ORDER : S. SUNIL DUTT YADAV, J. This Order has been Divided into following sections to facilitate analysis: Crl.P No.15186/2025 has been filed by accused nos.2, 3 and 7 calling in question the correctness of the order dated 17.10.2025 passed rejecting the application seeking to be enlarged on default bail, while extending time for investigation and for filing of final report under Section 187(3) of Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS", for short) in Crime No.73/2025 for the offences under Sections 103, 190, 61, 189(2) & (4), 109 r/w 3 (5) of BNS, 2023 and Section 25 (1B) (b) of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 3 (i) (ii) 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5) and 4 of the Karnataka Control of Organised Crimes Act, 2000 ("KCOCA", for short) pending on the file of learned LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru and allow the application filed by the petitioners under Section and etc. 2. Crl.P No.15187/2025 has been filed by accused nos.2, 3 and 7 calling in question the correctness of the order dated 17.10.2025 in Crime No.73/2025, allowing the application filed by the Special Public Prosecutor under Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA Act permitting the Investigating Agency to file a Final Report by granting further period of 45 days. 3. Crl.P 15216/2025 has been filed by accused nos.6 and 8 calling in question the correctness of the order dated 17.10.2025 passed under Section 187 (3) of BNSS, 2023 in Crime No.73/2025 for the offences under Sections 103, 190, 61, 189(2) & (4) , 109 r/w 3 (5) of BNS, 2023 and Section 25 (1B) (b) of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 3 (i) (ii) 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 3(5) and 4 of the KCOCA, pending on the file of learned LXXXI Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru. I. B RIEF F ACTS OF THE C ASE :- 4. Smt. Vijayalakshmi, mother of deceased, is stated to have filed a complaint to Bharathinagar Police Station on 15.07.2025 alleging that her son was murdered by certain persons and accordingly, First Information Report was registered in Crime No.73/2025 for the offences under Sections 103 and 190 of BNS. 5. The State of Karnataka had transferred the investigation to the CID subsequently and the said Agency has invoked the provisions of KCOCA against all the accused. 6. 5. The State of Karnataka had transferred the investigation to the CID subsequently and the said Agency has invoked the provisions of KCOCA against all the accused. 6. The accused no.6 and 8 are stated to have surrendered on 16.07.2025 and the said accused have filed an application on 15.10.2025 claiming that they are entitled to be considered for grant of Bail for failure to file investigation report within the stipulated time. 7. It is further made out from the facts that the Public Prosecutor had filed an application on 09.10.2025 for extension of time to file Final Report which application was filed under Section 22 (2) (b) of the KCOCA Act. 8. It is submitted that the Trial Court had granted extension of 45 days to file the final report and consequently has rejected the bail application as having become infructuous. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present petition is filed. II. A NALYSIS A. C ONTENTION REGARDING NON - ENCLOSING COPY OF THE REPORT OF THE I NVESTIGATING O FFICER 9. Learned Counsel appearing for accused nos.6 and 8 Sri. Venkatesh Dalwai has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others , 1 (1994) 4 SCC 602 to contend that the report of the Investigation Officer ought to have been a part of the report of the Public Prosecutor submitted to the Court. It is contended that unless the report of the Investigation Officer is referred to in the report of the Public Prosecutor, the application of mind by the Public Prosecutor as regards the report of the Investigation Officer cannot be discerned. Reliance is placed on the observations of the Apex Court in para 23 which is extracted as bellow: "23. We may at this stage, also on a plain reading of clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20, point out that the Legislature has provided for seeking extension of time for completion of investigation on a report of the public prosecutor. The Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating officer to make an application for seeking extension of time from the court. The Legislature did not purposely leave it to an investigating officer to make an application for seeking extension of time from the court. This provision is in tune with the legislative intent to have the investigations completed expeditiously and not to allow an accused to be kept in continued detention during unnecessary prolonged investigation at the whims of the police. The Legislature expects that the investigation must be completed with utmost promptitude but where it becomes necessary to seek some more time for completion of the investigation, the investigating agency must submit itself to the scrutiny of the public prosecutor in the first instance and satisfy him about the progress of the investigation and furnish reasons for seeking further custody of an accused. A public prosecutor is an important officer of the State Government and is appointed by the State under the Code of Criminal Procedure. He is not a part of the investigating agency. He is an independent statutory authority. The public prosecutor is expected to independently apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency before