JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. 1. By way of impugned judgment dated 08.02.2007, the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Udaipur (for short, hereinafter referred to as 'learned trial Court') convicted the appellant for offence under Section 7 & 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in Criminal Case No. 26/2004 and sentenced him as under :- OFFENCE PUNISHMENT Section 7 of P.C. Act Two years imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.2000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo one month additional imprisonment. Section 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of P.C. Act Three years imprisonment alongwith fine of Rs.3000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo two months additional imprisonment 2. Succinctly stated, the facts apposite are that on 06.08.2003, complainant Digvijay Singh filed a written report before the Anti Corruption Bureau stating therein that he is trader of wheat and about two months back, his stock of wheat loaded in truck was seized by the police. Upon showing all the documents to the District Magistrate, Dungarpur, he ordered the truck to be released. However, despite showing the documents and order, the police inspector demanded illegal gratification and received Rs.8000/-. Thereafter, he again took Rs. 10,000/- as bribe for favouring in the case. However, subsequently, he started demanding money stating that the complainant is doing illegal trading of wheat and demanded Rs.3000/- monthly-. Thereafter, he again demanded money for giving Final report in the case and Rs.3,000/- monthly. 3. On the basis of the complaint, a case was registered and trap proceedings were initiated. On 10.08.2003, the trap party reached the police station and recovered the trap money in the sum of Rs.2,000/-. The hands of the petitioner were washed in a solution of Sodium Carbonate which turned pink. 4. The police registered a case for offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and investigation commenced. Upon completion of investigation, Anti Corruption Bureau, submitted charge-sheet against accused appellant for offence under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act before court of Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Udaipur where charges of the case were framed. The accused denied the charges. Upon denial to all the charges, the learned trial Court put him on trial. 5. The prosecution in support of charges, examined eleven witnesses. The accused denied the charges. Upon denial to all the charges, the learned trial Court put him on trial. 5. The prosecution in support of charges, examined eleven witnesses. Besides occular evidence, various documents were produced by the prosecution, which were exhibited. In defence, accused-appellant produced DW/1 Munshi Ram, DW/2 Vinod Kumar and also exhibited certain documents. 6. After conclusion of the evidence, learned trial Court heard final arguments and convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 7 , 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act with sentence mentioned above. 7. Mr. B.S. Rathore, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously urged that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate and scrutinize the evidence available on record in correct perspective. It is argued that in this case, PW/3 Digvijay Singh who is the complainant, has turned hostile and does not support the prosecution story. It is the specific case of the appellant that the complainant forcibly put money in the pocket of petitioner and he pushed the complainant away. The version of appellant is supported by the PW/3 Digvijay Singh himself. It is submitted that the conviction against the appellant is only on the basis of alleged bribe which was lying on the ground at the time of trap and not recovered from the conscious possession of the appellant which probabalise the case of defence that the complainant tried to give money to the accused but the same was refused by the appellant and he tossed it on the ground. Further, at the time of the alleged demand and registration of FIR, no work was pending with the appellant so as to place him in a position to raise a demand against the complainant. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of N. Sunkanna Vs. State of A.P. reported in 2015 Cr.L.R. (SC) 1164 , Satvir Singh Vs. State of Delhi through CBI reported in 2014 (Suppl) Cr.L.R (SC) 447 , N. Vijayakumr Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2021 Cr.L.R. (SC) 331 , Madan lal Vs. State of Rajasthan (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6895 of 2022) decided on 07.03.2025 Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General submits that learned trial Court after considering the evidence meticulously convicted and sentenced the appellant, therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment is called for. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2021 Cr.L.R. (SC) 331 , Madan lal Vs. State of Rajasthan (Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6895 of 2022) decided on 07.03.2025 Per contra, learned Additional Advocate General submits that learned trial Court after considering the evidence meticulously convicted and sentenced the appellant, therefore, no interference with the impugned judgment is called for. Learned Public Prosecutor contended that the complainant has specifically alleged that the appellant had sought bribe and he was caught red handed, therefore, in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case and incriminating material available against the appellant, has rightly convicted the accused appellant, therefore, no interference is called for with the impugned judgment. 8. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant, learned Public Prosecutor, and meticulously examined the impugned judgment alongwith material available on record. In the light thereof, the several points worth addressing can be identified after sifting through the record to determine whether the prosecution has proven the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act beyond a reasonable doubt. 9. It is essential to note that we are interpreting and applying Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act in their form before the amendment introduced by Act 16 of 2018, which came into effect on 26th July 2018. It is crucial to apply the law in force at the time of the offence to ensure justice is served based on the applicable statutes and regulations at the relevant time. Section 7 of the P.C. Act in its form as it existed at the relevant time, outlined the provisions related to public servants taking bribes, offering bribes, or accepting valuable items without lawful consideration. It defined the offences and laid down the punishments for such actions. 10. A. Whether the prosecution has proved a case of ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of bribe beyond all reasonable doubt. 11. In the first instance, it is deemed appropriate to reproduce Section 7 of the Act for easy reference: “7. It defined the offences and laid down the punishments for such actions. 10. A. Whether the prosecution has proved a case of ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of bribe beyond all reasonable doubt. 11. In the first instance, it is deemed appropriate to reproduce Section 7 of the Act for easy reference: “7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.- Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section2 or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations.- (a) "Expecting to be a public servant"- If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) "Gratification". The word "gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) "Legal remuneration"- The words "legal remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.” 12. The twin conditions i.e. proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a ‘sine qua non’ in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under section 7 of the Act. In order to bring the accused to book, the prosecution has to prove the demand of ‘illegal gratification’ and its ‘subsequent acceptance’ either by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. In the case at hand, the subsequent acceptance of illegal gratification was not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 13. In the present case, the complainant alleged that the accused appellant had demanded bribe. However, with regard to acceptance by the accused petitioner, the complainant himself who was examined as PW.3 has been declared hostile and he mentioned that the accused appellant upon being offered the bribe at the time of trap, his hands touched the money but he refused to accept. However, with regard to acceptance by the accused petitioner, the complainant himself who was examined as PW.3 has been declared hostile and he mentioned that the accused appellant upon being offered the bribe at the time of trap, his hands touched the money but he refused to accept. The relevant statement of PW/3 Complainant, who turned hostile, is reproduced herein below: ^^,Mhih ds vkxzg ij xokg dks i{knzksgh ?kksf"kr fd;k tkdj ftjg dh vuqefr pkgh tks iznku dh xbZA ------ i`Foh flag lhvkbZ ls esjh dksbZ nq'euh ugha FkhA izn'kZ ih 14 ij nLr[kr , ls ch rkjh[k 6 dks ugha fd;s x;s Fks cfYd lkjh dk;Zokgh gksus ds ckn esjs ls djok;s FksA Lo;a dgk fd ;g nLr[kr eSaus Mkd caxys esa fd;s Fks tks eSaus 10 rkjh[k dks fd;s FksA fMIVh lk- ls esjh eqykdkr 10 rkjh[k dks gqbZ Fkh mlls igys esa muls ugha feyk FkkA izn'kZ ih 19 ij gLrk{kj eSaus 6 rkjh[k dks ugha fd;s Fks D;ksafd nl rkjh[k ls igys esjh fMIVh lk- ls eqykdkr ugha gqbZ FkhA ------ izn'kZ ih 28 dh QnZ VªkalfLØIV i<+dj xokg us dgk fd bl rjg dh okrkZ esjh vfHk;qDr ls ugha gqbZ FkhA izn'kZ ih 28 ij fcuk i<+k;s gh ,lhch okyksa us nLr[kr djok fy;s FksA eSaus dksbZ ,srjkt ugha fd;k eSaus ,lhch okyksa ds dgus ls gLrk{kj dj fn;s FksA izn'kZ ih 20 i<+dj xokg us dgk fd bl izdkj dh okrkZ vfHk;qDr ls esjh ugha gqbZ FkhA eq>s ,lhMh okyksa us dSlsV pykdj ugha lqukbZ FkhA eq>s vkt dSlsV pykdj lquk;h tkosa rks vkt eSa viuh vkokt ugha igpku ldrk gwaA ;g dguk xyr gS fd eSa eqfYte ls feyk gksus ds dkj.k viuh vkokt igpkuus ls badkj dj jgk gwaA ------ ;g lgh gS fd 85@03 eqdnek jln foHkkx ds vf/kdkfj;ksa us ntZ djok;k FkkA eqdnek 85@03 dh ,QvkbZvkj ntZ gksus ds ckn ;k mlls iwoZ vfHk;qDr us eq>s dHkh ugha cqyk;k vkSj u gh esjss ls ckrphr dh vkSj u gh esjss ls iSls ekaxsA 02-08-2003 dks tks Vªd tCr fd;k Fkk mleas Hkh i`Foh flag th dk dksbZ jksy ugha FkkA ;g lgh gS fd ,lhMh dks eSaus lwpuk blfy;s nh Fkh fd eSa iqfyl eq>s rax u djs vkSj u gh izrkfM+r djsaA i`Foh flag th us esjs ls fdlh Hkh dk;Z ds fy;s iSls ugha ekaxs vkSj u gh eSaus fdlh izdkj dh dksbZ fj'or nhA vfHk;qDr us esjsss ls dHkh fj'or dh ekax ugha dh vkSj u gh eSaus fdlh izdkj dh fj'or nhA leLr vkfVZdy ds psiksa ij gLrk{kj eq>s dk;Zokgh gksus ds i'pkr Mkd caxys ij ,d lkFk djok fy;s FksA** 14. PW-11, Dinesh Bohra, who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the relevant time, stated that he did not investigate the prior incidents and demands made by the accused, which casts a doubt on the validity of the current demands. PW-11, Dinesh Bohra, who was the Deputy Superintendent of Police at the relevant time, stated that he did not investigate the prior incidents and demands