JUDGMENT : Swarupama Chaturvedi, J. 1. Heard Sri Om Prakash Ojha, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Tej Bhan Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 2 . All three appeals being Special Appeal No. 530 of 2025, Special Appeal No. 608 of 2025 and Special Appeal (Defective) No. 656 of 2025, have been preferred against the common judgment and order dated 28.04.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ-A No. 49901 of 2016, Savitri Devi and 2 Others vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others, and the connected Writ-A No. 50483 of 2016, Girija Shankar Pandey vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others, whereby writ petitions filed by appellants here got dismissed. 3. Since common questions of law and fact arise in all appeals, all the appeals were heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. For the sake of clarity, the factual matrix of all connected matters has been considered conjointly, as the dispute emanates from rival groups within the management of the same institution and the facts are inextricably intertwined. While the common background has been narrated together, the cases of the individual teachers have been examined with reference to their respective dates of appointment, approvals, and service particulars. The present common judgment shall, therefore, govern all the connected matters, however, its application to each case shall operate independently and subject to the decision rendered on the individual merits of each matter. 4. The Junior High School in question was established in 1962-63 under the aegis of Shiksha Pracharani Sabha, Srinagar, Ballia, a society registered on 22.04.1963. The institution initially had temporary recognition up to 1976 and was granted permanent recognition in 1977. Singasan Sharma, Ram Kumar Ram and Girja Shankar Pandey, all three were appointed as Assistant Teachers in 1972, possessing the requisite qualifications. The appointment of Singasan Sharma was approved by the District Basic Education Officer on 20.12.1978, while the appointments of Ram Kumar Ram and Girja Shankar Pandey were approved on 18.04.1983. The institution was brought under the U.P. Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978 in July 1984, and thereafter salary was paid from the State exchequer. 5. In the year 1982, disputes arose between rival Committees of Management, leading to various petitions being filed regarding the validity of the management and entitlement of teachers appointed by rival committees. 5. In the year 1982, disputes arose between rival Committees of Management, leading to various petitions being filed regarding the validity of the management and entitlement of teachers appointed by rival committees. The controversy culminated in Civil Misc. Writ Petition Nos. 44607 of 1993, 15032 of 1995 and 25438 of 1996, which were decided by this Court by a detailed judgment dated 26.11.1998, holding one set of appointments to be valid and issuing specific directions for payment of salary from the State exchequer. The judgment was affirmed by dismissal of Special Appeal No. 1082 of 1998 on 21.05.2003, and the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 902 of 2007 was also dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 05.02.2007. Despite this, salary was again withheld, leading to contempt proceedings and further administrative inquiries. Meanwhile, the recognition of the institution was withdrawn in March 2014, which got challenged separately. 6. In the year 2014, Public Interest Litigation No. 25033 of 2014 was filed. This PIL was related to scholarship and mid-day meal distribution. Pursuant to the PIL, an inquiry was conducted by a six-member committee. The committee also examined appointment-related documents and submitted its report dated 25.03.2015. On the basis of the report, the Director, Basic Education passed an order dated 27.03.2015, directing stoppage of salary. Being aggrieved by the order, the appellants filed Writ-A No. 49901 of 2016 and Writ-A No. 50483 of 2016. Both the writ petitions were dismissed by the learned Single Judge by judgment dated 28.04.2025. 7 . In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge noted that the petitioners relied upon Rule 17 of the Rules for Grant of Gratuity to the Teachers of Aided Educational Institutions, 1960, contending that since the husband of original petitioner no.1 died in harness and petitioner no.3 retired after rendering service, their salary prior to withdrawal of recognition was payable and they were also entitled to family pension or pension. However, the learned Single Judge, relying upon the submissions of the State and the impleaded respondent no.5 in writ petition, found that the appointments of the petitioners and other employees were doubtful, as no appointment or approval documents were produced by the Committee of Management. However, the learned Single Judge, relying upon the submissions of the State and the impleaded respondent no.5 in writ petition, found that the appointments of the petitioners and other employees were doubtful, as no appointment or approval documents were produced by the Committee of Management. It was observed that after withdrawal of recognition, its consequences would also fall upon the employees and the State exchequer could not be burdened with payment of pension or family pension to employees of a non-existent institution. The learned Single Judge further held that the approval letters issued by the concerned Basic Shiksha Adhikari in favour of the husband of Savitri Devi and other employees were found to be doubtful in later enquiry report, and therefore, learned Single Judge concluded that the petitioners were not entitled to any relief. 