submitting a report to the court for extension of time with a view to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. He is not merely a post office or a forwarding agency. A public prosecutor may or may not agree with the reasons given by the investigating officer for seeking extension of time and may find that the investigation had not progressed in the proper manner or that there has been unnecessary, deliberate or avoidable delay in completing the investigation. In that event, he may not submit any report to the court under clause (bb) to seek extension of time. Thus, for seeking extension of time under clause (bb), the public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Designated Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer along with his request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the investigation necessary. The use of the expression “on the report of the public prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period” as occurring in clause (bb) in sub- section (2) of Section 167 as amended by Section 20(4) are important and indicative of the legislative intent not to keep an accused in custody unreasonably and to grant extension only on the report of the public prosecutor. The report of the public prosecutor, therefore, is not merely a formality but a very vital report, because the consequence of its acceptance affects the liberty of an accused and it must, therefore, strictly comply with the requirements as contained in clause (bb). The request of an investigating officer for extension of time is no substitute for the report of the public prosecutor. Where either no report as is envisaged by clause (bb) is filed or the report filed by the public prosecutor is not accepted by the Designated Court, since the grant of extension of time under clause (bb) is neither a formality nor automatic, the necessary corollary would be that an accused would be entitled to seek bail and the court ‘shall’ release him on bail if he furnishes bail as required by the Designated Court. It is not merely the question of form in which the request for extension under clause (bb) is made but one of substance. The contents of the report to be submitted by the public prosecutor, after proper application of his mind, are designed to assist the Designated Court to independently decide whether or not extension should be granted in a given case. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied for the justification, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Keeping in view the consequences of the grant of extension i.e. keeping an accused in further custody, the Designated Court must be satisfied for the justification, from the report of the public prosecutor, to grant extension of time to complete the investigation. Where the Designated Court declines to grant such an extension, the right to be released on bail on account of the ‘default’ of the prosecution becomes indefeasible and cannot be defeated by reasons other than those contemplated by sub-section (4) of Section 20 as discussed in the earlier part of this judgment. We are unable to agree with Mr Madhava Reddy or the Additional Solicitor General Mr Tulsi that even if the public prosecutor ‘presents’ the request of the investigating officer to the court or ‘forwards’ the request of the investigating officer to the court, it should be construed to be the report of the public prosecutor. There is no scope for such a construction when we are dealing with the liberty of a citizen. The courts are expected to zealously safeguard his liberty. Clause (bb) has to be read and interpreted on its plain language without addition or substitution of any expression in it. We have already dealt with the importance of the report of the public prosecutor and emphasised that he is neither a ‘post office’ of the investigating agency nor its ‘forwarding agency’ but is charged with a statutory duty. He must apply his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and his report must disclose on the face of it that he had applied his mind to the twin conditions contained in clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20. Since the law requires him to submit the report as envisaged by the section, he must act in the manner as provided by the section and in no other manner. A Designated Court which overlooks and ignores the requirements of a valid report fails in the performance of one of its essential duties and renders its order under clause (bb) vulnerable. A Designated Court which overlooks and ignores the requirements of a valid report fails in the performance of one of its essential duties and renders its order under clause (bb) vulnerable. Whether the public prosecutor labels his report as a report or as an application for extension, would not be of much consequence so long as it demonstrates on the face of it that he has applied his mind and is satisfied with the progress of the investigation and the genuineness of the reasons for grant of extension to keep an accused in further custody as envisaged by clause (bb) (supra). Even the mere reproduction of the application or request of the investigating officer by the public prosecutor in his report, without demonstration of the application of his mind and recording his own satisfaction, would not render his report as the one envisaged by clause (bb) and it would not be a proper report to seek extension of time. In the absence of an appropriate report the Designated Court would have no jurisdiction to deny to an accused his indefeasible right to be released on bail on account of the default of the prosecution to file the challan within the prescribed time if an accused seeks and is prepared to furnish the bail bonds as directed by the court. Moreover, no extension can be granted to keep an accused in custody beyond the prescribed period except to enable the investigation to be completed and as already stated before any extension is granted under clause (bb), the accused must be put on notice and permitted to have his say so as to be able to object to the grant of extension." 