ORDER : Pulla Karthik, J. This Writ Petition is filed seeking to declare and set aside the impugned suspension order vide reference No.HPS/HR/25-26/46 dated 04.08.2025, issued by respondent No.2, as illegal, arbitrary, violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 2. Heard Sri P. Raja Sripathi Rao, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Rahul Kandharkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, and Sri A.P. Suresh Ram, learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.2 and 3. 3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher (Hindi) in the respondent School on 12.06.1995, and his services were confirmed on 12.06.1998. Thereafter, in addition to the said post, the petitioner was associated with the National Cadre Corps (NCC) since 2006 as a Care Taker, and was subsequently, promoted to the rank of Chief Officer in the year 2024, by the Director General of NCC, New Delhi. As such, the petitioner has an unblemished service record of more than three decades. However, despite the same, he was issued with a show-cause notice dated 23.07.2025, calling for his explanation as to why action shall not be taken against him, in pursuance of the complaint supposedly made against the petitioner by the students of 8E, 8G and 8H, alleging his teaching inability and inappropriate behavior in the classroom. However, in response to the said notice, the petitioner submitted his detailed explanation on 25.07.2025, denying the allegations, and specifically seeking the copies of the complaint, the relevant Rules of the respondent School governing the disciplinary enquiries. However, none of the said documents were furnished to the petitioner, thereby, depriving him of a valuable opportunity to defend himself. It was further submitted that despite the petitioner’s categorical explanation, respondent No.2 has passed the present suspension order vide impugned letter dated 04.08.2025, stating that the petitioner’s explanation was inadequate and unsatisfactory, and observed that a prima facie case was made out against the petitioner to initiate disciplinary proceedings under the Disciplinary and Appeal Rules for Employees of HPS, 2002 (for short, ‘the HPS Rules’). 4. 4. Learned Senior Counsel contended that the entire exercise of illegally placing the petitioner under suspension was carried out in a completely biased and hasty manner, even without furnishing him the copies of the compliant and other relevant documents or affording him a fair opportunity to substantiate his case, thereby, violating every possible fundamental right available to the petitioner, in gross violation of Rule 6 of the HPS Rules, which mandates application of mind and strict adherence to the principles of natural justice. It was further contended that even if the alleged complaints were to be accepted as it is on the face of record, it would not disclose any act of grave misconduct, warranting the harsh punishment of suspension. As such, the impugned order is capricious, violative of principles of natural justice, and suffers from proper application of mind. Therefore, the impugned suspension order dated 04.08.2025 is liable to be set aside. 5. It was further submitted that on earlier occasions, on 01.04.2025, 19.04.2025 and 24.06.2025, on similar and routine allegations, show-cause notices were issued to the petitioner, but they were subsequently either closed or withdrawn with a warning of counseling. As such, it is clear that in a short span of less than four months, these complaints were given against the petitioner solely with an ulterior motive of victimizing such a senior faculty member. It was further submitted that though the impugned suspension order dated 04.08.2025 pertains only to the post of TGT (Hind), the respondents are illegally and in a high-handed manner interfering with the petitioner’s statutory role as Chief Officer of NCC. It was submitted that the petitioner was sent an e-mail dated 01.09.2025, stating that in view of his suspension, the School had nominated one Mr. Chetan as the in-charge Officer of the NCC, and vide another e-mail dated 02.09.2025, the petitioner was instructed to handover the charge of the said post to Mr. Chetan by 11.09.2025, which is highly illegal, arbitrary, mala fide, and suffers from lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, learned Senior Counsel prayed this Court to allow the present writ petition by setting aside the impugned suspension order dated 04.08.2025 and the consequential e-mails dated 01.09.2025 and 02.09.2025. 6. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher (Hindi), and is due to retire from service in the year 2026. 6. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the petitioner was appointed as a Trained Graduate Teacher (Hindi), and is due to retire from service in the year 2026. However, the petitioner is bereft of a clean and unblemished service record, as several complaints were received against the petitioner over the years from parents and students, more particularly, during 1997, 2015, 2019 and 2024. It was submitted that on every occasion, the petitioner was issued with show-cause notices, leading to his admitting the misconduct, and was later counseled or warned. However, despite repeated opportunities to correct his conduct, there was no progress. It was further submitted that during the year 2025 alone, multiple complaints were received against the petitioner from the students and parents regarding his conduct in class, and though he was found to have committed the said acts, the school administration has taken a lenient view and cautioned the petitioner not to repeat such acts. However, yet again, the petitioner continued to act in ways unbecoming of a teacher. 