made by the accused, which casts a doubt on the validity of the current demands. The relevant statement is reproduced herein below: ^^eSaus dk;Zokgh ds iwoZ ,QvkbZvkj uacj 85@2003 eaxokdj ugha ns[kh FkhA ;g lgh gS fjiksVZ izn'kZ ih 14 esa ifjoknh }kjk fHkUu fHkUu le; ij vkjksiksa dks bl dk;Zokgh ls iwoZ nh x;h jkf'k ds laca/k esa eSaus dksbZ rgdhdkr ugha dh FkhA Vªsi dk;Zokgh ls iwoZ ifjoknh }kjk vkjksih dks vnk fd;s x;s iSlksa ds laca/k esa eSaus dk;Zokgh ds nkSjku o mlds i'pkr~ dksbZ rgdhdkr ugha djh FkhA iqfyl Fkkuk lnj] Mwaxjiqj ds eq-ua- 85@2003 dh i=koyh esa ifjoknh fnfXot; flag vfHk;qDr Fkk ;k ugha bl laca/k esa eSaus vuqla/kku i=koyh dks ugha ns[kk FkkA Vªsi dk;Zokgh ds ckn Hkh eSaus eq-ua- 85@2003 dh i=koyh ns[kdj ;g tkuus dk iz;kl ugha fd;k Fkk fd ifjoknh mDr izdj.k esa vfHk;qDr gS ;k ughaA eSaus ifjoknh ds O;olk; ds ckjs esa dksbZ tkudkjh ugha djh FkhA iqfyl Fkkuk lnj ekeqyh Vsdjh ij cuk gqvk gS tks T;knk mapkbZ ij ugha gSA ekSds ij ge igqaps rc vkjksih ds dejs esa Fkkus ds nks pkj deZpkjh ekStwn FksA ;g xyr gS fd vkjksih i`Foh flag us eq>s ;g crk;k gks fd ifjoknh dk mlds ikl dksbZ dk;Z yafcr ugha gSA ;g xyr gS fd ekSds ij feys lnj Fkkus ds nhxj deZpkfj;ksa us eq>s ;g crk;k gks fd ifjoknh vkjksih i`Foh flag dh tsc esa tcju iSls Mkydj x;k gksA xokg us Lor% dgk fd ogka ekStwn Fkkus ds nhxj deZpkfj;ksa ls eSaus dksbZ iwNrkN ugha djh FkhA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ih 28 QnZ VªkalfLØIV esa ifjoknh o vkjksih dk uke ugha n'kkZ;k x;k gS mUgsa dsoy ifjoknh ,oa vkjksih ds uke ls lacksf/kr fd;k x;k gSA ;g lgh gS fd izn'kZ ih 28 esa okrkZ esjs }kjk lqus tkus dk i`"Bkadu vafdr fd;k gqvk ugha gSA QnZ VªkalfLØIV izn'kZ ih 20 esa ,slk mYys[k ugha fd;k gqvk gSA vkjksih }kjk ;g dgus ij fd mlus ifjoknh ls dksbZ fj'or jkf'k ugha yh gS ifjoknh us mldh tsc esa tcju iSls Mky fn;s Fks tks mlus Qsad fn;s gSaA ifjoknh us ml oDr dqN dgk ;k ugha bldk eq>s vkt /;ku ugha gSA ;g lgh gS fd eSa tc ekSds ij igqapk rc iSls tehu ij gh iM+s gq, FksA lnj Fkkuk Mwaxjiqj esa vkjksih dk dk;kZy; lhf<+;ksa ls pkj&ikap QhV dh nwjh ij FkkA ;g lgh gS fd vfHk;qDr us gj ckj fj'or us gj ckj fj'or jkf'k ysus ls euk fd;k Fkk vkSj ;g crk;k Fkk fd vfHk;qDr us gj ckj fj'or jkf'k ysus ls euk fd;k Fkk vkSj ;g crk;k Fkk fd ifjoknh mldh tsc esa tcju Mkydj pyk x;k gSA** 15. PW-04, Kari Lal Rot, who was independent witness of the case, has deposed that he was not an eye witness to the incident. His statement reproduced herein below: ^^fy[kki<+h djus ds ckn eSa fMokb,lih cksgjk th ds lkFk Vªsi ny esa x;k FkkA tqxy fd'kksj Hkh lkFk Fkk vkSj Vªsi ny ds lnL; Hkh lkFk FksA ge yksx ljdkjh thi ls x;s Fks vkSj fnfXot; flag izkbosV xkM+h ls x;k FkkA lnj Fkkuk Mwaxjiqj ds ikl igqapsA fnfXot; flag Fkkus esa igys pyk x;k FkkA ge Fkkus ds vklikl nwj [kM+s gks x;sA fQj Vªsi ny ds lkFk esa ge Fkkus ds vanj x;sA ogka ij eSaus tkdj ns[kk rks dejs esa nhokj ds ikl iSls iM+s gq, Fks tks fdlus Mkys eq>s irk ughaA------ ;g lgh gS fd Fkkus ds vanj ifjoknh fnfXot; flag vkSj vfHk;qDr i`Foh flag ds chp D;k ckrphr gqbZ eSaus u rks ns[kk vkSj u lquh D;ksafd eSa ,slh fLFkfr esa ugha FkkA tc ge vanj Fkkus esa x;s rks ml oDr fnfXot; flag vkSj nks flikgh vkSj i`Foh flag th Fks ;g lHkh i`Foh flag th ds psacj esa Fks vkSj flikfg;ksa ds uke eq>s ;kn ugha gSA lkjh ?kVuk i`Foh flag th ds psacj esa gqbZ FkhA** 16. PW-05, Jugal Kishore Sharma, who was also an independent witness of the case, has deposed that he was not an eye witness to the incident. His statement reproduced herein below: ge lnj Fkkus ds eSuxsV ls FkksM+k nwj :ds vkSj ifjoknh fnfXot; flag dks Fkkus ds fy;s jokuk fd;kA ge thi esa cSBs gq, Fks fQj b'kkjk ikdj eSa] dkjhyky th o Vªsi ny ds lHkh yksx Fkkus esa igqapsA fMokb,lih lk- ,lhch cksgjk lk- us fnfXot; flag ifjoknh ls iwNk fd #i;s dgka gS rks fnfXoft; flag us dgk fd #i;s i`Foh flag lhvkbZ dh tsc esa gSA fQj i`Foh flag lhvkbZ vkjksih dh ryk'kh yh xbZ rks #i;s ugha feys #i;s muds lkeus dh rjQ nhokj ds ikl Q'kZ ij iM+s FksA i`Foh flag vkjksih ls iwNrkN dh rks mlus crk;k #i;k fnfXot; flag us tcjnLrh fn;s gSa vkSj dgk fd eSaus #i;s lkeus dh vksj Q'kZ ij Qsad fn;s gSaA 17. In the case of Selvaraj vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2015) 10 SCC 230 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under :- “15. In State of Kerala and Anr. In the case of Selvaraj vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2015) 10 SCC 230 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under :- “15. In State of Kerala and Anr. v. C.P. Rao : 2011 (6) SCC 450 , it has been laid down that recovery of tainted money is not sufficient to convict the accused. There has to be corroboration of the testimony of the complainant regarding the demand of bribe and when the complainant is not available for examination during the trial, court has to be cautious while sifting the evidence of other witnesses. Charge has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has laid down thus: 12. Those observations quoted above are clearly applicable in this case. In the context of those observations, this Court in para 28 of A. Subair (supra) made it clear that the prosecution has to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt like any other criminal offence and the accused should be considered innocent till it is proved to the contrary by proper proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which is the vital ingredient to secure the conviction in a bribery case. In view of the aforesaid settled principles of law, we find it difficult to take a view different from the one taken by the High Court.” 