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2025 DIGILAW 1466 (JHR)

Ram Prasad Ram, S/o Lallu Ram v. Union of India

2025-07-01

PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

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JUDGMENT : Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. 1. Heard Mr. Peeyush Krishna Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/writ petitioner against the order dated 21-11-2022 passed by the Learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1843/2011, whereby and whereunder, the challenge made to the order of compulsory retirement of the appellant/writ petitioner vide order dated 15- 02-2006 and its affirmation in appeal and revision vide orders dated 08-04-2006 and 21/22-03-2007, has been dismissed. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case reveal that the writ petitioner was appointed as a Constable in Central Industrial Security Force and was posted at various places during his 30 years of service. It has been stated that on 05-08-2005, when the writ petitioner was doing “A” shift duty from 5:00AM to 01:00PM at Area No. 11, Birsa Bridge, Dhanbad along with another constable, namely, A.K. Jha and as they were being relieved from duty, a raid was conducted and from the possession of constable A.K. Jha, a sum of Rs. 1250/- was recovered. A disciplinary proceeding was started against constable A.K. Jha as well as the writ petitioner and the writ petitioner was suspended for the charges that he could not control the illegal act committed by constable A.K. Jha. The writ petitioner, on being served with the memo of charge, had denied the charge by filing a suitable reply in response to the same. Being dissatisfied with the reply, a departmental inquiry was instituted. On submission of the inquiry report, the respondent no. 5 had passed a final order dated 15-02-2006, whereby and whereunder, the writ petitioner was awarded a punishment of compulsory retirement with immediate effect further holding that the writ petitioner shall be entitled to 80% pension and gratuity as admissible to him on the date of compulsory retirement. An appeal was preferred by the writ petitioner against the order of compulsory retirement before the respondent no. 4 which was dismissed vide order dated 08- 04-2006. The order of the Appellate Authority was challenged by the writ petitioner before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3924/2006 which was dismissed as withdrawn enabling the writ petitioner to prefer a revision application. The writ petitioner had filed the revision application which was dismissed by the respondent no. 03 vide order dated 21/22-03-2007. The order of the Appellate Authority was challenged by the writ petitioner before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3924/2006 which was dismissed as withdrawn enabling the writ petitioner to prefer a revision application. The writ petitioner had filed the revision application which was dismissed by the respondent no. 03 vide order dated 21/22-03-2007. All these orders were challenged before this Court in W.P.(S) No. 1843/2011 which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 21-11-2022 which is the order impugned to the present appeal. 4. It has been submitted by Mr. Peeyush Krishna Chaudhary, learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner that the writ petitioner had an unblemished career and that nothing was recovered from his possession. It was Constable A.K. Jha who was the person responsible for illegally collecting money and an amount of Rs. 1250/- was recovered from him. It has been submitted by way of an alternative argument that the Disciplinary Authority has awarded a harsh punishment to the writ petitioner which is not in commensuration to the charge framed against him. 5. Mr. Anil Kumar, learned ASGI has submitted that the departmental proceeding was conducted in accordance with law and even the writ petitioner has failed to point out any procedural irregularity which has prejudiced him. The writ petitioner, being in Command of the shift, was himself involved in collection of money in the Morcha with the active connivance of Constable A.K. Jha and the Enquiry Officer had found the charges against the writ petitioner proved. The learned Single Judge has considered all aspects of the case while affirming the finding of the Disciplinary Authority as well as of the Appellate and Revisional Authority. 6. The Disciplinary Authority had recorded the following finding: “6. After taking into account all the above aspects, I fully agree with the findings of the enquiry officer and held the charged member guilty of the charges framed against him. Failure to prevent Const. A.K. Jha to collect money i.e. Rs. 1250/- illegally during duty hours by the charged member, being senior and further seizure of Rs.120/- from near the morcha clearly show gross negligence, dereliction of duty, lack of command and control over the subordinate and involvement in collection of illegal money on the part of the charged member. Failure to prevent Const. A.K. Jha to collect money i.e. Rs. 1250/- illegally during duty hours by the charged member, being senior and further seizure of Rs.120/- from near the morcha clearly show gross negligence, dereliction of