JUDGMENT : ANJAN MONI KALITA, J. Heard Mr. D. Kamduk, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms T. Jini, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This instant case has been taken up for final disposal at the motion stage itself as this Court is of the opinion that no prejudice will be caused to the respondent No.2, who is the informant and the father of the victim, and the respondent No.3, who is the victim in the instant case. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has also agreed that no prejudice will be caused, if the case is disposed of at the motion stage itself. 4. This application filed under Section 528 of the BNS S , 2023 for exercising/invoking the inherent power of this Court for quashing of criminal proceeding in connection with the POCSO Case No.01/2021 corresponding to Aalo W.P.S Case No.24/2024 under Section 64 BNS , R/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 (State vs. Lukri Kambu). The application has also been filed for quashing of the FIR dated 03.12.2024 in connection with Aalo W.P.S Case No.24/2024, under Section 64 BNS , R/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 which is pending before the Special Judge (POCSO), Aalo, as well as for quashing and setting aside of the Charge Sheet No.01/2025 dated 03.02.2024 in POCSO Case No.01/2021, under Section 64 BNS , R/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 5. The brief facts of the case are that an FIR dated 03.12.2024 was lodged before the Officer-in-Charge, Police Station Liromoba/Yomcha, West Siang District, Arunachal Pradesh by the informant, Shri Mabi Kayi alleging, inter alia, that his daughter, Miss Biti Kayi (Victim) was invited by one Shri Lukri Kambu(accused) to the house of one Rogi Kambu on 18.11.2024 at 13:00 Hrs. His daughter in good faith went to his room, wherein, he dragged her inside his bedroom and forcefully raped her. After commission of the rape, the accused person threatened her that if she discloses the incident to anybody, she would be killed. Due to such threat, his daughter did not disclose the incident of rape immediately to anyone. Therefore, there was a delay in filing of the FIR about the incident occurred. After commission of the rape, the accused person threatened her that if she discloses the incident to anybody, she would be killed. Due to such threat, his daughter did not disclose the incident of rape immediately to anyone. Therefore, there was a delay in filing of the FIR about the incident occurred. The informant further alleged that his daughter was a minor of 14 yrs 6 months old, who was studying at Class-VIII at Government Higher Secondary School, Liromoba, West Siang District. He alleged that the accused was of about 35 yrs of age and a married person. Therefore, he prayed for necessary action by the police authorities. 6. Accordingly, after registration of the FIR i.e. FIR No.24/2024, a Charge Sheet dated 03.02.2025 (it has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused petitioner as well as by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the date has been wrongly typed in the Charge Sheet as 03.02.2024) was filed against the accused person. Under the Charge Sheet, the aforesaid accused was charged under Section 6 4 BNS , R/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 7. During the investigation, the Investigating Authorities have recorded the statements of the informant, the victim, the mother of the victim, one Ms Koppak Gadi, who was supposedly in a love relationship with the accused as well as some other witnesses. The Investigating Agency further got the statement of the victim recorded under Section 183 (5) of the BNS before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Aalo, West Siang District. The Investigating Officer while submitting the aforesaid Charge Sheet also submitted MLC report of the victim which was received on 03.02.2025, where the concerned doctor found the victim’s hymen broken, however, no external injuries were found during the examination. It was also mentioned in the MLC report that there was no evidence of recent vaginal penetration. In the aforesaid Charge Sheet at serial No.6 of the brief facts of the case, it has been mentioned that as per the School Admission Register, which has been duly certified by the Teacher in-charge of Government Bole Primary School, the victim was of 17 years and 6 months old at the time of the reported incident. It may be worthwhile to reproduce the aforesaid paragraph-16 hereinbelow:- “6. It may be worthwhile to reproduce the aforesaid paragraph-16 hereinbelow:- “6. One original birth certificate and an adhaarcard(No. 961439914723) of the victim was seized from her father on being produced by him on 06/12/2024. The date of birth is given as 03/05/2010 (14 yrs 6 months) with registration no. LMB/658 dtd 03/05/2023. A letter was submitted to the Head Teacher of the victim's first school to furnish her date of birth at the time of admission. He had furnished the CTC copy of admission register which shows her birth date as 10/05/2007 date of admission on 12/06/2012. The mother of the victim was also inquired about the date of birth for additional inputs to this. However, citing reason of being illiterate she had no such record of birth. Hence, as per school records the victim was 17 yrs and 6 months old at the time of the reported incidence. The victim as well as her father reported that her phone was broken. Hence it could not be seized.” 8. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid Charge-sheet filed by the Investigating Officer, the accused petitioner has approached this Court for quashing of the aforesaid charge sheet as well as the FIR, so filed in the instant case. 9. Whereas the brief facts of the case as narrated by the accused petitioner are that the petitioner was in a love relationship with one Ms Koppak Gadi, who is working as lady Constable in Delhi police and posted in Delhi, due to the distance, which had separated them, the relationship could not continue further. In the meantime, the accused petitioner has fallen in love with the victim girl and both have been in a love relationship. It was also mentioned that when the father of the victim came to know about the relationship between the victim girl and the accused petitioner, he (father) got very agitated and filed the FIR alleging the rape of his minor daughter by the accused petitioner. It was also mentioned that when the father of the victim came to know about the relationship between the victim girl and the accused petitioner, he (father) got very agitated and filed the FIR alleging the rape of his minor daughter by the accused petitioner. It was also the case of the accused petitioner that the I.O of the case without any meticulous investigation into the matter particularly with regard to the age of the victim had casually filed the Charge Sheet and charged the accused petitioner under the POCSO Act without ascertaining the age of the victim and thereby, erroneously filed the Charge Sheet in connection with Aalo WPS Case No. 24/2024 under Section 64 BNS R/w with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012, against the accused petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that no case under Section 64 of the BNS is made out as the victim girl and the accused person were in love relationship and their physical relationship is of consensual nature. Therefore, the accused petitioner is highly aggrieved by the action of the Investigating Officer in filing the aforesaid Charge Sheet without actually ascertaining the age on the basis any valid materials, as well as charging him under Section 64 of the BNS in spite of materials on record that their physical relationship was of consensual nature. 10. The learned counsel for the accused petitioner submits that the age of the victim is much more than 17 years 6 months old which could be safely established from the records of 2007 which are available in the Office of the Child Development Project Officer (for short, ‘CDPO’), Liromoba, wherein, the age of the victim was mentioned as one year old during the registration at Anganwadi Centre in the year 2007. He submits that the aforesaid record clearly shows that the victim was born in the year 2006 and as such, the victim was more than 18 years of age at the time of the alleged offence. He further submits that as per the Aadhar Card (No.961439914723) of the victim, the date of birth of the victim is 03.05.2004, and that also shows that the victim was more than 18 years of age, at the time of the alleged offence. He further submits that as per the Aadhar Card (No.961439914723) of the victim, the date of birth of the victim is 03.05.2004, and that also shows that the victim was more than 18 years of age, at the time of the alleged offence. The learned counsel for the accused petitioner has also relied on the Electoral Roll of 1-Bole village, 27-Liromoba Assembly Constituency, wherein, the victim’s name and age are reflected in serial No.170, which shows her age as 19 years. 11. From the above materials as mentioned above, the learned counsel for the accused petitioner submits that all the above-mentioned documents, make it clear that the victim girl was of more than 18 years of age when the alleged offence was committed on her. He submits that in spite of those materials available before the Investigating Officer, the Investigating Officer has wrongfully relied on the Student Admission Register of the school, namely, Bole Primary School, wherein the date of birth of the victim was shown as 10.05.2007, which made her age 17 years 6 months old at the time of alleged commission of the offence. Therefore, the learned counsel submits that a grave error has been committed by the I.O. in filing the Charge Sheet by charging the accused petitioner under section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 without properly ascertaining the actual age of the victim girl. The learned counsel submits that the statements of the victim, her father, mother, one Ms Koppak Gadi, who was in a love relationship with the accused as well as several other witnesses, have been recorded. From the cumulative reading of the statements, it is clear that, in fact, the physical relationship that has occurred between the accused petitioner and the victim girl is of consensual nature, and the accused and the victim are in fact in love relationship. Therefore, he submits that the girl who was a major at that time and they were in a physical relationship, in consensus, there is no scope of charging the accused petitioner under Section 6 4 of BNS , R/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. Therefore, he submits that the girl who was a major at that time and they were in a physical relationship, in consensus, there is no scope of charging the accused petitioner under Section 6 4 of BNS , R/w Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. The learned counsel therefore, submits and prays that this Court in exercise of inherent power under 528 of BNS S , 2023 may quash the proceeding in connection with POCSO Case No.01/2025, corresponding to Aalo W.P.S Case No. 24/2024 under Section 6 4 BNS , R/w with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 holding the FIR dated 03.12.2024 as well as the aforesaid Charge Sheet dated 03.02.2025, as illegal. