ORDER : Nagesh Bheemapaka, J. Petitioner’s case is that Respondent No.1 is functioning as a specialized branch to handle NPA accounts and undertake proceedings under the SARFAESI Act for realization of security interest. Respondent No.4 is the Head Office of the Union Bank of India, while Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 are formal parties to the case. 1.1. It is stated, Novus Green Energy Systems Ltd., a company under the Companies Act, 2013, had availed several credit facilities from the Union Bank of India through its Mid Corporate Branch, Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. After classification of those loan accounts as Non-Performing Assets (NPA), the accounts were transferred to Respondent No.1 for recovery. The Bank, in order to recover dues, invoked provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and initiated steps to enforce the security interest created by guarantors. Among the securities was the subject property, which had been mortgaged by one Sri Yenigalla Vardhaman through his attorney holder, Sri Yenigalla Anshuman. 1.2. While so, Respondent No.1 issued a public auction notification dated 14.02.2025 for the sale of various properties, including the subject property, stating that property was free from encumbrances and litigation and that the Bank had taken possession. E-auction was conducted on 11.03.2025. Believing these representations, petitioner participated and offered a bid of Rs. 4,86,78,000/-, emerging as the highest bidder. He duly paid 25% of the bid amount, totalling Rs. 1,21,69,500/-, as per the auction terms, whereupon sale of the property was confirmed in his favour. Auction terms also stated that property was free from encumbrances and any court litigation, thereby inducing petitioner’s participation. 1.3. Petitioner asserted that after payment of 25% of the bid amount, he visited the subject property on 15.03.2025 and was shocked to discover a notice board stating that a civil suit, O.S. No. 211 of 2024, was pending before the XIX Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, concerning the same property. Petitioner immediately addressed the letter dated 24.03.2025 to the Bank, enclosing photographs of the notice board and sought extension of time to verify the third- party claims. Bank’s auction sale notice claimed that possession of the property was taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. However, in reality, the Bank had neither taken physical possession nor disclosed the existence of pending litigation. Bank’s auction sale notice claimed that possession of the property was taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 8 of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. However, in reality, the Bank had neither taken physical possession nor disclosed the existence of pending litigation. The Bank’s concealment of litigation and possession details was deliberate and in violation of the statutory requirements under Rule 8(7)(a) and (f) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. Furthermore, the Bank later filed an Application seeking impleadment in the said civil suit, thereby confirming that litigation existed even before the auction notice was issued. 1.4. Petitioner relied on the settled position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Banks’ Association, Bombay v. Devkala Consultancy Services , (2004) 11 SCC 1 wherein it was held that statutory authorities must exercise powers strictly in the manner prescribed and that disclosure of encumbrances and pending litigation is a mandatory statutory duty and not a mere formality. He also cited other judgments, including K. Senthil Kumar v. The General Manager (Writ Petition No. 13269 of 2016) and S. Shanmuganathan v. The Authorized Officer, IOB Bank , [(2017) ibclaw.in 104 HC] wherein it was reiterated that the bank’s duty to disclose encumbrances is a statutory obligation under Rule 9(9) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, and that failure to do so would attract Section 18(2) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, enabling the purchaser to avoid the contract. 1.5. Being disturbed by these developments, petitioner addressed several communications to the Bank on 24.03.2025, 22.05.2025 and 23.05.2025, informing them about the litigation and caution notices, and sought time to verify the third-party claims. Subsequently, petitioner came to know that an ex parte ad interim order had been passed on 28.04.2025 in I.A. No. 757 of 2024 in O.S. No. 211 of 2024 by the XIX Additional Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad, restraining alienation or interference with the property. Upon discovering this, he addressed a detailed representation dated 30.05.2025 to Respondent No.1, seeking clarification and appropriate action. 1.6. According to petitioner, it was the Bank’s responsibility to verify the title, possession and extent of the land before auction. Having relied on the Bank’s representations, he paid the bid amount in good faith. Upon discovering this, he addressed a detailed representation dated 30.05.2025 to Respondent No.1, seeking clarification and appropriate action. 