JUDGMENT : (Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.) 1. This judgment will decide the present Criminal Appeal and the two connected Criminal Appeals Nos.3888 of 2014 and 4448 of 2014. All the appeals arise out of the same crime, where the three appellants stood their trial jointly. They were convicted and sentenced to varying terms for the same offences. All the appeals have been heard together with Criminal Appeal No.1345 of 2015 being formally treated as the leading case. The appellants were tried before Mr. Musharraf Hussain, the then Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Bulandshahr vide Sessions Trial No.1316 of 2010 (arising out of Crime No.157 of 2010), under Section 326 read with Section 34 and Section 304 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'IPC'), Police Station Khurja Dehat, District Bulandshahr. They were convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Judge vide judgment and order dated 04.09.2014, passed in the sessions trial aforesaid, in the following manner: 2. Nanak Chand, a resident of Village Dharpa, Police Station Khurja Dehat, District Bulandshahr, lodged a First Information Report (for short, 'FIR') at 6.30 a.m. with Police Station Khurja Dehat, District Bulandshahr saying that in the night intervening 13/ 14.08.2010, his wife Smt. Ram Kumari, sons Rupesh and Chandra Mohan, were asleep in the verandah outside his house. The informant, Nanak Chand was asleep in the barnyard (Gher), where his animals are housed. At 1.00 o'clock in the wee hours, residents of his village, Bablu son of Bhule, Anil son of Ram Charan Jatav and Kale son of Chhote Lal, a resident of Village Achchheja Khurd, District Bulandshahr, assaulted his sleeping wife and children, throwing acid from a bucket, in consequence of which the victims, who had received severe acid burns, wailed and raised a commotion. Upon hearing all these sounds, he woke up. His daughter, Babita, who was already awake in order to attend the call of nature, told him that she had seen and identified the appellants, Bablu, Anil and Kale clearly committing the crime. A lot of natives of the village gathered. The informant and other residents of the village conveyed his injured wife and children to the Government Hospital, District Bulandshahr, where he got them admitted for treatment. The informant's wife, Ram Kumari and Rupesh, his son, were referred by the District Hospital to a higher centre in Delhi. 3. A lot of natives of the village gathered. The informant and other residents of the village conveyed his injured wife and children to the Government Hospital, District Bulandshahr, where he got them admitted for treatment. The informant's wife, Ram Kumari and Rupesh, his son, were referred by the District Hospital to a higher centre in Delhi. 3. It is said in the FIR that in the year 2006, two of the appellants, Bablu and Kale, had ravished his daughter 'A', in connection whereof they were convicted and sentenced by the Court to ten years imprisonment. It was just a few months back that they had come out of prison. It is on this account that they harboured animosity against the informant and for the said reason assaulted his wife and children, employing acid. 4. The aforesaid FIR was registered as Crime No.157 of 2010, under Section 326 IPC. Later on, during treatment at the Guru Teg Bahadur Hospital, Delhi (for short, 'the GTB Hospital'), the informant's wife succumbed to her injuries on 20.08.2010. The informant through a report dated 25.09.2010 informed the Police about the development. This led the Police to add the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC to the crime vide G.D. No.21 dated 25.09.2010 at 5.30 p.m. 5. Immediately after the crime was registered and the victims conveyed to the District Hospital, Bulandshahr, they were medically examined there on 14.08.2010 at 2.40 a.m. 6. The Doctor found on the person of Ram Kumari @ Raj Kumari, the informant's wife, 55% burns, caused by some chemical. These were opined to be of fresh duration and advised to be kept under observation. 7. The other injured, Rupesh, the informant's son was examined by the Doctor at the District Hospital on 14.08.2010 and his injuries too were opined to be caused by some chemical burns of fresh duration. These injuries were also advised to be kept under observation. 8. The third injured and the other son of the informant, Chandra Mohan, was examined at the District Hospital on 14.08.2010. In his case too, the injuries were opined to be caused by some chemical, which were of fresh duration. These were opined to be kept under observation. 9. These injuries were also advised to be kept under observation. 8. The third injured and the other son of the informant, Chandra Mohan, was examined at the District Hospital on 14.08.2010. In his case too, the injuries were opined to be caused by some chemical, which were of fresh duration. These were opined to be kept under observation. 9. It may be noticed that while the burns sustained by Smt. Ram Kumari @ Raj Kumari were opined by the District Hospital Doctor to be 55% and the injuries of the other victim, Rupesh, as 50% burns, the burn percentage in the case of the informant's other son, Chandra Mohan, was found to be 10%. 10. After the informant's wife and the deceased victim, Ram Kumari @ Raj Kumari, passed away on 20.08.2010, her cadaver was subjected to autopsy at the University College of Medical Sciences & GTB Hospital, Shahdara, Delhi, where she had died during treatment. The autopsy was held on 21.08.2010. There are very detailed observations of the Autopsy Doctor in the postmortem report about the nature of injuries sustained and other matters. The cause of death opined is “Shock as a result of antemortem infected corrosion burns (chemical) involving fifty percent of total body surface area”. 11. The Police, after investigating the case, filed a charge sheet against the three appellants on 17.11.2010. The Magistrate took cognizance on 18.11.2010. In due course, the case was committed to the Sessions on 01.12.2010. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Bulandshahr, before whom the case came up for framing of charge, framed two charges against the appellant, Kale and the two other convicts, Bablu and Anil jointly, charging them on the first count under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC, and, on the second, under Section 304 read with Section 34 IPC. 12. Eight witnesses were examined by the prosecution in support of their case, three of fact and five formal. PW-1 is Nanak Chand, the first informant; PW-2 is Rupesh, a victim and an injured witness of the occurrence; and, PW-3 is Babita, an eye witness, who is the deceased’s daughter and the two injured victims’ sister. PW-4, Dr. Rajiv Verma is the doctor, who examined the victims, when they were brought in at the District Hospital, Bulandshahr for necessary medical attention; PW-5 is Dr. Meghali Kelkar. PW-4, Dr. Rajiv Verma is the doctor, who examined the victims, when they were brought in at the District Hospital, Bulandshahr for necessary medical attention; PW-5 is Dr. Meghali Kelkar. She is a doctor at the G.T.B. Hospital, Delhi and has carried out the autopsy; PW-6 is Om Singh, a Sub-Inspector of Police, who was posted at Police Station Mansarovar Park, Delhi at the relevant time, when the deceased Raj Kumari passed away during treatment at G.T.B. Hospital, Delhi; PW-7, Satyapal Singh, was a Sub-Inspetor of Police, posted at the relevant time at Police Station Khurja Dehat. He is the Investigating Officer of the case, who filed the charge-sheet. PW-8, Jai Prakash, is a Constable Clerk, posted at the relevant time at P.S. Khurja Dehat, who got the check FIR drawn up on his dictation and made the relevant G.D. entry upon registering the FIR. 13. The following documents were produced by the prosecution to establish their case: 14. No witness was examined by the defence or documentary evidence produced. 15. Heard Mr. Rakesh Kumar Singh along with Mr. Mohammad Zakir, learned Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.1345 of 2015 and 3888 of 2014, Mr. Rakesh Kumar Pandey, learned Counsel for the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.4448 of 2014, and Mr. Shashi Shekhar Tiwari and Mr. Anil Kumar Mishra, learned Additional Government Advocates along with Mr. K.K. Nishad, learned State Law Officer appearing on behalf of the State. 16. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, we find that the evidence on record, relative to the charges, can be conveniently considered in the following manner. The genesis of and the motive for the crime 17. It is common ground between parties that out of three convicted appellants, two, to wit, Kale and Bablu were charged, tried, convicted and sentenced for the offence of ravishing the informant’s daughter ‘A’ by the learned Sessions Judge. This offence was committed by the two appellants, Bablu and Kale in the year 2006. Both the appellants received a term sentence of ten years each. They were out on bail pending appeal, when the present offence was committed. 18. This offence was committed by the two appellants, Bablu and Kale in the year 2006. Both the appellants received a term sentence of ten years each. They were out on bail pending appeal, when the present offence was committed. 