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the decision of the High Court of Meghalaya at Shillong in the case of Shri Skolbha Lamara &Anr. Vs. State of Meghalaya and 3 Ors. reported in 2023 Supreme (Online)(MEGH) 402 . The learned counsel relied on the following paragraphs of the aforesaid case, which are extracted herein below: ” 9. Similarly, the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta in the case of Ranjit Rajbanshi v. State of West Bengal & Ors : C.R.A. No. 458 of 2018 at para 47, 48 & 49, has observed as under: "47. In the present case, the victim girl was admittedly 16½ years old and studied in Class XII at the relevant point of time. She was not naïve enough not to know the implication of sexual intercourse; rather, the victim admittedly had a physical relationship with the accused, who was also of a very young age, on several occasions prior to the incident.Although the consent of a minor is not a good consent in law, and cannot be taken into account as 'consent' as such, the expression 'penetration' as envisaged in the POCSO Act has to be taken to mean a positive, unilateral act on the part of the accused. Consensual participatory intercourse, in view of the passion involved, need not always make penetration, by itself, an unilateral positive act of the accused but might also be a union between two persons out of their own volition. In the latter case, the expression 'penetrates', in Section 3(a) of the POCSO Act might not always connote mere voluntary juxtaposition of the sexual organs of two persons of different genders. In the latter case, the expression 'penetrates', in Section 3(a) of the POCSO Act might not always connote mere voluntary juxtaposition of the sexual organs of two persons of different genders. If the union is participatory in nature, there is no reason to indict only the male just because of the peculiar nature of anatomy of the sexual organs of different genders. The psyche of the parties and the maturity level of the victim are also relevant factors to be taken into consideration to decide whether the penetration was a unilateral and positive act on the part of the male. Hence, seen in proper perspective, the act alleged, even if proved, could not tantamount to penetration sufficient to attract Section 3 of the POCSO Act, keeping in view the admitted several prior occasions of physical union between the accused and the victim and the maturity of the victim. 48. As such, it cannot be said that the accused was guilty of penetrative sexual assault, as such, since here the act of penetration, even if true, would have to be taken not as an unilateral act of the accused but a participatory moment of passion involving the participation of both the victim and the accused. 49. Although the question of consent does not rise in case of a minor, in order to attract Section 376(1) of the IPC, it had to be established that the alleged offence was committed against the will of the victim. Read in conjunction, the provisions of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act ought to be construed on a similar footing and cannot incriminate the accused for a voluntary joint act of sexual union." 10. This Court as mentioned above, being in respectful agreement with the said observations made by the Hon'ble Madras High Court as well as the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta and in application of the same principle to the case in hand, would agree that ends of justice would be met if the proceedings in question is brought to a closure. 11. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. The said FIR dated 21.11.2022 filed by the petitioner No. 2 herein and also the consequent proceedings in Special (POCSO) Case No. 31 of 2022 are hereby set aside and quashed.” 13. 11. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. The said FIR dated 21.11.2022 filed by the petitioner No. 2 herein and also the consequent proceedings in Special (POCSO) Case No. 31 of 2022 are hereby set aside and quashed.” 13. The learned counsel for the accused petitioner has also relied on another case decided by the High Court of Meghalaya in the case of Shembhalang Rynghang & Anr. Vs. State of Meghalaya , reported in 2022 Supreme(Megh) 144 , decided on 23.03.2022. He specifically relied on the paragraphs No.22, 23 and 24 of the aforesaid case, which are reproduced herein below: - “ 22. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard appears to be relevant, in the case of Ranjit Rajbanshi (supra) at paragraphs 47, 48 & 49, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court has held as under: '47. In the present case, the victim girl was admittedly 16 1/2 years old and studied in Class XII at the relevant point of time. She was not naïve enough not to know the implication of sexual intercourse; rather, the victim admittedly had a physical relationship with the accused, who was also of a very young age, on several occasions prior to the incident. Although the consent of a minor is not a good consent in law, and cannot be taken into account as 'consent' as such, the expression 'penetration' as envisaged in the POCSO Act has to be taken to mean a positive, unilateral act on the part of the accused. Consensual participatory intercourse, in view of the passion involved, need not always make penetration, by itself, an unilateral positive act of the accused but might also be a union between two persons out of their own volition. In the latter case, the expression 'penetrates', in Section 3(a) of the POCSO Act might not always connote mere voluntary juxtaposition of the sexual organs of two persons of different genders. If the union is participatory in nature, there is no reason to indict only the male just because of the peculiar nature of anatomy of the sexual organs of different genders. The psyche of the parties and the maturity level of the victim are also relevant factors to be taken into consideration to decide whether the penetration was a unilateral and positive act on the part of the male. The psyche of the parties and the maturity level of the victim are also relevant factors to be taken into consideration to decide whether the penetration was a unilateral and positive act on the part of the male. Hence, seen in proper perspective, the act alleged, even if proved, could not tantamount to penetration sufficient to attract Section 3 of the POCSO Act, keeping in view the admitted several prior occasions of physical union between the accused and the victim and the maturity of the victim. 