JUDGMENT : AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. 1. The State of Rajasthan is in appeal against the judgment dated 04.01.2001 acquitting Dharamraj S/o Manna Lal and Satyanarain S/o Manna Lal (respondents). The complainant- Ranglal S/o Gangaram has filed revision against acquittal. 2. The facts as set up by the prosecution are that after recording parcha bayan of Amita (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’), on report of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kishangarh (SDM), FIR No.318/1999 was lodged at Police Station Madanganj, District Ajmer under Sections 143, 307, 120-B IPC and later on Section 302 IPC was added. The deceased stated that on the night of 06.09.1999 at around 3:00 am she alongwith her sister Pushpa were sleeping in the courtyard of house of Pushpa when Dharamraj (husband of the deceased), Satyanarain–brother-in-law (devar), Moolchand– brother-in-law (jeth), Govindram- brother-in- law (nandoi), Shanti – sister-in-law (jethani), Vimla- sister-in-law (nanad) and Mangi- sister-in-law (devrani) came, her husband from a container (in which kerosene oil is stored ‘hereinafter referred to as container’) poured kerosene and Satyanarain (brother-in-law) lit fire with matchbox. She was taken to YN Hospital, Kishangarh at around 5:00 am and her statement was recorded. She was referred to SMS Hospital, Jaipur where she succumbed to injuries on 11.09.1999. The postmortem was conducted. The cause of death was determined due to septicemic shock as a result of extensive antemortem burn injuries which were sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. The charge-sheet was filed against Dharamraj, Satyanarain, Govindram, Shanti, Vimla and Mangi. The prosecution recorded statement of twenty one witnesses and exhibited twenty six documents. In the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it was stated to be a case of false implication. 2.1 During trial apart from respondents all other accused were discharged vide order dated 02.05.2000. The respondents were acquitted holding that prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 3. Learned Public Prosecutor and learned counsel for the complainant submitted that statement of deceased read with testimony of PW-17 Pushpa proved that respondents had burned the deceased. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that PW-4 Mahaveer (tenant) stated to be eye witness had not supported the case of prosecution. PW-3 Bhanwar Lal, PW-12 Ramswaroop and PW-13 Hazari (guests in the house of Pushpa on the date of incident) examined as eye witnesses by prosecution were declared hostile. Contention is that recovery of container from house of Amarchand was doubtful.
PW-3 Bhanwar Lal, PW-12 Ramswaroop and PW-13 Hazari (guests in the house of Pushpa on the date of incident) examined as eye witnesses by prosecution were declared hostile. Contention is that recovery of container from house of Amarchand was doubtful. It is argued that PW-9 Mohana Ram (tenant in the house of Pushpa) had not attributed specific acts to the accused. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance. 6. The scope of interference in the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [ (2024) 8 SCC 149 ] held:- “40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka , (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.PC as follows: “8. xxx xxx xxx 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3.
That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 7. The marriage of the deceased was solemnized with Dharamraj ten years prior to the date of the incident. Pushpa (sister of the deceased) was married to brother of the husband of the deceased. On 06.09.1999, the deceased was brought to the hospital with 90% burn injuries and on recording of statement by SDM, FIR was lodged. The deceased in her statement named seven persons who had come to the house of Pushpa to kill her and specifically attributed the act of pouring kerosene from a container to Dharamraj (husband of the deceased) and Satyanarain- brother-in-law (devar) lit fire with a matchbox. Out of seven named accused, five were discharged during trial. Nothing has been brought before this Court that discharge of the co-accused was ever challenged. 8. As per site plan, boundary wall of the house of Pushpa was four and a half feet high whereas, PW-12 Ramswaroop stated that boundary wall was seven feet high and it was not easy for a person to jump over it. Further it was stated that the main gate of house was locked during night time. PW-4 Mahaveer testified that on the night of the incident, he had locked the main gate and opened it in the morning. 8.1 PW-4 Mahaveer, PW-9 Mohana Ram (tenants), PW-12 Ramswaroop and PW-13 Hazari (guests in the house of Pushpa) were projected to be eye witnesses but they had either not supported the case of prosecution or were declared hostile. 9. Testimony of PW-17 Pushpa was not found reliable by the trial court being an interested witness i.e. sister of the deceased. There was contradiction in the deposition of PW-17 Pushpa vis-a-vis statement made before police. 10. The deceased had suffered 90% burn injuries. The official recording statement was neither specified nor examined by prosecution. Dying declaration was not recorded in question-answer form. In the facts of the case, the trial court rightly had not convicted respondents solely on basis of dying declaration in absence of it being corroborated by other evidence. 11.
10. The deceased had suffered 90% burn injuries. The official recording statement was neither specified nor examined by prosecution. Dying declaration was not recorded in question-answer form. In the facts of the case, the trial court rightly had not convicted respondents solely on basis of dying declaration in absence of it being corroborated by other evidence. 11. Another aspect is that the incident was of 06.09.1999 at around 3:00 am. The deceased was admitted in hospital at 5:00 am, injury report was prepared at 5:00 am, fitness for recording of the statement was at 5:00 am and the statement was also recorded at 5:00 am. Considering the condition of the deceased, she was referred to SMS Hospital, Jaipur at 5:00 am. All these incidents happening at 5:00 am proved fatal for the prosecution story. 12. The prosecution failed to produce bedhead ticket of the deceased of YN Hospital, Kishangarh as well as SMS Hospital, Jaipur. 13. PW-17 Pushpa was medically examined on 17.09.1999, she suffered six simple injuries and all sustained by blunt weapon. According to her statement, she doused fire but there were no burn injuries on her hand and body. 14. The recovery of container from open space was not enhancing the case of prosecution. 15. In view of the above, the detailed, well reasoned impugned judgment passed after considering the facts and appreciating the evidence adduced, suffers from no factual or legal error much less perversity calling for interference in the appeal and revision. The appeal and the revision petition are dismissed.