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2025 DIGILAW 1460 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Ramlal son of Shri Baldas

2025-08-08

MANOJ KUMAR GARG, RAVI CHIRANIA

body2025
ORDER : RAVI CHIRANIA, J 1. The State has filed this Criminal Appeal under section 378 (iii) & (i) of Cr.P.C. against the judgment dated 06.07.1998 passed by Shri Mahendra Maheshwari, R.H.J.S., Additional District and Sessions Judge, Parbatsar (Rajasthan) in Session Case No. 28/98 (old number 25/95) whereby the sole accused respondent was acquitted. The State has file the present Criminal Appeal on the following grounds: “ i ) That learned trial court has gravely erred in law as well as in facts while acquitting the accused-respondent by giving him benefit of doubt and the impugned judgment is quite illegal, invalid, manifestly erroneous, contrary to the provisions of law and perverse to the material on record which deserves to be quashed and set aside. ii) That the learned trial court has gravely erred in law as well as in facts in disbelieving the prosecution evidence without any cogent reason which has resulted into grave miscarriage of justice and under these circumstances the impugned judgment deserves to be quashed and set aside. iii) That the learned trial court has not considered the dying declaration of the deceased Chanda Soni which was recorded during the treatment on the police request by the Civil Judge (J.D.) No.7 on dated 11-4-95 in the S.M.S. Hospital. She in her dying declaration has stated that the accused Ram Lal Swami burned her at about 2 O'clock on 31-3-95. It was further stated that the accused-respondent told her that the house has been built by him and has not been transferred to you and threatened her to remove from the house and started abusing. On preventing him from abusing the accused put kerosene over her body and lit the fire and when she cried he carried her inside and poured water over her. It was also stated by her that at the time of her earlier statements she did not take name of the accused due to the reason that the accused threatened him, whereas his husband never quarrels with her. Thus, the learned trial court has not appreciated the dying declaration in right perspective and has ignored the same without giving any cogent reason. iv) That the learned trial court has not properly considered the statements of prosecution witness Rahul who is minor children of deceased also told that his mother was closed in the room after bruning her. Thus, the learned trial court has not appreciated the dying declaration in right perspective and has ignored the same without giving any cogent reason. iv) That the learned trial court has not properly considered the statements of prosecution witness Rahul who is minor children of deceased also told that his mother was closed in the room after bruning her. Moreover, p.w.7 has also corroborated the prosecution case but the learned trial court has discarded the statements of prosecution witnesses merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures. v) That the learned trial court has not considered this aspect of the matter that the presence of the accused-respondent at the spot is very much proved on the record. Thus, there is no reason to take a contradictory view in acquitting the accused- respondent. Moreover, the medical exami-nation of Ram Lal was made after 15 days from the date of incident in support of his contention that the hands were burnt at the time of saving decea-sed, whereas there is no reason to believe on the medical report produced by the accused-respondent. The Dr. Kamal Bajaj has also stated in his statements that the medical examination was made after 15 to 16 days from the date of incident and therefore the medical report is not believable. Under these circumstances, there was no reason for the learned trial court to ignore the dying declaration of the deceased which is against the settled proposition of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in 1997 Criminal Law Reporter page 134, 157. Thus, the learned trial court has not applied its judicious mind while acquitting the accused-respondent by giving him benefit of doubt. vi) That further grounds will be submitted at the time of arguments.” 2. The law in respect of interference by the Appellate Court in the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is well settled. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment passed in the case of “ The State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta ” (2025) 3 SCC 433 while considering the previous judgments held as under: 5. The law in respect of interference by the Appellate Court in the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court is well settled. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment passed in the case of “ The State of Uttarakhand v. Sanjay Ram Tamta ” (2025) 3 SCC 433 while considering the previous judgments held as under: 5. Trite is the principle that the Appellate courts would be slow in reversing an order of acquittal, especially since the presumption of innocence that is always available to the Accused; as a basic principle of criminal jurisprudence, stands reinforced and reaffirmed by the acquittal and unless there are very substantive and compelling reasons to do so, there cannot be a reversal of an order of acquittal. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse and the only conclusion possible from the compelling evidence is of quilt; Appellate Courts will be slow to reverse an order of acquittal. Recently, in Constable 907 Surender Singh v. State of Uttarakhand MANU/SC/0114/2025 : INSC 114, one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) referring to various binding precedents of this Court succinctly laid down the principle in the following manner in paragraph 12: 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the Accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 3. In the light of the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment of Sanjay Ram Tamta (supra) and other judgments passed from time to time, we shall now examine the record of the trial Court and the judgment of acquittal passed in the present case. In the light of the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent judgment of Sanjay Ram Tamta (supra) and other judgments passed from time to time, we shall now examine the record of the trial Court and the judgment of acquittal passed in the present case. As noted from the record of the trial Court, the grounds as raised by the learned Public Prosecutor, the relevant facts of the case are that deceased Smt. Chanda Soni gave her parcha bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ on 31.03.1995 to S.H.O., P.S. Maroth, District Nagaur in which she stated that her husband Ghanshyam Soni disturbs her (matrimonial dispute) and, therefore, at 1:00 PM in the noon she poured kerosene on self and by matchstick lit the fire. She further stated that suddenly neighbour Ramlal Swami came to her house who put water from the pot on her and tried to defuse the fire and while doing so Ramlal Swami also suffered burn injuries on his hands. As per the statement, she had dispute with her husband from last four years and, therefore, she put fire on self. In the last she stated that she has disputes with her husband – Ghanshyam Soni and Ramlal Swami. 4. The above parcha bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ Exhibit P-7, as per record of the trial Court, is reproduced as under: ^^Jhefr pUnk lksuh us iqfyl nfj;k¶r ij crk;k fd vkt fnu esa eSa esjs u;s ?kj esa cSBh Fkh ?kj dk dke dj jgh FkhA esjk ifr ?ku';ke lksuh eq>s ges'kk ijs'kku djrk gSA fnu ds djhcu 1 cts eSaus esjs 'kjhj ij djksflu rsy Mkydj ekfpl ls vkx yxk yhA eSaus vkx yxkus ds ckn fpYykbZ Hkh ughaA esjk iM+kslh jkeyky Lokeh vpkud gh esjs ?kj esa vk;k ftlus esjs 'kjhj ij ikuh dk eVdk Mky dj vkx cq>kbZA vkx cq>kus oDr jkeyky lksuh ds Hkh gkFk ty x;sA esjs ifr ds vksj esjs fiNys pkj lky ls >xM+s py jgs gSA bl dkj.k eSa rax vkdj vkt eSus esjs 'kjhj ij djksflu rsy Mky dj vkx yxk nhA esjk ifr ?ku';ke lksuh vkSj jkeyky nksuks ds fookn gSA blh dkj.k eSaus vkx yxkbZA blds vykok eq>s dqN ugha dgukA^^ 5. On the said parcha bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ , the police registered the FIR bearing No.22/95 dated 31.03.1995 for offences under Section 302 of IPC. On the said parcha bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ , the police registered the FIR bearing No.22/95 dated 31.03.1995 for offences under Section 302 of IPC. During the course of investigation, the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded on 11.04.1995 in the Burn Unit of S.M.S. Hospital, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ACJM’ for short) which is Ex-P.9. The Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division) & Judicial Magistrate-I Class, No.7, Jaipur, Metropolitan, Jaipur recorded the dying declaration in the form of questions and answers. During the