48. As such, it cannot be said that the accused was guilty of penetrative sexual assault, as such, since here the act of penetration, even if true, would have to be taken not as an unilateral act of the accused but a participatory moment of passion involving the participation of both the victim and the accused. 49. Although the question of consent does not arise in case of a minor, in order to attract Section 376(1) of the IPC, it had to be established that the alleged offence was committed against the will of the victim. Read in conjunction, the provisions of Section 376 of the IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act ought to be construed on a similar footing and cannot incriminate the accused for a voluntary joint act of sexual union." 23. Echoing the same sentiment, the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of Vijayalakshmi (supra) at paragraphs 12 & 18 has held as follows: '12. As rightly recognized by the Learned Single Judge of this Court in Sabari's Case (cited supra), incidences where teenagers and young adults fall victim to offences under the POCSO Act being slapped against them without understanding the implication of the severity of the enactment is an issue that brings much concern to the conscience of this Court. A reading of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the POCSO Act would show that the Act was brought into force to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography, pursuant to Article 15 of the Constitution of India, 1950 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, a large array of cases filed under the POCSO Act seems to be those arising on the basis of complaints registered by the families of adolescents and teenagers who are involved in romantic relationships with each other. However, a large array of cases filed under the POCSO Act seems to be those arising on the basis of complaints registered by the families of adolescents and teenagers who are involved in romantic relationships with each other. The scheme of the Act clearly shows that it did not intend to bring within its scope or ambit, cases of the nature where adolescents or teenagers involved in romantic relationships are concerned. 18. In the present case, the 2nd Petitioner who was in a relationship with the 2nd Respondent who is also in his early twenties, has clearly stated that she was the one who insisted that the 2nd Respondent take her away from her home and marry her, due to the pressure exerted by her parents. The 2nd Respondent, who was placed in a very precarious situation decided to concede to the demand of the 2nd Petitioner. Thereafter, they eloped from their respective homes, got married and consummated the marriage. Incidents of this nature keep occurring regularly even now in villages and towns and occasionally in cities. After the parents or family lodge a complaint, the police register FIRs for offences of kidnapping and various offences under the POCSO Act. Several criminal cases booked under the POCSO Act fall under this category. As a consequence of such a FIR being registered, invariably the boy gets arrested and thereafter, his youthful life comes to a grinding halt. The provisions of the POCSO Act, as it stands today, will surely make the acts of the boy an offence due to its stringent nature. An adolescent boy caught in a situation like this will surely have no defense if the criminal case is taken to its logical end. Punishing an adolescent boy who enters into a relationship with a minor girl by treating him as an offender, was never the objective of the POCSO Act. An adolescent boy and girl who are in the grips of their hormones and biological changes and whose decision-making ability is yet to fully develop, should essentially support and guidance of their parents and the society at large. These incidents should never be perceived from an adult's point of view and such an understanding will in fact lead to lack of empathy. An adolescent boy who is sent to prison in a case of this nature will be persecuted throughout his life. These incidents should never be perceived from an adult's point of view and such an understanding will in fact lead to lack of empathy. An adolescent boy who is sent to prison in a case of this nature will be persecuted throughout his life. It is high time that the legislature takes into consideration cases of this nature involving adolescents involved in relationships and swiftly bring in necessary amendments under the Act. The legislature has to keep pace with the changing societal needs and bring about necessary changes in law and more particularly in a stringent law such as the POCSO Act.' 24. In a recent judgment, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Kundan & Anr. v. State & Ors, vide order dated 21.02.2022 in CRL.M.C. 27/2022 dealing with a similar case in which the alleged victim girl who had gone missing and was found in the company of the accused therein, had stated that she has married the said accused and a child out of the said wedlock was born to them with the parents of both the parties having accepted the marriage, an application u/s 482 Cr.P.C for quashing of the related FIR, on being preferred was allowed. Elaborating on the power of the High Court u/s 482 Cr.P.C, the court has quoted the decision in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab: (2012) 10 SCC 303 at paragraphs 55 & 56 therein which are also reproduced herein for better elucidation: - '55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquidalicuiconcedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsaesse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection. 