18. In the case of N. Sunkanna ( Supra ), the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “6. The prosecution examined the other fair price shop dealers in Kurnool as PWs 3, 4 and 6 to prove that the accused was receiving monthly mamools from them. PWs 4 and 6 did not state so and they were declared hostile. PW-3 though in the examination-in-chief stated so, in the cross-examination turned round and stated that the accused never asked any monthly mamool and he did not pay Rs. 50/- at any time. The prosecution has not examined any other witness present at the time when the money was demanded by the accused and also when the money was allegedly handed-over to the accused by the complainant. The complainant himself had disowned his complaint and has turned hostile and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand. In short there is no proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. The complainant himself had disowned his complaint and has turned hostile and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand. In short there is no proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. The possession is also admitted by the accused. It is settled law that mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence Under Section 7 , since demand of illegal gratification is sine-qua-non to constitute the said offence. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence Under Section 13 (1)(d) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. It is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn Under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Unless there is proof of demand of illegal gratification proof of acceptance will not follow. Reference may be made to the two decisions of three-Judge Bench of this Court in B. Jayaraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh : (2014) 13 SCC 55 ] and P. Satyanarayna Murthy v. The District Inspector of Police and Anr. : ( 2015 (9) SCALE 724 ].” 17. The Apex Court in the case of Neeraj Dutta vs State (Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi) reported in [2023] 2 SCR 997 has observed as: “12. In the case of N. Vijayakumar MANU/SC/0051/2021 : 2021 (3) SCC 687 , another bench of three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption Under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the offences punishable Under Section 7 and Clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13 (1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: 26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the Accused. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus: 26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the Accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, : (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri.) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., MANU/SC/0245/2014 : (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri.) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case Under Sections 7 , 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption Under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court. (emphasis added) Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 18. Since, ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ is not proved beyond reasonable doubts in the instant case, the presumption under Section 20 of the Act cannot be raised. Even in the case of Neeraj Dutta (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act has held as under :- “11. Even the issue of presumption Under Section 20 of the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of 2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases of B. Jayaraj : 2014 (13) SCC 55 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy : 2015 (10) SCC 152 . In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases of B. Jayaraj : 2014 (13) SCC 55 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy : 2015 (10) SCC 152 . There is another decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu : 2021 (3) SCC 687 , which follows the view taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj MANU/SC/0245/2014 : 2014 (13) SCC 55 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy : 2015 (10) SCC 152 . In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj : 2014 (13) SCC 55 , this Court has dealt with the presumption Under Section 20 of the PC Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus: 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn Under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence Under Section 7 and not the offences Under Sections 13 (1)(d) (i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn Under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption Under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent. (emphasis added)” 19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Shanthamma vs State of Telangana reported in (2022) 4 SCC 574 has held that: “7. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We have perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. The offence Under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine quo non for establishing the offence Under Section 7 of the PC Act. In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. : (2015) 10 SCC 152 , this Court has summarised the well-settled law on the subject in paragraph 23 which reads thus: 23. In the case of P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police, State of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. : (2015) 10 SCC 152 , this Court has summarised the well-settled law on the subject in paragraph 23 which reads thus: 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence Under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two Sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person Accused of the offence Under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.” 