18. It is argued on behalf of the appellants by the learned Counsel that their implication in the present crime is motivated because despite being convicted and sentenced on charges of ravishing the informant’s daughter, which too were, according to the appellants, false charges, they have been admitted to bail by this Court pending appeal. It is to spite the appellants that they have now been framed in the present case. The offence here is one that is blind, committed in the dead of night while the victims, the informant and all family members were fast asleep. The perpetrators are very different men than the appellants, who committed the offence by night for their own reasons, but the informant, who harbours grudge and ill-will against the appellants for their perceived involvement in the rape of his daughter, nominated them in the present crime without the slightest of truth to the allegations. 19. Mr. S.S. Tiwari, learned A.G.A. has stoutly refuted this submission and says that there is a prompt reporting of the heinous crime, which excludes every possibility of a false implication. 20. It is true that two, out of the three appellants, Kale and Bablu, were indeed involved in an earlier crime against the informant’s family, where the latter’s daughter was ravished by the two. They were convicted and sentenced for the offence of gang- rape with each of them, receiving a term of ten years rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.5000/- each. In addition, they were ordered to suffer an additional term of three months in the event of default in payment of the fine imposed. 21. The involvement of the two appellants in the case of gang- rape could be thought of as the motive for the informant to falsely implicate them, to wit, Kale and Bablu, particularly as these two, after being convicted by the learned Trial Judge, were enlarged on bail by this Court pending appeal. On the other hand, the motive to commit the crime, could well emanate from the appellants’ grudge, resulting from their conviction. On the other hand, the motive to commit the crime, could well emanate from the appellants’ grudge, resulting from their conviction. It is for this reason that the relevant fact of motive is always regarded as a matter, that may establish the prosecution or work to probabilize the defence. 22. In every case, and so also here, which side the weight of motive would tilt scales, depends on the other facts established in the case. Motive is, therefore, a relevant fact, that has to be seen in the totality of other facts proved by evidence to see which way it really works in a given case. In this case, we would consider the substantive evidence about other relevant facts, more fundamental to a prosecution based on an eye-witness account before opining which way motive has played its role, to wit, if it has led to the crime or a false implication for the appellants. Accordingly, this would be considered later on in this judgment. The FIR and the circumstances attending its registration; if it is ante-timed 23. According to the FIR, the crime was committed at 1:00 a.m. on 13/14.05.2010, that is to say, in the wee hours at Village Dharpa, P.S. Khurja Dehat, District Bulandshar. In the attack by throwing of acid, said to have been committed by the appellants, the informant’s wife and two sons sustained injuries. The injured were conveyed in a commercial vehicle, popularly called a TATA- 407, to P.S. Khurja Dehat. The policemen at the police station are said to have advised the informant to rush the injured to the Government Hospital, Bulandshahr in order to save their life. The doctors of the District Hospital, Bulandshahr, finding the condition of Smt. Raj Kumari and Rupesh to be serious, referred them to the GTB Hospital. The FIR is shown to have been registered at 6.30 a.m. in the morning upon being lodged by the first informant, Nanak Chand. 24. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the appellants that the FIR is clearly ante-timed and not at all a spontaneous account of the occurrence. Learned Counsel for the appellants have invited the attention of the Court to the testimony of Nanak Chand, PW-1, which he says, clearly shows that the FIR was lodged after the informant had got his wife admitted to the GTB Hospital and returned home to his village in Bulandshahr. Learned Counsel for the appellants have invited the attention of the Court to the testimony of Nanak Chand, PW-1, which he says, clearly shows that the FIR was lodged after the informant had got his wife admitted to the GTB Hospital and returned home to his village in Bulandshahr. It was scribed by Sanjay Kumar at the police station, where many people from the informant’s village and elsewhere had reached upon hearing the news. The FIR was lodged after due consultation about quarter to nine in the morning. It is, thus, argued that the FIR, which is shown to be registered at 6.30 a.m., is clearly an ante-timed document, lodged after consultation and premeditation; not a prompt and spontaneous report of the crime. 25. Mr. Tiwari, the learned A.G.A., has submitted that the FIR was lodged at 6.30 in the morning by the informant, a fact duly proved by PW-3, Jai Prakash, the Constable Clerk, who drew up the check FIR and made a G.D. Entry thereof in the records of the police station at 6.30 a.m. on 14.08.2010. He submits that it is for the said reason that the learned Trial Judge, before whom the same argument about the FIR being an ante-timed document was advanced, rejected it. 26. There is nothing said in the examination-in-chief by the first informant, PW-1, about the time when the FIR was lodged, though he proved the written information by his testimony recorded in the dock, which was marked as Ex. Ka-1. In his cross-examination done by learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, Bablu, PW- 1, Nanak Chand, has stated the fact that he has passed his intermediate examination. He is, therefore, a reasonably educated man; certainly a literate and not a rustic. 27. In his cross-examination on behalf of the appellant, Anil, PW-1, Nanak Chand, has stated: 28. Further, in his cross-examination at the instance of the appellant, Anil, PW-1 has said: 29. Further on, Nanak Chand, PW-1, when cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, Kale, stated: 30. PW-8, who is the Constable Clerk at Police Station Khurja Dehat at the relevant time and drew up the check FIR, besides making the relative G.D. Entry in the Station House Diary regarding registration of the case, has testified in his examination-in-chief to the following effect: 31. In his cross-examination, PW-8, Constable Clerk, Jai Prakash, has stated: 32. PW-8, who is the Constable Clerk at Police Station Khurja Dehat at the relevant time and drew up the check FIR, besides making the relative G.D. Entry in the Station House Diary regarding registration of the case, has testified in his examination-in-chief to the following effect: 31. In his cross-examination, PW-8, Constable Clerk, Jai Prakash, has stated: 32. Upon a perusal of all this testimony, what is apparent is that Nanak Chand, PW-1, who is the first informant, is by no means an illiterate man. It cannot be said that he has no understanding of the clock or that he could not understand the hour of the day, when he lodged the FIR. It cannot also be said that he would not be able to read the time of registration shown on the check FIR. In fact, he has correctly read the time of registration of the FIR, and, therefore, never mentioned it in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination at the instance of the appellant, Anil, it has come out that PW-1 proceeded with the victims first to the P.S. Khurja Dehat, where looking to the critical condition of the injured, the policemen asked him to rush them to the District Hospital, Bulandshahr. The doctors at the District Hospital, Bulandshahr, assessing the critical condition of the victims, referred them to a higher centre in Delhi. They gave a referral slip as well. It has further figured in his cross-examination that travelling from the District Hospital, Bulandshahr, he reached the hospital in Delhi at 9.00 a.m. It has then further on come in PW-1’s testimony during cross-examination on behalf of Anil that after he got the victims admitted, he returned back to his village, where the scribe of the FIR, Sanjay, was waiting at his home. He then, in consultation with other residents of the village, got the FIR scribed. 33. It has further on come in PW-1’s cross-examination, also done at the instance of the appellant, Kale, that the witness had gone along with the victims to the hospital. The victims were got admitted by the Bulandshahr Police to the hospital. He had reported the matter to the Police. Here, he has said that the report was lodged at 2.00 a.m. It is next said that a relative of his, Sanjay Kumar, a resident of Village Gurdharpur, is the scribe of the FIR. The victims were got admitted by the Bulandshahr Police to the hospital. He had reported the matter to the Police. Here, he has said that the report was lodged at 2.00 a.m. It is next said that a relative of his, Sanjay Kumar, a resident of Village Gurdharpur, is the scribe of the FIR. This scribe was informed over telephone by PW-1 at 1.30 a.m. The scribe, Sanjay Kumar, reached Village Dharpa from his Village Girdharpur at 7.00 o’clock in the morning. PW-1, who had by then gone to Delhi with the victims, returned to his village at about 7.45 in the morning, where he met Sanjay. PW-1, along with Sanjay and many other residents of the village, proceeded to P.S. Khurja Dehat, where they reached to lodge the FIR at about 9.00 o’clock in the morning. 