56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 . No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided.'” 14. Relying on the aforesaid cases decided by the High Court of Meghalaya at Shillong, the learned counsel submits that this is a fit case for exercising the inherent power under Section 528 of BNSS , 2023, as in the instant case, the victim and the accused person were in a love relationship and the physical relationship that occurred between them was consensual in nature. He submits that the Investigating Officer has erroneously taken the victim’s age as 17 years 6 months relying on the School Admission Register, whereas, rejected other authentic documents such as Aadhar Card, Records of the Office of CDPO as well as the Electoral Roll, which, in fact, shows that the victim girl was a major, when the alleged offence was committed. Therefore, he submits that though Section 6 4 read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act have been slapped against the accused petitioner, this Court after taking into account the aforesaid fact of consensual sexual relationship and the other authentic documents showing her age, in exercise of power under Section 528 of BNSS , 2023, may set aside and quash the aforesaid Charge Sheet and the proceedings pending before the trial Court. 15. Per contra, Ms. T. Jini, learned Addl. P.P. submits that the provisions for presumption and determination of age of a child have been provided in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as, Act of 2015). She submits that the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 of the said Act, 2015 and or the Child Welfare Committee under Section 27 is the right authority to determine the age of a child. She submits that the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 of the said Act, 2015 and or the Child Welfare Committee under Section 27 is the right authority to determine the age of a child. She submits that such Board or a Committee could be approached to determine the age of the child by filing an appropriate application before the Trial Court where the trial will be conducted. She has drawn the attention of this Court to Sub-section 2 of 94 of the Act of 2015, wherein, under Sub-section (i), it has been provided that the Board or the Committee while undertaking the process of age determination shall seek evidence by obtaining (i) date of birth certificate from the School or the Matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available and in the absence thereof, (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a Municipal Authority or a Panchayat. She further submits that only in the absence of (i) & (ii), aforementioned, the age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board, therefore, she submits that the date of birth recorded in the School Admission Register is the most authentic document to be relied for determining the age of a child. She submits that in the instant case also the records of the School Admission Register have been treated as the most authentic document for determination of the age by the Investigating Officer while submitting the aforesaid Charge Sheet. She submits that the Register maintained in the Office of the CDPO was, in fact, procured by the accused petitioner after the Charge Sheet was filed and the same was never brought before the Investigating Officer. She submits that the Investigating Officer has not committed any error by rejecting the Aadhar Card as well as the Birth Certificate of the victim girl and treating the School Admission Register as the most authentic document to presume/determine the age of the victim girl. She submits that the Investigating Officer has not committed any error by rejecting the Aadhar Card as well as the Birth Certificate of the victim girl and treating the School Admission Register as the most authentic document to presume/determine the age of the victim girl. She submits that if the date of birth mentioned in the School Admission Register is taken into account while calculating the age of the victim girl on the date of the occurrence of the offence, she was obviously a minor at that point of time and therefore, the Charge framed against the accused petitioner under Section 4 of the POCSO Act is not at all at fault. She submits that the materials available on record, clearly show that the offence of rape was committed by the accused/petitioner as there was no consent when the first incident of physical relationship happened. She submits that even if there was any kind of love relationship between the victim girl and the accused person, consent was never there. In view of the aforesaid submissions made by her, she submits that, at this stage, this Court may not interfere with the trial proceeding as the accused petitioner could not show any major defect or illegality in filing of the Charge-Sheet by the Investigating Officer which will force this Court to interfere with the pending proceeding before the concerned Trial Court. 16. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the accused petitioner as well as the respondent-State. 