JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. Heard Ms. V. Anne Therie, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. Ms. A. Ayemi, the learned Government Advocate, Nagaland appears on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 and Mr. Arenlong, the learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent No. 7. 2. The petitioner herein is aggrieved by the order dated 27.04.2023 whereby the respondent No. 7 was appointed as a Multi Tasking Staff (MTS/Peon) under the Establishment of the Executive Engineer, PWD (R&B) Changtongya Division, Mokokchung. The petitioner has also sought for certain directions that directions be issued to the effect that the petitioner should be considered on the basis of land ownership basis and thereupon preference be given to the petitioner. 3. For deciding, as to whether, the petitioner’s case merits consideration, it is relevant to take note of the facts which led to the filing of the present writ petition. 4. On 06.07.2021, one Imtishilu expired in harness while working as a Peon under the Establishment of the respondent No. 6. Upon his death, a vacancy arose, in the Establishment of the respondent No. 6. The petitioner on coming to learn about the said vacancy submitted an application to the respondent No. 5 on 20.07.2021. It is the case of the petitioner that in the said application so filed by the petitioner on 20.07.2021, the petitioner had made reference that she was the land owner of the land wherein the Office and a good citizen of Changtongya Village. Along with the said application, the petitioner had also submitted a certificate issued by the Chairman of the Changtongya Village Council dated 18.07.2021 certifying that the petitioner is the rightful owner of the site where the Office Building and the Godown of the S.D.O., PWD Changtongya was constructed. 5. The grievance of the petitioner is that the petitioner’s application was not considered rather the respondent No. 7 was appointed vide the impugned order dated 27.04.2023 as a Multi Tasking Staff (MTS) in the Establishment of the respondent No. 6 in the vacancy which arose on account of the death of Late Imtishilu. It is under such circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner on 26.07.2023. 6. The records reveal that the official respondents have filed an affidavit-in-opposition on 16.02.2024 and further an additional affidavit-in-opposition on 27.08.2024. In the affidavit- in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. It is under such circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner on 26.07.2023. 6. The records reveal that the official respondents have filed an affidavit-in-opposition on 16.02.2024 and further an additional affidavit-in-opposition on 27.08.2024. In the affidavit- in-opposition filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6, reference was drawn to the Office Memorandum dated 03.03.2022, but there was nothing mentioned in the said affidavit-in-opposition, as to why, the respondent No.7 was appointed vide the impugned order dated 27.04.2023. 7. In the additional affidavit-in-opposition so filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 pursuant to an order passed by this Court on 01.08.2024 stated that the petitioner did not apply on land ownership basis. The only aspect which was mentioned as regards the appointment of the respondent No. 7 was that the respondent No.7 was appointed in view of an approval given by the Government vide a letter dated 04.01.2023. It was further mentioned in the said additional affidavit-in-opposition that 13 (thirteen) appointments have been made on the basis of land ownership from amongst the land owners under the said Division. However, it is pertinent herein to observe that both the pleadings of the official respondents are not clear and specific, as to whether the petitioner’s family donated the land or whether any member of the petitioner’s family had been appointed on land owner basis. 8. The respondent No. 7 had filed an affidavit-in-opposition wherein various preliminary objections were taken as regards, the maintainability of the writ petition. The preliminary objections which were taken were that the drawing up of the writ petition was not in terms with the Rules of the Gauhati High Court, 1954 and further, there was suppression of material facts. It is further seen from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No.7 that the respondent No. 7’s credentials were placed along with the application filed by the respondent No. 7 on 10.11.2022 for appointment against the vacant post of Peon in the office of the respondent No. 6. 9. In the backdrop of the above pleadings, this Court has duly considered the submissions so made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties. 10. 9. In the backdrop of the above pleadings, this Court has duly considered the submissions so made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties. 10. Before touching on the merits, this Court finds it relevant to take note of the submissions so made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.7 on the preliminary objections so raised as regards the maintainability of the writ petition. 11. The first preliminary objection which was taken is that the writ petition was not drawn up in the manner set out in Chapter V-A of the Rules of the Gauhati High Court, 1954. 