34. PW-1 is the first informant and his testimony, apart from being wayward about the time, when the FIR was registered, is certain about one fact that the FIR was not lodged, or for that matter registered, at 6.30 in the morning. A wholesome reading of his testimony would place the registration of the FIR some time about 9.00 a.m., or may be a little later. PW-1 is categorical that from the police station, where he had initially gone along with the patients, he proceeded to the District Hospital, Bulandshahr. After some superficial management, the victims were referred to the GTB Hospital. The informant went to Delhi. He has categorically said that he reached his village back at about quarter to eight in the morning, where the Scribe, Sanjay Kumar was waiting for him. It is but obvious that the FIR must have been scribed after quarter to eight. PW-1 has also categorically said that the first informant, in the company of the scribe and others, reached P.S. Khurja Dehat at 9.00 o’clock. Elsewhere, it has figured that the FIR was written outside the police station. This would lead to an inference about the time of lodging the FIR being anything after 9.00 a.m. on 14.08.2010. 35. PW-1 has also categorically said that the first informant, in the company of the scribe and others, reached P.S. Khurja Dehat at 9.00 o’clock. Elsewhere, it has figured that the FIR was written outside the police station. This would lead to an inference about the time of lodging the FIR being anything after 9.00 a.m. on 14.08.2010. 35. If every other detail is discounted, in the face of the Constable Clerk’s grand authority justifying entries made by him in public records, it cannot be accepted that PW-1, who had come back from Delhi, reaching his village at about quarter to eight in the morning hours of 14.08.2010, could, by any means, have got the FIR lodged at P.S. Khurja Dehat at 6.30 in the morning. That time of the day would not be supported by the time taken in the onward journey reckoned from the victims’ house to P.S. Khurja Dehat, and then to the District Hospital, Bulandshahr, the time spent there in the administration of some superficial treatment, the onward journey from District Hospital, Bulandshahr to the GTB Hospital, located in Delhi, and the return journey that PW-1 undertook to reach his village in District Bulandshahr. The time, that PW-1 has indicated of his arrival back home in his village as 7:45 a.m., is apparently realistic and correct, given the distances involved, of which judicial notice may be taken. 36. There is no way that PW-1, undertaking all this journey and the steps involved in consulting doctors at the District Hospital, Bulandshahr, then at Delhi getting the victims admitted to the GTB Hospital and returning back home to his village in Bulandshahr, from where he proceeded to the police station, could ever have lodged the FIR at 6.30 in the morning of 14.08.2010. 37. We are convinced that by any stretch of human capability, the FIR in this case could never have been lodged by the first informant at 6.30 in the morning of 14.08.2010. 38. The testimony of PW-8, the Constable Clerk, Jai Prakash, is untruthful about the time of registration of the FIR and is nothing more than an affirmation of false official record about the time of registration. 38. The testimony of PW-8, the Constable Clerk, Jai Prakash, is untruthful about the time of registration of the FIR and is nothing more than an affirmation of false official record about the time of registration. The fact that no earlier FIR, other than the one giving rise to Crime No.157 of 2010, was registered on 14.08.2010, G.D. Entry No.7 made at 6.30 a.m., relating to the said crime, was a matter of no difficulty for the Police. The next crime was registered, or so to speak the next G.D. Entry of the day was made at 7.00 a.m. vide G.D. Entry No.8. Therefore, the affirmation of time of registration of the FIR and the relative G.D. Entry by the Constable Clerk, will be of little help to the State in justifying the time of registration of the FIR. The FIR in this case is clearly ante-timed. And, we hold accordingly. If the ocular testimony of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 is relevant and consistent 39. In order to bring home the charge, the prosecution have examined three witnesses of fact, to wit, Nanak Chand, PW-1, Rupesh, PW-2 and Kumari Babita, PW-3. Nanak Chand is the first informant and claimed himself to be a witness of res gestae. In his examination-in-chief, he has stated: 40. In his cross-examination done on behalf of the appellant, Bablu, PW-1 has said: 41. PW-1 was also cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, Anil, where he has stated: 42. PW-1 has also been cross-examined on behalf of the appellant, Kale. There, he has stated: 43. The aforesaid testimony places it beyond cavil that this witness, by no means, is a witness of the occurrence, though he claims to have seen happenings, that are relevant as res gestae under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Evidence Act). The testimony of PW-1 in his examination-in-chief to the effect that it was the appellants, who had thrown acid on the deceased and the two other victims, and, he was told of the fact by Babita, is hearsay. The assertion of the witness in his cross- examination to the effect that it is incorrect to say that he had not seen the occurrence and that he was informed about it by Babita, is again not relevant. The assertion of the witness in his cross- examination to the effect that it is incorrect to say that he had not seen the occurrence and that he was informed about it by Babita, is again not relevant. But, later on, in his cross-examination, he has said explicitly that though he did not see the appellants throw acid upon the victims, he saw them run away and recognized them. The fact that PW-1 saw the appellants run away from the scene of crime and also saw the three victims with acid burn injuries, put together, is relevant, if proved. Elsewhere, during his cross-examination extracted hereinabove, PW-1 has said that he saw the backside of the appellants as they ran away. He has further said that the appellants were looking on all sides as they escaped, and, therefore, he could recognize them in the moonlit night. The testimony of this witness, who was sleeping in the yard with his animals, and woken up by his daughter, Babita, after the event, does not inspire confidence about the fact that he saw anything of the occurrence or the assailants as they escaped. The victims had already sustained injuries and were writhing in pain. 44. According to this witness, Babita, his daughter, who had woken up and gone to answer the call of nature, using an open drain next to their house as a privy, if it can be called that, came over running to him and apprised him of the incident. PW-1 had woken up, hearing the cries for help coming from his house, when Babita, as already said, told him of the incident and the fact that the perpetrators were Bablu, Anil and Kale, who had thrown acid on Rupesh, Raj Kumari and Chandra Mohan. He would have taken, if not minutes, a few seconds, to come out of his slumber. There were his wife and sons, wailing in pain. That is the first thing, which would have caught his attention and, in fact, that is what happened too. The assailants made a quick get away. There is no case of any further aggression or assault. It is, therefore, very unlikely that this witness saw anything of the assailants as they ran away. That is the first thing, which would have caught his attention and, in fact, that is what happened too. The assailants made a quick get away. There is no case of any further aggression or assault. It is, therefore, very unlikely that this witness saw anything of the assailants as they ran away. The description that the assailants were looking around, while making good their escape, virtually as if inviting PW-1 to identify them in the moonlit night, is a fact hard to believe. This witness, therefore, saw nothing of the occurrence or anything relevant as res gestae. He just saw the trail of injury and agony left behind by the perpetrators. 45. The second witness, PW-2, Rupesh, is the most relevant witness. He is a survivor of the dastardly attack and a fortiori an injured witness. He has testified in his examination-in-chief on 21.03.2013, thus: 46. There is then a Court observation, recorded about this witness, to the following effect: 47. PW-2, Rupesh, has said in his cross-examination: 48. Again, PW-2 in his cross-examination done on behalf of the appellant, Bablu, has said: 49. Although, this witness has given a graphic description of the occurrence, describing it in minute detail, it has to be borne in mind that he is a person, who woke up in consequence of the burning sensation, resulting from the splash of acid on his body attributed to the appellants. It led him to shriek in pain, which caused the deceased, Raj Kumari, his mother, to suddenly wake up, stand straight and hold back the bucket carrying the active agent. Thereupon, the appellant, Bablu, kicked her, which made her fall back on the bed. The said appellant then emptied two buckets of acid on the deceased’s body. It is asserted in the examination-in-chief that the assailants were seen by this witness, his brother, Chandra Mohan, and sister, Babita, besides their father, the first informant. 