course of investigation, the dying declaration of the deceased was recorded on 11.04.1995 in the Burn Unit of S.M.S. Hospital, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ACJM’ for short) which is Ex-P.9. The Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Division) & Judicial Magistrate-I Class, No.7, Jaipur, Metropolitan, Jaipur recorded the dying declaration in the form of questions and answers. The dying declaration, running into four pages, being the important piece of evidence in the present case is reproduced as under: ^^c;ku fnukad 11-4-95 dks le; 1 ih-,e- ij cuZ ;qfuV] lokbZekuflag vLirky esa fy;k x;kA c;ku nsus okyh us viuk c;ku fuEu izdkj ls fn;k %& esjk uke & Jherh pUnk lksuh ifRu Jh ?ku”;ke lksuh mez & 32 o"kZ fu- ekjksB ftyk ukxkSj gky & cuZ ;quhV] ,l-,e-,l- vLirky t;iqjA iz'u & vkidh ;g fLFkfr dSls gq;h \\ mRrj & eq>s jkeyky Lokeh us tyk fn;k ftlls esjh ;g fLFkrh gq;hA iz'u & ;g ?kVuk dSls gq;h \\ mRrj & fnukad 31-3-95 dks le; djhc 2 ih,e ij jkeyky Lokeh fu- ekjksB esjs IykV ij gekjs edku esa vk;k o dgk fd edku o IykV [kkyh dj nksA eSus mls dgk fd ;g rks eSaus cuk;k gS esjs iSls yxs gS o eSa D;ksa [kkyh d:aA mlus dgk fd IykV eSus rsjs uke ugha fd;k gSA vc eSa rq>s fudkyqaxkA vkSj xkfy;ka nsus yxkA eSus xkyh nsus ls euk fd;k rks mlus vkyekjh ls rsy dh ihih mBkdj esjs mij Mky nh o ekphl yxk nhA eSa fpYykdj ckgj vk;h rc mlus eq>s ÄlhVdj vanj ykdj ikuh Mky fn;k o dgk fd ikuh Mky fn;k gS vc esjss i{k eas c;ku nsukA iz'u & vkidks fdlus cpk;k \\ mRrj & gekjs ?kj ds vkl ikl ?kuh cLrh ugha gS blfy, dksbZ cpkus ugha vk;kA iz'u & vkids ?kj eas dkSu dkSu Fks \\ mRrj & ml le; esjs ?kj esa dksbZ ugha FkkA esjs cPps esjs ihgj jgrs gSA esjs ifr Äu';ke lksuh viuh eka ds ikl vyx jgrs gSaA eSa vius ifr ls vyx jgrh gwaA eSa Ldwy esa v/;kfidk gwaA rFkk eSa ?kj ij vdsyh gh jgrh gwaA esjk edku flfu;j Ldwy ds ikl gh gSA tgka ?kuh cLrh ugha gSA iz'u & vkidks fdlus cpk;k \\ mRrj & esjs dks jkeyky Lokeh us gh ikuh Mkydj cpk;kA iz'u & vkidks ;gka dkSu yk;k \\ mRrj & eq>s jkeyky Lokeh us gh ykdj ;gka vLirky esa fn% 31-3-94 dks 5 cts 'kke dks t;iqj esa HkrhZ djk;k gSA iz'u & vkidks tykrs oDr ;g ?kVuk fdl fdl O;fDr us ns[kh gS \\ mRrj & eq>s tykrs oDr esjs ?kj ij dksbZ Hkh ugha FkkA vr% fdlh us Hkh ÄVuk ugha ns[khA eSa fpYykdj ckgj vk;h rc vkl ikl ds dkQh yksx bdV~Bs gks x;s FksA jkeyky Lokeh us mlh le; eq>s xkM+h esa Mkyk o t;iqj ykdj eq>s vLirky eas HkrhZ djok;kA iz'u & jkeyky us vkids lkFk ,lk D;ksa fd;k \\ mRrj & oks esjh tehu o edku gM+iuk pkgrk gSA eSaus mls iqfyl esa crkus dh dgh rks mlus eq>s Tkku ls gh ekj nsuk pkgkA iz'u & vkidks vkSj dqN dguk gSA mRrj & eq>s jkeyky Lokeh us esjh lEifr gM+ius gsrq tyk;k gSA esjs ifr us eq>s dHkh rax ugha fd;k og rks nsork vkneh gSA cl vc eq>s vkSj dqN ugha dgukA mijksDr c;ku esjs }kjk Jherh pUnk lksuh ds crk;s vuqlkj fy[ks x;sA c;ku mls i<+dj lquk;s x;s tks mlus lgh eku dj vius gLrk{kj fd;sA^^ 6. In the dying declaration dated 11.04.1995, the deceased stated, in response to the question that burn injuries were caused by Ramlal Swami. Further in the response to the question she stated that on 2.00 PM dated 31.04.1995 Ramlal Swami came to her house and told her to vacate the house to which she objected and stated that as her money is invested in the house and so she will not vacate. The deceased further stated in her statement that at the time of incident, no one was present in the house except her as she lives separately from her husband. She lives alone in the area where not many houses were situated nearly. She also stated that Ramlal Swami saved her by pouring water on her and he further took her to the hospital where she was admitted at 5.00 PM. The people near to her house gathered while she was in flames and went outside the house. In the closing lines of the dying declaration, according to her, the incident was caused by Ramlal as he wanted to grab her land and house. After remaining in hospital for almost 8-9 days she expired on 30.04.1995. The police after completing the investigation submitted that charge-sheet. The learned trial Court framed the charges and on denial the learned trial Court commenced the trial against the accused. From the prosecution side, as many as 17 witness were recorded namely PW-1 Hiraram, PW-2 Ajau Kumar Sharma, PW-3 Ramesh Kumar Sharma, PW-4 Ratni, PW-5 Rahul, PW-6 Ghanshyam, PW-7 Jivandhan, PW-8 Pratapram, PW-9Banwarilal, PW-10 Ghisaram, PW-11 Hemaram, PW-12 Puranmal, PW-13 Omprakash, PW-14 Ugham Singh, PW-15 Dr. OP Saini and PW-17 Dr. RL Bansal. In documentary evidence, 16 documents were exhibited which is Ex-P1 Site plan, Ex-P2 Seizure Memo of Saree Peticot, Ex-P3 Seizure Memo of Photo, Ex-P4 Peshkarda Kapde accused Ramlal, Ex-P5 Seizure Memo of Sarees, Peticots, Body, Ex-P6 Seizure Memo of Iron Container, Ex.P7 Parcha Bayan of Smt. Chanda Soni, Ex.P8 Letter written to ACJM, Jaipur for recording the statement, Ex.P9 Dying declaration of Chanda, Ex.P10 Letter for sending dying declaration, Ex.P11 Copy of Rojnamcha, Ex.P12 Arrest memo of accused Ramlal, Ex.P13 Information u/s 27 IPC, Ex.P13 First Information Report, Ex.P15 Injury Report of Chanda Devi, Ex.16 Post-mortem Report. 