17. This Court has gone through the Charge Sheet filed along with the statements recorded by the Police of various witnesses including the victim girl and the accused person. This Court has also gone through the statements recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Siang District, Aalo of the victim girl under Section 183 (5) of the BNSS , 2023. It is seen from the statement under Section 183 (5) of BNSS , 2023 that the statement was recorded on an oath under the Oaths Act, 1969 and after putting 5 (five) questions for ascertaining her understanding and her ability to answer rationally to the questions put to her. From a careful reading of the statement of the victim girl, it transpires that she had narrated the alleged offence committed by the accused petitioner in clear terms that the accused petitioner had forced her for a sexual intercourse without her consent. 18. From a careful reading of the statement of the victim girl, it transpires that she had narrated the alleged offence committed by the accused petitioner in clear terms that the accused petitioner had forced her for a sexual intercourse without her consent. 18. This Court has also considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused petitioner about the wrong submission of the Charge Sheet by the Investigating Officer. As, it has been mentioned above, the Investigating Officer has duly considered other documents, namely, the Birth Certificate and the Aadhar Card which were seized from the possession of the father of the victim girl and the Investigating Officer has also collected the authentic copy of the School Admission Register from the school, duly certified, wherein, the victim girl was studying. These facts are very clear from paragraph-6 of the Charge Sheet, which has already been quoted hereinabove. 19. It may be, worthwhile, at this stage to reproduce Sub-section (1) & (2) of Section 94 of the Act of 2015:- “94. Presumption and determination of age :- (1) Where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age; (2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age of determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining: - (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) & (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the committee or the Board. Provided that such age determination test conducted on the order of the committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.” 20. The above provisions clearly provide that presumption and determination of age of a child could be done by a legally constituted Committee or Board under the provisions of the Act of 2015 and such Board or Committee is empowered to determine the age of a child as per the provisions laid down under Sub-section 2 of the said Act of 2015. As per (i) of Sub-section 2, the date of birth certificate issued by the School is the primary document in determination of the age of a child. In fact, in the absence of such certificate, the other documents like the Birth Certificate given by a Corporation or Municipal Authority or a Panchayat can be taken into account. Therefore, a careful reading of the provisions makes it crystal clear that the date of birth certificate provided by the school on the basis of a School Admission Register is treated as the most authentic piece of evidence that can be relied in presumption and determination of the age of a child. 21. In the instant case also, though no such presumption and determination of age has been carried out by a Board or a Committee constituted under the Act of 2015, the Investigating Officer while determining or presuming the age, been prima facie satisfied, he has taken into account the School Admission Register issued by the concerned School. Therefore, without opining anything on the merit of the case, this Court finds no glaring error or fault in filing the Charge Sheet by the Investigating Officer taking the age of the victim girl as 17 years 6 months at the time of the alleged commission of the offence by the accused petitioner and thereby, framing the charges under Section 6 4 of BNSS , 2023 read with Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012. 22. This Court has also considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding consensual sexual relationships between the victim girl and the accused petitioner. 22. This Court has also considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding consensual sexual relationships between the victim girl and the accused petitioner. This Court has gone through the statement recorded by the Police as well as the statement of the victim girl under Section 183 (5) of BNSS , 2023 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Siang District, Aalo, Arunachal Pradesh and after due consideration without opining on the merits of such statements, this Court is of the considered opinion that the FIR as well as the other materials on record, prima facie disclose cognizable offences and the same that is pending before the Special Judge (POCSO) deserves to go ahead. This Court has carefully considered the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the extracts of the relevant paragraphs have already been quoted hereinabove. 23. After going through the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid cases, this Court is of the opinion that the exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is the opinion of this Court that it is neither advisable nor appropriate for the Court to provide a straitjacket formula regarding exercise of inherent power under Section 528 of BNSS , 2023. In the above cited cases, importance has been given to the age of the victim girl, both were more than 16 years of age at that relevant point of time of the commission of the alleged offence and consent to such sexual intercourse was taken to be a relevant factor in deciding the aforesaid cases. The High Court of Meghalaya has also considered the factual aspects in both the cases after filing of the FIRs in both the cases. 