7. It was further submitted that as many as (28) students of Classes 8E, 8G and 8H submitted their written complaint to the Middle School Coordinator on 11.07.2025, alleging that the petitioner does not teach properly, scolds students for coming late, calls them dumb, makes personal remarks and gives them nicknames, and discriminates between boys and girls. As such, based on the said complaint, a show-cause notice dated 23.07.2025 was issued, along with a copy of the complaint, calling for his explanation as to why disciplinary action shall not be initiated against him. In response, the petitioner submitted his detailed explanation on 25.07.2025. However, since the said explanation was found unsatisfactory, respondent No.2, being the competent disciplinary authority, is fully justified in placing the petitioner under suspension vide impugned proceedings dated 04.08.2025. Thereafter, an Enquiry Officer was appointed in accordance with the HPS Rules. However, the petitioner refused to appear before the enquiry officer and refused to receive the notices. 8. It was further submitted that the petitioner was afforded ample opportunity at every stage to defend himself but instead of participating in the enquiry proceedings, he had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court without first availing the statutory remedy of appeal available under the HPS Rules, with the sole intention of obstructing the ongoing disciplinary proceedings. 8. It was further submitted that the petitioner was afforded ample opportunity at every stage to defend himself but instead of participating in the enquiry proceedings, he had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court without first availing the statutory remedy of appeal available under the HPS Rules, with the sole intention of obstructing the ongoing disciplinary proceedings. It was also submitted that the HPS Society functions as a private unaided educational institution and is not State or public authority amenable to writ jurisdiction. As such, on these grounds alone, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed in limine. 9. This Court has taken note of the rival submissions/contentions urged by learned counsel for the respective parties. 10. Before adverting to the merits of the case, this Court deems it apposite to address the preliminary objection raised by the respondents with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition against the respondent School. 11. This Court, in W.P.No.13828 of 2023 vide order dated 03.05.2024, has already held that the respondent School is amenable to writ jurisdiction. The relevant portion of the said order reads as under: “15. Having regard to the rival contentions and the material on record, on the issue of maintainability of writ petition, this Court finds that the question as to whether the respondents No.2 and 3 are the instrumentality of the State has already been considered by the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Diddi Rambabu (cited supra) and since the said judgment has become final, this Court is not inclined to go into the arguments submitted by the petitioner with regard to the same. The said arguments are therefore rejected.” 12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent School preferred W.A.No.711 of 2024 before the Division Bench of this Court, which was disposed of vide judgment dated 21.06.2024, affirming the view taken by the learned Single Judge and rejected the contention of the respondents as to the very maintainability of the writ petition. The relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “8. As far as the maintainability of the writ petition against the appellant-school is concerned, several individuals have filed writ petitions against the appellant-School and they were entertained and the appellant-school has implemented the order passed by this Court. We were also informed that Service Rules were also framed at the instance of directions issued by this Court. As far as the maintainability of the writ petition against the appellant-school is concerned, several individuals have filed writ petitions against the appellant-School and they were entertained and the appellant-school has implemented the order passed by this Court. We were also informed that Service Rules were also framed at the instance of directions issued by this Court. Therefore, the contention of the appellants that it is not a State, is to be rejected and accordingly, it is rejected.” 13. In view of the above, it is now well-settled that a writ petition against the respondent School is maintainable under law. As such, the objection raised by the respondents with regard to maintainability of writ petition is hereby rejected. 14. Coming to the merits of the case, the petitioner, while working as a Trained Graduate Teacher (Hindi), was initially issued with a show-cause notice dated 23.07.2025, and was subsequently, placed under suspension vide impugned proceedings dated 04.08.2025, and an enquiry officer was appointed on 01.09.2025. The basis for the impugned suspension is the complaint lodged against the petitioner by the (28) students of Classes 8E, 8G and 8H, dated 11.07.2025. The following is an excerpt of the said complaint. “1. Teaching: Sahu sir does not teach anything in class.Out of the 4 classes of L-1 we have in a week, 3 of them are wasted on checking the same notes every day even though there is no new work given. In the 4th class if anything happens like talking before sir enters the class or if anyone comes a little late to the class from lunch, he wastes the entire class on scolding us. Whenever he starts a new chapter all sir does is read it and nothing else, he does not explain the chapter properly. 2. In the 4th class if anything happens like talking before sir enters the class or if anyone comes a little late to the class from lunch, he wastes the entire class on scolding us. Whenever he starts a new chapter all sir does is read it and nothing else, he does not explain the chapter properly. 