JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. JUDGMENT : DEEPAK ROSHAN, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. In the instant writ application, the petitioner prays for the following reliefs; a) for issuance of a writ(s)/order (s)/direction (s) or a writ in the nature of madamus commanding upon the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for payment of her salary for the intervening period 31.10.2009 till the date of reinstatement i.e. 18.5.2019 as it has been done in similarly situated case passed in W.P.(S) No.1163/2016 where the Hon'ble Court has held that "It was the respondents who prevented her to work on the ground which had no legs to stand" and also in view of the Judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in K.V. Jankiraman case also held the same view due to latches on the part of the respondents the petitioner should not suffer as She is willing to work and She was forced not to work hence entitled for the salary of the intervening period; b) for issuance of a writ(s)/order (s)/direction (s) or a writ in the nature of madamus commanding upon the respondents to regularize the services of the petitioner during which She was out of the service and regularizing the same, pay the same pay scale as the person appointed alongwith the petitioner are getting to the tune of Rs.52220/- whereas the petitioner is getting Rs.34,110/- only as the service of the petitioner is being treated as a fresh appointment which is totally against the law as She has been appointed along with other similarly situated persons way back in the year 2005 i.e. on 27.6.2005; c) for issuance of a writ(s)/order (s)/direction (s) or a writ in the nature of madamus commanding upon the respondents to pay the arrear of salary for the intervening period as well as regularize the services of the petitioner during which She was out of service as the dismissal order has been set aside by this Hon'ble Court and give the pay scale what her batch mate is getting and not to treat as a fresh appointee otherwise it will fall under the category of "Double jeopardy"; d) for issuance of a writ(s)/order (s)/direction (s) or a writ in the nature of madamus commanding upon the respondents to pay the arrear of salary for the intervening period as the case of the petitioner does not fall under the category of "no work no pay" as there is no latches on the part of the petitioner and the Hon'bleCourt has held in WP(S) No.2654/2014 dated 13.2.2019 "Penalty of dismissal for unauthorized duty for the period of 15 days is disproportionate to the charges framed and the same was also not proved in the Departmental proceeding who held as the dismissal is illegal and the matter was concluded and also held dismissal for trivial charges is bad and accordingly, directed to reinstate her forthwith, which clearly stipulate latches on the part of State Respondents, hence "no work no pay' is not applicable in the case of the petitioner; e) for issuance of a writ(s)/order (s)/direction (s) or a writ in the nature of madamus commanding upon the respondents not to discriminate with the petitioner with that of the petitioner of writ petition No. W.P.(S) 1163/2016 who has already been provided the arrear of salary for the intervening period; AND/OR Pass such other order(s)/direction(s) as Your Lordships may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of this case for doing conscionable justice to the petitioner. 3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings are that the Petitioner was appointed as constable on 27.06.2005. She applied for maternity leave for 135 days, and the same was sanctioned. However, she overstayed the leave by 15 days due to medical reasons, for which she was suspended on 03.07.2009, and on 04.08.2009, a charge sheet was served upon her for unauthorized absence. On 11.10.2009, the Inquiry Officer exonerated the Petitioner, but the Disciplinary Authority, without issuing second show cause and without differing from the finding of the Inquiry Officer, dismissed her from the service on 31.10.2009, which was challenged by her in W.P.(S) No. 6737 of 2011, and the dismissal order as well as the appellate order were quashed and the matter was remitted to disciplinary authority from the stage of second show cause and to give reasons for differing with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. Thereafter, the Petitioner was dismissed again on 15.03.2014 against which she filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2654 of 2014, which was also allowed vide order dated 13.02.2019 and she was reinstated on 08.05.2019. After reinstatement, the Petitioner had made several representations for the arrears of her salary; but the same has been rejected by the concerned authority; as a result of which she filed the present writ petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that in compliance of the order passed by this Court, the Petitioner has been reinstated in the service with effect from 8.5.2019 and the said order of reinstatement clearly indicated the word "Punnah" (means "again") reinstated. However, the Respondent Authorities though issued the letter of reinstatement but for the purpose of payment of salary for the intervening period, as well as the payment of pay scale as that of her batch mate, treated the service of the Petitioner as "break in service"; which resulted that she cannot claim the legal entitlements, hence the action of the respondent authorities falls under the definition of double jeopardy. He further submits that because of the latches on part of the respondent authorities, the Petitioner has not been given annual increment since, 2009 till her reinstatement; as such, the Petitioner should not suffer for the high-handedness of respondent authorities. He further submits that because of the latches on part of the respondent authorities, the Petitioner has not been given annual increment since, 2009 till her reinstatement; as such, the Petitioner should not suffer for the high-handedness of respondent authorities. He lastly submits that the batch mates of the Petitioner, who were appointed along with her, are getting higher pay than the Petitioner which is arbitrary; as such, the present writ application deserves to be allowed. 