50. It is said in his cross-examination that a bucket, full of acid, was thrown on him, which caused him a strong burning sensation, loss of vision in one eye and loss of hearing. It is rather unlikely that with impairment of his vital sensory organs, including loss of vision in one eye and hearing, he could, in the distress and turmoil of the moment, identify the appellants with certainty. It is rather unlikely that with impairment of his vital sensory organs, including loss of vision in one eye and hearing, he could, in the distress and turmoil of the moment, identify the appellants with certainty. In the later part of his cross-examination, the witness has reiterated that he had seen the appellants throw acid on the victims, including himself. At the tail-end of the thoroughly done cross-examination, he has said that at the time of occurrence, the place was well-lit with an electric light and he had seen the appellants throw acid on the victims (including himself). He has then said that they were asleep and he did not know anything. The last noted words in his cross-examination cast the die for his testimony, rendering it entirely unreliable, the inherent worth of this witness notwithstanding. 51. PW-3 is the last witness of fact, and, of immense importance. She is the sole witness, whose testimony cannot be held vitiated by sleep or slumber. She was fully awake and had gone over to an open drain, adjacent to the victims, to ease herself. 52. This witness in her examination-in-chief has given a graphic account of the occurrence in the following words: 53. This witness in her cross-examination on behalf of the appellants, Anil and Kale, has stated: 54. This witness has further on said in her cross-examination: 55. The testimony of this witness, given her circumstances, would be of immense value because she is not one of the victims, who woke up from sleep in consequence of the assault by throw of acid. She was already awake in connection with her own engagement and is otherwise a natural witness. A reading of her testimony, however, shows that on its own terms, it does not bring forth a coherent version of the occurrence. She has said in her examination-in-chief that she had woken up to attend the call of nature, and, thereupon, saw Bablu, Anil and Kale, the appellants, pour acid upon her brother Rupesh, mother Raj Kumari and Chandra Mohan, her other brother, employing a bucket. This would suggest that she saw the assault, as she had just got up from bed to leave for the privy or toilet. If that were the situation, there is no reason why the appellants would have not assaulted her first, or in the same act. 56. This would suggest that she saw the assault, as she had just got up from bed to leave for the privy or toilet. If that were the situation, there is no reason why the appellants would have not assaulted her first, or in the same act. 56. In the next breath, this witness says that her brother, Rupesh, raised alarm, which she heard, as she was relieving herself, which made her leave the imperative pursuit. Her testimony in the next leg suggests that she went back to the scene of crime and saw her brother, Rupesh, hug Anil and then box him on the nose. Her mother, this witness saw, hug Bablu, presumably again to save herself. The witness’s brother rushed to a hydrant or other source of water. It is next said that this witness saw the appellant, Anil, pour acid on her mother, the splashes whereof landed on her younger brother, Chandra Mohan. It is at this stage that this witness says that she rushed to her father across road, raising alarm. When her father came along with her, the three victims were already scorched by the corroding acid. At this point, this witness says that she saw the appellants, Bablu, Anil and Kale, make good their escape. They chose their escape route via Bhule’s house. 57. The inherent fallibility of this witness’s testimony comes from the facts, already noted. If she saw the assault, as she woke up to go over and answer the call of nature, she could not have possibly gone away in her pursuit, leaving the scene of assault, where the perpetrators were pouring acid on the three victims. Also, if she had woken up and seen the assailants, going about their evil deed, she too would have been assaulted. The part of the testimony, which says that after seeing the assault, she went over, as if it were, to answer the call of nature, which she abandoned upon hearing her brother raise alarm, is difficult in the nature of things to imagine or believe as a truthful account. She could not have seen the assault, gone to relieve herself and then abandon it upon hearing her brother call rescue. These contradictions have not at all been explained during her reasonably detailed cross- examination at the instance of the appellants. She could not have seen the assault, gone to relieve herself and then abandon it upon hearing her brother call rescue. These contradictions have not at all been explained during her reasonably detailed cross- examination at the instance of the appellants. These inherent fallacies, therefore, vitiate her testimony as a dependable account of the occurrence on its own worth. 58. The locus classicus in regard to the quality of an eye- witness’s testimony is Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras , AIR 1957 SC 614 , where it has been held: “ 11. …………… Generally speaking, oral testimony in this context may be classified into three categories, namely: (1) Wholly reliable. (2) Wholly unreliable. (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 12. In the first category of proof, the court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way — it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it is found to be above reproach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence or subornation. In the second category, the court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial……….” 59. Though, this principle was laid down regarding the dependability of a solitary witness, but the fact remains that if witnesses more than one are there and all of them, or both of them, as in this case, of their own evidence contradict themselves on material facts or give an inherently unreliable account of the occurrence, they would fall in the category of unreliable witnesses. Invariably, an injured witness is entitled to greater weight than others and his evidence cannot be lightly discarded, but this does not mean that an injured witness, who goes back on the entire prosecution version, saying that he was asleep when the assault took place and does not know anything, is to be believed, nevertheless. This is the case here with the testimony of PW-2. 60. PW-3 has been shown by us to have given out an account that is inherently unbelievable and self-contradictory. She is an unreliable witness for that reason alone. This is the case here with the testimony of PW-2. 60. PW-3 has been shown by us to have given out an account that is inherently unbelievable and self-contradictory. She is an unreliable witness for that reason alone. A similar view was expressed in a Bench decision of this Court in Tahir and others v. State of U.P., 2019:AHC-LKO:27021-DB , where their Lordships rejected the testimony of a solitary injured witness and after considering a wealth of authority about vitiation of the credit of a witness on account of contradictions, exaggerations or improvement, held: “ 31. This Court is conscious and aware of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a witness who is claiming to be an injured witness of the crime and generally the evidence of an injured witness is considered at a higher pedestal than other witnesses as he is a stamped witness. But keeping in view the whole testimony of PW-1 Ram Sewak we are unable to accept the same as reliable and truthful and it appears that the true account of the occurrence has been suppressed by PW-1 Ram Sewak and truth and false hood are so intermixed in his evidence that they could not be separated and the only course available is to discard the evidence of this witness. Therefore, keeping in view the inherent inconsistencies in his evidence it is in the interest of justice that his untruthful and unreliable testimony must be discarded. In view of above discussion we are not inclined to accept the unreliable testimony of solitary witness PW-1 Ram Sewak. Once the Testimony of this solitary eye witness has been found to be not reliable there is no other evidence on record which may come to the rescue of the prosecution and the case of the prosecution, due to the inherent weakness, in the testimony of PW-1 Ram Sewak, is bound to collapse. The testimony of PW 1 Ram Sewak falls short of the requirement of proof of the charge beyond all reasonable doubt. The Appellants are thus entitled to the benefit of doubt in the facts and circumstances of the case. The contrary view taken by the trial Court is against the weight of the evidence on record and the exposition of law cited at the Bar and traversed herein above. The Appellants are thus entitled to the benefit of doubt in the facts and circumstances of the case. The contrary view taken by the trial Court is against the weight of the evidence on record and the exposition of law cited at the Bar and traversed herein above. The trial Court appears to have committed a manifest error in appreciating the evidence of solitary eye witness and has ignored the material contradictions and inherent inconsistencies appearing on the surface of his evidence. Resultantly the Judgment and order of conviction of the trial Court could not stand and is liable to be set aside.” 