20. In the case of Madan lal Vs. State of Rajasthan vide Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6895 of 2022 decided on 07.03.2025 , the Honble Apex Court has observed that:- “15. On an examination of the evidence, there is considerable doubt raised in our mind, which qualifies as reasonable doubt, as to whether there was acceptance of bribe amounts by both the accused. True, the officers of the trap team spoke about the handing over of the money by the complainant to the 1st accused who handed over half, to the 2nd accused; which amounts were said to have been put by both the accused in their trouser pockets. PW 8 who led the trap team merely spoke of a recovery of the bribe amounts from the possession of the accused and the hands and trousers of the accused having positively reacted to the test solution. The said deposition is contrary to the statements made by the independent witnesses that some notes were found thrown on the floor. None of the officers spoke of any of the accused having taken out the notes and thrown it on the floor. 16. On an examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution, has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the trap team of the ACB. 16. On an examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution, has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the trap team of the ACB. In that circumstance there is no question of a presumption under Section 20 arising in this case. The conviction and sentence of the accused as brought out by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court, hence, is set aside.” 21. It is the admitted case of prosecution also that when the trap party reached, the trap money in the sum of Rs. 2000/- was lying on the floor. The only witness, who could have lent credible support to the prosecution's case, being the complainant himself has not supported the prosecution story of demand and acceptance of bribe money by the appellant as discussed in the foregoing paras. So far as the case of prosecution that the hands of appellant Prathvi Singh turning pink is concerned, the complainant-Digvijay Singh himself stated that when he tried to hand him over the money which touched the hands of appellant, but he refused to accept it. Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused appellant had allegedly demanded bribe from the complainant and that he had accepted the money and same was recovered from the possession of the appellant. Thus, the evidence on the point of demand and acceptance of bribe, has not been proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt. B. Whether the prosecution proved the existence of pending work. 22. The demand and receipt or illegal gratification has to be considered in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case. The demand has to be established by proving some act/duty which the accused was required to perform and which he did not perform but insisted for illegal gratification. 23. In the context of this issue at hand, it will be appropriate to deal with as to whether the evidence on record would prove the pendency of the official work as on 10.08.2003. As per the examination of PW-1 Chetan Lal Vasita, on 29.05.2003 there was no pending action in the police station regarding the truck and wheat of the complainant. As per the examination of PW-1 Chetan Lal Vasita, on 29.05.2003 there was no pending action in the police station regarding the truck and wheat of the complainant. He also deposed that in this entire investigation, the accused appellant- Prithavi Singh had no interference, nor did he participate in the investigation proceedings. The relevant statement of PW/1-Chetan Lal Vasita, reads as under :- **29-05-2003 dks Fkkus esa bl Vªd ckcr vkSj xsgw¡ ckcr dksbZ dk;Zokgh isafMax ugha Fkh D;ksafd xsgw¡ vkSj Vªd geus dCts esa ys fy;k FkkA xsgw¡ dks jktl la?k dks lkSai fn;k FkkA bl lkjh tkap esa vkjksih i`Foh flag dk dksbZ gLr{ksi ugha Fkk u tkap dk;Zokgh esa Hkkx fy;k FkkA bldh lkjh tkap gekjs izorZu LVkQ us dh FkhA** 24. PW-2 Prem Narayan Bhatnagar, has given a statement that is identical to that of PW-1, Chetan Lal Vasita. PW-2 Prem Narayan Bhatnagar, has given a statement that is identical to that of PW-1, Chetan Lal Vasita. The relevant statement of PW/2- Prem Narayan Bhatnagar, reads as under:- ^^;g lgh gS fd i`Foh flag us Mh,lvks lkgc dks lwpuk nh Fkh x'r ds nkSjku xsgw¡ ls Hkjk Vªd idM+k gS ftldks jksd j[kk gS vkSj tkap gsrq cqyok;k FkkA ge rhuksa vknfe;ksa dh Vhe us tkdj tkap dh FkhA bl tkap esa i`Foh flag th dk dksbZ gLr{ksi ugha FkkA ;g lgh gS fd Vªd vkSj xsgw¡ vius dCts esa ys fy;s FksA Vªd [kkyh dks iqfyl ykbu esa [kM+k djok fn;k vkSj xsgw¡ jktLo la?k Mwaxjiqj dks lqiqnZ dj fn;kA iqfyl ykbu esa tks Vªd lqiqnZ dh Fkh og tfj;s izn'kZ Mh 3 nh FkhA izn”kZ ih 10 ij bZ ls ,Q ejs k i`"Bkdau gS ftlds tfj;s Vªd e; xsgw¡ dh 140 cksfj;ka Mªkboj [kyklh lfgr izkIr fd;k x;k FkkA ;g geus 29-05-2003 dks gh izkIr dj fy;k FkkA 29-05-2003 ls yxkdj ,QvkbZvkj djus dh fnukad 10-06-2003 rd Fkkus esa dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha gqbZA izn'kZ ih 7 ds tfj;s geus xsgw¡ jktl la?k dks lkSaik FkkA ,QvkbZvkj ntZ djkus dh Lohd`fr dysDVj us nh Fkh tks izn'kZ ih 12 gS tks gekjs }kjk tkap djus dh ckn fjiksVZ nh mlds ckn nh FkhA lkjh tkap ls ;g irk yxk Fkk fd Vªd dk xsgw¡ dk ekfyd vUuiw.kkZ VªsfMax daiuh Mwaxjiqj dk FkkA nqckjk ,d Vªd fnukad 02-08-2003 dks idM+k Fkk ftldk uacj thts 09 oh 0597 Fkk tks Hkh xsgw¡ ls Hkjk gqvk Fkk ftlesa 120 cksjh xsgw¡ FkkA ;g Nsyk [ksjokM+ketksyk eksM ij dPph lM+d ij QSyk gqvk FkkA ogka ij iqfyl us bls idM+k FkkA iqfyl ds lc baLisaDVj