10. Accordingly, it is submitted that Investigation Officer's report not being made available to the court as it was not part of the report of the Public Prosecutor, the Special Court was deprived of relevant material to arrive at a conclusion to extend the period of investigation to file Final Report by accepting the reasons made out. 11. At the outset, it would be necessary to extract the relevant statutory provisions. 11. At the outset, it would be necessary to extract the relevant statutory provisions. Relevant extracts of Section 167 (2) of Cr.P.C., reads as follows: "(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that: (a) [the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding, - (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] [(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this Section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage.] (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police. [Explanation I - For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.] Relevant extracts of Section 187 (3) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 reads as follows: (1) XXX (2) XXX (3)"The Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this sub-section for a total period exceeding- (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of ten years or more; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXV for the purposes of that Chapter." Relevant extracts of Section 22 (2) of KCOCA reads as follows: "22. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code. - (1) XXXX (2) Section 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act subject to the modifications that, in sub-section (2), - (a) The references to “fifteen days” and “Sixty days” wherever they occur, shall be constructed as references to “Thirty days” and “ninety days” respectively; (b) After the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted namely:- “Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Special Court shall extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days.” 12. As rightly pointed out by the Additional State Public Prosecutor, the power of the court to extend time for filing the Final Report, is premised on acceptance of the reasons assigned by way of "report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of investigation and specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the period of Ninety days". 13. The plain language of proviso to Section 22 (2) (b) would indicate that the Special Court is to take an appropriate decision on the "report of the Public Prosecutor". 14. No doubt, in para 23 in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) the Apex Court has in extenso refered the importance of the Public Prosecutor applying his mind to the requisition of the Investigating Officer. However, a careful reading of the observations of the Apex Court would reveal that the Apex Court has infact in para 23 remarked that, "…. the Public Prosecutor may attach the request of the Investigating Officer along with his request or application and report..." (emphasis supplied) 15. The Apex Court has reiterated that the report of the Public Prosecutor is not a mere formality. However, the discussion touching upon the importance of the report of the Investigating Officer which is to be subjected to scrutiny by the Public Prosecutor does not have the effect rendering the report of the Public Prosecutor vitiated if the same does not contain the report of the Investigating Officer as an Annexure. 16. The observations of the Apex Court cannot be read without referring to the factual matrix that was under consideration. The factual matrix is reflected in Para 36, 37 and 38 of the judgment in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra). 17. The Apex Court has noticed that what was before the designated Judge was an application filed by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer and addressed to the designated Judge. Para 36 and 37 are extracted for reference and would throw light on the factual matrix. "36. The application for extension which was treated as a report of the Public Prosecutor by the Designated Court and on which extension of time for completion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet was granted has been filed by the appellant as an Annexure P-5 which is available at page 110 of the paper-book and reads thus: “OUT WARD NO. 90/89-P-1993 SUB-DIVISIONAL POLICE OFFICER, WESTERN RAILWAY, CHURCHGATE, BOMBAY. 