JUDGMENT : 1. The complainant in S.T. No. 97/2011 on the files of the Chief Judicial Magistrate Court, Kottayam, has filed this appeal, with the leave of this Court, challenging the judgment of acquittal dated 30.05.2013, whereby the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitted the accused in the above case, where the prosecution alleges commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 [hereinafter referred as ‘NI Act’ for short] by the accused. The 1 st respondent herein is the accused before the trial court and the 2 nd respondent herein is the State of Kerala, represented by the learned Public Prosecutor. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Public Prosecutor and the learned counsel appearing for the 1 st respondent, in detail. Perused the verdict under challenge and the records of the trial court. 3. Parties in this appeal shall be referred as ‘complainant’ and ‘accused’ hereafter. 4. The case of the complainant before the trial court is that, the accused borrowed an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant on 08.03.2011 and agreed to repay the same. Accordingly, cheque drawn at State Bank of Travancore, Kayamkulam Branch dated 18.05.2011 was issued by the accused in discharge of the said liability. But, when the cheque was presented for encashment, the same got dishonored for the reason ‘funds insufficient’ and the accused failed to make the payment even after getting the demand notice. 5. The trial court took cognizance of the matter and proceeded with trial. During trial, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and Exts.P1 to P6 were marked on the side of the complainant. Even though, the accused was given opportunity to adduce defence evidence after questioning him under Section 313(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. he did not opt to adduce any defence evidence. 6. On appreciation of evidence, the trial court found that the accused did not commit the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and thereby, the accused was acquitted. 7. While challenging the verdict of the trial court, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant that, the trial court found fault with the case of the complainant mainly on the point that the entries in Ext.P1 cheque were written by PW2, despite the fact that the accused is a graduate in law. 7. While challenging the verdict of the trial court, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant that, the trial court found fault with the case of the complainant mainly on the point that the entries in Ext.P1 cheque were written by PW2, despite the fact that the accused is a graduate in law. Secondly, the complainant’s case was given a go by, by the trial court on finding inconsistency in the evidence given by PWs 1 and 2 regarding the place of transaction. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant that, in the complaint it has been specifically stated in paragraph No.7 that the accused borrowed an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant and issued cheque in discharge of the said liability when they were at Collectorate, Kottayam and during the cross-examination of PW1, he reiterated the same. But, during examination of PW2, an eye witness to the transaction, he had given evidence that the transaction took place outside the RTO Office, Kottayam. According to the learned counsel for the complainant, Collectorate in Kottayam means a block of buildings where Head Offices of various departments including the District Collector’s Office have been functioning. Therefore, the evidence given by PW2 that the transaction was near the RTO Office and the evidence given by PW1 that the transaction was at Collectorate, Kottayam are pertaining to the same place and the same is not at all contradictory. He also submitted that, the trial court proceeded with the case under the wrong understanding of law that, a cheque could not be written by any other person other than the payer or drawer. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant placed decision of the Apex Court reported in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , 2019 0 Supreme (SC) 126 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 1 KHC 774 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 where in paragraph Nos. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant placed decision of the Apex Court reported in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , 2019 0 Supreme (SC) 126 : 2019 (1) KLT 598 : 2019 1 KHC 774 : 2019 (1) KLD 420 where in paragraph Nos. 36 to 40 and 42, the Apex Court summarized the legal position as regards to the applicability Sections 20, 87 and 139 of the NI Act, after referring the earlier decisions of the Apex Court reported in MSR Leathers v. S. Palaniappan, (2013) 1 SCC 177 , Southern Sales and Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH , (2008) 14 SCC 457 , Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee , (2001) 6 SCC 16 , State of Madras v. Vaidyanatha Iyer , AIR 1958 SC 61 , Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra , (2005) 5 SCC 294 , Rajesh Ranjan Yada @ Pappu Yadav v. CBI through its Director , (2007) 1 SCC 70 , Laxmi Dyechem v. State of Gujarat , (2012) 13 SCC 375 , K.N. Beena v. Muniyappan , (2001) 8 SCC 458 , R. Vijayan v. Baby , (2012) 1 SCC 260 , Raj Kumar Khurana v. State of (NCT of Delhi) , (2009) 6 SCC 72 , John K. John v. Tom Varghese , (2007) 12 SCC 714 , Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde , (2008) 4 SCC 54 and State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, (1992) 1 SCC 489 , Paragraph Nos. 36 to 40 and 42 are extracted as under: 36. The proposition of law which emerges from the judgments referred to above is that the onus to rebut the presumption under Section 139 that the cheque has been issued in discharge of a debt or liability is on the accused and the fact that the cheque might be post dated does not absolve the drawer of a cheque of the penal consequences of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 37. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. 38. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. 39. It is not the case of the respondent-accused that he either signed the cheque or parted with it under any threat or coercion. Nor is it the case of the respondent-accused that the unfilled signed cheque had been stolen. The existence of a fiduciary relationship between the payee of a cheque and its drawer, would not disentitle the payee to the benefit of the presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of evidence of exercise of undue influence or coercion. The second question is also answered in the negative. 40. