requirement of the law is that while extending the remand to judicial custody, the presence of the accused has to be procured either physically or virtually. This mandatory requirement of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of the power to extend judicial custody/remand. The reason is that the accused has the right to oppose the prayer for extension of the remand. Thus, when the Special Court exercises the power of granting extension under Section 20(2) of the 2015 Act for completing investigation by another 90 days, i.e. beyond the stipulated 180 days period, it was mandatory to produce the accused at the time when the Court considered the application for extension and that the accused was to be informed that the question of extension of the period of investigation was being considered. This was due to the fact that the grant of extension of time to complete the investigation takes away the infeasible right of the accused to apply for default bail and it takes away the right of the accused to raise a limited objection to the prayer for the extension. The Supreme Court held that the failure to produce the accused before the Court, at the time of consideration of the application for extension of time, would amount to violation of the right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, as prejudice was inherent. 19. Paragraph Nos. 30, 34, 35, 36 & 37 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (supra) are reproduced herein below as follows: “ 30. 19. Paragraph Nos. 30, 34, 35, 36 & 37 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (supra) are reproduced herein below as follows: “ 30. The logical and legal consequence of the grant of extension of time is the deprivation of the indefeasible right available to the accused to claim a default bail. If we accept the argument that the failure of the prosecution to produce the accused before the Court and to inform him that the application of extension is being considered by the Court is a mere procedural irregularity, it will negate the proviso added by subsection (2) of Section 20 of the 2015 Act and that may amount to violation of rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution. The reason is the grant of the extension of time takes away the right of the accused to get default bail which is intrinsically connected with the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution which is required to be followed before the liberty of a person is taken away has to be a fair and reasonable procedure. In fact, procedural safeguards play an important role in protecting the liberty guaranteed by Article 21. The failure to procure the presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the Court and the failure to inform him that the application made by the Public Prosecutor for the extension of time is being considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity. It is gross illegality that violates the rights of the accused under Article 21. 34. We must note here that the reports were submitted by the Public Prosecutor nearly a week before the expiry of the period of 90 days. In every case, period of seven days or more was available for completion of the period of ninety days. The orders were passed by the Special Court on the reports of the Public Prosecutor on the very day on which reports were submitted. There was no reason for such hurry. The Special Court could have always granted time of a couple of days to the prosecution to procure the presence of the accused either physically or through video conference. The orders were passed by the Special Court on the reports of the Public Prosecutor on the very day on which reports were submitted. There was no reason for such hurry. The Special Court could have always granted time of a couple of days to the prosecution to procure the presence of the accused either physically or through video conference. The accused may not be entitled to know the contents of the report but he is entitled to oppose the grant of extension of time on the grounds available to him in law. In the facts of the present case, the grant of extension of time without complying with the requirements laid down by the Constitution Bench has deprived the accused of their right to seek default bail. It has resulted in the failure of justice. 35. The orders passed by the Special Court of extending the period of investigation are rendered illegal on account of the failure of the respondents to produce the accused before the Special Court either physically or virtually when the prayer for grant of extension made by the Public Prosecutor was considered. It was the duty of the Special Court to ensure that this important procedural safeguard was followed. Moreover, the oral notice, as contemplated by this Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt, was also not given to the accused. 36. Once we hold that the orders granting extension to complete investigation are illegal and stand vitiated, it follows that the appellants are entitled to default bail. 37. When they applied for bail, the appellants had no notice of the extension of time granted by the Court. Moreover, the applications were made before the filing of charge sheet. Hence, the appellants are entitled to default bail. At this stage, we may note here that in the case of Sanjay Dutt as well as in the case of Bikramjit Singh, this Court held that grant of default bail does not prevent re arrest of the petitioners on cogent grounds after filing of chargesheet. Thereafter, the accused can always apply for regular bail. However, as held by this Court in the case of Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, re-arrest cannot be made only on the ground of filing of charge sheet. It all depends on the facts of each case.” 20. Thereafter, the accused can always apply for regular bail. However, as held by this Court in the case of Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, re-arrest cannot be made only on the ground of filing of charge sheet. It all depends on the facts of each case.” 20. The Supreme Court thereafter set aside the impugned order passed by the Special Court, granting extension of time to complete the investigation and enlarged the appellants therein on default bail under sub-section (2) of Section 167 Cr.PC, as the investigation had not been completed within 180 days, as required under Section 20(2) of the 2015 Act and the extension of the investigation period had been allowed, without affording any opportunity to the accused to make any objection against the application for extension of time. 21. In the present case, the impugned Order dated 13.01.2025 clearly shows that the petitioners was not present and neither was her counsel present at the time of passing of the impugned order. In fact, the petitioners had subsequently filed Bail Application No. 26/2025 in the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl on 21.01.2025, which was dismissed vide Order dated 21.01.2025. Bail Application No. 26/2025 was an application for default bail under Section 187 of BNSS read with Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985. However, the Bail Application was dismissed on the ground that before expiry of the time stipulated for concluding investigation within 180 days, in terms of Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, the respondent had filed an application for extension of the investigation period before the Special Court, which was allowed on 13.01.2025 by extending the investigation period by 90 days, beyond the 180 days period. As such, the application for default bail under Section 187 of the BNSS was rejected. 