90/89-P-1993 SUB-DIVISIONAL POLICE OFFICER, WESTERN RAILWAY, CHURCHGATE, BOMBAY. Date : June 29, 1993 To, Hon'ble Designated Judge, Designated Court, Pune. Sub: Regarding progress of investigation and request for extension of period to file the charge-sheet under CR No. 90 of 1989 under Sections 302, 338, 114, 120(b), 147, 148, 149 of IPC and under Sections 3/25(1)(c) of Indian Arms Act and under Section 3 of TADA registered at Palghar Police Railway Station. Respected Sir, With regard to the above, I have to state that with permission of District and Sessions Judge of Thane the investigation of the above case is continued from 23-9-1992…. Received on 12-7-1993 Respectfully submitted Sd/— Date: 29-6-1993 Judge. Judge. Sd/— (M.V. Deshmukh) Sub-Divisional Police Officer D.R. Churchgate, Bombay. Submitted to: Shri Vijay Sawant, Specially appointed Government Pleader, Designated Court, Pune.” 37. As would be seen from the application itself, it is not a report of the Public Prosecutor but an application filed by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer and is addressed to the Designated Judge of the Designated Court. Even if it be assumed from the endorsement at the bottom of the letter which reads thus: “Submitted to: Shri Vijay Sawant, Specially appointed Government Pleader, Designated Court, Pune.”] that the application was submitted to the Public Prosecutor and not directly to the Designated Court, in vain have we searched for any material on the record to show that the Public Prosecutor filed any report along with this application before the Designated Court. In fact learned counsel for the respondents admitted that besides the application, extracted above, no other report was filed by the Public Prosecutor to seek extension of time for completion of the investigation as envisaged by clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of TADA though the Public Prosecutor had filed his objections to the bail application filed under Section 20(4) of TADA read with Section 167(2) of the Code. The Designated Court treated the “It is pertinent to note that in these applications the Investigating Officer had forwarded the report indicating the progress of the investigation on 29-6-1993 and in the said progress report he prayed for extension of two months' time for submitting the charge-sheet on the ground that the prosecution wants to seek sanction of the Inspector General of Police. It may be noted that as per the Amendment Act, 1993, Section 20-A has been added and as per this provision, the previous sanction of the Inspector General of Police would be necessary. Similarly, it is mentioned in the said report that in this matter four police officers have also been involved and prior sanction of the Government for prosecuting the government servants as per the provisions of Section 197 CrPC (is required). Thus, the investigating officer wants time for making compliance of law. Taking into consideration very serious and complicated nature of the offence the prayer for extension of two months' time from 29-6-1993 appears reasonable for seeking sanction to file charge-sheet. It is contended on behalf of the applicant-accused that a report of the Public Prosecutor is necessary. It may be noted that the Public Prosecutor while giving his reply has referred to this report of the investigating officer and prayed for extension of time. The Public Prosecutor is also required to obtain the report from the investigating officer and on the basis of that report the Public Prosecutor files the reply in the court. The reply of the Public Prosecutor, read with the report dated 29-6- 1993 of the investigating officer, is sufficient compliance of the report contemplated under the proviso (bb) indicating the progress of the investigation. Therefore the extension will have to be granted to the investigating machinery for two months from 29-6-1993. In the result the bail cannot be granted.” 18. The Apex Court then proceeds to specifically observe that the request of the Investigating Agency cannot be treated as report of the Public Prosecutor. The observations at Para 38 reads as follows: "38. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the view of the Designated Court that since the application of the investigating officer was supported by the Public Prosecutor, the request of the investigating agency could be treated as the report of the Public Prosecutor when read with the objections filed by the Public Prosecutor to the bail application. The observations of the Designated Court show that the said court lost sight of the importance of the report and treated the whole thing in a rather casual manner. The observations of the Designated Court show that the said court lost sight of the importance of the report and treated the whole thing in a rather casual manner. The application of the investigating officer dated 29-6-1993, reproduced above, can by no stretch of imagination be construed as a report of the Public Prosecutor as envisaged by Section 20(4)(bb) of TADA and therefore no extension under clause (bb) could have been granted by the Designated Court without the receipt of the report of the Public Prosecutor. That apart, even if we ignore the discrepancy in the various dates regarding the presentation of the application in the court it appears from a bare perusal of the application of the investigating officer that the Public Prosecutor did not even endorse the application with any comments to indicate as to whether or not he was agreeing with the statements contained in the application. The Public Prosecutor obviously did not apply his mind to the request of the investigating agency and merely acted as its ‘post office’. The Designated Court was deprived of the opportunity of scrutinising the report of the Public Prosecutor before granting extension. We need not, therefore, even comment upon the reasons given by the investigating officer in the application to test their correctness or otherwise because we are firmly of the view that the said letter/application of the investigating officer cannot be construed or treated as a substitute for the report of the Public Prosecutor as contemplated by clause (bb) of Section 20(4) of TADA. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the objections filed by the Public Prosecutor to the bail application read with the application of the investigating officer may be held to be substantial compliance with the requirements of clause (bb). We cannot agree." 19. The observations made by the court must be read in context and the judgment is not an authority for what it lays down in the abstract but is an authority for what it lays down in the context of a particular factual matrix. It would be relevant to notice observations of the Apex Court in Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 14 which reads as follows: “ 7. It is well settled that the judgment of a court is not to be read mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as if it were a statute…. It would be relevant to notice observations of the Apex Court in Deepak Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 14 which reads as follows: “ 7. It is well settled that the judgment of a court is not to be read mechanically as a Euclid's theorem nor as if it were a statute…. .…17. As held in Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. N.R. Vairamani [ (2004) 8 SCC 579 : AIR 2004 SC 4778 ] a decision cannot be relied on without disclosing the factual situation. In the same judgment this Court also observed: (SCC pp. 584-85, paras 9-12) 9. Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and that too taken out of their context. (emphasis in original) These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. (emphasis supplied) In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. v. Horton [ 1951 AC 737 : (1951) 2 All ER 1 (HL)] (AC at p. 761), Lord MacDermott observed: (All ER p. 14 C-D) “… The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge, …” 10. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [ 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said: “… Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd. [ 1970 AC 1004 : (1970) 2 WLR 1140 : (1970) 2 All ER 294 (HL)] Lord Reid said: “… Lord Atkin's speech … is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) [(1971) 1 WLR 1062: (1971) 2 All ER 1267] observed: (All ER p. 1274 d) “… One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament;” And, in British Railways Board v. Herrington [ 1972 AC 877 : (1972) 2 WLR 537 : (1972) 1 All ER 749 (HL)] Lord Morris said: (All ER p. 761 c) “… There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or a judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 11. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance on a decision is not proper. 12. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus: “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect; in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cardozo [, J.]) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive. *** Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. (emphasis in original) My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. *** Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. (emphasis in original) My plea is to keep the path of justice clear of obstructions which could impede it. (emphasis supplied)”’ ” The same view was taken by this Court in Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (KV) v. State of Maharashtra [ (2008) 1 SCC 494 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 215: AIR 2008 SC 946 ] (SCC pp. 499-501, paras 14-17) and in Govt. of Karnataka v. Gowramma [ (2007) 13 SCC 482 : AIR 2008 SC 863 ].” 20. The observation of the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur (supra) at Para 23 throwing light on the distinction between the inputs of the Investigating Officer vis-à-vis report of the Public Prosecutor is in the context of a report of the Investigating Officer being presented to the court without a separate report of the Public Prosecutor. It is in such context, that the Apex Court has emphasised the distinction between the inputs of the Investigating Officer and the role of the Public Prosecutor in submitting a report to the Court after applying his mind. 21. If the observations of the Apex Court are understood in such context, there is no ambiguity. In fact, the Apex Court has specifically observed that the Public Prosecutor may attach the request of the Investigating Officer. Accordingly, even a reading of the plain language would not admit of a mandatory requirement to attach the report of the Investigating Officer along with the report of the Public Prosecutor. 22. It is necessary to be cognizant of the legal position that unless the Final Report is submitted by the Investigating Agency to the Court the prosecution cannot be compelled to divulge the extent and stage of investigation. Though if in the opinion of the Investigating Officer they are entitled to waive such privilege, which is the prerogative of the prosecution. 23. The absence of annexing the report of the Investigating Officer would not denude the legal value to be attached to the report of the Public Prosecutor. B. F ULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INVESTIGATION BEYOND 90 DAYS AS IS PERMISSIBLE IN TERMS OF PROVISO TO S ECTION 22(2)(b) OF THE KCOCA. 24. 23. The absence of annexing the report of the Investigating Officer would not denude the legal value to be attached to the report of the Public Prosecutor. B. F ULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INVESTIGATION BEYOND 90 DAYS AS IS PERMISSIBLE IN TERMS OF PROVISO TO S ECTION 22(2)(b) OF THE KCOCA. 