ORDER: GAURI GODSE, J. 1. Heard learned counsels for the parties. This petition is filed by the original defendant who has suffered a decree for eviction passed by the first appellate court, which is confirmed upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. After the confirmation of the decree, the petitioner filed an application under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908(‘CPC’), raising objections to the execution of the decree. By the impugned order, the trial court rejected the said application. The revision application filed before the Division Bench of the Small Causes Court was dismissed, and the executing court’s order was confirmed. The petitioner has therefore filed this petition to challenge the orders rejecting the application under Section 47 of the CPC. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the rent court, i.e. the small causes court, had no jurisdiction to entertain the eviction proceedings as the termination notice was issued under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and thus, the rent court had no jurisdiction to decide the eviction proceedings. Section 47 of the CPC is an independent provision that enables a party to raise objections that go to the root of the matter, and, more particularly, to question of the court's jurisdiction. He therefore submits that all the questions which go to the root of the matter relating to the execution of the decree must be determined by the executing court. Hence, all the objections raised by the petitioner had to be considered by the executing court. The verification of the plaint was defective and thus, even on that ground, the rent court had no jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction, as the plaint itself was defective. The Director of the petitioner’s company was not added as a party to the suit. Hence, even on that ground, the decree would not be executable. He therefore submits that the impugned orders would warrant interference by this court as the questions regarding jurisdiction and the defective plaint, which would vitiate the entire proceedings, need to be considered in view of the scope of inquiry under section 47 of the CPC. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent (the decree holder) supports the impugned orders. He submits that all the grounds argued in the application under Section 47 were the grounds raised in the written statement. All these objections, therefore, cannot be considered afresh in execution proceedings. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent (the decree holder) supports the impugned orders. He submits that all the grounds argued in the application under Section 47 were the grounds raised in the written statement. All these objections, therefore, cannot be considered afresh in execution proceedings. He submits that the petitioner against whom the decree of eviction is confirmed upto the Hon’ble Apex Court has filed objections under Section 47 only with an intention to delay and defeat the execution of the eviction decree. He relies upon the findings recorded in the eviction proceedings by the first appellate court and this court in the revision application, to point out that the objections raised in the application under Section 47. He therefore submits that the defendant who has suffered the decree cannot be entertained on such grounds as if the grounds were raised in the trial court in the suit filed for eviction. He therefore submits that the impugned order would not require any interference by this court. 4. I have perused the papers of the petition. All the grounds raised by the petitioner in the application under Section 47 are the grounds that were also raised in the written statement. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly submits that all the grounds raised in the written statement were also argued before this court in the civil revision application and the review filed seeking review of the order rejecting the revision application against the eviction decree. 5. Initially, the trial court had dismissed the suit. However, in the appeal filed before the appellate bench of the small causes court, the eviction decree was passed. The decree was passed on the ground that the petitioner had defaulted in payment of the property tax and repair cess payable to the corporation. One of the grounds for eviction is by accepting the allegations of the landlord about the nuisance and annoyance created by the petitioner. The issue with regard to the terms and conditions of the lease deed and the notice issued under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act is also a part of the findings recorded by the first appellate court in the eviction proceedings. This court, while rejecting the civil revision application challenging the eviction decree, has considered all the grounds raised by the petitioner in relation to the written statement. This court, while rejecting the civil revision application challenging the eviction decree, has considered all the grounds raised by the petitioner in relation to the written statement. The breach of the terms and conditions of the lease, the ground of sub-letting, the creation of third-party rights, and the protection under the Rent Act are also part of the consideration before this court in dismissing the petitioner's civil revision application against the eviction decree. 6. The grounds raised in the application under Section 47 regarding the respondent's legal entity are not based on any ground that the decree is a nullity. None of the grounds regarding jurisdiction, pertain to any inherent lack of jurisdiction. The order passed by the executing court rejecting the application under Section 47 also refers to and considers the objections raised by the petitioner that the decree under execution was void as it was obtained by fraud. The objection on the ground of fraud has no foundation. The issue regarding the legal entity of the petitioner, being a private limited company, is rightly held by the trial court as a misconceived attempt to prolong the execution of the decree. The objection regarding the defective plaint is considered by the executing court with reference to the authorisation and compliance as required under Order VI of CPC, as the plaint was signed by the trustees and was verified by one of the trustees. The pleadings did not warrant an issue regarding jurisdiction. The issue of jurisdiction was therefore required to be taken at the first instance and cannot be the ground of challenge at the instance of the defendant who has suffered the eviction decree upto the Hon’ble Apex Court. It is a well-established legal principle that the executing court cannot go beyond the decree. 7. The court, while passing the decree of eviction, has considered the default committed by the petitioner in payment of property tax and repair cess as per the terms and conditions of the lease, unauthorised construction carried out by the petitioner, creation of third-party interest and nuisance and annoyance caused by the petitioner. On the said grounds, the eviction suit was decreed by the first appellate court, confirmed by this court, and affirmed by the Apex Court. On the said grounds, the eviction suit was decreed by the first appellate court, confirmed by this court, and affirmed by the Apex Court. Hence, the executing court rightly refused to entertain the objections raised by the petitioner under Section 47 of the CPC as it is an attempt to prolong the execution and defeat the eviction decree. The division bench of the small causes court, while rejecting the revision application, has therefore rightly dismissed the revision application by confirming the findings recorded by the executing court. 8. A perusal of the grounds raised under Section 47 is rightly held as an attempt to prolong the execution of the decree and defeat the eviction process initiated by the landlord. The decree under execution is dated 21 st October 2016. This court rejected the civil revision application on 11 th December 2017. The Special Leave Petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 11 th May 2018. The application under Section 47 is thus an attempt to defeat the execution of the decree and prolong the execution. 9. The scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is well-established by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. Vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 239. The Apex Court held that the High Court can interfere in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. It is held that the power is discretionary and has to be exercised sparingly on equitable principles. 10. In the present case, there is no illegality or perversity in the reasons recorded in the impugned order, warranting any interference by this court in the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition is devoid of any merit. Hence, the petition is rejected. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks an extension of time to pay costs as directed by the order dated 20 th November 2025. Learned advocate for the petitioner is permitted to deposit the payment of costs as per the order dated 20 th November 2025 within three weeks from today.