5. Learned Counsel for the Respondents submits that in compliance of the order of this Court the Petitioner was reinstated on the vacant post of constable with effect from 08.05.2019. He further submits that the Commandant, JAP-10 Hotwar vide Force Order No. 1204/2019 dated 20.07.2019 adjusted the intervening period of 9 years 9 months and 17 days in “Extra Ordinary Leave” on the principle of “No work no pay”. He further submits that the Petitioner cannot equate herself with others who were appointed along with her for the sole reason that the others have earned the increments by continuing in service and the Petitioner was out of service. Further, since the Petitioner has not been allowed any back wages; as such, she has not earned any increment also and that is the reason for difference in salary with others. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after going through the documents annexed with the respective affidavits it appears that the Petitioner was dismissed from service for overstaying 15 days only on her leave. The impugned order of dismissal was initially assailed by her in W.P.(S) No. 6737 of 2011, and vide order passed by this Court in the aforesaid writ application; the dismissal order as well as the appellate order were quashed and the matter was remitted to disciplinary authority from the stage of second show cause and to give reasons for differing with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. Thereafter, the Petitioner was dismissed again on 15.03.2014 against which she filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2654 of 2014, which was also allowed vide order dated 13.02.2019; whereby the order of dismissal was quashed and the Petitioner was directed to be reinstated and finally she was reinstated on 08.05.2019. 7. Thereafter, the Petitioner was dismissed again on 15.03.2014 against which she filed writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2654 of 2014, which was also allowed vide order dated 13.02.2019; whereby the order of dismissal was quashed and the Petitioner was directed to be reinstated and finally she was reinstated on 08.05.2019. 7. The core grievance of the Petitioner is that she is not being paid the arrears of her salary for the intervening period and her representation for regularization of her service for the intervening period has been rejected by order dated 20.07.2019. Supporting the rejection order learned counsel for the Respondents contended that the period of 9 years 9 months and 17 days has been adjusted by the Commandant, JAP-10 Hotwar as “Extra Ordinary Leave” and the Petitioner is not entitled for any back wages on the principle of “no work no pay”. 8. This Court does not agree with the stand of the respondents, inasmuch as, initially the order of dismissal was quashed by this Court vide order passed in W.P.(S) No. 6737 of 2011 and the matter was remitted to disciplinary authority from the stage of second show cause and to give reasons for differing with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. Thereafter, the Petitioner was dismissed again on 15.03.2014 against which she filed another writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 2654 of 2014, which was also allowed vide order dated 13.02.2019; whereby the order of dismissal was quashed as being disproportionate and passed in breach of natural justice; and the respondents were directed to reinstate the Petitioner. The jurisprudence on the point of benefits for the intervening period is very clear that when an employee is reinstated after wrongful dismissal; he/she is reinstated with all the benefits including pay, leave etc. as on reinstatement the employee is entitled for all the privileges of which he/she was divested by order of dismissal. The employer cannot unilaterally decide to adjust the period of wrongful dismissal as “Extraordinary Leave”. In this regard it would be profitable to refer to Rule 236 and 180 of the Jharkhand Service Code which talks about extra ordinary leave. The relevant part is quoted herein below: “E- EXTRAORDINARY LEAVE 236. The employer cannot unilaterally decide to adjust the period of wrongful dismissal as “Extraordinary Leave”. In this regard it would be profitable to refer to Rule 236 and 180 of the Jharkhand Service Code which talks about extra ordinary leave. The relevant part is quoted herein below: “E- EXTRAORDINARY LEAVE 236. Extraordinary leave may be granted to a government servant in special circumstances: - (i) When no other leave is admissible under these rules; (ii) When, other leave being admissible, the Government servant applies in writing for the grant of extra ordinary leave.” “ 180. (a) In special circumstances and when no other leave is under these rules admissible, extraordinary leave may be granted. Such leave is not debited against the leave account. No leave-salary is admissible during such leave. (b) The authority empowered to sanction leave may grant extra- ordinary leave in combination with, or in continuation of, any leave that is admissible, and may commute retrospectively period of absence without leave into extra ordinary leave. Note 1 .- The State Government for special reasons dispense with the condition that extraordinary leave may be granted only when no other leave is by rule admissible, provided that a government servant cannot be compelled to take extra ordinary leave when leave with allowances is admissible to him. Note 2 .- The power of commuting period of absence without leave into extraordinary leave under sub-rule (b) is absolute; in other words, such commutation is permissible even when other leave was admissible to Government servant at the time of his absence without leave commenced.” 