8. In Special Appeal No. 1082 of 1998, the fact was that Shri Lallan Tiwari, was appointed on 01.07.1977, which was approved on 22.05.1980. Since the institution was brought under the grant-in-aid scheme in 1984, and the respondent received salary from the State from 01.07.1984 to 21.01.1985. His services were terminated on 22.01.1985, and the termination was approved on 28th August 1985. Aggrieved, by this, he filed Writ Petition No. 11013 of 1985, wherein interim orders dated 10.09.1985 and 12.02.1988 directed payment of salary. Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 36951 of 1994 was decided on 21.11.1994, directing the District Basic Education Officer to decide the dispute relating to termination. Pursuant thereto, the DBEO passed an order dated 19.07.1995 revoking the respondent’s suspension. Meanwhile, the dispute regarding the Committee of Management was finally decided by this Hon’ble Court by order dated 26.11.1998. The Special Appeal No. 1082 of 1998 filed against the said order was dismissed, and the challenge thereto was also rejected on 21.05.2003. The respondent has now sought recall of the orders dated 26.11.1998 and 21.05.2003, alleging that his termination was illegal. 9. In the background of aforesaid facts, learned counsel for appellants submits that once the validity of appointments and entitlement to salary had been conclusively adjudicated by this Court in its judgment dated 26.11.1998, affirmed in Special Appeal and further upheld by dismissal of the Special Leave Petition on merits, the issue attained finality and could not be reopened by administrative authorities or by the learned Single Judge. 10. 10. To further support his contention, learned counsel for the appellants relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2024) 11 SCC 770 , wherein Supreme Court examined the question whether a teacher, whose appointment had been approved by the competent authority and who had discharged duties for a considerable length of time, could be denied salary and service benefits on the ground of alleged irregularities in appointment. In this case the Supreme Court held that once an appointment is approved and the teacher has worked for years, salary cannot be withheld merely on the basis of procedural lapses or alleged irregularities attributable to the management or the authorities. It was further held that the State cannot be permitted to take advantage of its own lapse, or that of its officers, in granting approval and thereafter deny salary and service benefits. The Court emphasised that a teacher who is not at fault cannot be penalised for alleged mistakes of the management, especially when the employee has in fact rendered service and the employer has enjoyed the benefit thereof. 11. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent State, on the other hand, supports the impugned judgment and submits that subsequent inquiries and findings justified the action taken by the authorities. He further submits that the dismissal of Special leave petition cannot be seen as finality of the issue to opine that the High Court cannot review it. 12. Further, learned counsel for respondents placed reliance upon judgement of the Apex Court in Kunhayammed and others Vs State of Kerala and another, (2000) 6 SCC 359 , where Supreme Court has examined the legal implications and the impact of an order rejecting a petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India has arisen. It was held by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is converted into an appeal. 13. It was held by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is converted into an appeal. 13. After hearing parties, following issues arise for consideration: (i) Whether the issue of validity of appointment and entitlement to salary could be reopened after dismissal of special leave petition by the Supreme Court? and (ii) Whether the appellants or their legal representatives are entitled to salary and consequential retiral benefits like gratuity and pension in the facts and circumstances of the case? 14. After going through pleadings and careful perusal of records, it appears that the appellant in Special Appeal No. 530 of 2025, Singasan Sharma, was appointed as Assistant Teacher on 10.07.1972 and joined on 15.07.1972, and his appointment was approved on 20.12.1978. Ram Kumar Ram (who died on 11.02.2013), are represented by his widow Savitri Devi, and one Girja Shankar Pandey, represented by his son Vineet Pandey, were both appointed on 11.08.1972, and their appointments were approved on 18.04.1983. Upon the institution being brought under the Payment of Salaries Act, all three were paid salary from the State exchequer. Salary was stopped intermittently between September 1992 to August 2007, and again after February 2009. 