JUDGMENT : MANISH CHOUDHURY, J. 1. Invoking the extraordinary, discretionary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has instituted the instant writ petition seeking inter-alia a direction to the respondent Assam Power Distribution Company Limited [APDCL] to make payment of an amount of Rs. 1,58,760/-, which amount, according to the petitioner, was arbitrarily deducted from the retirement gratuity of the petitioner after his retirement from service on superannuation on 01.01.2014. 2. The petitioner joined service in the erstwhile Assam State Electricity Board [ASEB] and after trifurcation of the ASEB, pursuant to the Electricity Act, 2003 into three entities, the service of the petitioner came to be under the APDCL. During his service career, the petitioner rose through the ranks and finally on 01.01.2014, he retired from service of the APDCL on reaching the age of superannuation of 60 years. At the time of his retirement on superannuation, the petitioner was serving in the post of Engineering Subordinate–II [E/S-II]. Subsequent to his retirement on superannuation, the competent authority in the APDCL issued an Office Order on 19.08.2014 sanctioning pension, commuted value of pension and retirement gratuity. By the Office Order dated 19.08.2014, the petitioner was sanctioned pension @ 11,890/- per month with effect from 02.01.2014 prior to the date of drawal of committed value of pension and thereafter @ Rs. 7,927/- per month till his death or restoration of full pension, whichever would be earlier. The Office Order also sanctioned an amount of Rs. 4,66,525/- towards commuted value of pension. In so far as retirement gratuity is concerned, the petitioner was paid an amount after adjustment of outstanding liabilities. Though an employee of the APDCL was entitled for a retirement gratuity of Rs. 7,00,000/-, the petitioner was not granted the entire amount of Rs. 7,00,000/-. It was mentioned that the petitioner had an outstanding liability of Rs. 1,58,760/- because of excess drawal of pay and the interest on it which was credited to GPF account as per the provisions of Revision of Pay Rules, 1992 and 1997. The Office Order also mentioned about family pension. Since the petitioner is surviving as on date, there is no necessity to dilate on the aspect of family pension. 3. I have heard Mr. R. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Standing Counsel, APDCL for the respondent APDCL authorities. 4. Mr. The Office Order also mentioned about family pension. Since the petitioner is surviving as on date, there is no necessity to dilate on the aspect of family pension. 3. I have heard Mr. R. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Standing Counsel, APDCL for the respondent APDCL authorities. 4. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that it was after the petitioner’s retirement on superannuation, the respondent authorities checked the payments made towards pay and allowances of the petitioner during his service period and it was detected that during the period from 2006 to 2014, there was erroneous fixation of pay. After calculation, the respondent authorities had arrived at the figure of Rs. 1,58,760/- and without any kind of prior information to the petitioner, the respondent authorities had deducted the said amount from the retirement gratuity of the petitioner. He has submitted that there was no role attributable to the petitioner in such erroneous fixation of pay. During the subsequent period after retirement, the petitioner had been undergoing medical treatment at various health facilities within the State as well as outside the State. As the petitioner is a chronic patient suffering from bronchial asthama, hypertension, diabetes, liver, GB, pancreas, spleen, kidneys, urinary bladder, prostate, seminal vesicles since the year 2010, he had to go for medical treatment from time to time at various health facilities including Apollo Hospital at Chennai. He has submitted that though the petitioner ought to have objected to such arbitrary deduction of the afore-stated amount within a reasonable period of time, his health condition had prevented him from raising any complaint within a reasonable period of time. It is further submitted that even such a claim at this stage should not be rejected as rejection would be harsh and onerous for the petitioner at this advanced stage of his life when he is suffering from various illnesses. 4.1. Mr. Sharma, in support of his submissions regarding arbitrary deduction of the amount, has referred to the decisions in State of Punjab and others vs. Rafiq Mashi [White Washer] and others, [2015] 4 SCC 334 ; Kanishk Sinha and another vs. the State of West Bengal and another [2025] INSC 278; and Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak vs. Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation , [2022] 18 SCC 144 5. Mr. Mr. Pathak, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent APDCL authorities has submitted that there was inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in approaching the Court claiming the relief. He has contended that the claim of the petitioner is, in essence, a money claim and in respect of such a money claim, the law of limitation for recovery of money is ordinarily applicable. From the Office Order dated 19.08.2014, it was evident that an amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- was adjusted because of payment of excess amount to the petitioner. Despite knowing the reason for adjustment, the petitioner had waited for about a decade and the same amounts to waiver and acquiescence. To buttress his submissions, Mr. Pathak has referred to the decisions in CA no. 362 of 1962 [ State of Madhya Pradesh and another vs. Bhailal Bhai ]; Chairman, State Bank of India and another vs. M.J. James , [2022] 2 SCC 301 ; and Udai Shankar Awasthi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another , [2013] 2 SCC 435 . He has, at the same time, also fairly submitted that there is a separate line of decisions on the aspects of delay, laches, waiver, acquiescence, etc. in Tukaram Kana Joshi and others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others , [2013] 1 SCC 353 ; Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others , [2020] 2 SCC 569 ; and Dharanidhar Mishra [D] and another vs. State of Bihar and others, [2024] 10 SCC 605 6. I have given consideration to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the materials on record. 