24. In terms of the proviso inserted as specified under Section 22 (2) (b) the detention of the accused may be further extended beyond the period of 90 days as provided under the Code of Criminal Procedure up to a period of 180 days. 25. The proviso which provides for such extension as inserted by Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA, reads as follows: 22. (2) (b) After the proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted namely:- “Provided further that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of ninety days, the Special Court shall extend the said period up to one hundred and eighty days on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of ninety days.” 26. What becomes clear is that such extension beyond 90 days would be permissible where: i) On the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating progress of investigation. ii) Assigning specific reasons for detention of accused beyond the period of 90 days. 27. At the outset, the uncontroverted facts would reveal that the application seeking extension is filed well within the period of 90 days. The report of the Public Prosecutor is detailed. A perusal of the report would reveal: (a) Progress of investigation at Point 1 to 17 which is self-explanatory is extracted as below: (c) The report also contains the reasons for continuing the detention of accused in judicial custody beyond 90 days. This would relate to the requirement of assigning "the specific reasons f or the detention of the accused beyond the said period of 90 days." 28. Accordingly, it can be stated that the report does satisfy the requirement of the proviso insofar as (i) the progress of investigation is detailed; (ii) the specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond 90 days is also enumerated. C. A PPLICATION OF MIND OF THE P UBLIC P ROSECUTOR 29. Accordingly, it can be stated that the report does satisfy the requirement of the proviso insofar as (i) the progress of investigation is detailed; (ii) the specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond 90 days is also enumerated. C. A PPLICATION OF MIND OF THE P UBLIC P ROSECUTOR 29. What needs to be seen as regards the report of the Public Prosecutor is that there has to be application of mind when the prosecutor is forwarding his report to the court. The report even if it were to endorse in entirety the report of the Investigating Officer by a separate report of the Public Prosecutor and the entirety of the report of the Investigating Officer is adopted, it could stand legal scrutiny if the reliance is on the reacquisition by the Investigating Officer which itself is detailed. However, while adopting the report of the public prosecutor in its entirety the report should also expressly contain the independent application of mind of the Public Prosecutor. It would be appropriate to extract the concluding Para of the report of the Public Prosecutor which reads as follows: 30. A reading of concluding paragraph clearly reflects the independent application of mind of public prosecutor which would be sufficient to stand legal scrutiny. While the entirety of the report of the Investigation officer forms a part of the report of the Public Prosecutor, and the Public Prosecutor proceeds to state that he has applied his mind and requests the Court for extension of time to complete investigation. This would constitute sufficient application of mind. 31. Though the report of the Investigating Officer does not appear to have been produced before the designated Judge, the same has been produced in the present proceedings. The report of the Investigating Officer is detailed and, on its basis, report is made to the designated Court by the Public Prosecutor separately. That by itself in the present facts would be sufficient. D. S ATISFACTION OF THE DESIGNATED J UDGE 32. The report of the Investigating Officer is detailed and, on its basis, report is made to the designated Court by the Public Prosecutor separately. That by itself in the present facts would be sufficient. D. S ATISFACTION OF THE DESIGNATED J UDGE 32. In terms of proviso inserted by Section 22 of KCOCA, power is conferred on the Special Court to extend the period of custody beyond the maximum period of 90 days is on the designated Judge who needless to state is required to be satisfied about the report of the Public Prosecutor being in compliance with the requirements of indicating the progress of investigation and specifying reasons for detention of accused. 33. While the first safeguard is that of application of mind by the Public Prosecutor, the second tier of safeguard is the decision to extend time to complete investigation while accused continues to remain in custody. Such power being exercised by the designated Judge is decision which needless to state has to reflect application of mind. 34. As noticed supra, this decision of extension under proviso of Section 22 (2) (b) is intertwined with power to extend custody in terms of Section 167 (2) (a) of Cr.P.C. Every time extension of order of remand is passed under Section 167 (2) (a) of Cr.P.C., there is a requirement that the designated Judge "is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so". 