Judgment : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. The present criminal appeal 374 of Cr.P.C. has been filed by the accused-appellant against the judgment dated 11.11.1997, passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No.1, Hanumangarh, in Session Case No.57/1995 by which the learned Trial Court convicted the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC and awarded him sentence of life imprisonment along with fine of Rs.100/- and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo one month’s RI. 2. Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy are that on 01.05.1995, complainant Chandu Ram gave an oral information at Police Station Pilibangan to the effect that in the morning at about 6:30 AM, when he was going towards the way to Manak Theri, he saw the dead-body of Raju lying on the way and a pistol was also lying near the dead-body of Raju. The complainant alleged that someone murdered Raju by gunshot. 3. On the said oral report, Police registered the FIR No.101/1995 and started investigation. During investigation, Police arrested the appellant on 02.05.1995. Thereafter, on completion of investigation, police filed challan against the accused appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. 4. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed the charge for the offence under Section 302 IPC against the accused-appellant, who denied the charge and sought trial. 5. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as fifteen witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in support of its case. 6. The statement of the accused appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in defence, a document was exhibited. 7. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide judgment dated 11.11.1997 convicted and sentenced the present accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. Hence, this criminal appeal filed by the accused-appellant against his conviction. 8. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant has vehemently submitted that this case is primarily based on circumstantial evidence, which includes the evidence of last seen theory. However, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not establish any connection between the present accused-appellant and the alleged crime. Hence, this criminal appeal filed by the accused-appellant against his conviction. 8. Learned counsel for the accused-appellant has vehemently submitted that this case is primarily based on circumstantial evidence, which includes the evidence of last seen theory. However, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not establish any connection between the present accused-appellant and the alleged crime. It is contended that the name of the appellant was not mentioned in the FIR, which was filed by the complainant Chandu Ram (PW-2) and later a “last seen” witness was produced by the prosecution, Nathi, mother of the deceased Raju. It is submitted that Nathi, in her statement deposed that in the evening before the incident, accused-appellant-Gopi Ram came to her house and took deceased-Raju along with him. The following morning, the dead-body of Raju was discovered. Counsel submits that the statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. of witness Nathi (PW-11) was recorded by the Police after two days of incident. When she reached at the place where the dead-body of Raju discovered, both the accused-appellant-Gopiram and complainant-Chandu Ram (PW-2) were already present. However, Nathi did not mention in her statement that on the previous evening, deceased Raju had gone with accused-appellant. She only identified the accused appellant to the police at a later stage. This suggests that her statement was an afterthought and cannot be relied upon. Counsel further submits that the weapon used in the incident i.e. pistol was recovered from the vicinity of the deceased’s body. However, no recovery of weapon was made from the present accused-appellant. Thus, the learned trial court fell into error of law to appreciate these material aspects of the matter while convicting the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. Thus, the impugned judgment of conviction being per se illegal and perverse, deserves to be quashed and set aside and the appellant may be acquitted from the offences under Section 302 IPC. To buttress his contentions, counsel has relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Ashish Jain Vs. Makrand Singh & Ors. [AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 546] & Inderjeet Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab [1991 AIR SCW 1679] and upon the judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Rajman Vs. Staet of UP. 9. Makrand Singh & Ors. [AIR 2019 SUPREME COURT 546] & Inderjeet Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab [1991 AIR SCW 1679] and upon the judgment of Allahabad High Court in the case of Rajman Vs. Staet of UP. 9. Per-contra, the learned Public Prosecutor has vehemently submitted that though it is true that the statement of witness Nathi (PW-11), mother of the deceased-Raju, was recorded by the Police after two days of the incident, but when she saw dead-body of her son, she went into a dark shocking state and therefore, her state of mind was not in a position to narrate the fact that on the last evening, her son went with the accused-appellant. It is further submitted that there is an old animosity between the parties. Thus, the learned trial court after meticulous examination of the evidence, oral as well as documentary, has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. The learned Public Prosecutor thus craves dismissal of the appeal. 10. We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as record of the case. 11. On perusal of the FIR, the name of the accused-appellant was not mentioned therein. The complainant Chanduram explicitly stated in the FIR that the dead-body of Raju was found lying on the roadway, with a pistol also discovered in close proximity. The circumstances indicate that Raju was killed by a gunshot. The complainant Chanduram (PW-2) examined before the trial court reiterated the same account during his deposition. Importantly, neither in the FIR nor in his subsequent statement did complainant Chanduram (PW-2) mention the name of the present appellant. Additionally, the independent witnesses namely Harnek Singh (PW-5), Dashrath (PW-6), Biruram (PW-7), Rajsingh (PW-8) and Basant Singh (PW-15) were declared hostile by the trial court, indicating their lack of cooperation and raising questions about their credibility. 