ukFkqyky th us bls idM+k Fkk vkSj gesa cqyk;k FkkA ge ogka igqaps vkSj ipkZ cuk;k FkkA izn'kZ Mh 2 ij lh ls Mh esjs gLrk{kj gSaA izn'kZ Mh 2 cuk;k ml fnu psru yky clhVk Hkh lkFk FksA ;g lgh gS fd bl dk;Zokgh izn'kZ Mh 2 dh esa Hkh i`Foh flag th 'kkfey ugha FksA** 25. In the case of State vs. E. Venkateswara Rao (Criminal Appeal No. 622/2007) decided on 14.12.2023, the Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, has held as under:- “16. In the case of State vs. E. Venkateswara Rao (Criminal Appeal No. 622/2007) decided on 14.12.2023, the Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court, has held as under:- “16. In the light of the above, firstly, I would like to deal with as to whether the evidence on record would prove the pendency of the official favour as on 11.08.2000 and 14.08.2000 in the manner as alleged by the prosecution. During cross examination P.W.1 admitted that he took the V.A.O. to M.R.O. whenever he visits office of M.R.O. V.A.O. prepared Ex.P.4, Ex.P.5 and Ex.P.6. V.A.O. told him that file was sent to A.O. Out of 20 times four or five times he took the VAO along with him to A.O. He deposed that in his presence A.O. and the V.A.O. quarreled with each other in one occasion, but he does not know the reason. He presented Ex.P.1 to M.R.O. on 04.02.2000. M.R.O. sent their application to the Superintendent and Superintendent sent notice to them. Superintendent sent the file to A.O. for preparing note file. It is true that V.A.O. sent his recommendations on 31.05.2000 to M.R.O. Superintendent sent the file to A.O. after receipt of recommendations to prepare note file. He does not whether A.O. put up note file on 12.06.2000 recommending for issuance of pattadar passbooks and title deeds and M.R.O. issued proceedings on 13.06.2000 directing the V.A.O. to prepare passbooks and present before him. He denied that he knows everything about the same and he is suppressing it. He denied that on 11.08.2000 he went to the M.R.O. Office along with V.A.O., met the M.R.O. at about 3-00 p.m. He denied that M.R.O. verified their passbooks and title deeds on 11.08.2000 and noticed entries were not tallied with the proceedings and also noticed that V.A.O. did not sign in the passbooks and title deeds and did not make entries, as such, instructed A.O. to verify the entries in the pass books after V.A.O. brought them back. So, the defence of A.O. before P.W.1 was that on 13.06.2000 itself M.R.O. issued proceedings recommending for issuance of passbooks and directed V.A.O. to make necessary entries and to bring the passbooks and on 11.08.2000 when the V.A.O. brought the passbooks to him he found some discrepancies and directed for its rectification and directed V.A.O. to get it verified by A.O. This is the substance of the decence of A.O. before P.W.1. 23. It is to be noted that the evidence of P.W.4 only means that passbooks were processed by the A.O. with his initials, etc. He did not testify that A.O. physically brought the file to him. Apart from this, there was a spontaneous version by A.O. during post-trap when he was questioned by D.S.P. that P.W.1 thrust the currency notes into the left side shirt pocket of A.O. and he tried to pick up the same and in the meantime ACB people came. In my considered view, this version of A.O. was not tested by the D.S.P. in a proper manner by conducting chemical test to the pattadar passbooks and title deeds. These are all the infirmities in the case of the prosecution which are evident from the record. In view of the above reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution failed to prove the pendency of the official favour in the manner as alleged. The evidence of P.W.1 is not at all believable. There was a categorical admission from P.W.1 that A.O. and V.A.O. had in one occasion quarreled with each other. This part of evidence shows that V.A.O. was accompanying P.W.1 all through in most of times.” 26. In the case of Chandresha vs State Of Karnataka vide Criminal Appeal No. 200105/ 2015 decided on 16.02.2022, the Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench of Karnataka High Court has observed that:- “19. As could be seen from the written submissions, there is a specific stand taken by the accused that as on the date of trap no work of the complainant was pending with the accused and soon after the receipt of the bill, he has passed the bill on the same day and therefore, there was no demand of illegal gratification by accused and the trap is a motivated trap. 20. 20. In view of the legal principles enunciated in A.Subair's case (supra), since the work was not pending before the accused as on the date of trap, the important ingredient to attract and complete the offence punishable under Sections 7 , 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be sustained.” 27. In the case of Imamsab Moulasab Torgal vs The State Of Karnataka vide Criminal Appeal No. 2553/2013 decided on 11.07.2023, the Hon’ble Co-ordinate Bench of Karnataka High Court has observed as under:- “22 on the date of trap on 16.08.2010 no any work of complainant was pending with the accused. In this context of the matter, it is profitable to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in A. SUBAIR VS. STATE OF KERALA reported in (2009) 6 SUPREME COURT CASE 507, wherein it has been observed and held that in order to secure an order of conviction for the offences punishable under Section 7 , 13(1)(d) R/w Section 13 (2) of prevention of corruption Act the prosecution has to establish the following ingredients: 1. Demand and acceptance of bribe money. 2. Handling of tainted money by the accused on the day of trap (colour test). 