JUDGMENT : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. 1. This Criminal Appeal is preferred on behalf of the sole appellant being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction dated 10.01.2008 and order of sentence dated 11.01.2008 passed by learned 5 th Additional. Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Dumka in Sessions Case No. 234 of 2006, whereby and where under the appellant has been convicted for offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. 2. The prosecution’s case is based on the fardbeyan of informant Kaleshwar Rai (P.W-7), recorded on 29/09/2006. He in his fardbeyan stated that on 28/09/2006, after returning from Hatia with co-villager Bhokta Murmu (Appellant), an altercation broke out at around 7:00 P.M. between him and Bhokta Murmu and his wife Roshni Marandi as they were abusing him. During the altercation, Roshni Marandi held him while Bhokta Murmu attacked him with a farsa (5-6 blows) on his head and face, causing bleeding injuries. Both accused also slapped him, causing him to fall unconscious. 3. On the basis of aforesaid fardbeyan F.I.R. being Jarmundi P.S. Case No. 177 of 2006 was registered under Sections 341, 323, 324, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and the chargesheet was submitted against the appellant. The Court took cognizance and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions where charges were framed under Sections 323 and 307 against the appellant and his wife. 4. It is argued by the learned amicus curiae on behalf of the appellant that the Investigating Officer (P.W-8), after due investigation, filed chargesheet only under Sections 323, 324, 341 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. However, the learned Court took cognizance under Section 307 of IPC also despite the absence of necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under the Section 307. She further argued that even if the prosecution case is accepted in totality, at best, an offence under Section 324 IPC is made out. The incident arose out of a sudden quarrel without any premeditation, and there is nothing on record to suggest that the appellant had any intention to cause death or knowledge that the assault will cause death. She further submitted that although the prosecution alleges that the Appellant was armed with a farsa, the injuries inflicted were not on any vital part of the Informant’s body and therefore, there was no intention to kill. She further submitted that although the prosecution alleges that the Appellant was armed with a farsa, the injuries inflicted were not on any vital part of the Informant’s body and therefore, there was no intention to kill. Moreover, the alleged weapon—farsa was never recovered or seized during the investigation. Additionally, the Informant has admitted that after victim fell to the ground, the appellant did not continue to assault him, which suggests that there was no intention to kill. The conduct of the Appellant does not support the charge under Section 307 IPC. Lastly, it is submitted that the Informant has made material improvements in his testimony by introducing motive (i.e., demand of wages/money), which was never mentioned in the original Fardbeyan, indicating an afterthought. Hence, the conviction under Section 307 IPC is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. 5. Learned counsel on behalf of the state submitted that informant has fully supported his case in his deposition. He submitted that there is direct allegation against the petitioner of assaulting the informant. He further submitted that the injury report of the informant clearly showed that the petitioner was intending to kill the informant and the injury inflicted is on the vital part of the body. Thus, he prayed that the conviction under Section 307 is valid and it should not be interfered with. 6. To prove the prosecution case, altogether nine prosecution witnesses have been examined :- P.W.1, Ishwar Lal Rai, he is the resident of same village. He deposed that he got information of the incidence from his co-villager. Thus, he is not an eye witness. P.W.2, Sitaram Singh, has deposed that he got aware of the incidence from the accused himself. In his cross examination in para-7 he admits that there was very cordial relation between him and the appellant. P.W.3, Mahia Devi, is the sister of the informant. She has said that she got to know about the incidence from the accused himself. Thus, she is also not an eye witness. P.W.4, Kishan Roy, was tendered for cross examination. He has stated nothing about the incidence. P.W.5, Bandhiya Devi, was also tendered for cross examination. She has stated nothing about the incidence. P.W.6, Dr. Rudrani Kisku, opined that all the injuries were due to sharp edged weapon. She exhibited injury report Exhibit-1. Supplementary injury report was exhibited by another doctor as Exhibit-1/1. He has stated nothing about the incidence. P.W.5, Bandhiya Devi, was also tendered for cross examination. She has stated nothing about the incidence. P.W.6, Dr. Rudrani Kisku, opined that all the injuries were due to sharp edged weapon. She exhibited injury report Exhibit-1. Supplementary injury report was exhibited by another doctor as Exhibit-1/1. He opined that the injuries are simple in nature. P.W.7, Kaleshwar Rai, is the informant. He in his depostition stated that the accused named Bhokta Murmu assaulted him with farsa. He in examination has said that assault took place due to demand of money. He has also admitted in cross examination the fact that the other accused Roshni Devi has not assaulted him. He stated that on the next date of occurrence he went to hospital. P.W.8, Parsuram Prasad, is the investigation officer of the case. He went to the place of occurrence and he has recorded the fardbeyan of the informant. He exhibited the fardbeyan and formal F.I.R. as Exhibit Nos.2 and 3. P.W.9, Hemanti Devi, she has stated that the assault took place due to the demand of money. She said that the accused Bhokta Murmu gave farsa blows to her husband. She said that the accused Roshni Devi caught hold of her husband (P.W. 7) during assault. 7. Several documents were also exhibited:- Ext.1 and 1/1 :- Injury Reports Ext.2 :- Fardbeyan Ext.3 :- Formal FIR FINDING 8 It is an undisputed fact that no independent eyewitness was present at the time of the alleged incident. The witnesses examined in the case, namely P.W.1, P.W.2, and P.W.3, have not claimed to have personally witnessed the occurrence; rather, their testimonies are based on what they were told by others, making them hearsay witnesses. Furthermore, P.W.4 and P.W.5 were merely formal or tendered witnesses, and their depositions do not contain any substantive or material statements regarding the incident in question. Additionally, P.W.9, who happens to be the wife of the informant, is evidently an interested witness due to her close relationship with the complainant, and her testimony must therefore be approached with a degree of caution. 