ORDER : 1. The appellants challenge a common order dated 18.11.2023 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in a batch of Writ Petitions. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge disposed of W.P.Nos.20396, 25795 of 2002 and 8406 of 2013 inter alia by permitting the writ petitioners to submit representations before the official respondents for allotment of an alternate land in lieu of the land acquired, within three weeks from the date of receipt of the order and to consider the case of the writ petitioners for allotment of alternate land. The respondents were also directed to pass appropriate orders within three months from the date of submission of the writ petitioners’ representations. 2. The appellants before this Court are the Managing Director, Telangana Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (‘TIIC’) (the appellant in W.A.No.396 of 2025) and the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District, (the appellant in W.A.No.1020 of 2025). The respondent Nos.1, 7, 8, 10, 14, 19 and 60 (in the two Writ Appeals) are represented by learned Senior Counsel. 3. W.A.No.396 of 2025 has been filed with a delay of 460 days and W.A.No.1020 of 2025 has been filed with a delay of 488 days. 4. We have taken up the I.As in the two Writ Appeals to decide on the objection of the respondents to the delay being condoned. 5. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants as well as learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1, 7, 8, 10, 14, 19 and 60 with regard to condonation of the delay. The affidavits in the two I.As which seek to explain the delay. The grounds proffered for seeking condonation of the delay are substantially the same in both the I.As. 6. The appellant states in paragraph 4 of the affidavit in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in W.A.No.1020 of 2025 that Assembly Elections in the State of Telangana were concluded on 30.11.2023 and the results were announced on 03.12.2023 resulting to a change in Government. It is stated in paragraph 4 that the Elections for the Parliament were announced on 16.03.2024 and the Model Code of Conduct was enforced leading to the entire machinery of the State being involved in the Elections. Paragraph 6 of the affidavit states that the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District (deponent of the affidavit) assumed charge on 28.10.2024 and initiated several ‘flagship’ programmes.
Paragraph 6 of the affidavit states that the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District (deponent of the affidavit) assumed charge on 28.10.2024 and initiated several ‘flagship’ programmes. It is further stated that the administrative workload in the District had increased in view of administrative responsibilities and land acquisition processes. 7. These are the only grounds stated by the appellant in W.A.No.1020 of 2025 for condonation of the delay of 488 days in filing the Writ Appeal. 8. We note that the affidavit falls short of furnishing even the most basic of clarifications including ‘when’ the appellant received the impugned common order. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit simply avers that the order under challenge was received by the office of the appellant ‘before the General Assembly Elections’. Hence, it is assumed that the Court would do the necessary deductions as to the date or time of the appellant’s knowledge of the impugned order. The appellant assumes that the delay would be condoned as a matter of right even if the pleadings towards sufficiency of cause are woefully inadequate. 9. In essence, the sole reason given by the appellant in W.A.No.1020 of 2025 to justify the delay of 488 days is the Assembly Elections of November, 2023 and the Parliamentary Elections of March, 2024, respectively. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the impugned common order was passed on 18.11.2023. The narration of the development works undertaken in Ranga Reddy District from October, 2024 onwards reads like a self-promotional exercise with the assumption that the delay would therefore be condoned. 10. We fail to see as to how either the Assembly Elections or the development works undertaken in the District can satisfy the requirement of sufficiency of cause under section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963. Article 117 of the Schedule to The Limitation Act, 1963 provides for a limitation period of thirty days from the date of the decree/order of a High Court for filing of an intra-High Court Appeal. The delay of 488 days looks humongous in the total insufficiency of the reasons proffered. 11. The affidavit filed in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in W.A.No.396 of 2025 for condoning the delay of 460 days is even more surprising. The appellant herein is the Managing Director of a Corporation (TIIC) who, for reasons unexplained, adopts the grounds given by the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District in W.A.No.1020 of 2025.