24. As far as the case of Shri Skolbha Lamara (supra) is concerned, it was an admitted fact that the victim girl and the accused person was in a love relationship though the victim girl was a minor girl of 16 years of age at the relevant time. It was also a fact that the victim girl became pregnant and she subsequently delivered a child. The relationship did not remain as same when the accused (petitioner No.1 in the case) refused to recognize his relationship with the girl. The father of the victim girl (Petitioner No. 2 in the case), out of anger, filed the FIR. It was also a fact that the victim girl became pregnant and she subsequently delivered a child. The relationship did not remain as same when the accused (petitioner No.1 in the case) refused to recognize his relationship with the girl. The father of the victim girl (Petitioner No. 2 in the case), out of anger, filed the FIR. Investigation started and thereafter the Charge Sheet was filed under Section 5 (i) (ii)/6 of POCSO Act against the accused (Petitioner No.1). The vital fact that was under consideration was that the accused (Petitioner No.1) and the father of the victim girl (Petitioner No.2), later had change of hearts and good sense prevailed that the relationship between the victim girl and the accused was recognised by both the families. The families agreed that when the victim minor girl comes of age, she would be legally married by the accused (Petitioner No.1) and until then, the accused (Petitioner No.1) assured that he will take care of the child born out of his relationship with the victim girl. And in that backdrop, the accused (Petitioner No.1) and the father of the victim girl (Petitioner No.2) have jointly approached the Court with a prayer that the proceeding before the trial Court may be brought to a closure as continuing with the same will not serve any useful purpose considering the fact that the parties have come to an agreement. In fact, a Deed of Settlement was also executed between the parties. In that factual matrix, a joint prayer was made and the father of the victim (Petitioner No. 2) indicated that he was no longer willing to pursue the matter before the Court. Therefore, it is apparent that the High Court of Meghalaya in consideration of the aforesaid facts and circumstances taking into account the developments happened after filing of the FIR as well as taking into account the welfare of the child as well as the victim girl and consensual nature of the physical relationship, came to the conclusion that ends of justice would be met if the proceeding in question was brought to a closure. However, in the case in hand, the facts are distinguishable from the aforesaid case. However, in the case in hand, the facts are distinguishable from the aforesaid case. The FIR lodged and the statements recorded, clearly show that the first physical relationship between the victim girl and the accused occurred due to forceful act of the accused person and there was no consent of the victim girl. The facts and circumstance of the aforesaid case and the case in hand are totally different from each other. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the aforesaid case has no applicability to the case in hand before this Court. 25. The other case i.e., Shembhalang Rynghang (supra) cited herein above by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is the case wherein, the trial was completed and the accused person was found guilty for an offence under Section 5 (j)(2) of the POCSO Act. However, no case was found to be made out under Section 376 (2)(m) of the IPC and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. This is also a case wherein the victim girl (Petitioner No.2) and the accused person (Petitioner No.1) jointly filed the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging the conviction of the petitioner No.1 for an offence under Section 5 (i) (ii) of the POCSO Act. The Petitioner No. 2, a minor at the time of occurence of alleged offence, is a major and living with petitioner No. 1 as his wife while the case was heard. They also have a child born out of their relationship. In fact, Petitioner No. 2 after attaining majority, solemnised their marriage and duly registered the marriage before the Marriage Registrar, Nongpoh. A bare perusal of the case clearly depicts that the physical relationship between the accused and the victim girl was consensual though the girl was a minor at that point of time. In fact, the FIR was lodged by the mother of the victim girl when she found her daughter to be pregnant. The admitted fact was that during the consideration of the petition, both were legally married and staying together as husband and wife with their child. Therefore, in that peculiar facts and circumstances of the case when the petitioners were living together as a happy family, the order of conviction of petitioner No. 1 was causing considerable hardship and inconvenience to the couples, the petitioners. Therefore, in that peculiar facts and circumstances of the case when the petitioners were living together as a happy family, the order of conviction of petitioner No. 1 was causing considerable hardship and inconvenience to the couples, the petitioners. Taking into the exceptional facts prevailing in the case, the Court therein, after due consideration, had set aside the conviction of the petitioner. However, as apparent, the facts are totally different in the case on hand. Therefore, this Court after due consideration, is of the considered opinion that the case of Shembhalang Rynghang (supra) is not applicable to the case on hand before this Court. 