JUDGMENT : MANISH MATHUR, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned State counsel for opposite parties. 2. Petition has been filed challenging order dated 17.12.2025 whereby petitioner has been attached to the Headquarter at Lucknow. 3. It is submitted that earlier, petitioner while being posted as Food Safety Officer at Mathura was suspended vide order dated 16.10.2025 which was challenged in Writ A No.13092 of 2025 and vide order dated 19.11.2025, the operation of suspension order was stayed. It is submitted that in pursuance thereof, impugned order has been passed but instead of posting petitioner at the original place of posting, he has been attached to the Head Office at Lucknow. 4. It is submitted that once the petitioner prior to suspension was posted in District Mathura and with the stay order of this Court in operation, the fresh attachment order could not have been passed in the garb of reinstating petitioner in service. 5. It is further submitted that since inquiry proceedings are already continuing against petitioner in District Agra Division, it is necessary for petitioner to continue in his earlier place of posting, particularly since no proceedings against petitioner are ongoing at Lucknow. 6. Learned State counsel has been provided written instructions dated 19.12.2025, a copy of which is taken on record and as per which even by passing of impugned order, no adverse effect would occasion to petitioner since he is continuing in service. It is also indicated that serious charges have been levelled against petitioner and therefore it will not be conducive for petitioner's posting in his erstwhile place. 7. Upon consideration of submissions advanced by learned counsel for parties and perusal of material on record, the fact pertaining to petitioner's suspension and stay thereof as indicated here-in-above are admitted. 8. In the considered opinion of this Court, once the suspension order of petitioner dated 16.10.2025 was stayed in its entirety, it was incumbent upon opposite parties to have continued petitioner in his place of posting prior to passing of the suspension order. 9. However instead of adopting the aforesaid method, opposite parties in the garb of reinstating petitioner in service, have attached him at Lucknow. 10. The aforesaid procedure is totally alien to service jurisprudence and even otherwise the concept of prejudice being caused is irrelevant since opposite parties were bound to comply with direction issued by this Court. 11. 9. However instead of adopting the aforesaid method, opposite parties in the garb of reinstating petitioner in service, have attached him at Lucknow. 10. The aforesaid procedure is totally alien to service jurisprudence and even otherwise the concept of prejudice being caused is irrelevant since opposite parties were bound to comply with direction issued by this Court. 11. The aspect can also be considered in terms of principles of restitution as specified in Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereby the party aggrieved is required to be placed in the same position in which he/she was prior to passing of the order which was impugned and has either been stayed or quashed. The said principle is an existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. The said proposition has been considered by Supreme Court in the case of Citibank N.A. v. Hitten P. Dalal [ (2016) 1 SCC 411 ] in the following manner:- "17. In Kerala SEB v. M.R.F. Ltd. (1996) 1 SCC 597 also the view taken by this Court was similar. But it was further clarified that the Court has a duty that in the matter of restitution justice be done as per facts of the case. In granting relief of restitution the Court “should not be oblivious of any unmerited hardship to be suffered by the party against whom action by way of restitution is taken.” This Court favoured a pragmatic view and grant of relief in a manner as may be reasonable, fair and practicable without causing unmerited hardships to either of the parties. In South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648 , this Court re-emphasized that restitution is for meeting the ends of justice and depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. This Court further clarified in para 27 that as held by Privy Council in the case of Jai Berham vs. Kedar Nath Marwari, AIR 1922 PC 269 , Section 144 CPC is rather a statutory recognition of an already existing rule of justice, equity and fair play and therefore even apart from Section 144 the Court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. This Court approved the view of the Privy Council that the Court has to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances, towards all parties involved. 19. This Court approved the view of the Privy Council that the Court has to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances, towards all parties involved. 19. In the ultimate analysis we find that the law on restitution under Section 144 of the CPC is quite well settled. It vests expansive power in the Court but such power has to be exercised to ensure equity, fairness and justice for both the parties. It also flows from more or less common stand of parties on the principle of law that for ascertaining the value of the property which is no longer available for restitution on account of sale etc., the Court should adopt a realistic and verifiable approach instead of resorting to hypothetical and presumptive value. It is also one of the established propositions that in the context of restitution the Court should keep under consideration not only the loss suffered by the party entitled to restitution but also the gain, if any, made by other party who is obliged to make restitution. No unmerited injustice should be caused to any of the parties." 12. Although specific provisions of the Code Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction, but the general principles, particularly that of restitution, would be applicable in the present case as well. 13. In view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, it being evident that impugned order dated 17.12.2025 is not in consonance with the directions issued by this Court on 19.11.2025, the same is quashed by issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari, directing opposite party no.2 i.e. Commissioner Food Safety and Drug Administration, Sector-C, Aliganj, Lucknow to post petitioner in the place where he was posted prior to issuance of suspension order. 14. Resultantly, petition succeeds and is allowed at the admission stage itself . Parties to bear their own costs.