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2025 DIGILAW 1432 (KER)

Shahana P. , W/o Yasin Sajar v. State of Kerala

2025-05-26

JOBIN SEBASTIAN, P.B.SURESH KUMAR

body2025
JUDGMENT : Jobin Sebastian, J. An order of detention dated 28.11.2024 passed under Section 3(1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (‘KAA(P) Act’ for brevity) against one Yasin Sajeer @ Yasin Sajar, S/o Avarankutty, is under challenge in this writ petition. The petitioner herein is the wife of the detenu. After considering the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government vide order dated 31.01.2025 has confirmed the order, and the petitioner’s husband has been ordered to be detained for a period of six months from the date of detention. 2. As revealed from the records, the proposal for the initiation of proceedings under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act was submitted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad. For the purpose of initiation of the said proceedings, the detenu was classified as a 'known goonda' as defined under Section 2(o)(ii) r/w 2(j) of the KAA(P) Act. For passing the order of detention, the authority reckoned 3 cases in which the detenu was involved. The case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.440/2024 of Shornur Police Station, alleging the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 (b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act. 3. We heard Sri. Mohammed Aslam P.A., the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri. K.A. Anas, the learned Government Pleader. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the impugned order was passed by the jurisdictional authority without proper application of mind and without arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. According to the counsel, there is an inordinate delay in passing the impugned order after the alleged commission of the last prejudicial activity, and the said delay will snap the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of the detention order. It was further contended that the jurisdictional authority passed the impugned order without seriously taking note of the fact that the detenu was already on bail in the case registered with respect to the last prejudicial activity. According to the counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court while granting bail to the detenu was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and passed the impugned order in a hasty manner. According to the counsel, the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court while granting bail to the detenu was not properly considered by the jurisdictional authority, and passed the impugned order in a hasty manner. The counsel further urged that, apart from the three cases considered by the detaining authority for classifying the detenu as a “known goonda”, the details of the other cases were also considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the impugned order, and hence, the impugned order is vitiated. The learned counsel further urged that the detenu never violated the bail conditions imposed in any of the earlier cases. Nevertheless, jurisdictional authority in its order wrongly mentioned that the detenu, after obtaining bail in the previous cases, violated the bail conditions in the said orders, and the said wrong mentioning of a fact itself throws light on the non-application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority while passing the impugned order. 5. In response, the learned Government Pleader contended that the order of detention was passed after proper application of mind and arriving at the requisite objective as well as subjective satisfaction. Moreover, the learned Government Pleader submitted that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal for initiation of proceedings under KAA(P) Act or in passing the impugned order of detention. According to the Government Pleader, some minimal delay is quite natural as the authority requires some time to collect the details of the cases in which the detenu is involved and as well as for verifying the records and for complying with the procedural formalities. It is further urged that at the time of passing the impugned order the jurisdictional authority was fully cognizant of the fact that the detenu was on bail in connection with the last prejudicial activity and it was after being satisfied that those conditions are not sufficient to restrain the detenu from repeating criminal activities, the order of detention was passed. 6. The records reveal that the detenu was classified as a “known goonda”, considering his recurrent involvement in 3 cases. The case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.440/2024 of Shornur Police Station, alleging the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 20 (b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act. 6. The records reveal that the detenu was classified as a “known goonda”, considering his recurrent involvement in 3 cases. The case registered against the detenu with respect to the last prejudicial activity is Crime No.440/2024 of Shornur Police Station, alleging the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 20 (b)(ii)(B) and 29 of the NDPS Act. The detenu, who is arrayed as the 2nd accused in the said case, was caught red-handed with 1.974 kg of Ganja along with the 1st accused on 03.08.2024. Thereafter, it was on 03.10.2024, the detenu was released on bail on conditions. The proposal for the initiation of proceedings under the KAA(P) Act against the detenu was mooted by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, on 14.10.2024. It is true that the sponsoring authority was not quick in mooting the proposal immediately after the commission of the last prejudicial activity by the detenu. However, the said delay is justified as the detenu was in judicial custody till 03.10.2024. As the detenu was in judicial custody, there was no basis for any apprehension regarding the immediate commission of any offence by the detenu, and therefore, the inaction of the sponsoring authority in mooting the proposal forthwith after the commission of the last prejudicial activity is justifiable. Moreover, after the release of the detenu on bail without much delay, on 14.10.2024, a proposal was forwarded by the District Police Chief, Palakkad, to the jurisdictional authority for the initiation of proceedings against the detenu under the KAA(P) Act. The said minimal delay in mooting the proposal after the release of the detenu on bail is also justifiable, as some minimal days are highly necessary for collecting the details of the cases in which the detenu is involved and to verify the records of those cases. Subsequently, the detention order was passed on 28.11.2024 without any unreasonable delay. The sequence of the events clearly shows that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention was snapped. 