ORDER : SANDEEP SHAH, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed by the defendant petitioner challenging the order dated 07.02.2025 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Merta, whereby the application filed by the petitioner under Section 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) was rejected. 2. The brief facts relevant to the present case are that the petitioner filed a suit against Riyaj Mohammad and Munna Bhai for cancellation of the decree dated 23.05.2013, the sale deed dated 08.07.2013, and the agreement dated 15.06.2002. The suit, Civil Case No. 135/2013, is pending adjudication before the Additional Civil Judge, Junior Division, Merta. 3. In the suit, the dispute concerns plot Nos. A-18 and A-19, situated at Sangam Vihar Colony, Merta City, District Nagaur. The plaintiff-petitioner asserted that she purchased the plot through a sale deed dated 04.08.2011 executed by Gulsher Khan, Ajmeri Khan, Nisar Khan, and Salawat Khan. It was also stated that after the sale deed was executed, the petitioner was issued a patta by the Municipal Council. 4. Subsequently, the petitioner discovered that the sellers had executed a power of attorney dated 04.08.2011 in favor of Riyaj Mohammad, who, acting in connivance with the co-respondent Munna Bhai, obtained a compromise decree and executed a sale deed in favor of Munna Bhai. Therefore, the petitioner filed the suit on 23.11.2013 seeking cancellation of the documents mentioned above, along with other reliefs. 5. Subsequently, the respondent Munna Bhai filed a suit against the present petitioner, alleging a prior cause of action and praying for the cancellation of the sale deed executed in favor of the petitioner, as well as the cancellation of the patta. The respondent claimed to be the actual owner based on the decree and the sale deed executed in their favor. 6. In the subsequent case, the trial was nearing conclusion, with the matter fixed for final arguments. At that stage, on 20.01.2025, the petitioner filed an application under Section 10 , stating briefly in one paragraph that the cause of action in both cases was the same and that the parties in both cases were identical. 7. However, the application itself acknowledged that both cases could not be tried together due to the difference in jurisdiction of the concerned courts. 7. However, the application itself acknowledged that both cases could not be tried together due to the difference in jurisdiction of the concerned courts. Therefore, the respondent prayed that Civil Suit No. 1139/2014 (Munna Bhai v. Sayra Bano & Ors.) be stayed until the final decision in Civil Original Case No. 135/2013 (Sayra Bano v. Riyaj Mohammad & Ors.). 8. The respondent filed a reply to the aforementioned application, raising objections regarding the maintainability of the application at such a belated stage. He further asserted that the parties are not the same, and that the matters are not directly or substantially common in both cases. 9. The learned trial court, after considering the arguments of both the parties, dismissed the application filed by the petitioner seeking a stay of the proceedings. The court observed that the issues involved in both cases are neither directly nor substantially common. Furthermore, it noted that the application under Section 10 was filed at a very belated stage, when the matter was already fixed for final arguments. Aggrieved by this order, the present writ petition has been filed. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently submits that the matter in issue is directly and substantially the same in both suits and that the parties are also common. Therefore, the proceedings in the subsequent suit ought to have been stayed. He further submits that Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not prescribe any specific time limit for filing such an application, and hence, it can be filed at any stage of the proceedings. He asserts that the findings in one case would have a definite bearing on the outcome of the other, and therefore, it would be appropriate to stay the subsequent suit, especially since both matters could not be consolidated due to jurisdictional differences. 11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the impugned order and submitted that the issues involved in the earlier suit are not directly and substantially the same as those in the present suit. He pointed out that the prayer in the earlier suit pertained to the cancellation of a decree, sale deed, and agreement, whereas in the present suit, the prayer is limited to the cancellation of the sale deed executed in favor of Sayra Bano. 12. He, thus, contended that the provisions of Section 10 CPC are not applicable to the present case. 12. He, thus, contended that the provisions of Section 10 CPC are not applicable to the present case. He further submitted that the first suit involves the issue of whether the power of attorney was validly executed, which is not a question arising in the subsequent suit. 13. Additionally, he argued that the application under Section 10 CPC was filed at a highly belated stage, when the matter was fixed for final arguments, indicating a delay and lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner. On this ground alone, he asserted, the application was not maintainable. Accordingly, he submitted that the learned trial court has rightly passed the order rejecting the application. 14. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. This Court is of the opinion that, in so far as the earlier suit filed by Sayra Bano is concerned, the same pertains to a declaration that the decree for specific performance dated 23.05.2013 is null and void, and also seeks cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of Sayra Bano. 15. In contrast, the issue raised in the present suit relates to the validity of the sale deed executed in favour of Sayra Bano. Therefore, it is evident that the matter in issue in both cases is not directly and substantially the same. Even if the issues in the present case may be incidental or collaterally related to the earlier case, such correlation does not fall within the scope of "directly and substantially in issue" as contemplated under Section 10 CPC. 16. This Court takes guidance from the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256 , wherein it was observed as under:— “ Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both the suits is identical. The key words in Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue” in the provisions instituted suit. The words “directly and substantially in issue” in the previous instituted suit. The words “directly and substantially in issue” are used in contradistinction to the words “incidentally or collaterally in issue”. The key words in Section 10 are “the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue” in the provisions instituted suit. The words “directly and substantially in issue” in the previous instituted suit. The words “directly and substantially in issue” are used in contradistinction to the words “incidentally or collaterally in issue”. Therefore, Section 10 would apply only if there is identity of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of the subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical.” 17. Thus, it is clear that the trial court has rightly passed the impugned order in treating the issues in both suits as not being directly and substantially identical. 18. With regard to the filing of an application under Section 10 CPC at any stage, a plain reading of the provision reveals that the embargo is only on “proceeding with the trial” of a subsequent suit. However, while no specific time limit is prescribed under the provision, the language and intent of Section 10 make it clear that a party cannot be permitted to file such an application at a highly belated stage—particularly when the trial is at its fag end. This position of law is well-settled and no longer res integra. 19. In the present case, the record indicates that the trial had already commenced; issues were framed, and the evidence of both the plaintiff and the defendants had been completed. The matter was listed for final arguments. 20. This, coupled with the fact that no plausible explanation was provided in the application filed under Section 10 CPC for the delay in moving such an application, leads this Court to concur with the findings of the trial court and to affirm the impugned order. 21. The writ petition, being devoid of any merit, is accordingly dismissed.