12. In the opinion of this Court, non-drawing of the writ petition in the manner as set out in the Rules of the Gauhati High Court, 1954 is not the fault of the petitioner, but it is the fault of the lawyer. Additionally, it was also the fault of the Registry in accepting the writ petition when it was not drawn up in the manner in which it ought to have been drawn up. On that aspect, however, it is the opinion of this Court that the petitioner cannot be non-suited, more so, when the petitioner alleges violation of her fundamental rights and constitutional rights. 13. The second preliminary objection which was taken is that there was suppression of material facts. It is relevant to take note of that all facts are not material facts and it is only when there is a suppression of materials facts, then the petitioner can be non-suited. In the said context, this Court finds it relevant to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166 wherein the Supreme Court dealt when a petitioner can be non-suited even without going into the merits on the ground of suppression of material facts. Paragraph No. 13 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein below: “ 13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. Paragraph No. 13 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein below: “ 13. As a general rule, suppression of a material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. But the suppressed fact must be a material one in the sense that had it not been suppressed it would have had an effect on the merits of the case. It must be a matter which was material for the consideration of the court, whatever view the court may have taken [R. v. General Commrs. for the purposes of the Income Tax Act for the District of Kensington, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJKB 257 : 116 LT 136 (CA)] . Thus when the liability to income tax was questioned by an applicant on the ground of her non-residence, the fact that she had purchased and was maintaining a house in the country was held to be a material fact, the suppression of which disentitled her to the relief claimed [Ibid.]. Again when in earlier proceedings before this Court, the appellant had undertaken that it would not carry on the manufacture of liquor at its distillery and the proceedings before this Court were concluded on that basis, a subsequent writ petition for renewal of the licence to manufacture liquor at the same distillery before the High Court was held to have been initiated for oblique and ulterior purposes and the interim order passed by the High Court in such subsequent application was set aside by this Court [State of Haryana v. Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 431 : AIR 1977 SC 781 ] . Similarly, a challenge to an order fixing the price was rejected because the petitioners had suppressed the fact that an agreement had been entered into between the petitioners and the Government relating to the fixation of price and that the impugned order had been replaced by another order [Welcom Hotel v. State of A.P., (1983) 4 SCC 575 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 872 : AIR 1983 SC 1015 ].” 14. In the backdrop of the above principles, let this Court take note the basis on which the respondent No. 7 alleges that the petitioner had suppressed material facts. In the backdrop of the above principles, let this Court take note the basis on which the respondent No. 7 alleges that the petitioner had suppressed material facts. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.7 submitted that the petitioner has not brought on record the Office Memorandum dated 16.08.2018 issued by the Government and as such, it was a suppression of the material facts. It was further alleged that the petitioner has not disclosed that there were already 13 (thirteen) appointments made on land ownership basis in the Establishment of the respondent No.6. 15. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court now deal with, as to whether, the said aspects would constitute material facts. The first aspect is whether, reference not made to the Office Memorandum dated 16.08.2018 can be considered to be a suppression of material facts. 16. A perusal of the writ petition would show that the petitioner claims that she applied on land ownership basis. It is relevant to observe that an appointment to the Government Services has to be within the ambit of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. It is very pertinent at this stage that the trinity of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution encompasses an equality code in pursuance to the preambular values of equality of status, opportunity and social justice. Article 14 of the Constitution lays down general principles governing equality by postulating that there shall be “equality before the law” and “equal protection of laws”. Both these expressions are different in content and its applicability. The expression “equality before the law” is derived from the English Common Law and entails absence of special privileges for any individual within the territory. Be that as it may, it should however not be confused that it means that the same law should apply to everyone. On the other hand, it means that the same law should apply to those who are similarly situated. The expression “equal protection of laws” means that amongst the equals, law must be equally administered. This very basis would show that it enjoins the State with the power to reasonably classify those who are differently placed. The mandate of “equal protection of law” casts a positive obligation on the State to ensure that everyone may enjoy equal protection of laws and no one is unfairly denied this protection. This very basis would show that it enjoins the State with the power to reasonably classify those who are differently placed. The mandate of “equal protection of law” casts a positive obligation on the State to ensure that everyone may enjoy equal protection of laws and no one is unfairly denied this protection. In essence the guarantee of equality entails that all persons in like circumstances must be treated alike. In other words, there must be a parity of treatment under parity of conditions. 