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2025 DIGILAW 1453 (KER)

Jaleel, S/o. Jamal v. State of Kerala

2025-05-26

GOPINATH P.

body2025
JUDGMENT [CRL.A Nos.2414/2024 and 70/2025] These appeals raise identical questions of law and can therefore be conveniently disposed of by a common judgment. 2. These appeals are filed under Section 341 of the Code of Criminal Procedure , 1973, challenging the proceedings against the appellants under Section 340 Cr.PC in OP(MV) No.921/2009 on the file of the III Additional District Court/ II Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘MACT’). 3. The brief facts are as follows: OP(MV) No.921/2009 was one filed by legal heirs of one Ayyappan, who succumbed to injuries sustained in a road traffic accident. The petition showed one Prakasan to be the owner cum driver of the offending motorcycle and he was impleaded as the 1 st respondent. The United India Insurance Company Ltd., which was impleaded as the 2 nd respondent in the petition before the MACT, took up a contention that the offending motorcycle was not driven by the aforesaid Prakasan, but by one Nimesh. It was contended that the aforesaid Nimesh had no licence to drive a motorcycle, and in order to ensure that the claim was met by the Insurance Company, it was falsely projected that the motorcycle was driven by the aforesaid Prakasan. In order to prove its contention, the Insurance Company cited the appellants herein as witnesses. The appellants deposed before the MACT that they were eyewitnesses to the accident and they had seen the aforesaid Prakasan riding the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The attention of the MACT was then brought to the fact that in proceedings in C.C.No.314/2009 before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkancherry, which was a prosecution under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code , 1860 ( IPC ), the appellants have given evidence to the effect that they had not witnessed the accident and they had not seen Prakasan riding the motorcycle at the time of the accident. The deposition of the appellants before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkancherry, was produced before the MACT, and thus the MACT came to the conclusion that false evidence had been tendered before the MACT by the appellants by stating that it was Prakasan who was riding the motorcycle, which was contrary to the statement made by the appellants before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkancherry, in proceedings in C.C.NO.314/2009. It was also found that the appellants had denied the deposition given by them before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkancherry. The MACT, therefore, came to the conclusion that the appellants had committed the offence punishable under Section 193 of the IPC and, therefore, forwarded the matter as a complaint to the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Thrissur, for prosecuting the appellants in terms of the provisions contained in Section 340 of the Cr.PC. 4. Smt. Dhanya P. Ashokan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants on the instructions of Adv. M.R.Venugopal, submits that the order passed by the MACT is unsustainable in law. It is submitted that the MACT has not followed the procedure contemplated by the provisions of Section 340 of the Cr.P.C., and the MACT has failed to record the finding that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 195 of the Cr.P.C. The learned Senior Counsel refers to the judgment of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah ; 2005 KHC 647 , to contend that in view of the language used in Section 340 of the Cr.PC, the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding the commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C, unless the court is of the opinion that it is expedient to do so in the interest of justice. The learned Senior Counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pritish v. State of Maharashtra and Others ; 2002 KHC 1092 , to contend that while the holding of an enquiry may not be mandatory, the formation of an opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint be made is mandatory, as Section 340 of the Cr.PC is primarily concerned with the administration of justice. The learned Senior Counsel also submits that the MACT has come to the conclusion that the appellants have given false evidence. It is submitted that such formation of opinion is bad in law going by the law laid down in paragraph 16 of Pritish (supra) 5. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor opposes the grant of any relief to the appellants. The learned Senior Counsel also submits that the MACT has come to the conclusion that the appellants have given false evidence. It is submitted that such formation of opinion is bad in law going by the law laid down in paragraph 16 of Pritish (supra) 5. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor opposes the grant of any relief to the appellants. He submits that when the MACT had materials before it to conclude that the evidence tendered before it was contradictory to the evidence tendered by the appellants before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkancherry, in C.C.No.314/2009, the only option to the MACT was to initiate proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.PC. It is submitted that in the facts of the present case, the question as to whether the aforesaid Prakasan was actually driving the motorcycle was crucial to the adjudication of liability in proceedings before the MACT, and therefore the statement given by the appellants that they had seen Prakasan riding the motorcycle before the MACT clearly interferes with the administration of justice when they had stated in other judicial proceedings that they had not witnessed the accident. It is submitted in C.C.No.314/2009, the appellants contended that they had not seen the accident in order to save the accused from prosecution under Section 304A of the IPC , while in proceedings before the MACT, they had taken the contention that they had witnessed the accident and it was Prakasan who was driving the motorcycle. It is submitted that, going by the impugned order of the MACT, the appellants even denied their deposition before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Wadakkancherry, in C.C No.314/2009. 6. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned Senior Public Prosecutor, I am of the view that, in the light of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), the matter has to be remanded to the of the MACT, as the impugned order does not indicate that the MACT had formed an opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice that proceedings be initiated in terms of the provisions contained in Section 340 of the Cr.PC, in the facts and circumstances of this case. Paragraph No.23 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), reads thus: “23. Paragraph No.23 of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), reads thus: “23. In view of the language used in Section 340 Cr.P.C. the Court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the Section is conditioned by the words "Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justice." This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the Court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(i)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the Court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in Court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the Court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remedyless, has to be discarded”. The learned Senior Counsel may also be right in contending that the Court cannot, at the stage of making a complaint under Section 340 of the Cr.PC, come to a conclusion that false evidence had been tendered before the MACT, and should only have considered whether it is expedient in the interest of justice that an enquiry should be made into any offence affecting the administration of justice. In other words, it may not have been proper for the MACT to conclude that false evidence had been tendered before the MACT. 7. Therefore, the orders impugned in these appeals are set aside, and the proceedings are restored to the file of the MACT for considering whether the proceedings should be initiated against the appellants under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C. keeping in mind the observations of the Supreme Court in the decisions referred to above. I make it clear that I have not expressed any final opinion on the merits of the matter, and it will be open to the MACT to pass fresh orders in accordance with the law and taking note of the findings in this judgment and the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above. If any proceedings have already been initiated against the appellants pursuant to the impugned orders, those proceedings have to be withdrawn. I make it clear that a fresh complaint can be registered if the MACT were to come to the conclusion that there is reason to continue with the proceedings under Section 340 of the Cr.P.C against the appellants. Appeals are disposed of as above.