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Allahabad High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 1461 (ALL)

Birendra Lal Verma v. State of U. P.

2025-12-19

ACHAL SACHDEV, SIDDHARTHA VARMA

body2025
JUDGMENT : HON’BLE ACHAL SACHDEV, J. 1. Various First Information Reports from the districts of Sonbhadra; Sant Ravidas Nagar; Basti; Ghaziabad, Kanpur Nagar; Jaunpur and Varanasi were lodged and they have been challenged by means of various writ petitions. 2. Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29173 challenges the FIR registered in Sonbhadra on 18.10.2025 which had given rise to Case Crime No.1054 of 2025 under sections 21 & 8 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the "NDPS Act") and sections 318(4) & 319(4) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as "BNS"). In the FIR there are 4 accused persons. 3. The FIR which was lodged in Ghaziabad on 4.11.2025 had given rise to Case Crime No.0691 of 2025 under sections 336(3), 319(2), 318(4), 3(5) of BNS and sections 8, 22, 29, 37 and 60 of NDPS Act. In the FIR there were 17 accused persons. This FIR has been challenged in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28339 of 2025 by Pappan Yadav; in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.26006 of 2025 by Abhishek Sharma and in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.26679 of 2025 by Aasif Mohammad. 4. Thereafter FIR dated 12.11.2025 which was lodged in the district of Kanpur Nagar and which had given rise to Case Crime No.0087 of 2025 was lodged against one Vinod Agarwal and he had filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27128 of 2025. One more FIR was lodged in Kanpur Nagar in which the accused persons were Smt. Manju Sharma and Abhishek Sharma and this FIR had given rise to Case Crime No.0090 of 2025. Manju Sharma and Dr. Abhishek Sharma filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29116 of 2025 challenging the FIR vis-a-vis. them. 5. Another set of writ petitions was pertaining to the district of Jaunpur. The FIR dated 21.11.2025 which had given rise to Case Crime No.354 of 2025 was lodged against 14 accused persons. Against this FIR, Ankit Srivastava filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28628 of 2025; Mohd. Salman Ansari filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28377 of 2025; Anupriya Singh filed Criminal Misc. The FIR dated 21.11.2025 which had given rise to Case Crime No.354 of 2025 was lodged against 14 accused persons. Against this FIR, Ankit Srivastava filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28628 of 2025; Mohd. Salman Ansari filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28377 of 2025; Anupriya Singh filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28393 of 2025; M/s. Milan Drug Centre through its proprietor Arun Prakash Maurya, M/s. Milan Medical Agency through its proprietor Om Prakash Maurya, M/s. Shi Medical Agency through its proprietor Ankul Kumar Maurya; M/s. Harsh Medical Agency through its proprietor Sanjeev Kumar Chaurasiya; M/s. Nigam Medical Agency through its proprietor Devek Kumar Nigam; M/s. S.N. Medical Agency through its proprietor Smt. Mehroon Nisha; M/s. Gupta Trading through its proprietor Saurabh Kumar filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28667 of 2025; Shubham Jaiswal filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28733 of 2025. In the same district i.e. Jaunpur another FIR dated 30.11.2025 was lodged against 4 persons which had given rise to Case Crime No.0357 of 2025. This FIR was challenged by Arun Sonkar (correct name Arjun Sonkar) in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29247 of 2025. 6. Again, in district Varanasi FIR dated 15.11.2025 was lodged against 28 persons which had given rise to Case Crime No.235 of 2025. Against this FIR, Pratik Mishra, Mukesh Kumar Yadav, Rishabh Yadav, Vivek Kumar Khanna and Ankush Singh filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27700 of 2025; Vishal Kumar Jaiswal, Divesh Jaiswal, Adarsh Pandey, Niraj Kumar Singh and Vikas Singh filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27806 of 2025; Bhola Prasad filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27953 of 2025; Niraj Seth and Tushar Agarwal filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27968 of 2025; Shubham Jaiswal filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27985 of 2025 and Dharmendra Kumar Agarwal filed Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27505 of 2025. In the same district another FIR being FIR dated 19.11.2025 was lodged which had given rise to Case Crime No.0343 of 2025. This FIR was challenged by Shubham Jaiswal in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29328 of 2025. 7. The FIR dated 28.11.2025 lodged in Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi) which had given rise to Case Crime No.187 of 2025 was challenged in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29022 of 2025 and the FIR dated 22.11.2025 lodged in Basti and which had given rise to Case Crime No.0217 of 2025 was challenged in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28730 of 2025. 8. The FIR dated 28.11.2025 lodged in Sant Ravidas Nagar (Bhadohi) which had given rise to Case Crime No.187 of 2025 was challenged in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29022 of 2025 and the FIR dated 22.11.2025 lodged in Basti and which had given rise to Case Crime No.0217 of 2025 was challenged in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28730 of 2025. 8. Learned counsel who appeared for the petitioners in all the writ petitions were Sri Nipun Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Naman Agarwal, Ms. Sufia Saba, Sri Ashish Chitransh, Sri B.K.S. Raghuvanshi, Sri Shantanu, Sri Madhukar Maurya, Paritosh Joshi, Shashank Shekhar Misra, Abhijeet Mishra, Ghanshyam Yadav, Akshay Raghuvanshi and Sri Vivek Chaturvedi. 9. If we analyze the various FIRs then the allegations that can be gleaned out against the petitioners were as follows : The FIR dated 18.10.2025 which was challenged in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.29173 of 2025 related to district Sonbhadra and was lodged under sections 319(2), 318(4) of BNS and sections 8 and 21 of NDPS Act. In it the first informant Sri Vinod Kumar Sav, Excise Inspector had alleged that when he, along with his team, in a Government Vehicle No.UP70AG1647 was keeping a vigil during the Dhanteras and Deepawali festival, then through some informer information had been received that two containers having intoxicating syrup bottles were coming from Hinduari and going to Shaktinagar. Upon getting this information, vehicles were checked. The containers registered as RJ11GC1710 and no.MH46AR6826 were intercepted. The drivers of these two containers along with their companions informed that they were carrying certain namkeen and chips packets and they were taking them from Ghaziabad to Jharkhand. When the police became strict and asked them as to what was actually contained in the containers then the drivers and their companions told that in the containers, in between the chips packets and the snacks packets, ESKUF Cough Syrup bottles were kept and were being taken to Jharkhand. Upon getting this information, the Excise Inspector informed Sri Rajesh Kumar Maurya, the Drug Inspector and from the containers 399 sacks were found having 4787 cartons and in total there were 119675 bottles of the medicines. The invoice which the vehicle drivers were having were of 'Hot Mix Namkeen'. Upon getting information that the drug ESKUF Cough Syrup had Codeine as an ingredient, the bottles of the cough syrup were sealed and accordingly action was taken vis.-a-vis. The invoice which the vehicle drivers were having were of 'Hot Mix Namkeen'. Upon getting information that the drug ESKUF Cough Syrup had Codeine as an ingredient, the bottles of the cough syrup were sealed and accordingly action was taken vis.-a-vis. the NDPS Act and other concerned Acts. In the FIR itself it was stated that the articles were being taken from Ghaziabad to Jharkhand. 10. Thereafter the police got active and information was sent to the Ghaziabad police and it was informed that a vehicle had been apprehended in Sonbhadra and with regard to it a case had been registered which had given rise to Case Crime No.1054 of 2025. 11. The first informant in the Ghaziabad case, Inspector Anil Kumar Rajput had lodged the FIR on 4.11.2025 and that had given rise to Case Crime No.0691 of 2025 and upon various enquiries being made information was got from a Mukhbir (informer) that in the Machhali Godam the owner of Bareilly Gorakhpur Transport namely Santosh Bhadana along with his friend Saurabh Tyagi were dealing with the cough syrup bottles and he had informed that these bottles were loaded at the godown and after hiding them in wheat, rice and other articles, they were being smuggled to various places for being used as an intoxicant. Thereafter the Machhali Godam of Bareilly Gorakhpur Transport company was raided, where a 12 tyred truck and two tankers were found parked and in the vicinity in a Creta Car a person was seen sitting, who was supervising the loading and unloading of various cartons from the trucks. The person who was sitting in the Creta Car gave out his name as Saurabh Tyagi, son of Mukesh Kumar Tyagi and from him and his driver was recovered five mobiles with various telephone numbers. The whatsapp chats from his mobile numbers were fed in a pen drive. A laptop was also recovered along with 3 pendrives. Not only that, Rs.20,00,000/- were also recovered. Also recovered, were 4 seals showing the names of the following firms : (i) Darshana Enterprises; (ii) S N Pharma (iii) R S Pharma (iv) the other seal was with regard to the above three firms and their proprietors. 