35. In the present case, the reflection of application of mind of the designated Judge can be found on a reading of the order, the relevant extracts reproduced below: "20. The main aspect which is submitted by the prosecution indicates that genesis for commission of the above case is the real estate dispute which was prevailing between the parties. The learned SPP has submitted that certain documents are required to be confronted to the accused persons which can only be done only on the receipt of the FSL and further the accused No.5 has obtained necessary interim protection by the kind orders of the Hon'ble High court. It is submitted that he was the main person at whose instance the incident had taken place and hence his interrogation was very much essential. That apart, I have also bestowed my anxious reading to the reasons assigned by the learned SPP and on considering the same, it seems to be justifiable one. It is submitted that he was the main person at whose instance the incident had taken place and hence his interrogation was very much essential. That apart, I have also bestowed my anxious reading to the reasons assigned by the learned SPP and on considering the same, it seems to be justifiable one. Further it is relevant to note that the application was filed on 09.10.2025 which was much prior to the completion of the stipulated period for completion of investigation and also it is noticed that at the time of and were filing the application the accused persons secured/present before the court proper opportunity was granted to them to file their statement of objections. Though in strict parlance, they may not have any say on the manner of investigation being conducted, but considering the fact that allowing of application may in a way interfere with the indefeasible right which may occur in favour of the accused if the final report is not filed within the stipulated period, the court had permitted the accused to filed necessary objections. The accused had filed the objection and they were also permitted to make submission in this regard. As such the mandate of the act which is more fully enshrined in the authority of the Hon'ble Apex court is complied with. 21. xxx 22. In the aforesaid authority it has been clearly held that the grant of extension of period of investigation cannot be made on mechanical grounds since it affects the liberty of the citizen on extraneous grounds. Further it is held that, for seeking extension of time, the public prosecutor after an independent application of his mind to the request of the investigating agency is required to make a report to the Court indicating therein the progress of the investigation and disclosing justification for keeping the accused in further custody to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation. The public prosecutor may attach the request of the investigating officer along with his request or application and report, but his report, as envisaged under clause (bb), must disclose on the face of it that he has applied his mind and was satisfied with the progress of the investigation and considered grant of further time to complete the investigation necessary. In this regard the application filed by the learned SPP itself is self-explanatory, wherein he has dealt in detail. 23. In this regard the application filed by the learned SPP itself is self-explanatory, wherein he has dealt in detail. 23. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the extension could be granted only on the Report of the Public Prosecutor for completion of investigation and filing the challan thereafter and for no other purpose. Even in the aforesaid case, it is noticed from the records that extension of period of limitation is sought only for the purpose of continuing with the investigation and not for any administrative defects. The reason assigned by the SPP seems to be plausible …" 36. Clearly the order reflects application of mind and such satisfaction of the designated Judge would satisfy the statutory mandate under Section 167 (2) (a) while extending judicial remand as well as the order extending time for investigation in terms of the proviso under 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA. 37. So far as the challenge to order of the Court extending investigation by 45 days it would be sufficient to observe such extension is an exercise of judicial discretion by the Court and we find no reason to interfere with such exercise of judicial discretion. 38. Though, the counsel for the petitioner Venkatesh Dalawai has contended that Sessions Judge has failed to observe that the accused 6 and 8 have filed their statement of objections, that would not be of any legal significance as the said accused having filed statement of objections indicate them being aware of the prosecution’s application for extension of time which would ipso facto fulfil the legal requirement of keeping the accused informed. E. P RODUCTION OF ACCUSED WHILST CONSIDERING APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INVESTIGATION WHILE ACCUSED STILL REMAINS IN CUSTODY 39. One of the other contentions raised is as regards accused not being produced during the relevant point of time when their application for default bail was considered. 40. The following table would indicate the relevant date on which application was filed and argued and the date of presence of the accused. 41. Undisputedly the application was filed before the expiry of 90 days. 42. The petitioners have contended that there have been procedural violations insofar as the petitioners were not notified regarding the filing of application and were not produced on all dates when the application was being considered. 43. 