duty, lack of command and control over the subordinate and involvement in collection of illegal money on the part of the charged member. The charged member by doing so, declared himself unfit to continue in service in a disciplined force like CISF and deserves a stringent punishment. However, keeping in view his old age and length of service in the department. I take a lenient view and therefore, in exercise of powers conferred upon me under Rule - 32 (1) read in conjunction with Schedule – I and Rule 34 of CISF Rules, 2001 awarded the punishment of COMPULSORY RETIREMENT with immediate effect on No.764300854 HC/GD R P Ram CISF Unit CISF Unit BCCL Dhanbad. It is further directed that he will be entitled to 80% of pension and gratuity as admissible to him on the date of his compulsory retirement as per Rule - 40 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 7. It appears that the writ petitioner was senior to Constable A.K. Jha and both were on duty when on a raid conducted, Rs. 1250/- cash was recovered from the possession of Constable A.K. Jha, while Rs. 120/- was seized from the morcha. The writ petitioner has not pointed out any major deficiency in the disciplinary proceeding which has prejudiced his cause and it appears that the principles of natural justice have duly been followed which is not even a cause of complaint of the writ petitioner. Nothing has been pointed out that the finding of fact is based on no evidence or that the conclusion arrived at is arbitrary and illegal. The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration all aspects of the matter including the limited scope of judicial review. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner has raised the question of punishment which, according to him, is disproportionate to the charge. In this connection we may refer to the case of Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj v. Bank of India reported in (2019) 15 SCC 786 , wherein it has been held as follows: “ 5. It is trite to say that the domain of the courts on the issue of quantum of punishment is very limited. In this connection we may refer to the case of Naresh Chandra Bhardwaj v. Bank of India reported in (2019) 15 SCC 786 , wherein it has been held as follows: “ 5. It is trite to say that the domain of the courts on the issue of quantum of punishment is very limited. It is the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, which decides the nature of punishment keeping in mind the seriousness of the misconduct committed. This would not imply that if the punishment is so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of the court the courts are denuded of the authority to interfere with the same. Normally even in such cases it may be appropriate to remit the matter back for consideration by the disciplinary/appellate authority. However, one other cause for interference can be where the plea raised is of parity in punishment but then the prerequisite would be that the parity has to be in the nature of charges made and held against the delinquent employee and the conduct of the employee post the incident. It is the latter aspect which is sought to be advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant by relying upon the judgment in Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P. [Rajendra Yadav v. State of M.P., (2013) 3 SCC 73 : (2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 476] On this very aspect the learned counsel for the respondents drew out attention to a subsequent judgment in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh [Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 159] which had taken note of the earlier judgment referred to aforesaid. 6. There is really no difference in the proposition, which is sought to be propounded except that in the latter judgment the principles have been succinctly summarised in the last paragraph of the judgment, which read as under: (Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank case [Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 159] , SCC p. 382, para 19) “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct was identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable .” 9. The punishment which has been awarded to the writ petitioner is in commensuration to his act of misconduct. The writ petitioner was a member of a disciplined force and indulging in such acts, for which he had been charged, which was subsequently proved during the enquiry proceedings does not entail any interference. The punishment imposed upon the writ petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate and Revisional Authority is upheld by us. The writ petitioner was a member of a disciplined force and indulging in such acts, for which he had been charged, which was subsequently proved during the enquiry proceedings does not entail any interference. The punishment imposed upon the writ petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate and Revisional Authority is upheld by us. Thus, on the basis of the findings recorded above, we do not find any reason to interfere in the impugned order dated 21-12-2022 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1843/2011 and consequently, we dismiss this appeal. 10. Pending I.A.s, if any, stands closed.