12. A laptop was also recovered along with 3 pendrives. Not only that, Rs.20,00,000/- were also recovered. Also recovered, were 4 seals showing the names of the following firms : (i) Darshana Enterprises; (ii) S N Pharma (iii) R S Pharma (iv) the other seal was with regard to the above three firms and their proprietors. 12. Also was found in the bag of the accused Saurabh Tyagi a card showing that he was a citizen of United Arab Emirates and that he was working as an Archive Clerk at Ramada Plaza Deira Hotel at Dubai. There were other cards also available with the accused Saurabh Tyagi and they were with regard to one Sanjit Chakraborti. Matter did not end there. On a 100 Rupee stamp paper, an agreement with one Vanya Enterprises was also found. The arrested person i.e. Saurabh Tyagi informed the police authority that he was having connections with Pappan Yadav who had a firm called “Mederon Health Care” and that he was dealing with the cough syrup. He also informed that the network with regard to the cough syrup was also having its tentacles in Varanasi where Shubham Jaiswal was dealing in the cough syrup illegitimately and he was sending those cough syrups to various destinations. He also told the police authorities as to how the fabricated bills were prepared and were used for the purposes of selling of the cough syrup for illegal purposes. The accused Saurabh Tyagi also ifnormed the police as to how the phones with fabricated IDs and SIM cards were used in the sale and purchase of the cough syrups. Information was also given as to how the e-way bills etc. were prepared for the other purposes but were used for the purposes of transporting the cough syrup. 13. Since information was received with regard to the carrying on of illegal trade of cough syrup in Varanasi, the police party informed the Varanasi police and there the FIR was lodged after certain raids etc. on 15.11.2025 against as many as 28 individuals and that had given rise to Case Crime No.0235 of 2025. Against the FIR filed at Varanasi, eight writ petitions were filed, the details of which have been already given in the very beginning. In the FIR which was lodged vis.-a-vis. on 15.11.2025 against as many as 28 individuals and that had given rise to Case Crime No.0235 of 2025. Against the FIR filed at Varanasi, eight writ petitions were filed, the details of which have been already given in the very beginning. In the FIR which was lodged vis.-a-vis. Varanasi, it was essentially narrated in the FIR that one Shaily Traders of Ranchi, Jharkhand was transferring the cough syrup to as many as 38 firms and these 38 firms in their turn were selling/transferring the cough syrup to smaller distributors. The FIR which had given rise to Case Crime No.0235 of 2025 had also given the details of all the firms etc. and the articles which were apprehended from those firms. It had also stated as to how the articles were transferred to non-existent smaller retailers. Also was mentioned the fact that the smaller retailers were quite often non-existent and that the cough syrup was thus clandestinely being transported to unknown destinations. 14. With regard to Jaunpur, FIR dated 21.11.2025 was lodged and that had given rise to Case Crime No.0354 of 2025 . With regard to the cases at Jaunpur also, the FIRs indicated how the main contraband was taken from Shaily Traders, Jharkhand and thereafter transferred to as many as 12 firms and again thereafter given to smaller firms with doubtful credentials. 15. To the Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28628 of 2025 pertaining to district Jaunpur wherein the petitioner is Ankit Kumar Srivastava and to Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27953 of 2025 wherein the petitioner is Bhola Prasad, short counter affidavits have been filed by the learned Additional Advocate General on behalf of the State. 16. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has, in effect, submitted that in the cases at hand, FIRs were lodged under various sections of NDPS Act, BNS and Drugs and Cosmetics Act and that could not have been done in view of the judgments of this Court and that of the Supreme Court. 17. The FIR in the district of Sonbhadra was lodged under sections 318(4), 319(2) of BNS and sections 8 and 21 of NDPS Act. Similarly, FIR in the district of Basti was lodged under sections 276, 277, 278 318(4) of BNS. 17. The FIR in the district of Sonbhadra was lodged under sections 318(4), 319(2) of BNS and sections 8 and 21 of NDPS Act. Similarly, FIR in the district of Basti was lodged under sections 276, 277, 278 318(4) of BNS. In S.R.Nagar it was lodged under sections 318(4), 338, 340(2), 206(b), 336(3) of BNS; In district Varanasi, two FIRs were lodged one as Case Crime No.0235 of 2025 under sections 26(D) of NDPS Act and the subsequently added sections 8,21 and 29 of NDPS Act and under sections 61(2), 338, 336(2) and 340(2) of BNS. The other FIR had given rise to Case Crime No.03433 of 2025 under sections 8, 21 and 25 of NDPS Act. In Kanpur Nagar also two FIRs were lodged; one as Case Crime No.0087 of 2025 under sections 132, 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340(2) of BNS and another as Case Crime No.0090 of 2025 under sections 340(2), 318(4), 336(3), 338 of BNS and sections 21(c) and 26 NDPS Act. In district Ghaziabad FIR was lodged as Case Crime No.691 of 2025 under sections 3(5), 318(4), 319(2), 336(3) of BNS and section 8, 22 and 29 of NDPS Act. In district Jaunpur, two FIRs one being Case Crime No.354 of 2025 under sections 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340(2), 61(2) of BNS and another as Case Crime No.357 of 2025 under sections 318(4), 336(3), 338, 340(2), 61(2) of BNS were lodged. 18. He submits that under the NDPS Act, there was, under section 8, a prohibition to certain operations. He, therefore, drew the attention of the Court to section 8 of NDPS Act and, therefore, the same is being reproduced as under :- “ 8. Prohibition of certain operations. 18. He submits that under the NDPS Act, there was, under section 8, a prohibition to certain operations. He, therefore, drew the attention of the Court to section 8 of NDPS Act and, therefore, the same is being reproduced as under :- “ 8. Prohibition of certain operations. —No person shall— (a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant; or (b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; or (c) produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation also in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation: Provided that, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of ganja or the production, possession, use, consumption, purchase, sale, transport, warehousing, import inter-State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose other than medical and scientific purpose shall take effect only from the date which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf: Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to the export of poppy straw for decorative purposes.” (emphasis supplied) 19. Since there is a prohibition under section 8(c) of the NDPS Act to produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and further since there were certain exceptions made for the narcotic drug and psychotropic substances for being used for medicinal and scientific purposes after authorisation, he submitted that the articles which were under consideration i.e. the cough syrup “Phensedyl” which contained “codeine”, the case could not be covered under the NDPS Act. For this purpose, learned counsel for the petitioners also took the Court through the provisions of sections 2(xi), 2(xiv), 2(xvi) and 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act which are being reproduced here as under :- (xi) “manufactured drug” means— (a) all coca derivatives, medicinal cannabis, opium derivatives and poppy straw concentrate; (b) any other narcotic substance or preparation which the Central Government may, having regard to the available information as to its nature or to a decision, if any, under any International Convention, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare not to be a manufactured drug, but does not include any narcotic substance or preparation which the Central Government may, having regard to the available information as to its nature or to a decision, if any, under any International Convention, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare not to be a manufactured drug; ……. (xiv) “narcotic drug” means coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium, poppy straw and includes all manufactured drugs; …….. (xvi) “opium derivative” means— (a) medicinal opium, that is, opium which has undergone the processes necessary to adapt it for medicinal use in accordance with the requirements of the Indian Pharmacopoeia or any other pharmacopoeia notified in this behalf by the Central Government, whether in powder form or granulated or otherwise or mixed with neutral materials; (b) prepared opium, that is, any product of opium obtained by any series of operations designed to transform opium into an extract suitable for smoking and the dross or other residue remaining after opium is smoked; (c) phenanthrene alkaloids, namely, morphine, codeine, thebaine and their salts; (d) diacetylmorphine, that is, the alkaloid also known as dia-morphine or heroin and its salts; and (e) all preparations containing more than 0.2 per cent. of morphine or containing any diacetylmorphine; ……... (xxiii) “Psychotropic substance” means any substance, natural or synthetic, or any natural material or any salt or