26. At this point of time, it may be worthwhile to refer to a case i.e. Supriya Jain Vs. State of Haryana & Another , reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765. The principle laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court while hearing the petition under Section 528 of the BNSS , having been laid down in Paragraph No. 17 of the aforesaid case, the relevant part of which are extracted herein below: - “ 17. This is a case where the charges have been framed and the accused are awaiting trial. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, noticed above, we are of the considered opinion that the investigation and the follow-up steps are not so patently and unobtrusively defective or erroneous (except to the extent we propose to mention before concluding our judgment) that allowing the trial to progress might cause a miscarriage of justice. This is also not an appropriate stage to delve deep into the records. It is no part of the business of any of the courts to ascertain what the outcome of the trial could be, conviction or acquittal of the accused. The small window that the law, through judicial precedents, provides is to look at the allegations in the FIR and the materials collected in course of investigation, without a rebuttal thereof by the accused, and to form an opinion upon consideration thereof that an offence is indeed not disclosed from it. Unless the prosecution is shown to be illegitimate so as to result in an abuse of the process of law, it would not be proper to scuttle it. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to quashing of a charge/proceedings either in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397, Cr. Unless the prosecution is shown to be illegitimate so as to result in an abuse of the process of law, it would not be proper to scuttle it. The principles to be borne in mind with regard to quashing of a charge/proceedings either in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397, Cr. P.C. or section 482, Cr. P.C. or together, as the case may be, has engaged the attention of this Court many a time. Reference to each and every precedent is unnecessary. However, we may profitably refer to only one decision of this Court where upon a survey of almost all the precedents on the point, the principles have been summarized by this Court succinctly. In Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, this Court laid down the following guiding principles: “ 27.1. …………………………………………………. 27.2. ………………………………………………….. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4. …………………………………………………… 27.5. …………………………………………………… 27.6. …………………………………………………… 27.7. …………………………………………………… 27.8. …………………………………………………… 27.9. …………………………………………………… 27.10. …………………………………………………. 27.11. …………………………………………………. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482 , the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 27.14. …………………………………………………….. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.” 27. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.” 27. In the above case, it has been clearly pointed out by the Hon’ble Apex Court that while hearing the petition, under Section 528 of the BNSS , High Court need not delve into the records. It is no part of the business of any of the Courts to ascertain what the outcome of the trial could be, conviction or acquittal of the accused. It was further laid down that meticulous examination of the evidence is not needed for considering at the stage of hearing of such petition. It was further laid down that quashing of charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather that its quashing at that initial state. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to deicide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 28. In view of the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court and further due consideration, this Court is of the opinion that each case has to be dealt independently on the basis of the materials on record and the established legal positions. There is no straitjacket formula for deciding a petition filed under Section 528 of the BNSS , 2023. Though in the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, above, the Courts therein, have come to conclusions that the charges under the POCSO Act were not correct on the basis of the facts of those cases and thereby, allowing the petitions under Section 528 of the BNSS , 2023, by quashing the proceeding pending before the Trial Court in one case, and in another by setting aside the conviction order of the accused under the POCSO Act, in the present facts and circumstances of the case on hand, this Court is of respectful opinion that the cases cited above are not applicable to the instant case. 29. This Court also finds strength in the submissions of the learned Addl. 29. This Court also finds strength in the submissions of the learned Addl. P.P. that the option for determination of the age of the victim girl is still there with the accused petitioner and he can avail that option by filing an appropriate application before the learned Trial Court for determination of age of the victim girl. 30. Considering all aspects of the matter in their entirety, including the submissions made by the respective learned counsels, materials brought on record and the case laws that have been discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the instant petition filed under Section 528 of BNSS , 2023, deserves to be not entertained at this stage and therefore, this petition stands dismissed, as rejected. 31. This Criminal Petition is accordingly disposed of, as dismissed.