61. We would not reach our conclusions about the truthfulness of the prosecution just at this. We ought examine the matter further because we have in hand a dastardly crime committed in a place, that is to say, the victims’ home, where the witnesses, who have testified, are natural and one of them is injured. In the present aspect of that analysis, we think we ought compare the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 on the most material of relevant facts. 62. While the injured witness, PW-2, Rupesh, has described the manner of assault saying that all the three appellants poured a bucket full of acid on his body, which led to a severe burning sensation and he shrieked, causing his mother to suddenly get up and hold the bucket, carrying the acid in Kale’s hand, Bablu kicked his mother, causing her to fall on the cot and it was he (Bablu), who poured two buckets of acid on her. By contrast, PW- 3 describes the occurrence in the manner that when she got up, she saw all the three appellants pour the corrosive substance on all the three sleeping victims. Her brother, Rupesh, raised alarm and she saw him hug the appellant, Anil, and then box him on the nose. According to this witness, her mother hugged the other appellant, Bablu, while her brother, Rupesh, the victim made off to a nearby hydrant. It was then that the appellant, Anil poured a bucket full of acid, upon her mother, the deceased, the splashes of which were received by her younger brother, Chandra Mohan. 63. Now, these two accounts of the occurrence are not ones that carry minor contradictions of detail. It was then that the appellant, Anil poured a bucket full of acid, upon her mother, the deceased, the splashes of which were received by her younger brother, Chandra Mohan. 63. Now, these two accounts of the occurrence are not ones that carry minor contradictions of detail. These are also not accounts of the occurrence seen from a different vantage or at different points of time by the two witnesses. Both the accounts are about the principal assault by throwing acid, which was in one or two acts, to be precise, two. Whereas according to PW-2, all the three appellants poured acid on him, according to PW-3, they did so simultaneously, assaulting all the three victims. PW-2 credits assault by pouring or throwing acid upon the deceased victim, Raj Kumari, to the appellant Bablu, in very definitive terms, whereas PW-3 credits that assault to the appellant Anil. PW-3 has said that, after attempting to ward of the assault or receiving the first splash of acid, PW-2 rushed to a hydrant, there is no mention of the fact, even in the slightest measure in the testimony of PW- 2. PW-3 credits the injured witness, PW-2, with the act of hugging the appellant Anil and boxing him on the nose, apparently to save himself, whereas no whisper of these acts to ward of the attack figure in the injured witnesses’ own testimony. 64. Though, there are many varying accounts by these two witnesses about where and how they were sleeping, it is noteworthy that PW-2, the injured witness, says that his cot was positioned at a distance of one foot from his mother’s cot, whereas his brother Chandra Mohan’s cot was laid just adjacent to their mother’s, the deceased victim. He further says that PW-3, his sister, slept on the same cot as his brother Chandra Mohan. By contrast, PW-3, Babita, says that there were four cots laid out in the verandah. Her cot was separate from the others. She never slept on either of her brothers’ cot or that of her mother. 65. In her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. made before the Police, PW-3 has stated that she was sleeping on the roof of her house. She was confronted with the fact, about which she said that she did not say so to the Investigating Officer and does not know how he has mentioned it that way. 65. In her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. made before the Police, PW-3 has stated that she was sleeping on the roof of her house. She was confronted with the fact, about which she said that she did not say so to the Investigating Officer and does not know how he has mentioned it that way. It is in this background that it becomes doubtful, whether she was sleeping at all in the verandah, there being material contradiction about the positioning of her cot and the number of cots laid there. If the fact, whether she was sleeping in the verandah, is doubtful, the manner in which she has described witnessing the occurrence also becomes doubtful. 66. The other contradiction between PW-2 and PW-3, one an injured witness and other an eye-witness, are material and go to the root of the matter. We have mentioned these hereinabove. 67. The two accounts of the occurrence witnessed at the same time by the injured witness and PW-3, speak about material facts differently, such as who assaulted the deceased with the acid throw, the fact about PW-2, the injured witness, boxing one of the assailants on the nose, and then running over to a hydrant, which figure in the testimony of PW-3, but not in that of PW-2 at all. These show the witnesses speak very inconsistently about the manner of assault. The fact that the three assailants were named by the two eye-witnesses alone, PW-2 and PW-3, would not prove the guilt of the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt, given other relevant facts to be shortly noticed, which make the law require the prosecution evidence to be cautiously approached and carefully scrutinized. An overall perspective and conclusions 68. We have already held the FIR in this case to be ante-timed. If a prosecution that is founded on an ante-timed FIR, ought be thrown out on that ground alone, is a very relevant question in this case. If not, what are the consequences of an ante-timed FIR for the prosecution and in which cases are they attracted, is a question closely related. The question was considered by the Supreme Court in Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar, (2012) 7 SCC 225 , where it was held: “ 57. If not, what are the consequences of an ante-timed FIR for the prosecution and in which cases are they attracted, is a question closely related. The question was considered by the Supreme Court in Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar, (2012) 7 SCC 225 , where it was held: “ 57. We now come to the main contention on behalf of the defence that the High Court should have totally discarded the prosecution story once it held that the evidence creates a reasonable suspicion about the FIR being antedated and ante-timed. 58. In none of the cases cited by the defence, we find that this Court has discarded the entire prosecution story only on the ground that the FIR was antedated and ante-timed. In Ganesh Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra [ (1978) 4 SCC 371 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1] relied on by the defence this Court considered the inordinate delay in recording the statements of witnesses under Section 161 CrPC and other circumstances along with the fact that the FIR was lodged belatedly without proper explanation and then held that the prosecution case was not reliable. Again, in Marudanal Augusti v. State of Kerala [ (1980) 4 SCC 425 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 985] cited by the defence, this Court disbelieved the prosecution story not because of unexplained delay in the dispatch of the FIR to the Magistrate only but also because the FIR which contained graphic details of the occurrence with the minutest details did not mention the names of the witnesses and there were other infirmities to throw serious doubt on the prosecution story. 59. In Awadhesh v. State of M.P. [ (1988) 2 SCC 557 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 361 : AIR 1988 SC 1158 ] relied on by the defence, besides finding that the delay in lodging the FIR was suspicious, this Court also found that the empty cartridges were recovered from the place of occurrence one day after the incident and the medical evidence established that the witnesses had not actually seen the incident and considering all these circumstances this Court held that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. 60. 60. This Court has, on the other hand, held in State of M.P. v. Mansingh [ (2003) 10 SCC 414 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 390] that if the date and time of the FIR is suspicious, the prosecution version is not rendered vulnerable but the court is required to make a careful analysis of the evidence in support of the prosecution case.” 69. The principle then appears to be that for the mere fact that the FIR is found to be ante-timed, the prosecution would not collapse. The ante-timing of the FIR would have to be considered with other relevant facts. If the prosecution by their evidence establish a well-knit case, the ante-timed FIR may not vitiate it. An ante-timed FIR casts a shadow of suspicion on the prosecution case, because advantage of the earliest version of the occurrence is lost and some premeditation, and may be even manipulation of some facts, is inferable. Notwithstanding that if the dock evidence is flawless and consistent, witnesses do not contradict each other on material particulars, establish their presence on the scene of crime and given an account, that is corroborated by other evidence, an ante-timed FIR would not be fatal. 