7. The statement of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.. 7. The statement of the accused were recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.. In defence four witnesses were examined, namely, D.W.1-Ramlal, D.W.2-Chandmal Khichi, D.W.3-Devilal and D.W.4-Dr. Kamal Bajaj. 8. After considering the material witnesses and the documentary evidence, as produced by the prosecution, the two dying declarations of the deceased dated 31.03.1995 and 11.04.1995 and the witnesses produced in defence, the learned trial Court by a judgment dated 6 th July 1998 passed the judgment of acquittal on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. 9. Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, the learned Public Prosecutor questioned the judgment passed by the leaned trial Court on the grounds as mentioned in the in the appeal. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, the deceased in the parcha bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ (Ex.P.7) dated 31.03.1995 specifically named the accused Ramlal and she further, in her dying declaration, as recorded by the ACJM, Ex.-P.9, again named the accused Ramlal, specifying the reason, why she was burnt by the accused. 10. The learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit further took us to the statement of P.W-5 Rahul (son of the deceased) aged about six years who is eye witness, according to the learned Public Prosecutor who stated in his statement that the accused-appellant after entering the house caused fire to his mother. 10. The learned Public Prosecutor Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit further took us to the statement of P.W-5 Rahul (son of the deceased) aged about six years who is eye witness, according to the learned Public Prosecutor who stated in his statement that the accused-appellant after entering the house caused fire to his mother. The statement of PW-5 - Rahul (son of the deceased) as recorded by learned trial Court is reproduced as under: ^^ftl fnu esjh eka tyh ml fnu eSa ?kj Fkk esjh eka ds ikl FkkA bl ij eSa esjh eka vkSj eqyfte jkew gkftj vnkyr FksA jkew us igys esjh eka dks ekjk vkSj fQj ?kklysV Mkydj rqyh yxk nh rqyh yxkus ls esjh eka ty xbZ eSa fQj esjs ikik ds ikl x;kA eSa cktkj x;k vkSj ogk esjs ikik dks vkx yxkus dh ckr crkbZ esjs nknk nknh cktkj esa gh jgrs gS esjss nknk nknh Hkh cktkj esa ?kj ij FksA eSus esjs ikik nknk o nknh dks dgk fd jkew us eEeh dks tyk fn;kA ftjg }kjk odhy eqyfte %& tc esjh eka tyh rc eSa ?kj ds ckgj [ksy jgk FkkA esjh eka ftl edku esa jgrh Fkh mlds pkjks vkSj nhokj gS tks ikap N% QhV Åaph gSA iqfyl us eq>ls iwNrkN dh Fkh eq>s /;ku ugh fd ÄVuk ds fdrus fnu ckn iwNrkN dh FkhA ogka iM+kSlh vk;s Fks eSa muesa ls fdlh dk uke ugh tkurkA esjs eEehikik vyx vyx jgrs FksA^^ According to the learned Public Prosecutor, PW-5 Rahul specifically named the accused appellant, therefore, he is a material witness being an eye-witness of the incident. The learned Public Prosecutor further referred to the statement of PW-7, Jeevan Dhan, aged about 16 years, who is also an eye-witness, according to learned Public Prosecutor. As per the statement of PW-7, the deceased and the appellant were fighting inside the house of the deceased and when the deceased shouted, the respondent dragged her inside the house and by pouring the kerosene, accused put her on fire. In the cross- examination also, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, PW-7 supported the case of the prosecution and, therefore, he is an eye-witness of the case. The statement of PW-7 as recorded by the learned trial Court is reproduced as under: ^ 11. In the cross- examination also, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, PW-7 supported the case of the prosecution and, therefore, he is an eye-witness of the case. The statement of PW-7 as recorded by the learned trial Court is reproduced as under: ^ 11. Learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that PW-2, Ajay Kumar Sharma, who is the doctor also supported the story of the prosecution. 