preparation of such substance or material included in the list of psychotropic substances specified in the Schedule; 20. Since after 2014, the concept of essential narcotic drug was also introduced, learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Nipun Singh took the Court through section 2(viiia) of the NDPS Act and the same is also being reproduced here as under : “(viiia) “essential narcotic drug” means a narcotic drug notified by the Central Government for medical and scientific use;” 21. Since after 2014, the concept of essential narcotic drug was also introduced, learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Nipun Singh took the Court through section 2(viiia) of the NDPS Act and the same is also being reproduced here as under : “(viiia) “essential narcotic drug” means a narcotic drug notified by the Central Government for medical and scientific use;” 21. As per section 2(xi), “manufactured drug” would mean only such drug which was covered under the definition of “manufactured drug”. He further submitted that such of those drug which the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette had declared not to be a “manufactured drug” would not come within the purview of the NDPS Act. He, thereafter submitted that under section 21 of the NDPS Act, if there is any contravention with relation to any manufactured drug and its preparation, then it was punishable under section 21 of the NDPS Act alone. Since, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon section 21 of the NDPS Act, for showing the punishment which could have followed a conviction under the NDPS Act vis.-a-vis. “manufactured drug”, the same is being reproduced here as under :- “ 21. Punishment for contravention in relation to manufactured drugs and preparations. — Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or any rule or order made or condition of licence granted thereunder, manufactures, possesses, sells, purchases, transports, imports inter-State, exports inter-State or uses any manufactured drug or any preparation containing any manufactured drug shall be punishable,— (a) where the contravention involves small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to 4[one year], or with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees, or with both; (b) where the contravention involves quantity, lesser than commercial quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees; (c) where the contravention involves commercial quantity, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees: Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.” 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a notification numbered as “S.O. 826(E) dated 14.11.1985 which was issued as per section 2(xi) of the NDPS Act and stated that if Clause 35 of the notification is seen then Codeine which had a scientific name as Methyl Morphine would be a “manufactured drug” but would be excepted from being a “manufactured drug” if it was compounded with one or more ingredients and was containing not more than 100 milligrams of the drug per dosage unit. Since, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon Clause 35 of the Notification dated 14.11.1985, the same is being reproduced here as under :- “35. Methyl morphine (commonly known as “Codeine”) and Ethyl morphine and their sales (including Dionine), all dilutions and preparations except those which are compounded with one or more other ingredients and containing not more than 100 milligrams of the drug per dosage unit and with a concentration not more than 2.5 percent in undivided preparations and which have been established in therapeutic practice.” 23. Learned counsel for the petitioners thereafter also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India : 2015 (2) ALJ 193 and submitted that since the cough syrup in question i.e. Phensedyl was having dilutions and preparations with other compounds and also since codeine was not more than 100 mg. per dosage, therefore, it was not a ‘manufactured drug’ and also would not attract the provisions of the NDPS Act. He further submitted that the petitioners in all the writ petitions had licenses under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the rules framed thereunder and, therefore, he submitted that as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma reported in (2021) 12 SCC 674 the offences which fell under Chapter IV of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 could not be dealt with under the NDPS Act . He relied upon certain paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma which had laid down that the Food Inspector alone was authorized to lodge a First Information Report and not any police officer and, therefore, no FIR could have been registered. He relied upon certain paragraphs of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma which had laid down that the Food Inspector alone was authorized to lodge a First Information Report and not any police officer and, therefore, no FIR could have been registered. Since, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon paragraph nos.158, 158(1), 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168 of the judgment, the same are being reproduced here as under : “158. There is another aspect which may have an important bearing on the issue. Under Section 36-AC of the Act, the offences as mentioned therein which include some of the offences under Chapter IV of the Act are declared cognizable and non-bailable. The provision imposes restriction on the arrested person being released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application and when the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused person is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit an offence. This limitation, is apart from the limitations in CrPC, inter alia. Now, the police officer acting under CrPC even proceeding for a moment on the basis that it is sufficient that a mere memorandum of arrest as required under CrPC is prepared and further there is compliance with other provisions of CrPC also, would it suffice is the question that would arise in the following manner? We have noted from the provisions of the Act and the Rules that it is the Drugs Inspector who is empowered and duty- bound to investigate the complaint about violations of Acts and Rules. He is the person charged with a duty of prosecuting the offenders. If the police officer is merely to be granted a power of arrest and without having any power of investigation then how would it be possible for the police officer to make any investigation under the Act and if no investigation is possible, how would the police officer be in a position to be of any assistance to the Public Prosecutor and, therefore, to the court in the disposal of an application for bail? In other words, it would be based on the records of investigation and material collected by the investigating officer that a court in a case would decide as to whether bail is to be granted or not. How would the police officer seek a remand for carrying out investigation which he cannot do? If the Act and the Rules do not contemplate investigation by a police officer, then, conferring the power of arrest on the police officer, would, in fact, frustrate the working of the Act. On the other hand, if it is the Drugs Inspector who can arrest, the following consequences would follow: 158.1 He has the requisite technical qualifications to properly investigate and prosecute the offender. 159. Declaring the power to arrest with the Inspector, is not to be understood as proclaiming that the Inspector is bound to arrest any person. The provisions of CrPC, relating to arrest, would necessarily have to be followed by the Drugs Inspector. In fact, he is obliged to bear in mind the law, as declared by this Court in D.K. Basu, and the peril of defying the same, would be to invite consequences, inter alia, as are provided therein. As far as the arrest, not being mentioned in Section 34-AA, as forming a ground for visiting the delinquent officer with penalty, it may be noticed that there is a residuary power in Section 34-AA and it would cover any act. We notice that Section 34-AA(d) provides that if any Inspector, exercising powers under the Act or the Rules made thereunder, commits, as such Inspector, any other act, to the injury of any person without having reason to believe that such act is required for the execution of his duty, he shall be punishable with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. 160. Regarding the power for seeking and ordering a remand under Section 167, we would apply the principles laid down by this Court in Deepak Mahajan and the same principles would apply. 