70. But, where there are inconsistencies in evidence, witnesses contradict or give an inherently improbable account of the occurrence in the dock and the cross-examination, which discredits their version or the witnesses themselves, an ante- timed FIR may cast the die against the prosecution. On a more refined principle, as held in State of M.P. v. Mansingh, (2003) 10 SCC 414 , an ante-timed FIR requires the prosecution evidence to be scrutinized more carefully, or so to speak, approached with caution. After all, a prompt FIR, shown to be lodged according to its apparent tenor in the G.D., though not substantive evidence, is an assurance about the earliest and truthful account of facts being before the Court. 71. The principle has been further explained and the ante-timing of an FIR differentiated into two classes – one that is inconsequential, and, the other that may affect the prosecution – in the Bench decision of this Court in Kaushal Kumar Upadhyay v. State of U.P., (2020) 6 All LJ 266 . In Kaushal Kumar Upadhyay (supra), following the Supreme Court in Anand Mohan (supra), it was remarked: “ 9. In Kaushal Kumar Upadhyay (supra), following the Supreme Court in Anand Mohan (supra), it was remarked: “ 9. An ante-timed report, is a report which does not appear to have been lodged at a time when it is purported to have been lodged. It is well settled in view of me judgment of the Apex Court in Anand Mohan v. State of Bihar, (2012) 7 SCC 225 : (2013 Cri LJ 2644 (SC)) that prosecution case cannot be thrown merely on the basis of ante-timed FIR, provided the prosecution case is successfully established on the basis of other cogent and substantive evidence. A report could be ante-timed for 2 reasons, first where the police itself was negligent/lackadaisical in entertaining the report or where the police with design/collusion of the informant with a view to implicate innocents entertains report not at a time when it is purported to have been lodged. The former is to be ignored as an investigational default, giving no advantage to the accused while the latter could be a ground to bring the prosecution case under suspect. Each case will have to be decided on its own merits……….” 72. This is not a case, where the first informant was chasing or begging the police to lodge his FIR. Rather, it was registered as and when it was presented to the Police. The difficulty is that the time schedule between the events involving the commission of crime, the conveying of the victims to the District Hospital, Bulandshahr and further on to Delhi with the informant returning to his native Village Dharpa, Bulandshahr, then holding consultation and finally proceeding to the police station to lodge the FIR, place the time when he actually lodged it, way beyond the recorded time of its registration. We have already dealt with this issue in much detail earlier in this judgment. Thus, the FIR here is one which belongs to that category of ante-timing that might affect the prosecution. 73. This is not a case, where the two eye-witnesses, one of them injured, whose testimony could have been damning, have delivered evidence of sterling quality. We have already dealt with this issue in much detail earlier in this judgment. Thus, the FIR here is one which belongs to that category of ante-timing that might affect the prosecution. 73. This is not a case, where the two eye-witnesses, one of them injured, whose testimony could have been damning, have delivered evidence of sterling quality. We have already held in the earlier part of this judgment that PW-2, who is the injured witness and whose presence is, therefore, inherently not doubtful, has said at the end of his inculpatory testimony that at the time of occurrence, all of them were asleep and he does not know anything. His testimony has, therefore, lost all its worth standing by itself. Likewise, the testimony of PW-3, Babita, who is the informant’s daughter and a sister of the injured, carries an account that we have noticed to be inherently flawed and not worth credence. 74. Then these two witnesses, PW-2 and PW-3, have materially contradicted each other about the manner of assault to the extent that the identity of the assailant, who delivered the fatal acid bath to the deceased victim is different. There are other major contradictions in their testimony that have already been noticed and need no repetition. It is for this reason and others given, that we have held that the evidence of the witnesses may not prove the appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 75. Now, when one views this unreliable dock evidence in the background of an ante-timed FIR, where there is at least a time difference of three hours, in the time shown when the FIR was registered, and the time when it could actually have been registered the earliest, much suspicion shrouds the prosecution case. Also, one cannot ignore in the background of the ante-timed FIR and the witnesses speaking contradictory, inconsistent and inherently unreliable, the fact that the FIR was much ante-timed, because the informant, PW-1, could never have lodged it at the hour of the day, when it is shown to have been registered. 76. It is also noteworthy that in the account of facts, leading up to the lodging of the FIR by the informant, he has admitted in his cross-examination that when he came back to his village from Delhi, the scribe of the FIR was already there at the informant’s home. 76. It is also noteworthy that in the account of facts, leading up to the lodging of the FIR by the informant, he has admitted in his cross-examination that when he came back to his village from Delhi, the scribe of the FIR was already there at the informant’s home. He has most noticeably said that he and other residents of the village lodged the FIR after consultation amongst themselves. The ante-timing of the FIR in this case, therefore, is suggestive of adjustment and twisting of facts, may be wholesome mis- statement, which ultimately led the eye-witnesses to speak inconsistent and unreliable in their dock evidence. 77. Now, the question arises why would at all there be a false implication attempted by the informant and other witnesses, who are his closest blood-relatives; his children. It is here that we have to judge whether the motive attributed to the appellants to commit the crime could indeed have worked with the other edge of the double edged sword and served as the cause for the informant to falsely implicate. 78. It is at this stage that we must briefly consider the stand of each of the appellants in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. 79. The appellant, Kale, in answer to the last question under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has said (quoting the question): 80. Likewise, the appellant, Bablu, in answer to the law question in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has said (question quoted): 81. The appellant, Anil, who was not an accused in the case of rape brought by the informant, relating to one of his daughters, has said in answer to the last question in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has said (question quoted): 82. We are mindful of the principle that in a case based on direct evidence, the existence of motive to commit the crime is of little or no relevance. It is relevant to help the prosecution, if a motive exists to assure the Court that the accused is indeed guilty. Nevertheless, in a case that has its genesis in an ante-timed FIR of the second category that we have noticed, where the witnesses are close family members of the victims and have come up with a rather inconsistent and improbable account of the occurrence, the existence of a possible motive to falsely implicate, would have its weight. Nevertheless, in a case that has its genesis in an ante-timed FIR of the second category that we have noticed, where the witnesses are close family members of the victims and have come up with a rather inconsistent and improbable account of the occurrence, the existence of a possible motive to falsely implicate, would have its weight. Every blood-relative, who is a witness, cannot be regarded partisan or interested. A witness becomes interested, if being a relative and may be for some reason as well, he bears some kind of grudge, ill-will or animosity against the accused and would want him convicted. A relative witness is not synonymous with an interested witness and this position of the law is well settled. In judging the credibility of witnesses, it is also a well regarded principle that a relative of the victim would be the last person to see an innocent convicted and the perpetrator going scot-free. Therefore, being a relative, does not of itself make a witness interested. Rather, it entitles him to weight, if his account is found to be truthful, consistent and probable. If, however, a relative witness has some motive to falsely implicate, particularly a grudge or animosity against the accused, his evidence has to be received with a degree of caution and scrutinized with great care. 83. The principles applicable to the appreciation of evidence of relatives, who bear some animosity or grudge against the accused, have been elaborately discussed and summarized with reference to earlier authority by the Supreme Court in Raju alias Balachandran and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2012) 12 SCC 701 . In Raju (supra), it was observed by the Supreme Court: “ Discussion 19. Before us, only two contentions were advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. Firstly, it was contended that since PW 5 Srinivasan was a related and interested witness, his evidence must be closely scrutinised, and if his testimony is put to close scrutiny, it will be quite clear that he ought not to be believed. Secondly, it was contended that the prosecution case was doubtful since there was no evidence except the unreliable testimony of PW 5 Srinivasan. 