ORDER : 1. This Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘Cr.P.C.’) by the petitioner/accused No.1, seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C. No.307 of 2016 on the file of the XII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally at Hyderabad, for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code , 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). 2. Heard Mr.K.Sathakarni, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.Thomas Lloyd, learned counsel for respondent No.3 and Mr.M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2. 3. Brief facts of the case: 3.1. Respondent No.3/de facto complainant lodged a complaint against the petitioner, stating that the petitioner approached her and asked her to purchase a house bearing Municipal No.8-2- 293/82/A/795, situated at Road No. 36, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad, claiming that his Company had an agreement with the original owner i.e., Smt. M. Jayasree, and amounts have to be paid to her and he would get the sale deed directly conveyed from her in favour of respondent No. 3. Believing the same, respondent No.3 entered into an agreement with the petitioner and paid an amount of Rs.14 Crores between July and November 2013 through cheques and RTGS to the petitioner and his company i.e., M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited and she was put in possession of the said property and established her boutique under the name and style of ‘Trisha Showroom’. Despite repeated requests, the petitioner failed to get the sale deed registered through M.Jayasree and postponing the registration. Subsequently, respondent No. 3 came to know that the petitioner had got the property registered in the name of his Company instead of her name and the petitioner informed to respondent No.3 that M.Jayasree was not agreed to execute Sale Deed in her favour on the ground of income tax issues. However, respondent No.3 promised her to register the Sale Deed shortly and entered into Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). Basing upon the same, respondent No.3 prepared the Sale Deed in the month of January, 2015 and petitioner signed the said document by providing all the details, photographs etc. and he promised to come to registration office to register the document. However, he kept postponing the same on one pretext or the other. Basing upon the same, respondent No.3 prepared the Sale Deed in the month of January, 2015 and petitioner signed the said document by providing all the details, photographs etc. and he promised to come to registration office to register the document. However, he kept postponing the same on one pretext or the other. At that stage, respondent No.3 came to know that the petitioner mortgaged it to the Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation (APSFC) as collateral for a loan. When confronted, the petitioner admitted the fact and promised to clear the APSFC loan and execute the sale deed but failed to do so. Later, APSFC issued a notice dated 02.12.2015 proposing to sell the mortgaged property under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951. Respondent No. 3 further stated that the petitioner, who was acting as Power of Attorney Holder of M/s. Dymes Engineers Private Limited, had earlier sold another property at Kokapet Village to her in December 2013 for a consideration of Rs. 2.5 Crores. However, after persuading her to cancel the said sale in January 2015, the petitioner failed to return the sale consideration and further stated that the petitioner has cheated Respondent No. 3 on two occasions, having received large amounts of money from her without executing the sale deed or refund the consideration, thereby committed the offences of cheating and criminal breach of trust. 4. Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 4.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has not committed any offence and he was falsely implicated in the present crime. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint or in the charge sheet, the nature of allegations levelled against the petitioner is purely civil in nature arising out of non-execution of the registered sale deed in respect of house property. Respondent No.3 has already filed suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 before the competent civil Court against M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited as well as the petitioner seeking specific performance of contract and for perpetual injunction in respect of the very same property with the very same allegations and the said suit is pending. Suppressing the said fact, respondent No.3 filed the present complaint on 04.02.2016 to settle the civil disputes pending between them, which is not permissible under law. 4.2. Suppressing the said fact, respondent No.3 filed the present complaint on 04.02.2016 to settle the civil disputes pending between them, which is not permissible under law. 4.2. He further submitted that respondent no.3 filed another suit in O.S.No.219 of 2016 on the file of the XI Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad against the petitioner’s Company for recovery of amount and O.S.No.1803 of 2015 on the file of the III Senior Civil Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar for grant of perpetual injunction against the petitioner’s Company and the said cases are pending. 4.3 He further submitted that Dymes Engineers Private Limited represented by GPA Holder i.e. M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited filed suit in O.S.No.127 of 2016 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar seeking specific performance of the contract against respondent No.3 and two others, who are none other than her husband and son, to execute and register the Cancellation Deed in their favour and the said suit is also pending. 