161. This process of interpretation would produce the result of harmonising two seemingly irreconcilable commands from the law-giver. This interpretation commends itself to us for the reason that the investigation into offences, under Chapter IV of the Act, would commence, be carried out and would culminate in, in the safe hands of the competent and qualified statutory authority, as designated by law. This interpretation commends itself to us for the reason that the investigation into offences, under Chapter IV of the Act, would commence, be carried out and would culminate in, in the safe hands of the competent and qualified statutory authority, as designated by law. It would also avoid an outside agency like a police officer, being obliged to register an FIR, for the reason that where arrest has to be made, an FIR is to be registered, and, when the registering of the FIR carries with it an unattainable object of preferring a final report under Section 173 CPC, as far as the police officer is concerned. We make it clear that if a police officer is approached with regard to a complaint regarding commission of an offence falling under Chapter IV of the Act, he is not to register an FIR unless it be that a cognizable offence, other than an offence falling under Chapter IV of the Act, is also made out. He must make over the complaint to the competent Drugs Inspector so that action in accordance with law is immediately taken where only offences under Chapter IV are made out. 162. As far as the arrest contemplated under Section 41 CrPC is concerned, in case a cognizable offence, falling under Chapter IV of the Act, is committed, either in the presence of the Drugs Inspector, or in respect of which offence, a police officer would have power to arrest, as provided therein viz. covered by the situations contemplated under Section 41(ba), the Drugs Inspector would be entitled to effect the arrest. We are arriving at this conclusion on the basis that since the procedure under CrPC is to be read as applicable, except to the extent that a different procedure is to be provided under the Act, and since there is no procedure or power otherwise provided in the Act in regard to arrest, the powers and procedure available to a police officer, with the limitations on the said power, as laid down in D.K.Basu, as also as contained in CrPC, would be applicable. 163. By way of following Deepak Mahajan, we hold that the Drugs Inspector, under the Act, is invested with certain powers similar to a police officer. Still further, we would hold that the word "investigation" cannot be limited only to a police investigation, as has been noted in Deepak Mahajan. 163. By way of following Deepak Mahajan, we hold that the Drugs Inspector, under the Act, is invested with certain powers similar to a police officer. Still further, we would hold that the word "investigation" cannot be limited only to a police investigation, as has been noted in Deepak Mahajan. Thirdly, we find that the power to arrest a person must indeed flow from the provisions of a statute. The statutory provision under the Act is Section 22(1)(d). The arrested person, under the Act, would be an accused person to be detained under Section 167 (2) CrPC. No doubt, the police officer is bound to provide assistance to the Inspector in case of need to effectuate the arrest where there is resistance or likelihood of resistance. No doubt, in regard to the arrest in relation to offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act, which do not fall under Section 36-AC, the power of arrest would depend upon the provision in the Schedule to CrPC. 164. We again reiterate that the existence of the power to arrest with the Drugs Inspector is not to be understood as opening the doors to making illegal, unauthorised or unnecessary arrest. Every power comes with responsibility. In view of the impact of an arrest, the highest care must be taken to exercise the same strictly as per the law. The power of arrest must be exercised, recognising the source of his authority, to be Section 22(1)(d) of the Act, which is for carrying out the purpose of Chapter IV of the Act or any Rules made thereunder. 165. Section 33-P of the Act, reads as follows: "33-P. Power to give directions.-The Central Government may give such directions to any State Government as may appear to the Central Government to be necessary for carrying into execution in the State any of the provisions of this Act or of any Rule or Order made thereunder." We notice that the Central Government is conferred with powers to give directions to the State Government for the purpose of carrying into execution, in the State, any of the provisions of the Act or any Rule or Order made thereunder. It is for the Central Government to consider the question whether it can, under the said provision, issue directions in regard to the power of arrest, which we have found, subject to what we have stated in this judgment. 166. It is for the Central Government to consider the question whether it can, under the said provision, issue directions in regard to the power of arrest, which we have found, subject to what we have stated in this judgment. 166. Further, Section 58 CrPC provides that the officers-in- charge of police stations are to report cases of all persons arrested without warrant as provided therein. We make it clear that the Drugs Inspector must, apart from other relevant provisions of CrPC, comply with the requirement of reporting. In view of the need to safeguard the interest of persons, who may be proceeded against by the Drugs Inspector, we also hold and direct that the Drugs Inspector will immediately, after arrest, make a report of the arrest to his superior officer. 167. It has been brought to our notice that FIRs have been filed in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. In the view we have taken, no further investigation can be done by the police officer. However, it is in the interest of justice that the FIRs are made over by the police officers to the Drugs Inspector concerned at the earliest. We are persuaded to issue such directions in the exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 168. It would appear that on an understanding of the provisions, arrests would have been effected by police officers in regard to the cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act. Having regard to the fact that we are resolving this controversy on a conspectus of the various provisions of the Act and CrPC, we are inclined to direct that this judgment, holding that police officers do not have power to arrest in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, is to operate from the date of this judgment.” 24. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted that in most of the cases, the Food Inspector or the Excise Inspector (informers) had lodged the FIRs under various sections of BNS. He submits that as per section 2 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the provisions of the Act would be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 and/or of any other law for the time being in force. He submits that as per section 2 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the provisions of the Act would be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930 and/or of any other law for the time being in force. He, therefore, submitted that the FIR which had mentioned other sections of other enactments was a malicious exercise on the part of the informers and thus the FIRs be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioners thereafter relied upon the judgment of this Court in Vibhor Rana vs. Union of India : 2021 SCC OnLine All 908 and submitted that since the composition of the drug Phensedyl cough syrup was covered under Clause 35 of the Notification dated 14.11.1985, the syrup was not a narcotic drug and any dealing in this drug would not be subjected to the provisions of the NDPS Act. He further submitted that the lodging of the FIR under the other sections of the BNS was a malicious exercise which ought not to have been done. Learned counsel for the petitioners relying upon the two notifications of the Drug Controller General of India dated 26.10.2005 and 1.3.2009 further had submitted that the Drug Controller General of India had also in so many words by these notifications stated that for medicines which were using codeine as an ingredient and were not covered by the Entry 35 of the Notification of the Government of India dated 14.11.1985 then the prosecution under the NDPS Act could not be done. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that if the account registers etc. were not being maintained, the case would only fall under the various provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Jharkhand vs. Dr. Nishkant Dubey & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.5476 of 2024 decided on 21.1.2025) and submitted that in that case, the Court had held that when a particular Act had provided a particular method by which the case had to be dealt with then it should be dealt with by the provisions of that Act alone. Nishkant Dubey & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.5476 of 2024 decided on 21.1.2025) and submitted that in that case, the Court had held that when a particular Act had provided a particular method by which the case had to be dealt with then it should be dealt with by the provisions of that Act alone. Learned counsel for the petitioners further relied upon Rule 97 of the Drug Rules, 1945 and stated that as per Rule 97(e), the phensedyl drug was containing the label of “Rx” and that meant that there was no narcotic substance in the medicine. He also relied upon Rule 97(f) to state that if the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance was substantially there then the “NRx” would have been written. He, therefore, submitted that when there was no narcotic drug in the medicine then the NDPS Act definitely ought not to have been applied. He further submitted that at various points of time, the State Government has been trying to regulate the flow of the medicines but whenever it tried to do so, orders were stayed by this Court. He submits that when the Government Order dated 15.8.2022 was issued by the officials of the State Government then on 15.2.2023, the High Court stayed the same. Further when on 21.12.2023 again the State Government tried to interfere in the domain of the Central Government then the High Court stayed the same on 15.3.2024. 26. Sri Imran Ibrahim who appeared for one of the petitioners has also made submissions relying upon section 17 of the BNS and stated that a person was justified to do an act he could legally do and by mistake he had committed some crime then it would be considered that he did the act in good faith. 