41. Undisputedly the application was filed before the expiry of 90 days. 42. The petitioners have contended that there have been procedural violations insofar as the petitioners were not notified regarding the filing of application and were not produced on all dates when the application was being considered. 43. The Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI, Bombay (II) , (1994) 5 SCC 410 speaking through a Constitution Bench after a detailed discussion as regards production of accused before the Court has concluded at Para 53 (2) (a) as follows: "53 (2)(a) Section 20(4)(bb) of the TADA Act only requires production of the accused before the court in accordance with Section 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and this is how the requirement of notice to the accused before granting extension beyond the prescribed period of 180 days in accordance with the further proviso to clause (bb) of sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the TADA Act has to be understood in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur [ (1994) 4 SCC 602 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1087 : JT (1994) 4 SC 255]. The requirement of such notice to the accused before granting the extension for completing the investigation is not a written notice to the accused giving reasons therein. Production of the accused at that time in the court informing him that the question of extension of the period for completing the investigation is being considered, is alone sufficient for the purpose." 44. Accordingly, it becomes clear that as regards notice to the accused before granting extension for completing the investigation, production of the accused at the relevant time in court informing him that extension of period of completing the investigation is being considered is sufficient. Such would be the legal position on a meaningful reading of para 53(2)(a) of Sanjay Dutts case( supra ). 45. The matter was called out on 27.09.2025 and adjourned to 10.10.2025. The case however was advanced to 06.10.2025 and accused no.1 had filed application under Section 346 of BNSS requesting the court to direct the Central Prison Authorities to provide accused no.1 with home cooked food. The matter was then adjourned to 09.10.2025. On 09.10.2025, SPP had filed application under Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA seeking extension of time to complete investigation. The matter was then adjourned to 09.10.2025. On 09.10.2025, SPP had filed application under Section 22 (2) (b) of KCOCA seeking extension of time to complete investigation. The court had adjourned the matter to 10.10.2025 on which date the accused were produced from judicial custody through VC and judicial custody was extended for a period of 15 days in terms of the mandate under 167(2). 46. It is the submission of learned Additional SPP that on 10.10.2025, copy was served to the counsel. The matter was then adjourned to 14.10.2025. On such date, learned counsel for accused nos.2, 3 and 7 had filed objections to the application filed by the prosecution seeking for extension of time. Hence it is clear that the very filing of objections to the application filed by the prosecution would indicate that the accused were notified regarding application for extension of time to complete investigation. 47. The application for extension of time was filed on 09.10.2025 and came to be decided on 17.10.2025. During this period, the accused were produced on 10.10.2025. They have filed objections to the application. Their production on 10.10.2025 would be sufficient compliance in terms of the observation of the Apex Court in Sanjay Dutt (supra). If presence during the process of consideration of application is in order to notify the accused regarding such extension so that they could object, then it can be stated that the purpose is served. As in the present case, they were produced on 10.10.2025 after an application for extension was filed, and objections were filed to such applications was filed on 14.10.2025 and they have been heard. 48. Insofar as their contention that they were not produced on other dates, it must be noticed that in terms of Section 187 of BNSS (section of 167 CRPC), every time custody is extended for every period not exceeding 15 days, the accused is to be produced. This requirement has been complied for the period during which application was being considered i.e., between 09.10.2025 and 17.10.2025 when orders came to be passed. The accused were produced on 10.10.2025 and subsequently on 24.10.2025. The requirement of production on dates of extension of remand has been complied with. 49. This requirement has been complied for the period during which application was being considered i.e., between 09.10.2025 and 17.10.2025 when orders came to be passed. The accused were produced on 10.10.2025 and subsequently on 24.10.2025. The requirement of production on dates of extension of remand has been complied with. 49. The contention that during the process of consideration of application seeking extension of time for investigation the petitioners were to be present on every date of hearing is rejected, as there is no such legal obligation. II. C ONCLUSION 50. This court considering a petition under Section 482 with its limited jurisdiction cannot sit in appeal over the conclusion of the designated Judge and accordingly, there are no grounds made out for interference with the exercise of such judicial discretion conferred under the statute. 51. Accordingly, in light of the discussion supra, the petitions are dismissed.