2. Insulting students: If we ask sir to explain the chapter again because we didn't understand he will start insulting us saying that we are too dumb to understand and most of the students are scared of him so whenever he asks who all did not understand the chapter, only a few people raise their hands and sir starts scolding the ones who raised their hands by saying that when everyone else is able to understand why aren't we, then he would continue saying that he knows the reason why we didn't understand and he says that we didn't understand because we are too dumb and then he would continue to talk about how our parents don't care about us.Sir also does not call us by our actual names, he calls us by the nickname he gave us. He also makes jokes by insulting the boys. He alsomakes racist jokes which with which people aren't comfortable. This is the problem faced by girls other than the ones listed above: Sir makes the girls sit in front of him during class and all sir does is talk to girls. The girls have a complaint saying that sir is biased.When sir makes jokes on boys or in general any jokes he looks around to see if any girls are laughing. If they are not laughing, he asks them why they are not laughing and continues to talk to girls. This is what sir does to boys during class: If any girl comes a little late to class and all the places are already occupied,he makes random boys stand up and makes them sit down on the floor and makes the girl sit in the now vacant place. If we talk and sir gives us punishment,we accept it as it is our fault but most of the time,sir makes us sit on the floor even if there is no mistake done by us.” 15. If we talk and sir gives us punishment,we accept it as it is our fault but most of the time,sir makes us sit on the floor even if there is no mistake done by us.” 15. From a bare reading of the above complaint, it is clear that the allegations, regarding the petitioner’s teaching and classroom behaviour, are serious in nature. The petitioner, being a teacher, is expected to maintain high standards of discipline and proper conduct in the classroom. Therefore, this Court is of the view that unless a detailed enquiry is conducted, the truth or otherwise of the said allegations cannot be elicited. As such, this Court is not inclined to grant any relief to the petitioner. 16. Further, it is well-settled law that an order of suspension is only an administrative measure to facilitate a fair enquiry into the alleged misconduct. Unless such an order is shown to be vitiated by mala fides or in gross violation of the statutory provisions, Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with such order. This position has been affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal , [(2013) 16 SCC 147] , wherein, it was observed as follows: “26. The scope of interference by the Court with the order of suspension has been examined by the Court in a large number of cases, particularly in State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh [ (1970) 1 SCC 108 ] , P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General [ (1993) 1 SCC 419 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 206 : (1993) 23 ATC 645] , ESI v. T. Abdul Razak [ (1996) 4 SCC 708 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1061] , Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [ (1988) 4 SCC 319 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 950] , Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan [ AIR 1960 SC 806 ] , U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan [1993 Supp (3) SCC 483 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 67 : (1993) 25 ATC 764] , State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena [ (1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455] , Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [ (1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745 ] and Allahabad Bank v. Deepak Kumar Bhola [ (1997) 4 SCC 1 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 897] , wherein it has been observed that even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon them by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. Where the charges are baseless, mala fide or vindictive and are framed only to keep the delinquent employee out of job, a case for judicial review is made out. But in a case where no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question and in order that the disciplinary proceedings may continue unhindered the court may not interfere. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the authority is not proceeding expeditiously as it ought to have been and it results in prolongation of sufferings for the delinquent employee, the court may issue directions. The court may, in case the authority fails to furnish proper explanation for delay in conclusion of the enquiry, direct to complete the enquiry within a stipulated period. However, mere delay in conclusion of enquiry or trial cannot be a ground for quashing the suspension order, if the charges are grave in nature. But, whether the employee should or should not continue in his office during the period of enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily the court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed in mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct in question. 27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. 27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in the aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as to which version is true when there are claims and counterclaims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it is an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review.” 17. Admittedly, in the instant case, no such infirmity is demonstrated, warranting interference with the impugned suspension order. 18. In view of the above and given that the gravity of allegations against the petitioner is serious, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned suspension order dated 04.08.2025. Therefore, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 19. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed. No costs.