27. Learned Additional Advocate General Sri Anoop Trivedi on behalf of the State assisted by Sri Pankaj Saxena and Sri Paritosh Malviya, learned Additional Government Advocates has submitted that the FIR is not an encyclopedia of all the occurrences. He submitted that the investigation was going on and that various wrong deeds of the petitioners had been unearthed. He has submitted that the FIR were lodged under various sections of BNS and NDPS Act and vis.-a-vis. them the investigation was going on and as and when the offences committed by the petitioners were discovered, sections were being added for the purpose of the investigation. 28. He has submitted that the FIR were lodged under various sections of BNS and NDPS Act and vis.-a-vis. them the investigation was going on and as and when the offences committed by the petitioners were discovered, sections were being added for the purpose of the investigation. 28. In the counter affidavit which he had filed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27953 of 2025 and 28628 of 2025, there are certain paragraphs which were relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General and as per him were of great importance for the decision of the case. In Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.27953 of 2025, learned Additional Advocate General relied upon paragraph nos.17 to 20 of the short counter affidavit and, therefore, they are being reproduced here as under :- “17. That it is also relevant to mention that this Hon'ble Court vide its order dated 11.12.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 28638 of 2025 (Nilesh Kumar Srivastava Versus State of U.P. and others) pleased to dismiss the writ petition after hearing the case on merits. A copy of order dated 11.12.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 28638 of 2025 (Nilesh Kumar Srivastava Versus State of U.P.and others) is being annexed as Annexure-4 to this affidavit 18. That for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court, a flow chart of illegal trade of Codein base cough syrup, which clearly shows that how sham and fraudulent transportation had been made from M/s Shailey Traders to 38 Firms (Layer-1) of District Varanasi and subsequently transported to other Firms of District Varanasi. A large conspiracy has been made in illegal trade of Codein base cough syrup for the use as Narcotic Drugs. A copy of flow chart is being annexed as Annexure-5 to this affidavit. 19. That it is pertinent to mention that huge recovery of Codein base cough syrup has been made by the Police in Commissionerate Varanasi and case crime no. 343 of 2025 under section 8/21/25 NDPS Act, Police Station Rohaniya, Commissionerate Varanasi and case crime no. 313 of 2025 under section 8/21/22/29 NDPS Act Police Station Ramnagar, Commissionerate Varanasi has been registered and investigation is going on. An entry to this effect has been made in C.D. No. 20 dated 11.12.2025. A Copy of FIRs of case crime no. 343 of 2025 and case crime no. 313 of 2025 under section 8/21/22/29 NDPS Act Police Station Ramnagar, Commissionerate Varanasi has been registered and investigation is going on. An entry to this effect has been made in C.D. No. 20 dated 11.12.2025. A Copy of FIRs of case crime no. 343 of 2025 and case crime no. 313 of 2025 as well as copy of C.D. No. 20 dated 11.12.2025 are being herewith and marked annexed as Annexure-6 to this affidavit respectively. 20. That during investigation Section 8/21/29 NDPS Act as well as Section 61(2), 338, 336(3), 340(2), 318(4) BNS has been added. An entry to this effect has been Court made in C.D. No. 6 and 15 dated 30.11.2025 and 18.12.2025.” 29. In Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.28628 of 2025, paragraphs, as per the learned Additional Advocate General, which were of importance, were paragraph nos.17 to 25 and they are being reproduced here as under:- “17. That it is also relevant to mention that this Hon'ble Court vide its order dated 11.12.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 28638 of 2025 (Nilesh Kumar Srivastava Versus State of U.P. and others) pleased to dismiss the writ petition after hearing the case on merits. A copy of order dated 11.12.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 28638 of 2025 (Nilesh Kumar Srivastava Versus State of U.P. and others) is being annexed as Annexure-4 to this affidavit 18. That for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court, a flow chart of illegal trade of Codein base cough syrup which clearly shows that how a large conspiracy has been made to illegal trade and use a Narcotic Drug. A copy of flow chart is being annexed as Annexure-5 to this affidavit. 19. That during the course of investigation, the investigating officer also investigated the transportation of alleged trade of Codein base cough syrup, at primarily stage, it has been found that no transportation of Codein base cough syrup has been made from District Ranchi (Jharkhand) to District Jaunpur. 20. That it is stated that during investigation the documents furnished by the Firm in B Layer to the Drug Inspector were analyzed and spot inspection were conducted. It was found that at the address of Kedar Medical Agency, a Hotel is being run. At the address of M/s Shakashya Firm there is one residential house and there is no medical store. It was found that at the address of Kedar Medical Agency, a Hotel is being run. At the address of M/s Shakashya Firm there is one residential house and there is no medical store. As far as Shree Medical is concerned, no such medical store is found in the address given, however, the investigating officer recorded the statement of landlord who has confirmed that no medical establishment is situated in this place nor in the vicinity. 21. That it is stated that the reviewing a Firm of Layer B have been found a small closed room and upon verification from the neighbours, it reveals those rooms never get open and no business is conducted ever. 22. That it is stated that documents furnished to Drug Inspector have been found to manufactured and forged. 23. That it is stated that upon further verification of aforesaid forged documents very shocking revelation came to know that these 12 Firms in B-Layer has allegedly sold the drugs, in question to 15 Firms, situated in 7 different districts. Upon physical verification it was found that almost all the Firms in C- Layer are absolutely not existence and as such it is established that the documents showing the sell to from these Firms to B- Layer Firms are forged and manufactured. Surprisingly two of the Firm in the B-Layer are also in existence in C-Layer, meaning thereby the Firms have again purchased the drug in question from other B-Layer Firms. 24. That it is stated that so far as documents pertaining to transportation from State of Jharkhand to District Jaunpur, a team of Police visited Jharkhand and investigated the owner of some Trucks and found that those Trucks have never gone to Jaunpur, in this regard a deep investigation is going on. 25. That it is stated that not only the investigating officer has found that almost all the Firms in C-Layer are the end Firms in district Ghazipur, Varanasi, Kanpur etc. the investigation in different districts in respect of such sale and purchase is required to be co-related.” 30. 25. That it is stated that not only the investigating officer has found that almost all the Firms in C-Layer are the end Firms in district Ghazipur, Varanasi, Kanpur etc. the investigation in different districts in respect of such sale and purchase is required to be co-related.” 30. Learned Additional Advocate General during the course of arguments relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence vs. Raj Kumar Arora & Ors [Criminal Appeal No.1319 of 2013 decided on 17.4.2025] submitted that an offence under section 8(C) of the NDPS Act could have been said to be made out even when the accused was dealing with the psychotropic substances mentioned in the Schedule of the NDPS Act which were not figuring in the Schedule-I of the Rules thereunder. Learned Additional Advocate General submitted that in the judgment of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra) a specific question was framed to that effect which was as under :- “i. Whether an offence under Section 8(c) could be said to have been made out when an accused “deals with” psychotropic substances mentioned in the Schedule to the NDPS Act but not figuring in Schedule I of the Rules thereunder.” 