12. The statement of ACJM as PW-3, Shree Ramesh Kumar Sharma, who recorded by dying declaration of deceased on 11.04.1995 in SMS Hospital, Jaipur were also recorded by the trial Court. The learned Public Prosecutor by referring to the statement of PW-3 submitted that as the dying declaration was recorded by the ACJM, PW-3, himself in the presence of the doctor, therefore, the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. In term of the above the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that, the learned trial Court committed a grave mistake by not appreciating the two dying declarations and statements of PW-5 and PW-7 while passing the judgment of acquittal. 13. Per contra , Mr. Jayant Jain and Ms. Urvashi Kalla, the learned counsels for the respondent strongly supported the judgment and submitted that the learned trial Court properly examined the allegations of the deceased as levelled against the appellant in her parch bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ (Ex-P7) dated 31st March 1995 and dying declaration (Ex-P9) dated 11 th April 1995 and further the statement of all other witnesses, including the documentary evidence and thereafter recorded in the judgment that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, rightly acquitted the accused. In opposition to the arguments as raised by Mr. Vikram Singh Rajpurohit, the learned Public Prosecutor, the learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Jayant Jain and Ms. Urvashi Kalla submitted that there are serious contradictions in the two dying declarations i.e. the one parch bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ (Ex-P7) dated 31 st March 1995 and second dated 11 th April 1995 (Ex-P9) as recorded by the ACJM, PW-3. In the first dying declaration dated 31 st march 1995, she initially leveled serious allegations against her husband Ghanshyam, however, by taking a somersault, she praised the behavior and conduct of her husband in the second dying declaration dated 11.04.1995. In the first dying declaration dated 31 st march 1995, she initially leveled serious allegations against her husband Ghanshyam, however, by taking a somersault, she praised the behavior and conduct of her husband in the second dying declaration dated 11.04.1995. The learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the deceased, as per her Parch bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ dated 31st March 1995, stated that she has family dispute with her husband from last four years, on account of which, she has put fire on self. The learned counsel further submitted that the complete conduct of the deceased itself is under question as she herself stated about the long pending disputes with her husband on 31 st March 1995, on account of which she is living separately and all alone, and just after 10-11 days she, while giving the second dying declaration dated 11.04.1995 PW-3, praised the conduct of her husband and did not state anything about him. This puts the complete conduct of the deceased herself into question and put serious question mark about the facts she stated in her dying declaration, as given to PW-3. 14. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr. Jayant Jain, further submitted that at the time of alleged incident, as occurred on 31.03.1995, deceased was all alone in the house and when she poured kerosene on self. The learned counsel further, most importantly, submitted that no one witnessed the incident and to support this fact the learned counsel referred to the lines of dying declaration in which she stated that ^eSaus vkx yxkus ds ckn fpYykbZ Hkh ughaA esjk iM+kslh jkeyky Lokeh vpkud gh esjss ?kj esa vk;k] ftlus esjs 'kjhj ij ikuh dk eVdk Mky dj vkx cq>kbZA^^ As per learned counsel, it is only after she put herself on fire the appellant, as per the deceased herself, came to her rescue and poured water on her to defuse the fire. Due to this reason, the fact as stated in the dying declaration by the deceased cannot be read against the appellant and the learned trial Court has not committed any mistake while passing the judgment of acquittal. Due to this reason, the fact as stated in the dying declaration by the deceased cannot be read against the appellant and the learned trial Court has not committed any mistake while passing the judgment of acquittal. The learned