3. Work of the complainant must be pending as on the date of trap with the accused. The Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in CHANDRESHA S/O MADARSHA KATBA VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA LOKAYUKTA POLICE KALBURGI IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.200105/2015 DATED 16.02.2022 by relying on the aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when the work of complainant is not pending before accused as on the date of trap, the important ingredient to attract and complete the offence punishable under Section 7 , 13(1)(d) R/w Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act- cannot be sustained. The another Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in State of KARNATAKA VS. NARAYANSWAMY IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2506/2012 DATED 29.09.2021 has taken similar view that when work is not pending the offence punishable under Section 7 , 13(1)(d) R/w Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are not attracted. In the present case also indisputably the work of complainant was not pending as on the date of filing the complaint Ex.P.4 on 13.08.2010 or on the date of trap on 16.08.2010. In the present case also indisputably the work of complainant was not pending as on the date of filing the complaint Ex.P.4 on 13.08.2010 or on the date of trap on 16.08.2010. Therefore, in view of the principles enunciated in the afore mentioned judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court and Co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court, in view no work of complainant being pending as on the date of filing complaint or on the date of trap, the conviction for the offences punishable under Section 7 , 13(1)(d) R/w Section 13 (2) of the prevention of corruption Act cannot be legally sustained. The trial Court has not considered the effect of no work of complainant pending as on the date of filing complaint or on the date of trap, further there being no any concrete evidence to prove demand for illegal gratification erroneously proceeded to convict the accused which cannot be legally sustained.” 28. In the light of aforecited observations of Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that on the point of pendency of official work on the date of trap also, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. C. Whether accused appellant had dishonest intention and obtaining valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. 29. The petitioner has also been convicted for offence under Section 13 (1)(d) of the P.C. Act. At this stage, it is also relevant to refer to the provisions of Section 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act prior to amendment made in the year 2018, which reads as under :- "13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct, (d) if he, (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest." 30. It is clear from a reading of clause (d) that all the three wings of clause (d) of Sec. 13(1) are independent and alternative and disjunctive for constituting the ingredients for the offence under sec. It is clear from a reading of clause (d) that all the three wings of clause (d) of Sec. 13(1) are independent and alternative and disjunctive for constituting the ingredients for the offence under sec. 13(1)(d) as is clear from the use of the word ‘or’ at the end of each clause. Thus, under Sec.13 (1) (d) (i) obtaining any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means by a public servant in itself would satisfy the requirement of criminal misconduct under Section 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. On the same reasoning “obtaining a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage merely by abusing official position” as contemplated under Section 13 (1)(d)(ii) in itself would satisfy the ingredients of criminal misconduct under Section 13 (1)(d) of the Act, 1988. However, a charge under Sec. 13(1)(d) has to be fairly specific in respect of the offence, the accused is required to face in a criminal trial. It would not be enough to say that the accused committed criminal misconduct punishable Under Sec. 13(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The offence of Criminal misconduct is one contemplated in all or any of the four clauses (a) to (d) of Sec. 13(1) of the act and where the accused is sought to be made guilty only under clause (d), it must be specified. The prosecution has to prove that the Public Servant intentionally, dishonestly, fraudulently made any efforts in obtaining pecuniary advantage either for himself or others. The element of dishonesty is implicit in Clauses (i) & (ii) of Sec. 13(1) (d) of P.C. Act 1988. 31. It is settled proposition of law that so far as the offence under Section 13 (1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is concerned, the necessary ingredient for constituting aforesaid offence is that public servant has used corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abused his position as public servant and obtained a valuable thing or pecuniary advantage for himself or any other person. The intention of the legislation is not to punish a public servant for erroneous decision, but to punish for corruption. To fall within the four corners of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the PC Act, the decision/conduct of the public servant must be dishonest, amounting to corruption. 32. The intention of the legislation is not to punish a public servant for erroneous decision, but to punish for corruption. To fall within the four corners of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the PC Act, the decision/conduct of the public servant must be dishonest, amounting to corruption. 