31. He submits that in paragraph nos.53 to 56 of the above judgment, the answer had been given and therefore, paragraph nos.53 to 56 are being reproduced here as under : “ 53. Section 8 of the NDPS Act prohibits certain operations and reads as thus: 8. Prohibition of certain operations. He submits that in paragraph nos.53 to 56 of the above judgment, the answer had been given and therefore, paragraph nos.53 to 56 are being reproduced here as under : “ 53. Section 8 of the NDPS Act prohibits certain operations and reads as thus: 8. Prohibition of certain operations. — No person shall- (a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant; or (b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; or (c) produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter- State, import into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation also in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation: Provided that, and subject to the other provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the cultivation of the cannabis plant for the production of ganja or the production, possession, use, consumption, purchase, sale, transport, warehousing, import inter-State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose other than medical and scientific purpose shall take effect only from the date which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf: Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to the export of poppy straw for decorative purposes. (Emphasis supplied) 54. The mandate under Section 8 is that no person shall produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase, transport, warehouse, use, consume, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or tranship (hereinafter collectively referred to as “ deal in/dealing in ”) any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, except for medical or scientific purposes and in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder. In a case where any such provision imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation, the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances must also be dealt in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation. In a case where any such provision imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation, the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances must also be dealt in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation. The term “psychotropic substance” mentioned in Section 8 must be seen in light of Section 2(xxiii) which refers to the Schedule to the Act and all the psychotropic substances mentioned therein. Additionally, to bring a case within the exception carved out under Section 8, each of the conditions specified therein must be satisfied. In other words, for the accused to take the plea that his dealing in the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance does not constitute an offence under Section 8, it must be proved that the drug or substance was being dealt with (a) for medical or scientific purposes AND; (b) in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of the NDPS Act or the NDPS Rules or the orders made thereunder AND; (c) in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence, permit or authorisation, if any. 55. It is just not enough to prove or establish that the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance is capable of being used for a medical or scientific purpose. That would give unnecessary leeway to persons to indiscriminately deal with narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances under the garb that they could also be potentially used for medical or scientific purposes. Moreover, several of these drugs and substances are inherently of such a nature that they have widespread medicinal and scientific applications. Therefore, an expansive interpretation of the exception that the mere potential for usage of the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, for medical or scientific purpose, is sufficient would run counter to the object of the Act which seeks to act as a deterrent to the widespread dealing in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. What must, therefore, be proved to take the benefit of the exception is that the narcotic drug or psychotropic substances was being dealt in for a specified and real medical or scientific purpose, in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of the Act, the rules and orders made thereunder and, in case such provisions imposes any requirement by way of licence, permit or authorisation, in accordance with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation. 56. 56. Therefore, if any psychotropic substance mentioned in the Schedule to the Act is being dealt with for a purpose other than medical or scientific purposes, an offence under Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act would be made out. Furthermore, if any psychotropic substance mentioned in the Schedule to the Act is being dealt with for a medical or scientific purpose, but not in accordance with other provisions of the Act, rules, orders or, the terms and conditions of the licence, permit or authorisations, if any, then also, an offence under Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act could be said to have been made out. It is only when the exception is complied with entirely or wholly, that an accused can lay claim to the benefit provided under the said provision. (emphasis supplied) 32. Learned Additional Advocate General thereafter relying upon that very judgment submitted that if the quantity as it was in this case, was very large and it did not appeal to reason as to why such a huge quantity was being dealt with specially when there was a notification of the Commissioner Food Safety and Drugs dated 15.8.2022 which had provided as to how much of a codeine based cough syrup could be used by the CNF agent, the whole-seller and retailer. Since, learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the Notification dated 15.8.2022, the relevant portion of it is being reproduced here as under : 33. Learned Additional Advocate General stated that even though this notification had been stayed by the High Court but one can guess the enormity of the matter. He states that when only one bottle could have been given on prescription then it does not stand to reason that lakhs of bottles had been found missing after they left the main source i.e. Ranchi. Learned Additional Advocate General also passed on in a sealed cover a communication of the Food Safety and Drug Administration, Uttar Pradesh which indicated that in Varanasi alone 2,23,92,311 bottles were recovered. It may be kept as a part of the record. He, therefore, submitted that even if notification has been stayed, the enormity of the activities of the accused persons could be gaged. 34. It may be kept as a part of the record. He, therefore, submitted that even if notification has been stayed, the enormity of the activities of the accused persons could be gaged. 34. Learned Additional Advocate General, therefore, submitted that looking at the enormity of the entire racket which was prevailing in the entire State and thereafter also in all the neighbouring States namely the State of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Tripura, it could with confidence be said that the chemical codeine which was an ingredient of the cough syrup was not being used for medicinal or scientific purposes. He, therefore, submitted that as per the above judgment of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra) , it could not be said that if codeine based cough syrup was being dealt with then the case should be dealt with only under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act but it would also be dealt with under the NDPS Act and other laws of the land. Learned Additional Advocate General, therefore, relied upon paragraph no.90 of the above judgment and the same is being reproduced here as under :- “ 90. On a conspectus of the foregoing discussion on the scheme of the NDPS Act and its rules along with the D&C Act and the rules made thereunder, the position of law can be succinctly stated as follows: i. A bare reading of Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act defining a “psychotropic substance” would indicate that all the items listed in the Schedule to the Act along with its salts and preparations fall within the purview of “psychotropic substance”. The term “psychotropic substance” mentioned in Section 8 must be seen & understood in light of Section 2(xxiii) which refers to the Schedule to the Act and all the psychotropic substances mentioned therein. ii. Section 8(c) while prohibiting the “dealing in” of all psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the Act, carves out an exception i.e., provides for a situation wherein the dealing in of psychotropic substances would not amount to an offence. However, those conditions forming part of the exception carved out under Section 8 must be read conjointly and not individually. Section 8(c) while prohibiting the “dealing in” of all psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the Act, carves out an exception i.e., provides for a situation wherein the dealing in of psychotropic substances would not amount to an offence. However, those conditions forming part of the exception carved out under Section 8 must be read conjointly and not individually. In other words, for the accused to take the plea that his dealing in the narcotic drug or psychotropic substance does not constitute an offence under Section 8, it must be proved that the drug or substance was being dealt with (a) for medical or scientific purposes AND ; (b) in the manner and to the extent provided by the provisions of the NDPS Act or the NDPS Rules or the orders made thereunder AND ; (c) in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence, permit or authorisation, if any, required under the provisions of the NDPS Act or the NDPS Rules or the orders made thereunder. iii. The NDPS Rules, 1985 have been brought into being by the Central Government in exercise of the powers under Sections 9 and 76 of the NDPS Act, respectively. The underlying object of the NDPS rules is to “permit and regulate” certain activities for carrying out the purposes of the NDPS Act and not to “prohibit” those activities. The NDPS rules must not be understood as laying down standards different from or inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the NDPS Act, especially Section 8 and the Schedule to the NDPS Act. iv. Chapter VI of the NDPS Rules, inter alia, states that the import into and export out of India of all psychotropic substances, including those only mentioned under the Schedule to the Act, must be accompanied by a valid import certificate and export authorisation. However, the