17. In the backdrop of the above, it would be relevant to observe that the State of Nagaland had issued Notification dated 16.08.2018 whereby those persons who had donated the land subject to the terms and conditions stated therein would be provided jobs. This being a policy of the Government of Nagaland which is in the public domain, the non enclosing of the said Notification dated 16.08.2018 cannot be a case coming within the ambit of suppression of material facts inasmuch as the non-enclosing or non-mentioning of the Notification dated 16.08.2018 would only render the claim of appointment on the basis of land ownership bad inasmuch as without the said Notification, the petitioner cannot claim an exception to the general application of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 18. The second aspect on which the learned counsel for the respondent No. 7 urges in support of his submission of suppression of material facts is that the petitioner did not disclose that 13 (thirteen) persons have been appointed on the basis of land ownership. The question therefore arises is, as to whether, non disclosure of the fact that there were 13 (thirteen) appointments made on land ownership basis would amount to suppression of material facts. 19. It is very pertinent to mention that though the State respondents have stated that there were 13 (thirteen) appointments made to the Establishment of the respondent No. 6 on land ownership basis, but there was no mention in the pleadings of the State respondents that any of the person who were appointed were related to the petitioner's family. Under such circumstances, the non disclosure of 13 (thirteen) persons who were appointed on the basis of land ownership criteria cannot also be said to be a suppression of material facts. 20. Under such circumstances, the non disclosure of 13 (thirteen) persons who were appointed on the basis of land ownership criteria cannot also be said to be a suppression of material facts. 20. It is also very pertinent to observe that as per the State respondents, the petitioner did not apply on land ownership basis and this aspect would be seen from paragraph No. 3 of the additional affidavit-in-opposition filed by the State respondents on 27.08.2024. If that be so, the preliminary objections taken as regards non disclosure of the Office Memorandum dated 16.08.2018 as well as non disclosure that there were 13 (thirteen) appointments made on land ownership basis in the Establishment of respondent No. 6 have no relevance. 21. Having duly addressed the preliminary objection, let this Court deal with the merits. This Court specifically enquired with Ms. A. Ayemi, the learned Government Advocate, Nagaland appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 as to on what basis the respondents No. 7 was appointed vide the impugned order dated 27.04.2023. 22. Ms. A. Ayemi, the learned Government Advocate, Nagaland with all her fairness submitted that the respondent No. 7 was appointed in view of the approval from the Government dated 04.01.2023. 23. This Court further enquired, as to whether, there were any contemporaneous records maintained in respect to a selection being carried out taking into account that there were seven applicants who had submitted applications. 24. Ms. A. Ayemi, the learned Government Advocate, Nagaland submitted that there is nothing, in that regard. 25. The respondent No. 7 was appointed to a public post and as such it is the mandate of law that the Respondent Authorities have to abide by the mandate of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Merely on the basis of an approval being given by the Government which is not supported by any selection proceedings maintained with contemporaneous records, such appointment would be in violation to Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Further, there is no reasons assigned why the respondent No. 7 was preferred from amongst the seven applicants. 26. Accordingly, it is therefore, the opinion of this Court that the impugned order dated 27.04.2023 requires interference, as it violates the mandate of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 27. Further, there is no reasons assigned why the respondent No. 7 was preferred from amongst the seven applicants. 26. Accordingly, it is therefore, the opinion of this Court that the impugned order dated 27.04.2023 requires interference, as it violates the mandate of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 27. Consequently, this Court therefore disposes of the present writ petition with the following observations and directions: (i) The impugned order dated 27.04.2023 by which the respondent No. 7 was appointed as a Multi Tasking Staff (MTS) in the Establishment of the respondent No. 6 is set aside and quashed. (ii) The Respondent Authorities would be at liberty to fill up the said vacant post only by carrying out a fresh selection proceedings as per its extant policies. (iii) The claim of the petitioner for appointment on land ownership basis shall be subject to scrutiny in terms with the Notification dated 16.08.2018 and as modification or amendment to the said Notification.