15. The disputes originated solely due to rival Committees of Management formed in 1982, which led to competing claims and multiple rounds of litigation. The controversy was finally adjudicated by this Court by judgment dated 26.11.1998, which upheld the appointments of one set of teachers and directed payment of salary. The said judgment was affirmed in Special Appeal on 21.05.2003, and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 05.02.2007. Thus, the issue of validity of appointment and entitlement to salary attained finality. 16. Subsequent administrative inquiries, including those arising out of a Public Interest Litigation, could not have the effect of reopening issues already settled by binding judicial pronouncements. Once judicial finality had been reached, the Director of Education lacked jurisdiction to negate the appointments or to stop salary on the basis of a general inquiry report although High Court having jurisdiction can examine all such actions which was required to be seen for the adjudication. 17. Once judicial finality had been reached, the Director of Education lacked jurisdiction to negate the appointments or to stop salary on the basis of a general inquiry report although High Court having jurisdiction can examine all such actions which was required to be seen for the adjudication. 17. We considered the judgement of Supreme Court in Kunhayammed and others (supra) where Supreme Court has examined the effect of dismissal of the special leave petition at different stages and held that: “A petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal may be rejected for several reasons. For example, it may be rejected (i) as barred by time, or (ii) being a defective presentation, (iii) the petitioner having no locus standi to file the petition, (iv) the conduct of the petitioner disentitling him to any indulgence by the Court, (iv) the question raised by the petitioner for consideration by this Court being not fit for consideration or deserving being dealt with by the apex court of the country and so on. The expression often employed by this Court while disposing of such petitions are - heard and dismissed, dismissed, dismissed as barred by time and so on. May be that at the admission stage itself the opposite party appears on caveat or on notice and offers contest to the maintainability of the petition. The Court may apply its mind to the meritworthiness of the petitioners prayer seeking leave to file an appeal and having formed an opinion may say dismissed on merits. Such an order may be passed even ex-parte, that is, in the absence of the opposite party. In any case, the dismissal would remain a dismissal by a non-speaking order where no reasons have been assigned and no law has been declared by the Supreme Court. The dismissal is not of the appeal but of the special leave petition. Even if the merits have been gone into, they are the merits of the special leave petition only. In our opinion neither doctrine of merger nor Article 141 of the Constitution is attracted to such an order. The dismissal is not of the appeal but of the special leave petition. Even if the merits have been gone into, they are the merits of the special leave petition only. In our opinion neither doctrine of merger nor Article 141 of the Constitution is attracted to such an order. Grounds entitling exercise of review jurisdiction conferred by Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. or any other statutory provision or allowing review of an order passed in exercise of writ or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court (where also the principles underlying or emerging from Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. act as guidelines) are not necessarily the same on which this court exercises discretion to grant or not to grant special leave to appeal while disposing of a petition for the purpose. Mere rejection of special leave petition does not take away the jurisdiction of the court, tribunal or forum whose order forms the subject matter of petition for special leave to review its own order if grounds for exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to exist.” 18. In Kunhayammed and others (supra) Supreme Court has thoroughly examined all possible stages of hearing and consequently passed orders in the special leave petition and after detail deliberation, it was held that: “To merge means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-1068) We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supeme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage.” 19. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supeme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage.” 19. After perusal of the records, and after hearing learned counsel representing all parties, and upon giving anxious consideration to the facts of the present case, we are of the view that the appointments of the appellants were approved by the competent authority and that they continued to discharge their duties for decades, during which period their salaries were paid from the State exchequer after the institution was brought within the purview of the Payment of Salaries Act. The record further establishes that the appellants actually worked and the State derived the benefit of their services for a substantial length of time. Any doubt on their appointment letter, even if got raised in the report after decades of their service, is not attributable to the appellants but arose due to a dispute in the management. In such circumstances, denial of salary and retiral benefits to the appellants is wholly unsustainable in law and runs contrary to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra) . The State, having accepted their services and paid them for decades, cannot now be permitted to deny retiral benefits by reopening settled issues or by placing reliance on subsequent administrative inquiries. Equity, fairness and good conscience clearly demand that the appellants are held entitled to their consequential service and retiral benefits. 20. After going through Supreme Court judgement in Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra ), and examining complete facts and circumstances of the appeals, we find the judgement is applicable of the facts of these appeals. Following paragraph demonstrates it clearer: “19. In the inquiry, the appellants were not given any opportunity. Even in the inquiry held behind the back of the appellants, there were no findings of collusion or blameworthiness against them for the alleged manipulation. Even as on date, the appointment order dated 25.06.1999 and the approval order of 09.06.1999 have not been revoked. Following paragraph demonstrates it clearer: “19. In the inquiry, the appellants were not given any opportunity. Even in the inquiry held behind the back of the appellants, there were no findings of collusion or blameworthiness against them for the alleged manipulation. Even as on date, the appointment order dated 25.06.1999 and the approval order of 09.06.1999 have not been revoked. With no finding of guilt against the appellants and with no material against them, their salaries had been stopped and they have been prevented to sign on the regular attendance register, admittedly from October, 2005. The contention of the appellants is that they continued with their teaching work up till 30.03.2016 entering their names on a separate attendance register.” 21. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, this Court is of the considered view that the learned Single Judge was not legally precluded from examining the issues raised before him merely on the ground that the Special Leave Petition against the earlier judgment stood dismissed. Dismissal of a Special Leave Petition, particularly by a non-speaking order, does not by itself operate as a declaration of law, nor does it completely denude the High Court of its jurisdiction to examine subsequent actions, especially where such actions arise from fresh causes, administrative orders, or statutory inquiries. To that extent, the learned Single Judge was justified in examining the legality of the subsequent administrative orders and the material placed before him. 22. However, having regard to the undisputed factual position that the appellants were appointed in the early 1970s, their appointments were duly approved by the competent authority, and that they continuously discharged duties and were paid salary from the State exchequer for several decades, the denial of retiral benefits cannot be sustained. The long and uninterrupted service rendered by the appellants, coupled with payment of salary under the Payment of Salaries Act, constitutes a substantial and settled service record, which could not have been ignored while adjudicating their salary dues and entitlement to retiral benefits. 23. Even assuming that the authorities were entitled to scrutinize the validity of appointments at a certain stage, such scrutiny could not have the effect of effacing decades of service already rendered and accepted by the State, nor could it retrospectively deprive the appellants or their legal representatives of retiral benefits that flow from such service. Following table demonstrate service duration of three appellants in these appeals: 24. Following table demonstrate service duration of three appellants in these appeals: 24. It is well settled principle in law that pension and other retiral benefits are neither ex gratia nor a matter of charity, but constitute deferred compensation for long and continuous service rendered by an employee. Once the employee has served till minimum years of eligibility for such benefits, denial of retiral benefits would be arbitrary and unjust. For the determination of gratuity of appellants, Rule 5 and 6 of the U.P. School and College Teachers Gratuity Fund' is required to be examined. For ready reference Rule 5 is reproduced below: “5. A gratuity equal to six times of pay any last drawn by a teacher at the time of his death while in service provided he has put in not less than three years continuous service before his death. Notes (1) No gratuity will, however, be