4.4. He further submitted that in O.S.No.947 of 2015, respondent No.3, who was examined as PW.1, admitted in her evidence about pendency of five civil suits between herself and the defendants therein and also admitted that Sale Deed under Ex.A7 and Cancellation Deed in respect of Kokapet property are prepared on the same date. Hence, the allegations made in the complaint that the petitioner has not come forward to execute the Sale Deed, is not true and correct. Even according to the allegations made in the complaint, M.Jayasree executed the Registered Sale Deed in the name of M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited. Respondent No.3 has not made any allegation against M.Jayasree or M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited, on the other hand, lodged the complaint against the petitioner, who is the Managing Director of M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited. The property stands in the name of M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited, which is not made as an accused, and as such, there is no vicarious liability on the part of the petitioner. Hence, the offences under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC are not attracted against the petitioner. 4.5. He also submitted that the parties have already approached the competent civil Court and filed suits against each other and suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 in respect of the very same property claimed in the present complaint is pending. Hence, the offences under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC are not attracted against the petitioner. 4.5. He also submitted that the parties have already approached the competent civil Court and filed suits against each other and suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 in respect of the very same property claimed in the present complaint is pending. Respondent No.3 with an oblique motive to resolve the civil disputes pending between the parties, filed the present complaint by putting coercion and the same is clear abuse of process of law. 4.6. In support of his contention, he relied upon the following decisions: i) Kunti and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2023) 6 SCC 109 ii) S.K. Alagh vs. State of U.P. and others, (2008) 5 SCC 662 iii) Sarabjit Kaur vs. State of Punjab and others , (2023) 5 SCC 360 iv) Sunil Bharti Mittal vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2015) 4 SCC 609 v) Lalit Chaturvedi and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 171 vi) Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar, (2008) 14 SCC 1 5. Submissions of learned counsel for respondent No.3: 5.1. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.3 submitted that respondent No.3 has made specific allegations against the petitioner that she had paid huge amount of Rs.14 Crores to the petitioner and his Company towards purchase of the property situated at Shaikpet Village. Since the inception of transactions, the petitioner had intention to cheat respondent No.3. That the petitioner had induced respondent No.3 under the guise that he will get the sale deed registered directly in favour of respondent No.3 thorough the original owner, on the other hand, he got the sale deed registered in favour of his own Company. Thereafter, he promised that he will register the said property in her favour by entering into MOU. Pursuant to the said promise, respondent No.3 prepared the Sale Deed and the petitioner signed on it. However, he did not turn up for registration and he was postponing the same on one pretext or the other. Subsequently, respondent No.3 came to know that the petitioner mortgaged the said property with APSFC and availed the loan and he committed default and the petitioner’s Company is declared as Non-performing asset (NPA). 5.2. However, he did not turn up for registration and he was postponing the same on one pretext or the other. Subsequently, respondent No.3 came to know that the petitioner mortgaged the said property with APSFC and availed the loan and he committed default and the petitioner’s Company is declared as Non-performing asset (NPA). 5.2. He further submitted that the petitioner from the date of inception with a dishonest intention to cheated respondent No.3, committed fraud against him. Mere pendency of the civil suits is not a ground to seek quashing of the proceedings. The Investigating Officer after conducting detailed investigation and recording the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., filed the Final Report, wherein specific allegations are levelled against the petitioner, and the same was taken cognizance by the learned XII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and summons were issued. Before the trial Court, trial has been commenced and PW.1 evidence was completed and the matter is coming for cross-examination of PW.2. Whether the petitioner has committed the offence or not, can be revealed after full-fledged trial. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings. Analysis: 6. This Court considered the rival submissions made by the respective parties and perused the material available on record. It is not in dispute that respondent No.3 had transferred huge amount of Rs.14 Crores on various dates through RTGS and also by way of cheques in favour of the petitioner and his Company namely M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited in respect of purchase of the house bearing Municipal No. 8-2-293/82/A/795, consisting ground floor with a super built up area of 12,000 square feet on Plot No.795 in Sy.Nos.403/1 (old) & 120 (new) of Shaikpet Village and 102/1 of Hakimpet Village, situated within the approved layout of the Jubilee Hills Cooperative House Building Society Limited, Road No.36, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. According to the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet, it reveals that the petitioner informed respondent No.3 that his Company is having Agreement of Sale with M.Jayasree and she will execute sale deed directly in the name of respondent No.3. According to the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet, it reveals that the petitioner informed respondent No.3 that his Company is having Agreement of Sale with M.Jayasree and she will execute sale deed directly in the name of respondent No.3. After receiving the above said amount, the petitioner postponed the issue for getting registration of Sale Deed through M.Jayasree on one pretext or the other, on the other hand, petitioner got executed the Sale Deed in the name of his Company namely M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited from M.Jayasree. When respondent No.3 questioned the petitioner, he promised her to register the said property in her favour and executed MOU. Basing upon his promise, respondent No.3 prepared the Sale Deed in the month of January, 2015 and the petitioner signed on the said Sale Deed by furnishing the requisite documents, however, the petitioner has not come forward to execute the Sale Deed in her favour. Subsequently respondent No.3 came to know that the petitioner by mortgaging the above said property with APSFC, availed the loan and the petitioner Company had not repaid the loan amount and the same was declared as NPA. 7. The record further reveals that respondent No.3 filed suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015, on the file of the XI Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, against the petitioner and his Company, seeking specific performance of sale contract and also for perpetual injunction and the said suit is pending. The petitioner’s Company i.e., M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited and another also filed a suit in O.S.No.127 of 2016, on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar against respondent No.3 and two others seeking specific performance of execution of Registered Cancellation Deed in respect of the property situated in Kokapet and the same is pending. 8. The core contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that nature of the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet is civil in nature in respect of non-execution of sale deed and respondent No.3 had filed a suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 for specific performance of contract. 8. The core contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that nature of the allegations made in the complaint and charge sheet is civil in nature in respect of non-execution of sale deed and respondent No.3 had filed a suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 for specific performance of contract. When the said suit is pending, respondent No.3 filed the present complaint and the same is not permitted under law is concerned, the specific case of respondent No.3 is that the petitioner with a dishonest intention from the date of inception had received huge amount of Rs.14 Crores and has not taken any steps to execute the Sale Deed in the name of respondent No.3 through M.Jayasree, on the other hand, he got it executed in the name of his own Company i.e. M/s. Sandhya Hotels Private Limited and suppressed the factum of mortgaging the said property with APSFC. 9. To attract the offence under Section 420 of IPC, the ingredients of Section 415 of IPC have to be specified. In the case on hand, the allegations made in the complaint, statements of witnesses and charge sheet reveals that there are specific allegations levelled against the petitioner that there is a dishonest intention on his part from the date of inception. 10. In respect of the other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that respondent No.2 had already filed a suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015, on the file of the XI Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad and four more civil suits are pending between the parties and therefore, initiation of criminal proceedings is not permitted under law is concerned, it is trite law that mere pendency of civil cases between the parties does not bar to invoke criminal jurisdiction, provided that the allegations disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The allegations made in the complaint and the averments made in the suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 and relief sought therein, are different and distinct. 11. In Kunti supra, while referring to Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B. (2022) 7 SCC 124 the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal courts must exercise great caution before issuing process, particularly where the dispute is essentially civil in nature. 11. In Kunti supra, while referring to Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B. (2022) 7 SCC 124 the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal courts must exercise great caution before issuing process, particularly where the dispute is essentially civil in nature. The Court emphasized that purely civil disputes should not be converted into criminal proceedings, noting the judicial concern that parties often resort to criminal prosecution as a means to exert pressure for settlement of civil claims. It was underscored that such practices must be firmly deprecated and discouraged, as observed in Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd . (2006) 6 SCC 736 and G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P . (2000) 2 SCC 636 . 