12. The important evidence in this case pertains to Nathi (PW- 11), mother of deceased Raju and the last known person to have seen the deceased. The said witness in her deposition stated that on the last evening preceding the incident, the accused-appellant Gopiram came to her house and took her son deceased Raju along with him. 12. The important evidence in this case pertains to Nathi (PW- 11), mother of deceased Raju and the last known person to have seen the deceased. The said witness in her deposition stated that on the last evening preceding the incident, the accused-appellant Gopiram came to her house and took her son deceased Raju along with him. She further stated that after ten minutes deceased Raju and accused appellant Gopiram left her house, Basant Singh arrived and inquired about Balwant, upon which Nathi replied that she did not know about Balwant, but confirmed that her son deceased Raju had gone with accused-appellant Gopiram. However, Basant Singh was examined as PW-15 before the trial court and he did not support the testimony of PW-11 (Nathi) and was therefore, declared hostile. Thus, there exists no additional corroborative evidence linking the appellant to connect alleged crime. 13. Undoubtedly, the case at hand is one based on circumstantial evidence. It is the settled law that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must convince the Court that circumstances point towards the guilt of the accused alone and none else, as also lack of his innocence. In the case of Krishnan v. State of T.N. reported in (2014) 12 SCC 279 , the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed : “21. The conviction cannot be based only on the circumstance of last seen together with the deceased. In Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar [1994 Supp (2) SCC 372 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1551] this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 385, para 31) "31. Thus the evidence that the Appellant had gone to Sitaram in the evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the house of deceased Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it is accepted that they were there it would at best amount to be the evidence of the appellants having been seen last together with the deceased. But it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded." 24. But it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded." 24. In Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab [ (2005) 12 SCC 438 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 579] this Court held that in the absence of any other links in the chain of circumstantial evidence, the Appellant cannot be convicted solely based on "last seen together" even if version of the prosecution witness in this regard is believed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab reported in (2023) 7 SCC 727 , succinctly summarized the position of law on circumstantial evidence : “17. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It has been held that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It has been held that there is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved”. It has been held that the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. It has been held that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one sought to be proved, and that there must be a chain of evidence so complete so as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] where the following observations were made: (SCC p. 807, para 19) “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 18. It is a settled principle of law that, however strong a suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In the light of these guiding principles, we will have to consider the present case." (Emphasis supplied) 15. More recently, this came to be reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana reported in (2024) 3 SCC 324 , observing that in circumstantial evidence cases, all facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of the accused's guilt, excluding his innocence and also exclusion of third-party involvement. The relevant para is:- “29. There is a yawning gap between the charge against the Appellant and the evidence that the prosecution has adduced. The relevant para is:- “29. There is a yawning gap between the charge against the Appellant and the evidence that the prosecution has adduced. The circumstances do not establish the guilt of the Appellant at all. While the principle applicable to circumstantial evidence requires that the facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, in the present case the evidence adduced gives rise to doubts, improbabilities and inconsistencies.” 16. Moreover, in the case of Pradeep Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2023) 5 SCC 350 , the Hon’ble Apex Court clarified that in cases where there is a heavy reliance on circumstantial evidence and on a perusal of evidence, two views are possible, the one which is favourable to the accused must be adopted. 17. After thorough and meticulous evaluation of the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses and pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we find ourselves unable to concur with the judgment of the trial court. The circumstances presented are insufficient to establish guilt of the accused-appellant. It is well settled principle that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish all the circumstances by independent evidence and the circumstances so established must form a complete chain in proof of guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. The circumstances so proved must also be consistent only with the guilt of the accused. In the light of these principles, we find that apart from the evidence of PW-11 Nathi regarding the last seen, there is no other incriminating evidence. The only circumstance namely that the deceased was last seen in the company of the accused by itself is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. It is true that the deceased’s death was homicidal, but since there is no direct witness connecting the appellant with the crime, we should fall back on the circumstantial evidence and we are of the view that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are hardly sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused-appellant. The only relevant circumstance as pointed above is that the appellant and deceased-Raju left the house together. It is needless to say that no conviction can be passed on this sole circumstance. 18. In the result, the present criminal appeal is allowed. The only relevant circumstance as pointed above is that the appellant and deceased-Raju left the house together. It is needless to say that no conviction can be passed on this sole circumstance. 18. In the result, the present criminal appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant as recorded vide judgment dated 11.11.1997 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No.1, Hanumangarh, in Sessions Case No.57/1995 is quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of offence under Section 302 IPC. The appellant is on bail; he need not surrender. His bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. Record of the learned court below be sent back forthwith. 19. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. the accused appellant is directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount before the learned trial court within a period of one month, which shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the judgment or for grant of leave, the appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before Hon’ble Supreme Court.