22. As can be seen from the above, there is nothing to show that the petitioners had been made aware of the extension of the investigating period granted to the respondent, nor had the petitioners been given an opportunity to object the same. The petitioners having been arrested on 24.07.2024, the period of 180 days would have expired on 20.01.2025. However, the grant of extension of the investigation period by 90 days had already been given by the Special Court, vide Order dated 13.01.2025. The petitioners having been arrested on 24.07.2024, the period of 180 days would have expired on 20.01.2025. However, the grant of extension of the investigation period by 90 days had already been given by the Special Court, vide Order dated 13.01.2025. The petitioners had not been produced before the Special Court, either personally or through video conference, at the time of consideration of the respondent’s application for extending the period of investigation. In fact, a perusal of the original Trial Court records and the impugned order, shows that the grant of extension period for investigation by another 90 days had been issued on the same day the application was first seen by the Special Court. Neither were the petitioners produced nor her counsel present on the said date. 23 . In view of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) , the impugned order granting extension of time, to complete investigation by another 90 days would have to be declared to be unsustainable, as no opportunity to object to the application had been given to the petitioners. 24. As can be seen from the records, the petitioners’ default bail application had been submitted under Section 187 of the BNSS read with Section 36 -A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985 before the learned Special Court on 21.01.2025, that is, after the expiry of 180 days and prior to the filing of the charge-sheet, which had been done on 11.04.2025. 25. The petitioners’ application for default bail was registered as Bail Application No. 26/2025 in the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl. The same was however dismissed vide Order dated 21.01.2025 on the ground that extension of the investigation period had been allowed on 13.01.2025. This Court thus finds that as the impugned order extending the investigation period vide Order dated 13.01.2025 passed in NCB Crime No. 5/2024 was illegal and not sustainable, the rejection of the default bail application of the petitioners, vide Bail Application No. 26/2025, was not proper. The petitioners should have been released on default bail, but for the illegal impugned Order dated 13.01.2025. 26. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that a Co-ordinate Bench has, in a similar matter, pertaining to contraband of commercial quantity in relation to the ND&PS Act, 1985, has granted default bail in Criminal Petition No. 5/2023 ( Smt. Vanlalsiami and Anr. Vs. 26. It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that a Co-ordinate Bench has, in a similar matter, pertaining to contraband of commercial quantity in relation to the ND&PS Act, 1985, has granted default bail in Criminal Petition No. 5/2023 ( Smt. Vanlalsiami and Anr. Vs. State of Mizoram and Anr. ) vide Order dated 19.05.2023 , in line with the Supreme Court decision in Jigar @Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) due to the fact that at the time the Enforcement Agency was given extension of time, for completion of the investigation period beyond the initial 180 days, the accused petitioners therein nor his counsel, were given an opportunity to object to the application for extension of the investigation period. As such, keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (Supra) this Court is of the view that the petitioners herein has also made out a case for default bail, as the impugned order was illegal and stood vitiated. 27. Accordingly, in view of the reasons stated above, the impugned Order dated 13.01.2025 passed by the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl in NCB Crime No. 5/2024 is hereby set aside. However, in terms of the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya (supra) , the grant of default bail cannot prevent re-arrest of the petitioners on cogent grounds, after the filing of charge-sheet, if the facts so demand. It is also made clear that the default bail has been granted to the petitioners, as an application for default bail had been submitted by the petitioners after expiry of the initial 180 days after arrest and prior to the filing of the charge-sheet. 28. In view of the reasons stated above, the petitioners, namely, (i)MD Iman Hossain, (2) Ripan Hossain and (3) Niranjan Karmakar are to be released on default bail in terms of Section 187 (3) & (4) of the BNSS , on a bail bond of Rs. 200,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) each, which should be deposited, with one surety of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl. 29. 200,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) each, which should be deposited, with one surety of the like amount, to the satisfaction of the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl. 29. The bail is granted subject to the following conditions: (i) The petitioners shall not leave the State of Mizoram without the permission of Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl and shall deposit a copy of the Aadhaar Card and Voter’s ID with the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Aizawl. (ii) The petitioners shall attend the Court as and when directed to attend the Court. (iii) The petitioners shall not take any steps to intimidate/ influence the witnesses. 30. The petition is accordingly disposed of.