9. From the evidence of P.W.7 (informant) who is an injured witness I find that he stated that the appellant has assaulted him on head and his wife also caught him during assault, P.W.9 has also corroborated the same fact, this clearly suggests that the informant was assaulted and injured. 9. From the evidence of P.W.7 (informant) who is an injured witness I find that he stated that the appellant has assaulted him on head and his wife also caught him during assault, P.W.9 has also corroborated the same fact, this clearly suggests that the informant was assaulted and injured. 10. As regards P.W.6, he is the medical officer who conducted the medical examination and prepared the injury report of the alleged victim. Although it was opined that the injuries sustained were caused by a sharp-cutting weapon, it was also clearly stated that the injuries were simple in nature and not grievous. Furthermore, P.W.8, who is the investigating officer in this case, did not provide any substantial evidence beyond formally proving the place of occurrence. 11. To invoke Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code ‘intention or knowledge’ is sine qua non. Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code reads as follows:- “Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. ….……………. 12. The Hon,ble Supreme Court in the case of Sivamani and Another versus State Represented by Inspector of Police reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1581 has observed that the intention of the accused in a case involving bodily harm can be inferred not only from the actual injuries sustained by the victim but also from the overall circumstances surrounding the incident. In order to determine such intent, courts may take into account various factors, including type and nature of the weapon used during the commission of the offence, the manner in which it was used, the number and force of the blows delivered, the part of the body targeted, and the general context or background in which the assault occurred. These elements collectively help establish whether there was an intention to cause grievous harm or even death. It is necessary to quote paragraphs 9 and 10 of the aforesaid judgement: 9. These elements collectively help establish whether there was an intention to cause grievous harm or even death. It is necessary to quote paragraphs 9 and 10 of the aforesaid judgement: 9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem , (2005) 5 SCC 554 , the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that ‘…The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.’ The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v. State of Haryana , (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha , (2019) 3 SCC 605 . Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, ‘The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.’ 13. It is an admitted position that the informant was hospitalized only on the following day after the alleged occurrence. This delayed hospitalization itself is indicative of the fact that the injuries sustained by the informant were not of a grievous or life-threatening nature. Had the injuries been severe or posed an immediate danger to life, it would be natural and expected for the victim to seek urgent medical attention. The absence of such prompt hospitalization, therefore, lends support to the conclusion that the injuries were not grave. 14. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the weapon allegedly used in the commission of the assault has not been recovered by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. The non-recovery of the said weapon, seriously weakens the prosecution’s case. The absence of such a crucial piece of evidence casts a doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s version. Furthermore, it is significant to note that the weapon allegedly used in the commission of the assault has not been recovered by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation. The non-recovery of the said weapon, seriously weakens the prosecution’s case. The absence of such a crucial piece of evidence casts a doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s version. In criminal jurisprudence, the burden lies heavily on the prosecution to prove the charge against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. In the present case, the failure to recover the weapon, coupled with other inconsistencies and lack of corroborative evidence, leads this Court to conclude that the prosecution has fallen short of discharging that burden. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has not been able to establish the guilt of the accused to be punished under Section 307 of IPC beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. 15. Based on the statements of the informant and his wife and the medical evidence, it is clear that the appellant did cause the injury however, there is lack of intention to kill the informant. Also, there is no material to suggest that it was within the knowledge of the appellant that the assault and injury would cause death. Therefore, this court believes that Section 307 of the IPC does not apply in this case. Instead, the offence falls under Section 324 of the IPC. 16. Considering what has been discussed hereinabove this court is of the considered view that the conviction of the appellant under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be legally sustained and the same is liable to be converted into Section 324 of the IPC. This conviction is converted to one under Section 324 of IPC. 17. The appellant has already remained in custody for 2 Years 11 Months and 21 Days. The maximum punishment prescribed under Section 324 of the IPC is three years. Thus, the punishment of the appellant is modified to the period which he has already undergone in custody. 18. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is partly allowed with the modification of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence as mentioned above. 19. The appellant is discharged of the liability of the bail bonds. 20. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of. 21. 18. Accordingly, this criminal appeal is partly allowed with the modification of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence as mentioned above. 19. The appellant is discharged of the liability of the bail bonds. 20. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of. 21. Let the Trial Court Records be transmitted back to the Court concerned along with a copy of this judgement. 22. The Court had appointed Ms. Juhi Kumari, the learned counsel as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. Considering her assistance, I direct the Jharkhand High Court Legal Services Committee to pay remuneration of Rs.7,500/- to Ms. Juhi Kumari, the learned Amicus Curiae.