admissible to the family of a teacher whose death takes place after retirement or of a re-employed pensioner. (2) 'Continuous Service' means all whole-time service whether temporary, officiating or permanent, rendered either in one or more of the State aided educational institutions of any of the categories mentioned in Rule 3 and includes all periods spent on leave on average pay, or on medical certificate, but it does not include leave without pay.” 25. Rule 6 of the U.P. School and College Teachers Gratuity Fund, makes the provision for the nomination for the gratuity by employee who fulfils the criteria for the same. Rule 6 provides as follows: “6. A teacher covered by these rules, shall on completion of three years' continuous service make a nomination conferring on one or more members of his family, the right to receive any gratuity that may be admissible under these rules. The nomination shall be made in one of the attached forms as may be appropriated in the circumstances of the case.” 26. The law is to be interpreted in a way that it protects legitimate expectations of an employee who has served the institution for considerable time period. To determine pension eligibility in the facts of these appeals, Rule 17 of the 'Uttar Pradesh State Aided-educational Institution Employee's Contributory Provident Fund-Insurance-Pension Rules' provides that: “17. An employee shall be eligible for pension on- (i) retirement on attaining the age of superannuation or on the expiry of extension granted beyond the superannuation age. To determine pension eligibility in the facts of these appeals, Rule 17 of the 'Uttar Pradesh State Aided-educational Institution Employee's Contributory Provident Fund-Insurance-Pension Rules' provides that: “17. An employee shall be eligible for pension on- (i) retirement on attaining the age of superannuation or on the expiry of extension granted beyond the superannuation age. (ii) voluntary retirement after completing 25 years of qualifying services; (ii) retirement before the age of superannuation under a medical certificate of permanent incapacity for further service; and (iv) discharge due to abolition of post or closure of an institution due to withdrawal of recognition or other valid causes. Note (1) The age of compulsory retirement of an employee shall be such a prescribed in the relevant rules applicable to him. The date of superannuation shall be reckoned from the date of birth of an employee as entered in his Service Book or other records. In case the year of birth only is known, but not the month, the first July of the year shall be taken as the date of birth, similarly when both the year and the month of birth are known, but not the date, the 16th of the month shall be taken as the date of birth. (2) An employee may retire from service volunarily any time after completing 25 years of qualifying service, provided that he shall give in this behalf a notice in writing to the management at least 3 months before the date on which he wishes to retire.” 27. Rule 19 explains the conditions under which the employee would not be entitled for pension. “19 (a) Service will not count for pension unless the employee holds a substantive post on a permanent establishment. (b) Continuous temporary or officiating service followed without interruption by confirmation in the same or another post shall also count as qualifying service. (See also C.S.R. Para 422). (c) Leave without allowance, suspension allowed to stand as a specific penalty, overstayed of joining time or leave not subsequently regularised, and period of breaks in service shall not be reckoned as qualifying service. (d) Period of breaks between 2 periods of service due to termination of service, for no fault of the employee shall not be treated as interruption involving forfeiture of post qualifying service. In other cases breaks due to other causes shall result in forfeiture of past service unless condoned by Government. (d) Period of breaks between 2 periods of service due to termination of service, for no fault of the employee shall not be treated as interruption involving forfeiture of post qualifying service. In other cases breaks due to other causes shall result in forfeiture of past service unless condoned by Government. (e) Time passed on earned leave shall fully count as qualifying service, but time passed on other kinds leave with allowances shall count as qualifying service as follows: (i) If the total service is not less than 13 years, but less than 30 years, one year of such leave shall count as qualifying service; (ii) If the total service is not less than 30 years, two years of such leave shall counts as qualifying service. Notes (1) The term 'Earned Leave' means leave on full average pay. (2) In case of a married woman employee time passed on maternity leave may be allowed to count as qualifying service, provided that the period covered by such leave and also earned leave shall not exceed what would have been admissible had she availed of the whole of the earned leave to which she was entitled under the rules. (3) Total Service' means total service rekoning from the date of commencement of service qualifying for pension and includes periods of leave referred to above. (4) The service put in by an employee before he has completed 18 years of age or after attaining the age of superannuation unless extended by competent authority or on re-employment after retirement shall not qualify for pension. (5) The entry relating to confirmation of an employee in the service book shall be countersigned. (6) In cases not covered by these rules qualifying service shall be determined by Government and its decision shall be final.” 