1.6. According to petitioner, it was the Bank’s responsibility to verify the title, possession and extent of the land before auction. Having relied on the Bank’s representations, he paid the bid amount in good faith. Hence, Bank’s failure to disclose ongoing litigation and the interim order dated 28.04.2025 constituted a clear violation of the statutory and judicially-recognized obligation to disclose all known encumbrances. Petitioner stated that in its reply dated 05.06.2025, the Bank admitted awareness of the notice board and that it was taking steps to get impleaded in O.S. No. 211 of 2024. It is stated, due to the pending litigation, he could not peacefully enjoy or utilize the property. The uncertainty regarding the duration of the case prevented him from developing or alienating the property, thereby causing financial loss and distress. Upon further scrutiny, petitioner discovered that mortgage had been executed by the attorney holder, Mr. Yenigalla Anshuman, under a power of attorney granted by the owner, Mr. Yenigalla Vardhaman. Legal examination revealed that the said power of attorney did not authorize the attorney to mortgage the property, rendering the mortgage itself doubtful and possibly invalid. Thus, the legality of the Bank’s action in bringing the property to auction was questionable. 1.7. When petitioner requested refund of the amount paid, the Bank refused and instead issued a threatening e mail dated 05.06.2025 demanding payment of the remaining 75% of the sale price on or before 09.06.2025, failing which 25% already paid would be forfeited. This arbitrary act of the Bank, without addressing petitioner’s grievances or clarifying the legal status of the property, was stated to be illegal, violative of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and the Constitution of India. 2. While issuing notice before admission, this Court by order dated 13.06.2025, taking into consideration the submission of learned counsel for petitioner that petitioner does not want to pursue further with the purchase of the property in view of the litigation on the subject property, directed respondent / bank not to forfeit 25% of the bid amount up to 11.07.2025 and the said order was extended from time to time. 3. Respondents 1 and 4 filed counter asserting that no constitutional rights have been violated; Bank acted strictly as per the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and SARFAESI Rules, 2002. 3. Respondents 1 and 4 filed counter asserting that no constitutional rights have been violated; Bank acted strictly as per the SARFAESI Act, 2002 and SARFAESI Rules, 2002. They took preliminary objection that Writ Petition is not maintainable as Petitioner’s remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the 2002 Act. Petitioner, if aggrieved by any measure under Section 13(4) of the Act, should have filed a Securitisation Application before the DRT. It is a settled position that auction purchasers aggrieved by measures under Section 13(4) must approach the DRT and not to invoke writ jurisdiction. Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 being equitable and discretionary, should be exercised only in exceptional cases, which Petitioner has failed to demonstrate. The Writ Petition is therefore, liable to be dismissed on maintainability. 3.1. It is stated, M/s Novus Green Energy Systems Private Limited (Principal Borrower) availed financial assistance of Rs.113.07 Crores from Union Bank of India, Mid Corporate Branch, Hyderabad. The repayment was secured by immovable properties mortgaged by the Principal Borrower and guarantors, including Mr. Sri Yenigalla Vardhaman. Upon default in repayment, the account was declared as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) on 28.02.2024 and the account was transferred to Respondent No.1 branch for initiating recovery under the SARFAESI Act. Respondent No.1 initiated recovery measures under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, and issued a public e-auction notice dated 14.02.2025 for sale of mortgaged properties, including Plot No.63P (Northern Part), Manasa Hills, Budvel, Rajendra Nagar, Hyderabad (“subject property”) belonging to Sri Yenigalla Vardhaman. As per the e-auction notice dated 14.02.2025, bidders were allowed to inspect the secured assets with prior appointment and required to satisfy themselves regarding title, encumbrances and dues before bidding. The sale was to be conducted strictly on “as is where is,” “as is what is,” and “whatever there is” basis. Respondent No.1 states that it duly complied with all the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and Rules, disclosing encumbrances on the property as known to the Bank, which were ‘NIL’ at that time. The Bank categorically declared that, to its best knowledge, there was no encumbrance on the subject property. Bidders, including Petitioner, were required to conduct their own due diligence prior to bidding. 3.2. The Bank categorically declared that, to its best knowledge, there was no encumbrance on the subject property. Bidders, including Petitioner, were required to conduct their own due diligence prior to bidding. 