9. From the above-mentioned Rules, it is clear that for availing extra ordinary leave the government servant has to apply in writing and granting suo-motu extra ordinary leave is not permissible. Further, proviso appended to Note 1 of Rule 180 clearly stipulates that a government servant cannot be compelled to take extra ordinary leave when leave with allowance is admissible. As discussed above, when the Petitioner was reinstated in compliance of the order of this Court passed in W.P.(S) No. 2654 of 2014 wherein the order of dismissal was quashed; as such, it was the duty of concerned respondent to reinstate her with all the benefits/privileges of a regular employee, inasmuch as, the Petitioner became eligible for all the benefits including leave, increments etc. after reinstatement what the other employees have either availed or availing. after reinstatement what the other employees have either availed or availing. It is also not brought on record by the Respondents that the Petitioner ever applied for the grant of extra ordinary leave; thus, the Respondents were negligent on their part regarding reinstating the Petitioner but without other benefits. The Respondent cannot take advantage of their own wrong of wrongfully dismissing the Petitioner from service for overstaying 15 days only and forced the Petitioner to knock the door twice and when in the 2 nd round of litigation also; the Respondents lost, they prefer appeal which was also dismissed; as such, delaying the reinstatement for their own action and depriving the Petitioner from the just benefits and consequently adjusting such period (From the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement) as period of extraordinary leave; is without the authority of law. 10. Now coming to the second limb of argument of the Respondents that the Petitioner is not entitled for the arrears of salary on the basis of no work no pay principle; this contention is not acceptable to the court as the principle of no work is applicable when the employee is at fault. However, in the case at hand the Petitioner was dismissed for trivial charge of over-staying on her sanctioned leave for only 15 days which was initially quashed on the ground of procedural irregularity; but again, the order of dismissal was passed by the Respondents. Subsequently, the Petitioner again moved before this Court and after hearing the parties this Court again quashed the order of dismissal vide order dated 13.02.2019 in W.P.(S) No. 2654 of 2014 on the ground that dismissal from service on the ground of unauthorized absence from duty for about 15 days is disproportionate that too when employee has furnished a plausible explanation for absence. The relevant paragraph is quoted herein below: “8. Evidently, not only the penalty of dismissal from service on the ground of unauthorized absence from duty for about 15 days is disproportionate to the charge framed which, of course, was not found proved, the penalty order dated 15.03.2014 has been passed in breach of the rules of natural justice. The relevant paragraph is quoted herein below: “8. Evidently, not only the penalty of dismissal from service on the ground of unauthorized absence from duty for about 15 days is disproportionate to the charge framed which, of course, was not found proved, the penalty order dated 15.03.2014 has been passed in breach of the rules of natural justice. Normally, when an order suffers infirmity on the ground of breach of the rules of natural justice the matter is remitted back to the authority, however, in view of the facts disclosed in the present proceeding, I am of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal from service is illegal and while so, the matter must be concluded here itself. The maximum penalty, that is, dismissal from service which is akin to death penalty for an employee must not be inflicted so casually as has been done in this case. In the posture of maintaining discipline in the force, one cannot be terminated from service on trivial charges and, that too, when the explanation offered by the delinquent employee is a plausible reason for absence from duty.” 11. From the above order it is clear that when it has already been held by a Co-ordinate bench of this Court that the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority was not proper and the dismissal was at the behest of respondent authorities and that the ground of dismissal was very fragile then there arises no occasion to withhold the salary of the Petitioner for the period she was out of service, inasmuch as, for the sad absence the Petitioner was not at fault; as such, the principle of “no work no pay” will not be applicable in the present case. At the cost of repetition, the Respondents cannot take advantage of their own wrong of wrongfully dismissing the Petitioner from service and consequently deny her the benefits of salary, seniority, promotion and other benefits to which she would have been entitled, if she had attended the duties. 12. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order requires interference. At the cost of repetition, the Respondents cannot take advantage of their own wrong of wrongfully dismissing the Petitioner from service and consequently deny her the benefits of salary, seniority, promotion and other benefits to which she would have been entitled, if she had attended the duties. 12. Having regard to the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order requires interference. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 20.07.2019 (Annexure 8), passed by Commandant, JAP-10 Hotwar, is hereby, quashed and set aside and the concerned Respondent is directed to pay the salary for intervening period after deducting the subsistence allowance already paid; and further regularize the service of Petitioner from 31.10.2009 to 08.05.2019. The Respondent authorities are further directed to place the Petitioner in proper pay scale as per the applicable rules. The entire consequential benefits shall be extended to the Petitioner within a period of twelve weeks from the date of receipt/production of copy of this order. 13. As a result, the instant writ application stands allowed. Pending I.A., if any, is also closed.