counsel further submitted that a perusal of the second dying declaration dated 11 th April 1995 would show the though on one hand deceased alleged that appellant caused her fire ( surprisingly in the second dying declaration ), however, she herself further stated that (in the second dying declaration) without any contradiction and infirmity that it was the respondent who tried to defuse the fire and most importantly it was the respondent who took her to the hospital. At the cost of repetition, the counsel referred to certain questions as put to the deceased by the PW-3 so as to prove that the allegations as leveled against the respondent-accused are frivolous and baseless and he has not committed any offence. At the cost of repetition, the counsel referred to certain questions as put to the deceased by the PW-3 so as to prove that the allegations as leveled against the respondent-accused are frivolous and baseless and he has not committed any offence. The learned counsel took us to the following questions and answers of the dying declaration which is as under: iz'u & vkids ?kj eas dkSu dkSu Fks \\ mRrj & ml le; esjs ?kj esa dksbZ ugha FkkA esjs cPps esjs ihgj jgrs gSA esjs ifr ?ku';ke lksuh viuh eka ds ikl vyx jgrs gSaA eSa vius ifr ls vyx jgrh gwaA eSa Ldwy esa v/;kfidk gwaA rFkk eSa ?kj ij vdsyh gh jgrh gwaA esjk edku fluh;j Ldwy ds ikl gh gSA tgka ?kuh cLrh ugha gSA iz'u & vkidks fdlus cpk;k \\ mRrj & esjs dks jkeyky Lokeh us gh ikuh Mkydj cpk;kA iz'u & vkidks ;gka dkSu yk;k \\ mRrj & eq>s jkeyky Lokeh us gh ykdj ;gka vLirky esa fn% 31-3-94 dks 5 cts 'kke dks t;iqj esa HkrhZ djk;k gSA iz'u & vkidks tykrs oDr ;g ?kVuk fdl fdl O;fDr us ns[kh gS \\ mRrj & eq>s tykrs oDr esjs ?kj ij dksbZ Hkh ugha FkkA vr% fdlh us Hkh ÄVuk ugha ns[khA eSa fpYykdj ckgj vk;h rc vkl ikl ds dkQh yksx bdV~Bs gks x;s FksA jkeyky Lokeh us mlh le; eq>s xkM+h esa Mkyk o t;iqj ykdj eq>s vLirky esa HkrhZ djok;kA^^ By the above quoted questions and answers, the learned counsel for the respondent has tried to support the judgment of the trial Court because by the answers to the above questions, the deceased herself very clearly stated that she was all alone in the house at the time of incident and no one witnessed the incident. Further it is the respondent who tried to defuse the fire by putting water on her and it is the accused only who immediately took her to the hospital on the same day. This, according to the learned counsel for respondent Mr. Jayant Jain, sufficiently proves that had the respondent caused fire to the deceased then there was no reason for him to put water on the deceased to defuse the fire and to take her immediately to the hospital at Jaipur. This, according to the learned counsel for respondent Mr. Jayant Jain, sufficiently proves that had the respondent caused fire to the deceased then there was no reason for him to put water on the deceased to defuse the fire and to take her immediately to the hospital at Jaipur. According to the leaned counsel, it is only because of the effort of the respondent accused that she reached the hospital on time and survive for 8-9 days. 15. The learned counsel for the respondent, in counter to the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor with regard to the two eye witnesses, namely, PW-5 Rahul and PW-7 Jeevan Dhan, submitted that a perusal of the statement of both the witnesses, as recorded by the trial Court while parallely also reading the two dying declarations of the deceased, shows that both the witnesses i.e. PW-5 and PW-7 are not the eye-witnesses of the incident and the facts as stated by them are incorrect and their evidence was rightly disbelieved by the learned trial Court while passing the judgment of acquittal. 16. The learned counsel further submitted that when the deceased herself stated that no one was present in the house at the time of the incident then the statement of PW-5 Rahul and PW-6 Jeevan Dhan itself looses its significance reason being when according to PW5 himself, who was playing outside the house, the wall of which was 5-6 feet high and it was not possible for him to watch, the incident which he has stated to have watched. Therefore, PW-5 is not an eye-witness. 