12. In S.K. Alagh supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that vicarious liability in criminal law arises only when expressly provided by statute. The Court noted that statutes such as the Essential Commodities Act, the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, specifically create such liability for instance, Section 14-A of the 1952 Act deems an employer guilty of criminal breach of trust for misappropriation of employee deductions. However, in the absence of such statutory provision, as under Section 406 IPC, directors or officers of a company cannot be held vicariously liable for offences committed by the company itself, as reaffirmed in Maksud Saiyed v. State of Gujarat , (2008) 5 SCC 668 . 13. In Sarabjit Kaur supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that a mere breach of contract does not constitute the offence of cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intent exists at the inception of the transaction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that mere failure to fulfil a promise or return money cannot, by itself, justify criminal prosecution. It noted that the complainant had subsequently improved his allegations to implicate the appellant, revealing an attempt to convert a civil dispute into a criminal proceeding to exert pressure for monetary recovery. Emphasizing that criminal law should not be misused for settling civil disputes, the Court held that permitting such prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 14. Emphasizing that criminal law should not be misused for settling civil disputes, the Court held that permitting such prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 14. In Sunil Bharti Mittal supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while examining the scope of vicarious liability in criminal law, reiterated that such liability cannot be fastened on company directors or officers unless specifically provided by statute or where there is evidence of their direct involvement and criminal intent. It was argued, notably by Mr. Fali Nariman, that criminal law does not recognise vicarious liability unless imputed by law or supported by specific statutory provisions. The Court then analysed the “alter ego” doctrine as developed in Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc , [ (2011) 1 SCC 74 ] .,explaining that a company, being a juristic person, acts through its directing mind its directors or managers and the mens rea of such persons may, in appropriate cases, be imputed to the corporation itself. However, the converse does not automatically follow: the criminal intent of the company cannot, without specific evidence or statutory basis, be attributed to its officers or directors personally. 15. In Lalit Chaturvedi supra, the Supreme Court reiterated that mere non-payment of money or breach of contractual terms does not, by itself, constitute a criminal offence under Sections 406 or 420 IPC. For cheating, there must be deception or dishonest inducement at the inception of the transaction, and for criminal breach of trust, there must exist entrustment of property coupled with subsequent dishonest misappropriation. The Court found that the allegations in the complaint disclosed, at best, a civil dispute relating to non-payment of dues and that invocation of criminal process to recover money amounted to abuse of process of law. Accordingly, the FIR and charge-sheet were quashed, with liberty to pursue appropriate civil remedies. 16. In Rukmini Narvekar supra, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified the distinction between proceedings under Sections 227 and 482 CrPC. It was held that at the stage of framing of charge under Section 227, the court’s consideration is confined strictly to the material produced by the prosecution, and the accused cannot introduce independent evidence or documents in proof of innocence at that stage. The expression “hearing the submissions of the accused” in Section 227 does not permit the filing of additional material by the defence. The expression “hearing the submissions of the accused” in Section 227 does not permit the filing of additional material by the defence. However, under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court, in exercising its inherent powers, may look into material beyond the prosecution’s record where necessary to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. 17. The reliance placed on Kunti supra, S.K. Alagh supra Sarabjit Kaur supra, Sunil Bharti Mittal supra, Lalit Chaturvedi supra, and Rukmini Narvekar supra by the petitioner’s counsel is misplaced, as the facts of the present case are entirely distinct. In all those cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court interfered where the allegations disclosed only a civil dispute arising from non-payment or breach of contract, without any dishonest or fraudulent intention at inception. In contrast, the present complaint contains specific allegations that the petitioner, from the very beginning, acted with dishonest intent by receiving Rs. 14 crores from respondent No.3 under the pretext of facilitating execution of a sale deed, but instead got the property registered in his own company’s name and subsequently mortgaged it to APSFC without disclosure. Such conduct, if proved, clearly satisfies the ingredients of Sections 415 and 420 IPC, showing deception and dishonest inducement from inception. Further, as clarified in Rukmini Narvekar , at the stage of framing of charge or considering quash proceedings, the court’s examination is confined to the material produced by the prosecution, and the accused cannot rely upon independent evidence or documents to establish innocence. Hence, the cited decisions dealing with purely civil disputes or defence material at the pre-trial stage have no application to the present facts. 