import and export of substances enumerated in Schedule I of the Rules is restricted to a pre-determined set of purposes as explained under Chapter VIIA, irrespective of having obtained an import certificate or export authorisation under the other rules of this Chapter. v. Chapter VII indicates that the manufacture of all psychotropic substances, including those mentioned only under the Schedule to the Act must be in accordance with the conditions of licence issued under the D&C Rules. v. Chapter VII indicates that the manufacture of all psychotropic substances, including those mentioned only under the Schedule to the Act must be in accordance with the conditions of licence issued under the D&C Rules. Despite there being a general rule absolutely prohibiting the manufacture, possession, transport, import inter-State, export inter-State, sale, purchase, consumption or use of any of the psychotropic substances which find mention in Schedule I appended to the Rules, still the above activities can be done vis-à-vis the substances mentioned in Schedule I appended to the Rules, provided such activities are in accordance with other provisions of the Chapter which generally apply to all psychotropic substances, and for the limited purposes mentioned under Chapter VIIA. vi. The manufacture of all psychotropic substances mentioned under the Schedule to the Act, and those mentioned under Schedule I of the Rules (provided they are manufactured only for the purposes elaborated under Chapter VIIA), in violation of the conditions of licence of manufacture issued under the D&C Act and its rules would amount to a contravention of Rule 65 of the NDPS Rules and thereby Section 8 of the NDPS Act itself. In other words, due to the operation of Rule 65, a violation of the condition of licence under the D&C Act read with its Rules would ipso facto tantamount to a violation of the NDPS Act read with its Rules. vii. Furthermore, no person shall possess any psychotropic substance, including those mentioned only under the Schedule to the Act for any of the purposes covered by the D&C Rules, unless he is lawfully authorised to possess such substance for any of the said purposes under the NDPS rules. Therefore, Schedule I substances can be possessed only for the purposes mentioned under Chapter VIIA. All other substances mentioned only under the Schedule to the Act can be possessed for the purposes mentioned under Chapter VIIA and also for the purposes falling under the broad umbrella of “medical or scientific purposes” as mentioned under Section 8 of the NDPS Act. The above is in addition to the fulfilment of the requirements under the D&C Rules. viii. The above is in addition to the fulfilment of the requirements under the D&C Rules. viii. The underlying idea that resonates throughout the NDPS rules is that dealing in any of the psychotropic substances mentioned under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules must strictly be in accordance with the NDPS Rules AND ONLY for the purposes enumerated under Chapter VIIA of the NDPS Rules. The substances not figuring under Schedule I of the Rules but listed in the Schedule to the Act must also abide by the requirements cast upon by the NDPS Rules. The difference as regards these substances, however, is that while they may be dealt with for the purposes enumerated under Chapter VIIA of the NDPS Rules, they can also be dealt with for other “medical and scientific purposes”. Whether the accused has dealt with it within the confines of the expression “medical or scientific purposes” would be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. ix. Therefore, the substances under Schedule I to the Rules are more strictly restricted and the remaining psychotropic substances under the Schedule to the Act are more leniently restricted. The different levels in restriction could be seen as the primary reason behind providing two different schedules, i.e., one under the Act and another under the Rules. x. Several decisions of this Court including Hussain (supra), Ouseph alias Thankachan (supra), Ravindran alias John (supra), Sanjay Kumar Kedia (supra), D. Ramakrishnan (supra) and Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) have held that an offence under Section 8 of the NDPS Act can be made out even in respect of substances only mentioned under the Schedule to the NDPS Act and absent under Schedule I of the NDPS Rules. The outlier amongst these decisions was Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra) which was subsequently overruled in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra). xi. To say that no offence would be made out in a case where an accused deals with a substance mentioned only under the Schedule to the Act, would have the consequence of rendering the entire Schedule to the Act useless, unnecessary and nugatory. xii. Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra) assumed that the prohibitory power could only be traced to Rules 53 and 64 of the NDPS Rules respectively, and stated that Rules 53 and 64 of the NDPS Rules respectively, were a genus and the other rules following in their respective Chapters were species thereof. xii. Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra) assumed that the prohibitory power could only be traced to Rules 53 and 64 of the NDPS Rules respectively, and stated that Rules 53 and 64 of the NDPS Rules respectively, were a genus and the other rules following in their respective Chapters were species thereof. Therefore, since Rules 53 and 64 respectively, only related to the substances listed under Schedule I of the Rules, it was held that the dealing in of substances not finding a mention in Schedule I of the Rules and only listed under the Schedule to the Act, would be unregulated by the Rules and thus, would not amount to an offence under Section 8(c). xiii. On the other hand, Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) overruled Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra) by explaining that it is Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act which prohibits various activities with respect to psychotropic substances and the source of this prohibitory power cannot be attributed to Rules 53 and 64 respectively. Rules 53 and 64 are in the nature of an exception to the general scheme of the NDPS Rules. While Rules 53 and 64 state that the substances under Schedule I of the Rules cannot be dealt with in any manner, the other substances i.e., those mentioned under the Schedule to the Act, are also regulated under the other rules in the respective Chapters of the NDPS Rules. xiv. However, what we understand as also being the essence of the scheme of the NDPS Rules is that, it does not absolutely prohibit the dealing in of the substances mentioned under Schedule I of the Rules as held in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra). These substances figuring in Schedule I of the Rules can also be dealt with but only for the limited purposes mentioned under Chapter VIIA of the NDPS Rules. This is evident from the re-phrasing of the NDPS Rules which was effected on 25.03.2015, which according to us, has not changed the meaning of the Rules but only altered its language. xv. Section 80 states that the provisions of the NDPS Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the D&C Act and the Rules made thereunder. xv. Section 80 states that the provisions of the NDPS Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the D&C Act and the Rules made thereunder. Therefore, when an offence under the D&C Act is made out or can potentially be made out, the accused can also be charged or prosecuted for an offence under the NDPS Act or vice-versa. The object sought to be achieved under both the legislations is also distinct i.e. the NDPS Act is a special law enacted to regulate the operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with a view to curb and penalise the usage of drugs by persons for intoxication etc., whereas the D&C Act was enacted to prevent substandard, adulterated and spurious drugs from entering the medical market and to maintain high standards in medical treatment. Hence, offences under both the enactments can also be said to have been constituted simultaneously, where the circumstances so require. ii. Whether the decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande (supra) should operate with prospective effect? a. An overruling decision generally operates retrospectively.” 35. Still further, learned Additional Advocate General relying upon paragraphs 156 to 163 of the above judgment submitted that the NDPS Act would come into operation when codeine was being used in such a vast and enormous quantity. He submits that looking into the enormity of the matter, the case had to be investigated into under all the sections of the various Acts under which the FIRs were lodged. Learned Additional Advocate General in this regard also relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Md. Sahabuddin & Ors. vs. State of Assam : 2012 (119) AIC 45; Union of India vs. Sanjeev V. Deshpande : AIR 2014 SC 3625; Hira Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. : AIR 2020 SC 3255; and State of Punjab vs. Rakesh Kumar : AIR 2019 SC 84 . 36. Learned Additional Advocate General also relying upon the judgments of Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra : AIR 2021 SC 1918 ; State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy : (2004) 6 SCC 522 ; Supriya Jain vs. State of Haryana : (2023) 7 SCC 711 ; Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. 