11. The affidavit filed in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in W.A.No.396 of 2025 for condoning the delay of 460 days is even more surprising. The appellant herein is the Managing Director of a Corporation (TIIC) who, for reasons unexplained, adopts the grounds given by the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District in W.A.No.1020 of 2025. In the affidavit, the appellant states that the impugned common order dated 18.11.2023 was dispatched by this Court on 26.12.2024 and was received by the Office of the TIIC on 07.09.2025. The delay of almost two years in receipt of the impugned common order is alarming. 12. The appellant thereafter unquestioningly adopts the reasons given by the District Collector, Ranga Reddy District i.e., announcement of Parliamentary Elections on 16.03.2024 enforcement of the Model Code of Conduct and that the entire machinery of the State was involved in the Election process until the conclusion of the Elections on 06.06.2024. The only additional reason given is that the TIIC took time to obtain legal opinion on whether the TIIC or the Government should file an Appeal from the impugned common order. 13. As in the other Writ Appeal (W.A.No.1020 of 2025), the affidavit filed along with the application for condonation of delay does not even attempt to make an effort to furnish any details or particularize the reasons for the delay of 460 days in filing the Writ Appeal. 14. The lack of bona fides of the appellants in filing the Appeals after more than 460/488 days would also be evident from a Government Memo dated 17.07.2025 where the Collector, Ranga Reddy District vide letter dated 18.07.2025 requested the Vice- Chairman and Managing director of TSIIC, Hyderabad, to take immediate necessary action in view of the Contempt Case filed by the respondent. This fact is disclosed by the respondent No.8 in its counter in W.A.No.1020 of 2025. 15. Significantly, the Collector, Ranga Reddy District and TIIC are the two appellants before this Court. It is obvious that the Appeals were filed to undo the damage created in the wake of the letter given by the Collector. 16. The Supreme Court recently considered the impact of delay on the part of the State or any of its instrumentalities on public policy: Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969.
It is obvious that the Appeals were filed to undo the damage created in the wake of the letter given by the Collector. 16. The Supreme Court recently considered the impact of delay on the part of the State or any of its instrumentalities on public policy: Shivamma (Dead) by LRs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969. The conclusion arrived at therein is that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as sufficient ground for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further directed all High Courts not to condone delays on frivolous and superficial grounds until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out and the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. 17. Assembly Elections and Parliamentary Elections cannot be used as a sufficient reason for condonation of the delay in filing intra-Court Appeals. The lack of particulars with regard to the competent officers and their role in the conduct of elections or formation of Government would fall short of the sufficiency criteria for condonation of delay: The Govt. of Rajasthan Vs. Smt. Prem Kanwar Shaheed Jai Singh , 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 4741 and State of H.P. Vs. Jagson International Ltd. , MANU/HP/1093/2024. 18. Several High Courts have reiterated that existence of election duty does not mean that office work should come to a grinding halt particularly in the face of limitation: State of Punjab through Collector, Gurdaspur Vs. Inderjit Forestor Aliwal Range, Gurdaspur , 2012 SCC OnLine P&H 8911 . Further, delay in obtaining legal opinion cannot be treated as a fail-safe excuse and absolve the applicant from explaining the delay with sufficient details for justifying the delay: Paulus Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu , MANU/TN/1104/1994. A Division Bench of this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2025 in COMCA.No.1 of 2025 rejected the plea for condonation of delay made therein on the ground that the State cannot shrug off its responsibility of being diligent in pursuing Appeals. 19. All other considerations apart, condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on the facts and circumstances of each case. ‘Sufficient cause’ under section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963, permitting the appellant/applicant from preferring the Appeal/Application within the prescribed period, cannot be liberally interpreted where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is stark on the face of the pleadings: Basawaraj Vs.
‘Sufficient cause’ under section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963, permitting the appellant/applicant from preferring the Appeal/Application within the prescribed period, cannot be liberally interpreted where negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is stark on the face of the pleadings: Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer , (2013) 14 SCC 81 . 20. In essence, the cause shown must be compelling enough to advance the cause of substantial justice even in light of the Appeal not being filed within the statutory time limit. The prayer for condonation cannot be borne out of privilege or a sense of entitlement or an anticipated benefit for Government departments. A parallel limitation cannot be claimed when the State functionary/department has competent persons who were familiar with Court proceedings: Post Master General Vs. Living Media India Limited , (2012) 3 SCC 563 . The aforesaid case was rendered in 2012. We are now in 2025 where ‘competence’ would also include technology-literate with the wherewithal to remain alive and alert to Court proceedings. 21. We are hence of the firm view that the appellants have failed to make out a case for condoning the delay of 460 days and 488 days, respectively, in filing W.A.Nos.396 and 1020 of 2025, respectively. There is no explanation, even remotely satisfactory, provided by the appellants to fulfill the sufficiency benchmark of ‘sufficiency of cause’ required for condonation of the delay. 22. I.A.No.1 of 2025 in W.A.No.1020 of 2025 and I.A.No.1 of 2025 in W.A.No.396 of 2025 are accordingly dismissed in terms of the above. 23. W.A.Nos.1020 and 396 of 2025 are accordingly rejected. There shall be no order as to costs.