17. In respect of PW-7, the counsel submitted that this witness is also not an eye-witness as he stated to have watched incident from the road which happened inside a house having the boundary wall of more than 6 feet. Even a person crossing the road cannot even witness such kind of incident which has occurred inside a house having a boundary wall more than 6 feet. Therefore, the evidence of the witnesses PW-7 also rightly not found reliable by the learned trial Court while passing the judgment of acquittal. Even a person crossing the road cannot even witness such kind of incident which has occurred inside a house having a boundary wall more than 6 feet. Therefore, the evidence of the witnesses PW-7 also rightly not found reliable by the learned trial Court while passing the judgment of acquittal. The learned counsel submitted that it is only to have the property of the deceased or to grab the property of the respondent, although deceased had no property in her name, the complete story was designed by false statement to implicate the respondent in the case, however, they (witnesses of the prosecution) failed in their attempt as the story of the prosecution was completed discarded by the learned trial Court while passing the judgment of acquittal dated 6 th July 1995. 18. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material record of the learned trial Court and arguments as advanced before us by the learned counsels. 19. The only an important evidence, available on record of the trial Court, are the dying declarations of the deceased. There are two dying declaration one the parcha bayan ¼ipkZ C;ku½ dated 31st March 1995 (Ex-P.7) and second dying declaration dated 11 th April 1995 (Ex-P.9). Both the dying declaration sufficiently, as per the learned Public Prosecutor, proved the guilt of the respondent. On perusal of both the dying declaration, we are not in an agreement to the submission of the learned Public Prosecutor as the deceased herself demolished the case of the prosecution by first leveling the allegations against her husband Ghyanshayam in the first statement and then by praising his conduct in the second dying declaration dated 11 April 1995. Further, she herself stated in both the dying declarations that she was all alone in the house when she put herself on fire and this is sufficient piece of evidence which has demolished complete foundation of the case of the prosecution. An interesting and an important point which this Court has noted that even if this Court accepts the version of prosecution that the respondent caused fire on the deceased then why he would take steps for defusing the fire and without wasting any time would immediately take her to the hospital in order to save her life. An interesting and an important point which this Court has noted that even if this Court accepts the version of prosecution that the respondent caused fire on the deceased then why he would take steps for defusing the fire and without wasting any time would immediately take her to the hospital in order to save her life. According to us, if the respondent had caused fire then he would not have done what he did, also as per the statement of the deceased, for saving her life. Therefore, the statement of the deceased which are in the form of two dying declarations are not sufficient piece of evidence so as to reach to the conclusion that respondent-accused committed the offence as alleged, rather they are sufficient to prove that accused entered the house after deceased put herself on fire and tried to defuse fire and later, he took her to the hospital. 20. We are in agreement with the learned counsel for the respondent that PW-5 and PW-7 are not the eye witnesses because both of them were not present inside the house at the time when the deceased put herself on fire and further according to deceased herself, she was all alone at the time of incident and no one witnessed the incident . Further, both the witnesses, according to this Court, after perusal of their statement, read with dying declaration of deceased, are not the eye-witnesses and, therefore, their evidence cannot be read against the accused respondent. We have also seen the statement of ACJM recorded as PW-3, Ramesh Kumar Sharma, who himself stated that he did not record the fact regarding the fit state of mind of the deceased. Even otherwise statement of PW-3, as recorded by the learned trial Court, are not incriminating to the respondent as he simply stated what he recorded in the form of questions and answers in the dying declaration dated 11.04.1995 of the deceased. As far as dying declaration recorded by the PW-3, Ramesh Kumar Sharma, is concerned of the deceased, we have already discussed above that same is not sufficient to convict the respondent in the facts and circumstances of the case. 21. The law in regard to the dying declaration is well settled by the hon’ble Supreme Court according to which the dying declaration should be free from any kind of inconsistency, contradictions etc. 21. The law in regard to the dying declaration is well settled by the hon’ble Supreme Court according to which the dying declaration should be free from any kind of inconsistency, contradictions etc. and must be sufficient enough to prove the guilt of the accused. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “ Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt of NCT, Delhi) ” reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1633 in para 9 has laid down the following principle in regard to dying declaration: “ 9 . Having considered various pronouncements of this court, the following principles emerge, for a Court to consider when dealing with a case involving multiple dying declarations: 9.1 The primary requirement for all dying declarations is that they should be voluntary and reliable and that such statements should be in a fit state of mind; 9.2 All dying declarations should be consistent. In other words, inconsistencies between such statements should be 'material' for its credibility to be shaken; 9.3 When inconsistencies are found between various dying declarations, other evidence available on record may be considered for the purposes of corroboration of the contents of dying declarations. 9.4 The statement treated as a dying declaration must be interpreted in light of surrounding facts and circumstances. 9.5 Each declaration must be scrutinized on its own merits. The court has to examine upon which of the statements reliance can be placed in order for the case to proceed further. 9.6 When there are inconsistencies, the statement that has been recorded by a Magistrate or like higher officer can be relied on, subject to the indispensable qualities of truthfulness and being free of suspicion. 9.7 In the presence of inconsistencies, the medical fitness of the person making such declaration, at the relevant time, assumes importance along with other factors such as the possibility of tutoring by relatives, etc.” 22. On the support of above principle, as laid down in Hon’ble Supreme Court by Abhishek Sharma (supra), this court noted that dying declarations of the deceased which is Ex-P7 and Ex-P9 fail to pass this test and meet the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned case. 23. In the above paras, we have noted the contradictory stand of the deceased which has demolished the case of the prosecution against the respondent. 23. In the above paras, we have noted the contradictory stand of the deceased which has demolished the case of the prosecution against the respondent. This Court has minutely examined the conduct of the respondent after deep scrutiny of the complete record of the trial Court but we fail to find any concrete evidence which may take us to the guilt of accused. 24. In view of the above discussion and considering the law written by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in regard to interference in the judgment of acquittal, we fail to find no illegality in the judgment of acquittal passed by learned trial court. This Court on the basis of the discussions above noted that the prosecution has failed to prove its case before trial court beyond reasonable doubt and therefore trial court has rightly passed the judgment of acquittal dated 06.07.1995. The State further failed to satisfy this Court in the present appeal so as to make any interference in the judgment of acquittal, while following the law in regard to interference in the judgment of acquittal. The parameters as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court are clear and specific and therefore, no interference in the facts and circumstances of the present case is required in this case. 25. Consequently, the present D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 61/1999 filed by the State against the judgment of acquittal dated 06.07.1995 is dismissed. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481 B.N.S.S, each of the accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond each in the like amount, before the learned trial court, which shall be made effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave, the accused- respondents, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called upon to do so. 26. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned trial Court be sent back forthwith.