7. Subsequently, the detention order was passed on 28.11.2024 without any unreasonable delay. The sequence of the events clearly shows that there is no inordinate delay either in mooting the proposal as well as in passing the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention was snapped. 7. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that apart from the three cases considered by the detaining authority for classifying the detenu as a known goonda, the details of the other cases were also considered by the jurisdictional authority for passing the impugned order, and hence the impugned order is vitiated. However, a bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the contention of the petitioner in the above regard will not sustain. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that only three cases in which the detenu is involved are considered for classifying the detenu as a known goonda. It is true that in the impugned order a passive reference has been made with respect to two other cases apart from the abovesaid three cases considered for passing the impugned order. However, it is apparent that such a passive reference to two other cases is made while discussing the antecedents of the detenu, and the said cases did not form any basis for passing the impugned order. Notably, in the order, it is specifically mentioned that those cases were not considered for passing the order of detention against the detenu. 8. Another contention taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that though the detenu never violated any of the bail conditions imposed on him while granting bail in the earlier cases, the jurisdictional authority in its order wrongly mentioned that the detenu after obtaining bail in the previous cases violated the bail conditions imposed and the said wrong mentioning of a fact itself throws light towards non-application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority while passing the impugned order. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that in the two previous cases, in which the detenu is involved, one of the bail conditions clamped while granting bail was that ‘he shall not get involved in similar offences during the currency of the bail period’. While considering the said contention, it is to be noted that in the two previous cases, in which the detenu is involved, one of the bail conditions clamped while granting bail was that ‘he shall not get involved in similar offences during the currency of the bail period’. In the order of detention, it is mentioned that it was by violating the said condition, the detenu got involved in the last prejudicial activity as well as in the last but one case registered against him. It is true that the first case considered by the jurisdictional authority in passing the impugned order is a case registered for commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code, the second one is registered for an offence under the Abkari Act and the case with respect to the last prejudicial activity is registered alleging offences under the NDPS Act. Therefore, technically speaking, it cannot be said that the petitioner violated the previous bail condition, as the cases registered against him are not of a similar nature. However, it is apparent that regardless of the true spirit of the bail conditions imposed, he got involved in cases one after another, and it was after considering his recurrent involvement in criminal activities the impugned order of detention was passed by the jurisdictional authority. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel that, the detenu has not violated the earlier bail conditions and a statement in the impugned order that he violated the earlier bail conditions clamped on him will show that there is non application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority will not sustain especially when it is proved that the conditions imposed in the earlier bail orders was not effective to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. More pertinently, the impugned order is not passed for the violation of earlier bail conditions, but considering his recurrent involvement in criminal activities. The impugned order is seen passed by the jurisdictional authority after considering his recurrent involvement in criminal activities and after being satisfied that the bail conditions imposed are not sufficient to deter the detenu from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any non-application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority while passing the impugned order. 9. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any non-application of mind on the part of the jurisdictional authority while passing the impugned order. 9. Another contention canvassed from the side of the petitioner is that the jurisdictional authority, while passing the order, did not take notice of the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the last case registered against him. According to the counsel, the jurisdictional authority failed to consider the sufficiency of the bail conditions imposed by the court at the time when he was granted bail. While considering the contention of the counsel for the petitioner in the above regard, it is to be noted that there is no law that precludes the jurisdictional authority to pass an order of detention against a person who is already on bail. However, when an order of detention is passed against a person who is on bail, it is incumbent upon the authority to take note of the said fact and to consider whether the bail conditions imposed on such a person while granting bail by the court are sufficient to prevent the detenu from involving in criminal activities. Keeping in mind the above, while reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that in the impugned order itself, the fact that the detenu was released on bail in the case registered against him with respect to the last prejudicial activity is specifically adverted to. Moreover, in the impugned order, the sufficiency of the bail conditions is also seen properly considered by the jurisdictional authority. In the impugned order, it is specifically mentioned that the conditions clamped on the detenu are not sufficient to restrain him from repeating criminal activities. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the above regard will also fail. 10. From a perusal of the records, we are satisfied that all the necessary procedural requirements before passing an order under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act have been scrupulously complied with in this case. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner. We are further satisfied that the competent authority passed the detention order after thoroughly verifying all the materials placed by the sponsoring authority and after arriving at the requisite objective and subjective satisfaction. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order passed under Section 3(1) of the KAA(P) Act is vitiated in any manner. In view of the discussion above, we hold that the petitioner has not made out any case for interference. Hence, the writ petition stands dismissed.