32. To attract the term 'abuse' as contained in Section 13 (1)(d) of the PC Act, the prosecution has to establish that the official concerned used his position for something it is not intended. The sum and substance of the discussion is that dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under Section 13 (1)(d) of the PC Act. 33. A fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence with regard to the liability of an accused is the element of mens rea. On the principles of actus reus and mens rea, the learned author Sri.Glanville Williams in the 'Textbook of Criminal Law' [Third Edition, Dennis.J. Baker, page 95] comments thus: “The mere commission of a criminal act (or bringing about the state of affairs that the law provides against) is not enough to constitute a crime, at any rate in the case of the more serious crimes. These generally require, in addition, some element of wrongful intent or other fault. Increasing insistence upon this fault element was the mark of advancing civilization.” 34. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Jaffer Sharief Vs. State (through CBI) reported in 2013(1) SCC 205 while considering the question of criminal liability, has observed as under :- “17. It has already been noticed that the appellant besides working as the Minister of Railways was the Head of the two Public Sector Undertakings in question at the relevant time. It also appears from the materials on record that the four persons while in London had assisted the appellant in performing certain tasks connected with the discharge of duties as a Minister. It is difficult to visualise as to how in the light of the above facts, demonstrated by the materials revealed in the course of investigation, the appellant can be construed to have adopted corrupt or illegal means or to have abused his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any of the aforesaid four persons. If the statements of the witnesses examined under Section 161 show that the aforesaid four persons had performed certain tasks to assist the Minister in the discharge of his public duties, however insignificant such tasks may have been, no question of obtaining any pecuniary advantage by any corrupt or illegal means or by abuse of the position of the appellant as a public servant can arise. As a Minister it was for the appellant to decide on the number and identity of the officials and supporting staff who should accompany him to London if it was anticipated that he would be required to perform his official duties while in London. If in the process, the Rules or Norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under section 13(1)(d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant. A similar view has also been expressed by this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar vs . State of Kerala’ while considering the provisions of section 5 of Act of 1947. If the totality of the materials on record indicate the above position, we do not find any reason to allow the prosecution to continue against the appellant. Such continuance, in our view, would be an abuse of the process of court and therefore it will be the plain duty of the court to interdict the same.” 35. In the present case, since the prosecution failed to produce any material to prove the demand of bribe, its acceptance on the part of appellant so also pendency of work on the date of trap, therefore, as a consequential corollary, the prosecution has failed to show that the appellant, with dishonest intention, committed any acts and obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. 36. 36. Moving on to the concept of standard of legal proof, the well entrenched principle of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent and, therefore, the burden lies on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt is required to be considered here. 37. In the case of Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam reported in (2013) 12 SCC 406 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: "The reiteration of the golden principle runs through the web of the administration of justice in criminal cases has been done. It has further been held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of "may be" true but has to upgrade it in the domain of "must be" true in order to steer clear of any possible surmises or conjectures. Thus, on the material on record when judged on the touch stone of legal principles adumbrated hereinabove, leave no manner of doubt that the prosecution, in the instant case, has failed to prove unequivocally, the demand of illegal gratification." 38. The sum and substance of the above reasonings go to show that there is no acceptable or clinching evidence proving that appellant, with dishonest intention, committed any acts and obtained any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. 39. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment dated 08.02.2007, the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Udaipur convicted the appellant for offence under Section 7 & 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 in Criminal Case No. 26/2004 is set aside and the accused-appellant is acquitted of the offences by extending benefit of doubt. Appellant is on bail, therefore, his bail bonds are discharged. 40. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. the accused appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount before the learned trial court within a period of one month, which shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the judgment or for grant of leave, the appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before Hon’ble Supreme Court.