18. Insofar as the other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that respondent No.3 in her evidence before the trial Court in O.S.No.947 of 2015 as PW.1 admitted about the pendency of the civil suits and cancellation of the Sale Deed in respect of Kokapet property and the Sale Deed in respect of the Shaikpet property were prepared on the very same day and respondent No.3 has not executed the cancellation of Sale Deed. Hence, question of non-executing the Sale Deed by the petitioner on the very same day does not arise. Admittedly, suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 and the suit filed by the petitioner’s Company in O.S.No.127 of 2016 are pending and the same were not decided so far. Hence, question of non-executing the Sale Deed by the petitioner on the very same day does not arise. Admittedly, suit in O.S.No.947 of 2015 and the suit filed by the petitioner’s Company in O.S.No.127 of 2016 are pending and the same were not decided so far. Merely basing upon the evidence of respondent No.3, the petitioner is not entitled to seek quashing of the proceedings in the present case. Admittedly, C.C. No.307 of 2016 was riped for trial and the evidence of PW.1 was closed and the matter is coming up for the cross-examination of PW.2. The petitioner is entitled to put forth his grievances before the trial Court and he is also entitled to place all the material before the trial Court. The grounds, which are raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, are purely disputed questions of fact and the same have to be decided by the trial Court after full-fledged trial and the same cannot be adjudicated in quash proceedings. 19. It is relevant to mention that in K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. (2020) 14 SCC 552 the Hon’ble Apex Court has reaffirmed the well- settled principle that the same set of facts may give rise to both civil and criminal proceedings, and that availing civil remedy does not bar the initiation of criminal prosecution. The Court relied heavily on precedents like Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. (2002) 1 SCC 555 and Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686 to reiterate that criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil dispute is also pending between the parties. In Kamaladevi Agarwal, it was categorically held that the pendency of civil proceedings does not justify quashing criminal proceedings, especially where the allegations disclose a prima facie criminal offence. The Court observed that many acts of cheating occur in the context of commercial or financial transactions, and such a “civil profile” does not strip the act of its “criminal outfit.” Ultimately, the Hon’ble Supreme Court concluded that the High Court had erred in quashing the criminal proceedings, stressing that criminal cases must proceed as per the Cr.P.C. and cannot be halted solely due to parallel civil litigation, regardless of the status or authority of the civil forum. 20. 20. In S.N. Vijayalakshmi v. State of Karnataka , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1575 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that while civil and criminal proceedings may, in law, proceed simultaneously, a criminal prosecution can be sustained only where there is a clear presence of criminal intent at the inception of the transaction. 21. It is very much relevant to mention that in Sau. Kamala Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2019) 14 SCC 350 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional cases sparingly, with caution, only to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice; and it cannot be invoked to weigh evidence or stifle a genuine prosecution, but may be applied where the allegations in the complaint, taken at face value, do not disclose the basic ingredients of any offence. The case on hand does not fall under the ambit of the rarest of rare case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.307 of 2016. 22. For the foregoing reasons, this Court does not find any grounds to quash the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C. No.307 of 2016 pending on the file of the XII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally at Hyderabad. 23. Accordingly, the criminal petition is dismissed. However, taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner’s presence in C.C. No.307 of 2016 on the file of the XII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Nampally at Hyderabad is dispensed with, unless his presence is specifically required during the course of trial, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall represent through his counsel on each and every date of hearing. In case of non- appearance of the petitioner on the specific dates so fixed by the trial Court for his appearance, the trial Court is entitled to proceed with the matter, in accordance with law. It is needless to observe that any of the observations made in this order are only for the purpose of deciding this case and the trial Court shall decide the matter basing upon the evidence, which is going to be adduced by either of the parties in accordance with law. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this petition stand closed.