20. The first contention relates to the credibility of PW 5 Srinivasan. Secondly, it was contended that the prosecution case was doubtful since there was no evidence except the unreliable testimony of PW 5 Srinivasan. 20. The first contention relates to the credibility of PW 5 Srinivasan. It was said in this regard that he was a related witness being the elder brother of Veerappan and the son of Marudayi, both of whom were victims of the homicidal attack. It was also said that he was an interested witness since Veerappan (and therefore PW 5 Srinivasan) had some enmity with the appellants. It was said that for both reasons, his testimony lacks credibility. 21. What is the difference between a related witness and an interested witness? This has been brought out in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [ (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] . It was held that: (SCC p. 754, para 7) “7. … True, it is, she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot be called an ‘interested’ witness. She is related to the deceased. ‘Related’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be ‘interested’.” 22. In light of the Constitution Bench decision in State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh [ AIR 1958 SC 500 : 1958 Cri LJ 976] , the view that a “natural witness” or “the only possible eyewitness” cannot be an interested witness may not be, with respect, correct. In Basawan Singh [ AIR 1958 SC 500 : 1958 Cri LJ 976] , a trap witness (who would be a natural eyewitness) was considered an interested witness since he was “concerned in the success of the trap”. The Constitution Bench held: (AIR p. 506, para 15) “15. In Basawan Singh [ AIR 1958 SC 500 : 1958 Cri LJ 976] , a trap witness (who would be a natural eyewitness) was considered an interested witness since he was “concerned in the success of the trap”. The Constitution Bench held: (AIR p. 506, para 15) “15. … The correct rule is this: if any of the witnesses are accomplices who are particeps criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence must be tested in the same way as other interested evidence is tested by the application of diverse considerations which must vary from case to case, and in a proper case, the court may even look for independent corroboration before convicting the accused person.” 23. The wife of a deceased (as in Kalki [ (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] ), undoubtedly related to the victim, would be interested in seeing the accused person punished—in fact, she would be the most interested in seeing the accused person punished. It can hardly be said that she is not an interested witness. The view expressed in Kalki [ (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593] is too narrow and generalised and needs a rethink. 24. For the time being, we are concerned with four categories of witnesses—a third party disinterested and unrelated witness (such as a bystander or passer-by); a third party interested witness (such as a trap witness); a related and therefore an interested witness (such as the wife of the victim) having an interest in seeing that the accused is punished; a related and therefore an interested witness (such as the wife or brother of the victim) having an interest in seeing the accused punished and also having some enmity with the accused. But, more than the categorisation of a witness, the issue really is one of appreciation of the evidence of a witness. A court should examine the evidence of a related and interested witness having an interest in seeing the accused punished and also having some enmity with the accused with greater care and caution than the evidence of a third party disinterested and unrelated witness. This is all that is expected and required. 25. A court should examine the evidence of a related and interested witness having an interest in seeing the accused punished and also having some enmity with the accused with greater care and caution than the evidence of a third party disinterested and unrelated witness. This is all that is expected and required. 25. In the present case, PW 5 Srinivasan is not only a related and interested witness, but also someone who has an enmity with the appellants. His evidence, therefore, needs to be scrutinised with great care and caution. 26. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab [(1953) 2 SCC 36 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465 : 1954 SCR 145 ] this Court observed, without any generalisation, that a related witness would ordinarily speak the truth, but in the case of an enmity there may be a tendency to drag in an innocent person as an accused—each case has to be considered on its own facts. This is what this Court had to say: (AIR p. 366, para 26) “26. A witness is normally to be considered independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. However, we are not attempting any sweeping generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts. Our observations are only made to combat what is so often put forward in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.” 27. How the evidence of such a witness should be looked at was again considered in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1965 SC 328 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350 : (1964) 3 SCR 397 ] . There is no such general rule. Each case must be limited to and be governed by its own facts.” 27. How the evidence of such a witness should be looked at was again considered in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1965 SC 328 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 350 : (1964) 3 SCR 397 ] . This Court was of the opinion that a related or interested witness may not be hostile to the assailant, but if he is, then his evidence must be examined very carefully and all the infirmities taken into account. It was observed that where the witness shares the hostility of the victim against the assailant, it would be unlikely that he would not name the real assailant but would substitute the real assailant with the “enemy” of the victim. This is what this Court said: (AIR p. 331, para 6) “6. There can be no doubt that in a murder case when evidence is given by near relatives of the victim and the murder is alleged to have been committed by the enemy of the family, criminal courts must examine the evidence of the interested witnesses, like the relatives of the victim, very carefully. But a person may be interested in the victim, being his relation or otherwise, and may not necessarily be hostile to the accused. In that case, the fact that the witness was related to the victim or was his friend, may not necessarily introduce any infirmity in his evidence. But where the witness is a close relation of the victim and is shown to share the victim's hostility to his assailant, that naturally makes it necessary for the criminal courts to examine the evidence given by such witness very carefully and scrutinise all the infirmities in that evidence before deciding to act upon it. … [I]t may be relevant to remember that though the witness is hostile to the assailant, it is not likely that he would deliberately omit to name the real assailant and substitute in his place the name of the enemy of the family out of malice. The desire to punish the victim would be so powerful in his mind that he would unhesitatingly name the real assailant and would not think of substituting in his place the enemy of the family though he was not concerned with the assault. The desire to punish the victim would be so powerful in his mind that he would unhesitatingly name the real assailant and would not think of substituting in his place the enemy of the family though he was not concerned with the assault. It is not improbable that in giving evidence, such a witness may name the real assailant and may add other persons out of malice and enmity and that is a factor which has to be borne in mind in appreciating the evidence of interested witnesses. On principle, however, it is difficult to accept the plea that if a witness is shown to be a relative of the deceased and it is also shown that he shared the hostility of the victim towards the assailant, his evidence can never be accepted unless it is corroborated on material particulars.” 