7. From the Office Order dated 19.08.2014, it is noticed that the figure of Rs. 1,58,760/- was arrived at by totalling four figures of Rs. 53,416/-, Rs. 48,784/-, Rs. 28,056/- and Rs. 28,504/-. The reasons shown were excess pay drawn and interest on overdrawn amount, credit to GPF account, etc. By a subsequent Communication dated 08.09.2014, the said amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- was deducted as outstanding liabilities from the petitioner’s otherwise ordinarily entitled retirement gratuity amount of Rs. 7,00,000/-. The respondent authorities had found upon checking the pay fixation details of the petitioner from time to time that the pay fixation w.e.f. 01.01.2006 was wrongly made. By a subsequent Communication dated 08.09.2014, the said amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- was deducted as outstanding liabilities from the petitioner’s otherwise ordinarily entitled retirement gratuity amount of Rs. 7,00,000/-. The respondent authorities had found upon checking the pay fixation details of the petitioner from time to time that the pay fixation w.e.f. 01.01.2006 was wrongly made. It was decided that the overdrawn amount was to be worked out and entries were to be made in the service book afresh. After carrying out the exercise, the respondent authorities had arrived at the figure of Rs. 1,58,760/-. 8. From a Communication no. APDCL/ADT/PEN/12/327/Pt-III/87 dated 28.02.2014 addressed by the respondent no. 5 to his higher authority, it is evident that the matter of wrong fixation of pay was attributable to the respondent APDCL authorities. It is not a case of the respondent APDCL authorities that there was any kind of misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the petitioner in such erroneous fixation of pay. Meaning thereby, it was solely due to wrong fixation of pay made by the respondent APDCL authorities, the petitioner was provided with amounts towards pay and allowances which were otherwise not payable to him. The petitioner during his service career rose through the ranks to reach ultimately the rank of Engineering Subordinate-II [E/S-II]. 9. In Rafiq Mashi [White Washer] [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court had the occasion to deliberate on the aspect of right of the State as employer to recover amount paid in excess to its employees, without any fault or misrepresentation attributable to those employees. After analysing the legal position recorded in its earlier judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the right to recover would be sustainable so long as the same is not iniquitous or arbitrary. At the same time, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that recovery from the employees in lower rung of service would result in extreme hardship to them. It has been observed that the employees in lower rung of service would spend their entire earnings in the upkeep and welfare of their family, and if such excess payment is allowed to be recovered from them, it would cause them far more hardship, than the reciprocal gains to the employer. It has been observed that the employees in lower rung of service would spend their entire earnings in the upkeep and welfare of their family, and if such excess payment is allowed to be recovered from them, it would cause them far more hardship, than the reciprocal gains to the employer. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that such recovery from employees belonging to lower rungs [i.e. Class-III and Class-IV or Group-C and Group-D] of service should not be subjected to the ordeal of any recovery, even though they were beneficiaries of receiving higher emoluments, than were due to them. Such recovery would be iniquitous and arbitrary and therefore, would also breach the mandate contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 9.1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a number of situations and instances when recovery does not appear to be appropriate. Though not exhaustive, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has enumerated a number of situations of hardship in the following manner :- 18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to hereinabove, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law : [i] Recovery from the employees belonging to Class III and Class IV service [or Group C and Group D service]. [ii] Recovery from the retired employees, or the employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. [iii] Recovery from the employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. [iv] Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. [v] In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover. 10. [v] In any other case, where the court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover. 10. In Bhailal Bhai [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while observing that the laws of limitation do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court should keep in mind the maximum period fixed by the legislature for granting relief recovery of money by a suit in a civil court. It has been observed that the time within which a relief by a suit in a civil court is to be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be measured. When the delay is more than the said period, it would be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondent APDCL authorities that since the petitioner had the knowledge regarding the factum of recovery as far back as on 19.08.2014, it is not open for the petitioner to wait for such a long period. Thus, the writ petition suffers from delay and laches as well as waiver as regards the claim. 11. The decision in Udai Shankar Awasthi [supra] is a decision dealing with continuing offence under Section 468 and Section 472 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [CrPC]. 12. In Tarsem Singh [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has elaborately discussed on the principles underlying ‘continuing wrong’ and ‘recurring/successive wrong’, which can be made applicable to service law disputes. The delay was about sixteen years in Tarsem Singh [supra] in approaching the court seeking relief for arrears. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the issue in the following words :- 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches [where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition] or limitation [where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has summarized the issue in the following words :- 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches [where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition] or limitation [where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal]. One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. The ratio in Tarsem Singh [supra] has been referred to subsequently in a number of decisions including Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak [supra]. 13. It is settled proposition that the State, as a welfare State, is governed by the rule of law. It is also settled that law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions. A discretion is, however, vested in courts not to entertain a writ petition in an appropriate case, if the writ petition is found to have suffered from delay and laches. It is also settled that law of limitation does not apply to writ petitions. A discretion is, however, vested in courts not to entertain a writ petition in an appropriate case, if the writ petition is found to have suffered from delay and laches. It has been held in Tukaram Kana Joshi and others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others , [2013] 1 SCC 353 , to the effect that delay and laches is usually adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. But, it is still open for the Court to exercise judicial discretion and such discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the case. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion, but it is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause of action, etc. Therefore, the court while exercising the discretion shall keep in consideration the factor whether with the exercise of discretion, any third-party interest, already settled, is going to be unsettled. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of each case as facts and circumstances of each case vary from any other case. The exercise of discretion is also dependent upon reasons, when and how the delay had arisen. Ultimately, it is the discretion of the Court, which is to be exercised fairly and justly to promote justice and not to defeat it. No hard and fast rule is laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion is to be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event, the claim by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. Where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, it is the cause of substantial justice which is to be preferred as the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of non-deliberate delay. 14. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, it is the cause of substantial justice which is to be preferred as the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of non-deliberate delay. 14. As adverted to above, the case in hand is not a case where the responding APDCL authorities have made out a case that the fixation of pay of the petitioner for the reference period at a higher amount was attributable to any act of misrepresentation or fraud on the part of the petitioner. The pension and other retirement benefits are extended by the employer to an employee for long, continuous and dedicated years of service. It is already found out that the petitioner herein had retired on reaching the age of superannuation of sixty years on 01.01.2014. Subsequent to his retirement, the petitioner has been undergoing medical treatments for a number of ailments. The documents annexed to the writ petition do indicate such ailments. As on date, the petitioner is about seventy years of age and there appears to be constant need of medical expenditure. The petitioner is in the sunset years of his life and these years are also times of a lot of challenges like declining physical fitness, sufferance from various ailments, financial worries, etc. The act of recovery of the amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- towards excess payment is likely to visit the petitioner with harsh consequences in these sunset years. The erroneous fixation was made many years prior to the petitioner’s retirement and the respondent APDCL authorities did not carry out any remedial measures for many years thereafter. The act of recovery in the present case can be termed as a continuing wrong causing a continuous injury. In such peculiar facts and circumstances, allowing the employer who has to act as a model employer, to retain the said amount only on the ground that the petitioner was paid the same amount towards excess pay, etc., due to erroneous fixation of pay during the reference period for acts solely attributable to it without any act of misrepresentation or fraud on the petitioner appears to be a measure, which is harsh and onerous. So far as the amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- is concerned, the effect of directing the respondent APDCL authorities as the employer to disburse the amount of Rs. So far as the amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- is concerned, the effect of directing the respondent APDCL authorities as the employer to disburse the amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- would be much less compared with the succour the petitioner will have if the amount is disbursed to him. It is also not a case where any third-party rights are going to be affected. 15. In the above fact situation obtaining in the case, this Court is of the view that a direction is called for for disbursement of the amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- by the respondent employer, that is, the APDCL authorities to the petitioner. Accordingly, it is directed that the respondent APDCL authorities shall make payment of the amount Rs. 1,58,760/- to the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of submission of a certified copy of this order at the office of the respondent no. 2 by the petitioner. Since there is long delay on the part of the petitioner also in seeking remedy, no direction is made as regards the claim of interest. It is, however, made clear that in the event of failure to make disbursement of the amount of Rs. 1,58,760/- within the afore-stated period, the same would carry interest @ 6% per annum from the date of this order. 16. The writ petition stands partly allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.