36. Learned Additional Advocate General also relying upon the judgments of Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra : AIR 2021 SC 1918 ; State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy : (2004) 6 SCC 522 ; Supriya Jain vs. State of Haryana : (2023) 7 SCC 711 ; Parbatbhai Aahir & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat : (2017) 9 SCC 641 ; Rajesh Bajaj vs. State of NCT of Delhi : (1999) 3 SCC 259 ; Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi : (2021) 18 SCC 135 ; S.M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat : (2001) 7 SCC 659 ; Somjeet Mallick vs. State of Jharkhand : (2024) 10 SCC 527 ; State by the Inspector of Police vs. M. Maridoss & Anr. : (2023) 4 SCC 338 ; Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I vs. Mahaan Dairies : (2004) 11 SCC 798 and Principal Commissioner of Income Tax III-Bangalore vs. M/ s. Wipro Limited : (2023) 15 SCC 455 submitted that if a cognizable case was made out from the reading of the FIR then no interference was warranted in the writ petition. 37. He then further submitted that if the FIR upon the investigation was found to be such in which the investigation was imperative and a cognizable case was made out then no interference was warranted in the writ petition. In the instant case, he has submitted that a large number of cough syrup phensedyl having the chemical codeine was being dealt with by various petitioners as stockists and sub-stockists and that the manufactured articles were being brought from the State of Jharkhand into the State of Uttar Pradesh and various fraudulent documentation had been created by various drug dealers across the State. He submits that e- way bills were such that the transportation was being done of snacks and chips but in fact the bottles containing the cough syrup were being transported. He further submitted that persons who were dealing with the transferring of the cough syrup were having fabricated IDs and were also having telephone numbers/SIM cards on the basis of fake IDs. He has further submitted that the State-wide racket was unearthed and that 128 FIRs, if not more, had been got registered. He further submitted that persons who were dealing with the transferring of the cough syrup were having fabricated IDs and were also having telephone numbers/SIM cards on the basis of fake IDs. He has further submitted that the State-wide racket was unearthed and that 128 FIRs, if not more, had been got registered. He submitted relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra) that even licencees who were having licenses under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the accused persons had to be investigated vis.-a-vis. their roles in the preparations of the fabricated documents and their roles in the carrying of phensedyl bottles illegally from Ranchi, Jharkhand to the State of Uttar Pradesh and thereafter also to West Bengal and thereafter to Bangladesh. He states that the petitioners in almost all the cases were named in the FIR, the investigation is in progress and that any interference at this stage would be a great hurdle in the progress of investigation. He submits that if interference in the writ petition is done then there would also be a danger of the loss of evidence etc. Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 and M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918 for bolstering his argument with regard to non-interference by this Court. 38. In State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. , the Supreme Court has held : "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we have given the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 39. Also, the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra had laid down the law as under :- “33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "no coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.” 40. Learned Additional Advocate General also submitted that as per section 32(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the police could not be prevented from prosecuting the petitioners under the BNS etc. under which the offence had been committed. Learned Additional Advocate General also submitted that as per section 32(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the police could not be prevented from prosecuting the petitioners under the BNS etc. under which the offence had been committed. He, therefore, relied upon section 32(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act which is being reproduced here as under :- “ 32. Cognizance of offences : 1. No prosecution under this Chapter shall be instituted except by - (a) an Inspector; or (b) any gazetted officer of the Central Government or a State Government authorised in writing in this behalf by the Central Government or a State Government by a general or special order made in this behalf by that Government; or (c) any person aggrieved; or (d) a recognised consumer association whether such person is a member of that association or not. 2. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no court inferior to that of a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under this Chapter. 3. Nothing contained in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent any person from being prosecuted under any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) 41. He also relied upon section 80 of the NDPS Act which is being reproduced here as under :- “ 80. Application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 not barred.-- The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (23 of 1940) or the rules made thereunder.” 42. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioners in the above writ petitions and the learned Additional Advocate General, we are of the view that the petitioners reliance upon the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India reported in 2015 (2) ALJ 193 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in 2001 (12) SCC 164 would not be of any help to the petitioners. In fact the judgment of this Court in Vibhor Rana (supra) also would not be of any help to the petitioners. Definitely, the article which was being dealt with was Phensedyl which as per Clause 35 of the Notification dated 14.11.1985 would not be considered as a ‘manufactured drug’ under the NDPS Act. In fact the judgment of this Court in Vibhor Rana (supra) also would not be of any help to the petitioners. Definitely, the article which was being dealt with was Phensedyl which as per Clause 35 of the Notification dated 14.11.1985 would not be considered as a ‘manufactured drug’ under the NDPS Act. Also, we are of the view that since the license was under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ashok Kumar Sharma reported in (2021) 12 SCC 674 would be applicable to the case of the petitioners, had the other fraudulent acts which the petitioners had committed, not been committed by them. 43. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra) we are definitely of the view that phensedyl medicine which has codeine as a component which was being used in such enormity as was clear from the reading of the FIR then definitely we are of the view that the case had to be investigated into under all the sections of all the Acts under which the FIRs had been lodged. 44. Definitely we find that transferring of Phensedyl cough syrup was being done from Jharkhand to the State of Uttar Pradesh by e-way bills which were not in the proper category of carrying of drugs but were for the purposes of carrying of snacks and namkeen. We have also come across the FIRs stating that the medicinal articles were brought from the State of Jharkhand after concealing them in various grains namely wheat and rice. Not only that, we also find that the persons who were dealing with those articles namely Phensedyl cough syrup were having fabricated citizenship cards, Aadhar cards etc. etc. If fabrication was there as is evident from the FIR then definitely cases of the petitioners would be covered under the various other sections of BNS as well. 45. We also find that quite often the sub-stockists to whom the various main stockists were transferring the articles, were either not in existence or were such stockists who were not maintaining their stock registers etc. properly. 45. We also find that quite often the sub-stockists to whom the various main stockists were transferring the articles, were either not in existence or were such stockists who were not maintaining their stock registers etc. properly. We are also of the view that as per section 32(3) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, the petitioners could be prosecuted under “any other law for any act or omission which constitutes an offence against this Chapter.” Also section 80 of the NDPS Act gives the liberty to prosecute under the NDPS Act along with the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 46. The question thus which throughout was raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the drug phensedyl which has codeine as an ingredient could not be considered as a “manufactured drug” and that action could not be taken under the NDPS Act and other enactments, is thus suitably answered herein above in the judgment. The answer to this question is also readily available in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (supra) . The enormity of the entire matter has to be investigated and, therefore, no question for interference in the FIRs arises. 47. Having observed as above, we part with the case by observing that even though we have not interfered with the case, the investigating agencies would with all sagaciousness, investigate the case and would not in any manner at any point of time indulge in any malicious activity. 48. With these observations, all the writ petitions stand dismissed.