3.2. Petitioner participated in the e-auction conducted on 11.03.2025 after unconditionally accepting all the terms and conditions, and was declared the highest bidder for Rs.4,86,78,000/-, and was issued a sale intimation letter dated 11.03.2025 directing payment of 25% within one working day and the remaining 75% within 15 days (by 26.03.2025). Instead of paying the balance, Petitioner sent an e-mail dated 24.03.2025 alleging discovery of a notice board on the subject property referring to O.S. No.211 of 2024 before the XIX Addl. Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad. Petitioner alleged non-disclosure of this suit and sought 60 days' extension or time till completion of Section 14 proceedings under SARFAESI Act. Petitioner again, through e-mail dated 22.05.2025, demanded the Bank to take steps under Section14. 3.2(1). Petitioner, by e-mail dated 23.05.2025, informed Respondent No.1 that transfer of balance amount was in process but delayed due to procedural issues in his Capital Gain Account. He requested a 15-day extension, assuring completion of payment within 3 months. This, according to Respondent No.1, shows that Petitioner was fully aware of the terms of the e-auction and voluntarily sought extensions. Later, Petitioner’s letter dated 30.05.2025 stated that an ex parte interim injunction was granted on 28.04.2025 in I.A. No.757 of 2024 in O.S. No.211 of 2024 restraining dealings in the subject property, and questioned the validity of the Memorandum of Deposit of Title Deeds (MOTD). Respondent No.1 notes that this interim order came after the e-auction on 11.03.2025. Respondent No.1 replied by letter dated 05.06.2025 to Petitioner’s letters dated 30.05.2025 and 04.06.2025 stating that Bank was not a party to the suit and no notice was served. However, after the auction, the Bank noticed a board on the property by unknown persons referring to the civil suit. The Bank filed an impleadment application in that suit and no adverse order existed against the auctioned property; the Bank clarified that no stay was granted by the DRT and auction was held under SARFAESI Act, a special enactment for bank recovery; Bank informed Petitioner that extensions had already been granted five times and final deadline to pay 75% balance was 09.06.2025, failing which 25% bid amount would be forfeited. 3.3. 3.3. It is stated, Petitioner, having voluntarily accepted all the auction terms, cannot later challenge the contractual consequences of non-compliance. Forfeiture of 25% deposit is valid under Rule 9(5) of SARFAESI Rules, 2002. The doctrine of estoppel applies as Petitioner cannot now take a contrary position. Respondent No.1 reiterates that it disclosed encumbrances to the best of its knowledge as ‘NIL’. Bank was under no further obligation under Rule 8(6) beyond disclosure of facts within its knowledge. The Principal Borrower and guarantors, who received the sale notice under Rule 8(6) and Rule 9(1), did not disclose any civil suit. Hence, there was no concealment by the Bank. The e- auction terms expressly stated the sale was on “as is where is,” “as is what is,” and “whatever there is” basis, and bidders were responsible to verify title and encumbrances. The Bank made no representation or warranty, and cannot be held liable for any third-party claims. Petitioner participated after accepting the e-auction conditions. 3.4. The judgments cited by Petitioner are inapplicable as the facts differ. Respondent No.1 submits that the Petitioner’s e-mail dated 23.05.2025 shows he had accepted the e-auction terms and sought time due to transfer delays, not because of any alleged concealment. His later objections were afterthoughts to delay payment. The allegation regarding Power of Attorney is false. The Power of Attorney was executed by Sri Yenigalla Vardhaman in favour of his brother Sri Yenigalla Anshuman on 23.12.2015 (Document No.157/BKII-2015) and again on 26.04.2019 (Document No.60-BKIV-19). The Petitioner was free to inspect the property prior to auction but failed to do so. The Bank had no further obligation beyond this disclosure. Petitioner’s request for extensions was accommodated twice, on 25.03.2025 and 27.05.2025, yet he failed to pay the balance Rs.3,65,08,500/-. Consequently, the Bank issued a final letter dated 05.06.2025 warning of forfeiture. 4. Heard Sri V.V.S.N. Raju, learned counsel for petitioner, Sri P. Shashidhar Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 3 rd respondent, Sri K. Rathangapani Reddy, learned counsel for the 2 nd respondent. 5. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and submissions, this Court finds that the principal issue is the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters arising under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 6. 5. Upon careful consideration of the pleadings and submissions, this Court finds that the principal issue is the maintainability of the Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in matters arising under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. 6. The scheme of the SARFAESI Act provides a complete mechanism for redressal of grievances of aggrieved persons under Section 17 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT). Section 17 confers jurisdiction upon the DRT to examine the legality of measures taken under Section 13(4). It is well- settled that when a statute provides a specific remedy, writ jurisdiction shall not ordinarily be exercised. Petitioner, being an auction purchaser, has the same remedy under Section 17 if aggrieved by the measures of the secured creditor. 