28. More recently, in Waman v. State of Maharashtra [ (2011) 7 SCC 295 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 83] this Court dealt with the case of a related witness (though not a witness inimical to the assailant) and while referring to and relying upon Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 646] , Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [ (2010) 6 SCC 673 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 211] , Prahalad Patel v. State of M.P. [ (2011) 4 SCC 262 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] , Israr v. State of U.P. [ (2005) 9 SCC 616 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1260] , S. Sudershan Reddy v. State of A.P. [(2006) 10 SCC 163 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 503] , State of U.P. v. Naresh [ (2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] , Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2009) 9 SCC 719 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] and Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan [ (2009) 10 SCC 477 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 302] it was held: (Waman case [ (2011) 7 SCC 295 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 83] , SCC p. 302, para 20) “20. It is clear that merely because the witnesses are related to the complainant or the deceased, their evidence cannot be thrown out. If their evidence is found to be consistent and true, the fact of being a relative cannot by itself discredit their evidence. It is clear that merely because the witnesses are related to the complainant or the deceased, their evidence cannot be thrown out. If their evidence is found to be consistent and true, the fact of being a relative cannot by itself discredit their evidence. In other words, the relationship is not a factor to affect the credibility of a witness and the courts have to scrutinise their evidence meticulously with a little care.” 29. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a related or interested witness should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny. However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as held in Dalip Singh [(1953) 2 SCC 36 : AIR 1953 SC 364 : 1953 Cri LJ 1465 : 1954 SCR 145 ] and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 646] in the following words: (Sarwan Singh case [ (1976) 4 SCC 369 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 646] , SCC p. 376, para 10) “10. … The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that approach is made and the court is satisfied that the evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration.”” 84. The principles in Raju have been followed by the Supreme Court as recently as in Edakkandi Dineshan alias P. Dineshan and others v. State of Kerala, (2025) 3 SCC 273 . 85. Now, in the present case, we have two eye witnesses, one an injured, and, the other, who claims to have seen the appellants commit the crime. We have found on a careful scrutiny of their evidence that though they were inmates of the house and one of them had sustained severe injuries in the assault, their account of the occurrence, including the identity of the assailants, is inherently doubtful and the two accounts carry contradictions about the manner of assault. 86. We have found on a careful scrutiny of their evidence that though they were inmates of the house and one of them had sustained severe injuries in the assault, their account of the occurrence, including the identity of the assailants, is inherently doubtful and the two accounts carry contradictions about the manner of assault. 86. The identity of the assailants, who threw acid on the deceased and the manner of assault, do not inspire confidence about the truthfulness or reliability of the accounts of the occurrence by these two witnesses. The rather improbable account of the occurrence by the two eye-witnesses and the contradictions amongst themselves, when viewed in the foreshadow of the motive against two of the three appellants, that the first informant, PW-1, and his family members, that is to say, PW-2 and PW-3 had, it is perilous to accept the prosecution case as one supported by testimony that is free from blemish and dependable. 87. The motive for the informant and his family members, to wit, PW-2 and PW-3, the eye-witnesses, to falsely implicate the appellants, is the fact that these men were charged with ravishing the first informant's daughter and convicted in that case. In these circumstances, for the first informant and the two eye-witnesses, who are blood-relatives of the victim in the earlier case, to falsely implicate the appellants, Kale and Bablu, if they did not see the assailants of this case at all, cannot be ruled out. PW-2, who is an injured witness, has acknowledged at the end of his testimony that all of them were asleep and did not know anything. Therefore, for the victims, it was a blind case, where they did not know who were the assailants. The witnesses, placed in these circumstances, harboured, as they would, a good amount of animosity against appellant Nos.1 and 2 on account of these two men being involved in ravishing the informant's daughter and the witness's sister are interested witnesses. Their testimony, therefore, which is otherwise found inherently unreliable, improbable and contradictory, cannot at all be accepted. 88. So far as the motive against the appellant, Anil, is concerned, it has figured in the cross-examination of PW-3, Babita, that there was some dispute and sharp exchange of words between him and the first informant over the issue of dumping garbage. The witness has said that her father, the informant, bears animosity against Anil. 88. So far as the motive against the appellant, Anil, is concerned, it has figured in the cross-examination of PW-3, Babita, that there was some dispute and sharp exchange of words between him and the first informant over the issue of dumping garbage. The witness has said that her father, the informant, bears animosity against Anil. The Trial Court has discarded this consideration for a motive because the learned Judge thought that animosity is something which the informant, PW-1, could have himself spoken of and not his daughter. 89. We do not think that that is a correct approach to the understanding of the informant's motive. An animosity of this kind is known to one and all in the family, spoken of to family members, felt and shared by them. It is not something that is absolutely unknown to others and known only to the first informant, who is said to have quarrelled with the appellant, Anil. The only doubt that may arise is if a neighbourhood quarrel was motive enough to implicate in such a case. Once we have found that nobody knew anything about the identity of the assailants with the eye-witnesses giving inherently improbable and contradictory accounts, the feeling of vengeance and frustration that the informant and other members of the family would have felt, could be motive enough to implicate the appellant, Anil too, against whom they bore a grudge. 90. The fact that the grudge, if any, was on a trivial cause, which could not lead to a false implication in such a serious case, would be a consideration very relevant, if the informant or any member of his family had seen the real assailants and known their identity. If their identity was unknown and it was a blind case, false implication of the appellant Anil, alongside others, whatever grudges were harboured against him, could be motive enough to falsely implicate. This is certainly a strong possibility and probability. 91. This fact taken together with an ante-timed FIR, that was admittedly lodged after consultation with residents of the village, probabilises a tainted prosecution against the appellants. 92. All that we have said about the doubt created as to the prosecution on account of an ante-timed FIR, a motive to falsely implicate, would have been of little consequence, if the eye- witnesses had broadly and consistently proved the prosecution case. 92. All that we have said about the doubt created as to the prosecution on account of an ante-timed FIR, a motive to falsely implicate, would have been of little consequence, if the eye- witnesses had broadly and consistently proved the prosecution case. But, once they have failed to do that, the possibility of a motivated implication, accentuated by an ante-timed FIR, puts the prosecution case under a shadow of grave doubt. 93. It is too well settled for a principle of the law that in a criminal case, after all, it is the prosecution, who have to establish the case beyond all reasonable doubt, and, it cannot be held proved on probabilities or weaknesses of the defence. 94. In the totality of circumstances, we hold that the prosecution have not been able to prove the case against the appellants beyond all reasonable doubt. They are entitled to the benefit of doubt. 95. In the result, these appeals succeed and are allowed . The impugned judgment and order dated 04.09.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1, Bulandshahr in Sessions Trial No.1316 of 2010 (arising out of Crime No.157 of 2010), under Section 326 read with Section 34 and Section 304 read with Section 34 IPC, Police Station Khurja Dehat, District Bulandshahr, is hereby set aside . The appellants are in jail. They shall be released from prison forthwith unless wanted in any other case. 96. Before being released, the appellants shall execute personal bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each under Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) for their appearance, in the event of an appeal being preferred against their acquittal. 97. Let the lower court records be sent down to the Trial Court concerned.