28. (5) The entry relating to confirmation of an employee in the service book shall be countersigned. (6) In cases not covered by these rules qualifying service shall be determined by Government and its decision shall be final.” 28. Therefore, equity, good conscience, and settled service jurisprudence mandates that salary dues, pension and gratuity benefits for services of Singasan, Girija and Ram Kumar Ram is required to be considered as they have completed more than 3 years continuous service for gratuity and more than 25 years of service for pension benefits as per Rule, should principles of the Gratuity Act apply, otherwise gratuity if payable under the service rule and where options are exercised and if not for any special circumstances, such teachers would be entitled to gratuity in the light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Usha Rani vs. State of U.P. and 6 Others (Neutral Citation No.-2019:AHC:180910) and Guru Charan vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine All 515 . The situation of the appellants in the present case is no different from the individuals whose appointments were protected by Supreme Court in referred case. They were bona fide applicants who have got selected and served for decades. It will be a travesty of justice if relief is denied to the appellants for something which is done by rival groups in management committee at some point of time. 29. The impugned judgment dated 28.04.2025, therefore, is unsustainable upto the extent it upholds denial of retiral benefits, as the same has not considered the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra) and also the admitted fact of long and continuous service over a prolonged period, which is much more than minimum required service years required as per Rules. 30. Accordingly, the conclusion of learned single judge denying retiral benefits is held to be not sustainable and require interference in these appeals and therefore, the impugned common judgment and order dated 28.04.2025 passed by learned Single Judge in Writ A No. 49901 of 2016 and connected case is set aside and consequently the special appeals no. 530 of 2025, 608 of 2025 and Special Appeal Defective No. 656 of 2025 are allowed and respondents are directed to release all admissible salary arrears to the appellants for the period they actually discharged duties. 31. 530 of 2025, 608 of 2025 and Special Appeal Defective No. 656 of 2025 are allowed and respondents are directed to release all admissible salary arrears to the appellants for the period they actually discharged duties. 31. The respondents are further directed to compute and pay all consequential retiral benefits, including gratuity and pension, as may be admissible in law along with interest, as may be applicable to the appellants, and in cases where an employee has died, to their legal heirs. The entire exercise shall be completed expeditiously, preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. 32. In the matter of Special Appeal preferred by Lallan Tiwari, the controversy stood finally concluded as we have recorded above in the earlier part of the judgment that his termination of service. Order came to be finally approved by the authority and against which writ petition filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed on 26.11.1998 which stood further affirmed in the Special Appeal under the order of the coordinate Bench on 21.05.2003, review of which was also dismissed by the Bench vide order dated 16.12.2005. 33. In the circumstances, therefore, the case of Lallan Tiwari does not rest on the same footing as that of other appellants and hence we find no justification to now allow highly time barred recall application filed on 05.09.2012 in respect of the final judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court on 21.05.2003. We may further hold that once the judgment has attained finality and review application has also been dismissed by the Division Bench, neither any recall in respect of the judgment and order of the learned single judge was maintainable for the said judgment having been affirmed in the appeal, nor any recall application in respect of the order passed by the Division Bench would be maintainable in view of the fact that the review application had stood dismissed. 34. In the circumstances, therefore, we see neither any justification to condone the delay after more than nine years inasmuch as recall itself is not maintainable, hence, both the applications stand dismissed. 35. Thus all the other intra-court appeals and miscellaneous applications therein are disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to cost.