7. This legal position has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon [ (2010) 8 SCC 110 ], Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [ (2018) 3 SCC 85 ], and Phoenix ARC Pvt. Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [ (2022) 5 SCC 345 ], holding that High Courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 when statutory remedy is available. In PHR Invent Education Society v. UCO Bank , [ (2024) 6 SCC 579 ] the Hon’ble Supreme Court taking into consideration the above judgments held in the following lines: “22. The law with regard to entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of availability of alternative remedy is well settled. In Satyawati Tondon [ United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon , (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260 : 2010 INSC 428] , this Court observed thus : (SCC p. 123, paras 43-45) “43. Unfortunately, the High Court [Satyawati Tondon v. State of U.P., 2009 SCC OnLine All 2608] overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. 44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.” 23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still the courts cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 24. The view taken by this Court has been followed in Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank [Agarwal Tracom (P) Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (2018)1 SCC 626 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 425 : 2017 INSC 1146] . 25. In State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 41 : 2018 INSC 71] , this Court was considering an appeal against an interim order passed by the High Court in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution staying further proceedings at the stage of Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act. After considering various judgments rendered by this Court, the Court observed thus : (SCC p. 94, para 16) “16. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter-affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 26. The same position was again reiterated by this Court in Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir [Phoenix ARC (P) Ltd. v. Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir, (2022) 5 SCC 345 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 153 : 2022 INSC 44] . 27. Again, in Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu [Varimadugu Obi Reddy v. B. Sreenivasulu, (2023) 2 SCC 168 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 58 : 2022 INSC 1207] , after referring to earlier judgments, this Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 181-82, para 34) “34. The order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 was an appealable order under Section 18 of the Sarfaesi Act, 2002 and in the ordinary course of business, the borrowers/person aggrieved was supposed to avail the statutory remedy of appeal which the law provides under Section 18 of the Sarfaesi Act, 2002. In the absence of efficacious alternative remedy being availed, there was no reasonable justification tendered by the respondent borrowers in approaching the High Court and filing writ application assailing order of the Tribunal dated 1-8-2019 under its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the statutory right of appeal available at its command.” 28. It could thus be seen that this Court has strongly deprecated the practice of entertaining writ petitions in such matters. 29. Recently, in Celir LLP [Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) (P) Ltd., (2024) 2 SCC 1 : (2024) 1 SCC (Civ) 62 : 2023 INSC 838 ] , after surveying various judgments of this Court, the Court observed thus : (SCC p. 81, para 101) “101. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. More than a decade back, this Court had expressed serious concern despite its repeated pronouncements in regard to the High Courts ignoring the availability of statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Even after the decision of this Court in Satyawati Tondon [ United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon , (2010) 8 SCC 110 : (2010) 3 SCC (Civ) 260 : 2010 INSC 428] , it appears that the High Courts have continued to exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring the statutory remedies under the Rdbfi Act and the Sarfaesi Act.” 30. It can thus be seen that it is more than a settled legal position of law that in such matters, the High Court should not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution particularly when an alternative statutory remedy is available. 31. The only reasoning that could be seen from the impugned order [M.V. Ramana Rao v. UCO Bank, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3479] given by the learned Division Bench of the High Court is as under : (M.V. Ramana Rao case [M.V. Ramana Rao v. UCO Bank, 2022 SCC OnLine TS 3479] , SCC OnLine TS paras 11-15) “11. It is true that under Section 18 of the Sarfaesi Act, the petitioner has the alternative remedy against the impugned order by filing appeal before the appellate Tribunal. However, having regard to the fact that the writ petition is pending before this Court for quite some time and also considering the fact that if the impugned order is allowed to stand, petitioner would be left without a remedy to ventilate his grievance, we deem it fit and proper not to non-suit the petitioner on the ground of not availing the alternative remedy. 12. Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act provides that any person including a borrower who is aggrieved by the action of secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the Sarfaesi Act may file an application thereunder. The Supreme Court has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act, even to the extent of setting aside an auction-sale. In the instant case, we are consciously not referring to the merit of the case. The Supreme Court has held time and again that the Tribunal exercises wide jurisdiction under Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act, even to the extent of setting aside an auction-sale. In the instant case, we are consciously not referring to the merit of the case. All that we are concerned is whether for whatever reason a person who is aggrieved in law should be left remediless. In the instant case, the petitioner had invoked his remedy by filing securitisation application under sub- section (1) of Section 17 of the Sarfaesi Act. The application was pending for three years before the Tribunal. From the docket order dated 21-9-2020, we find that a junior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had reported that the matter was settled out of Court and therefore, leave was sought for withdrawing the securitisation application which was accordingly granted. 13. When the settlement did not materialise, petitioner went back to the Tribunal for revival of the securitisation application which was however dismissed on the ground that version of the petitioner did not deserve acceptance. 14. On thorough consideration of the matter we are of the view that dismissal of the miscellaneous application of the petitioner by the Tribunal does not appear to be justified. 15. Though subsequent developments may have a bearing on the grant of ultimate relief to a litigant but the same by itself cannot denude the adjudicating authority of its power to adjudicate the grievance raised by the aggrieved person which it otherwise possess.” 32. It can thus clearly be seen that though it was specifically contended on behalf of the appellant herein that the writ petition was not maintainable on account of availability of alternative remedy, the High Court has interfered with the writ petition only on the ground that the matter was pending for some time before it and if the petition was not entertained, the borrower would be left remediless. We however find that the High Court has failed to take into consideration the conduct of the borrower. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent developments, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter. 8. It is further to be noted that, though the High Court had been specifically informed that, on account of subsequent developments, that is confirmation of sale and registration thereof, the position had reached an irreversible stage, the High Court has failed to take into consideration those aspects of the matter. 8. In the present case, petitioner’s grievance pertains to alleged concealment of litigation and forfeiture of deposit amount, which are measures arising from proceedings under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act and Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules. Therefore, petitioner’s remedy lies before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Writ Petition is thus not maintainable. 9. On merits also, this Court finds that e-auction was conducted on 11.03.2025 and interim injunction in I.A. No.757 of 2024 in O.S. No.211 of 2024 was passed on 28.04.2025, subsequent to the auction. The Bank’s disclosure of encumbrances as ‘NIL’ was based on the information available as on 14.02.2025, and there is no material to show that Bank was in the know of the said suit earlier. The terms of auction, particularly Clauses 11, 14, 15, 26, and 28, clearly placed the responsibility on the bidder to verify encumbrances and title. Petitioner, having voluntarily participated, is bound by these terms. The doctrine of estoppel therefore, applies. The Bank’s action of forfeiture under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules, 2002 is legally- valid where the purchaser fails to pay the balance within the stipulated period. Petitioner admitted delay in his e mail dated 23.05.2025 citing procedural reasons in his Capital Gain Account. The subsequent objections appear as afterthoughts to avoid payment. The Bank extended time multiple times and acted in compliance with law. 10. Therefore, this Court holds that there is no illegality, arbitrariness or violation of Articles 14 or 300-A of the Constitution of India in the Bank’s action. The allegations of suppression or misrepresentation are unsubstantiated. 11. For the foregoing reasons, this Court is of the considered view that Writ Petition is not maintainable in view of the statutory remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs. 12. The interim order dated 13.06.2025 stands vacated automatically.