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. xxx xxx xxx 42. In the absence of any finding that the cheque in question was not signed by the respondent-accused or not voluntarily made over to the payee and in the absence of any evidence with regard to the circumstances in which a blank signed cheque had been given to the appellant- complainant, it may reasonably be presumed that the cheque was filled in by the appellant- complainant being the payee in the presence of the respondent-accused being the drawer, at his request and/or with his acquiescence. The subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change in the amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the payee. The High Court ought not to have acquitted the respondent-accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 8. The subsequent filling in of an unfilled signed cheque is not an alteration. There was no change in the amount of the cheque, its date or the name of the payee. The High Court ought not to have acquitted the respondent-accused of the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant/complainant also placed decision of the Delhi High Court in Ravi Chopra v. State and Anr., MANU/DE/0448/2008 : 2008 (102) DRJ 147 , to buttress the said point. 9. According to the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, in this matter, the case put up by the accused is by admitting the transaction and issuance of Ext.P1 cheque. But, according to the accused, the amount borrowed was only Rs.50,000/- and out of which, Rs.32,000/- was repaid. Thus, issuance of Ext.P1 cheque is admitted by the accused. By the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, the transaction and execution of cheque were proved by the complainant, so as to get presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act in his favour. If so, the finding of the trial court in the reverse is unsustainable and the same would require interference. 10. Refuting this contention, the learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/accused argued that, the parameters to be considered while appreciating evidence to reverse the finding of acquittal is totally different than the parameters to be considered while addressing the judgment of conviction to find its legality. According to the learned counsel for the accused, in this case, the evidence adduced by the complainant is insufficient to prove the transaction and execution of Ext.P1 cheque, otherwise the presumptions under Section 118 and 139 of the NI Act stand rebutted. The learned counsel for the accused placed decision of this Court in Suja Balachandran v. Divya, 2024 (7) KHC 394 : 2024 KHC OnLine 7211 : 2024 KER 89277 , with reference to paragraph Nos.20, 22, 24 and 30 in support of his contentions. 11. The learned counsel for the accused submitted further that, in the instant case, the oral evidence given by PW1 (the complainant) is not believable and the places of transaction deposed by PW1 and PW2 are also contradictory. Therefore, the verdict of acquittal is only to be confirmed, in tune with the finding of the trial court. 12. 11. The learned counsel for the accused submitted further that, in the instant case, the oral evidence given by PW1 (the complainant) is not believable and the places of transaction deposed by PW1 and PW2 are also contradictory. Therefore, the verdict of acquittal is only to be confirmed, in tune with the finding of the trial court. 12. In view of the rival submissions, the questions arise for consideration are: 1. Whether the trial court went wrong in holding that the evidence given by PWs 1 and 2 are contrary, so that the complainant failed to prove the transaction led to execution of Ext.P1 cheque? 2. Is there any legal mandate that a cheque shall be in the handwriting of the payer/drawer to be acted upon? 3. Whether the trial court verdict would require interference? 4. Order to be passed? 13. Points 1 and 2:- It is true that, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused, the judgment of acquittal and judgment of conviction have to be evaluated by different yardsticks and the Appellate Court need not interfere with the acquittal rendered by the trial court without a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of evidence on record that the guilt of the accused is proved beyond reasonable doubt, excluding any other possibility. That does not mean that the Appellate Court cannot reverse a wrong acquittal. To be more explicit, when appreciation of evidence done by the trial court is patently wrong against the mandate of law and the evidence would lead to prove the guilt of the accused without any other possibility, an Appellate Court can reverse the finding of acquittal into conviction. If a contra proposition is laid, that would tantamount to nullifying the power of the Appellate Court in the matter of reappreciation of evidence and the power to reverse an acquittal into conviction. 14. In this matter, the complainant filed chief affidavit and he himself got examined as PW1. In the affidavit, it has been averred that the accused borrowed Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant on 08.03.2011 for his contract works and agreed to return the same on 18.05.2011, for which Ext.P1 cheque was issued. He deposed about the dishonor of the same, issuance of notice and its acceptance by the accused. He also deposed that the accused failed to repay the amount. He deposed about the dishonor of the same, issuance of notice and its acceptance by the accused. He also deposed that the accused failed to repay the amount. Accordingly, the original cheque along with covering letter from Punjab National Bank, Dishonor memo dated 19.05.2011, Copy of notice dated 08.06.2011, Postal receipt and postal acknowledgment card got marked as Exts.P1 to P6 respectively. 15. In this matter, the accused raised contention that he did not borrow Rs.1,50,000/- as contended by the complainant. But, his case is that he borrowed Rs.50,000/- from the complainant and issued two signed blank cheques as security. Thereafter, he repaid Rs.32,000/-. But, the complainant misused one of the blank cheques and launched prosecution against him. Thus, the accused admits issuance of Ext.P1 cheque and signature therein for a different transaction, which also according to the accused is not at all fully discharged. 16. The finding of the trial court to the effect that, the complainant failed to explain under what circumstances PW2 came into the picture and wrote Ext.P1 cheque appears to be a strange observation. In this case, the evidence given by PW2 is that, he is familiar to both the complainant and accused and he was taken by the accused to the place of transaction and as instructed by the accused, he had written the cheque. It is true that, during 313 examination, the accused denied the said version and the same is given much emphasis by the trial court to disbelieve the evidence of PW2. 17. Insofar as the legal position as regards to the issuance of blank cheque is concerned, the same is well settled as extracted in Bir Singh ’s case (supra). Thus, even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the drawer/payer, which is towards some payment, would attract presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt or legal liability. In fact, law does not mandate that a cheque shall be in the handwriting of the drawer/payer. On the contrary, a cheque can be written by anybody other than a drawer/payer and the only mandate of law is that holder in due course/payee has to prove the transaction and execution of the cheque to impose criminal culpability on the drawer/payer. In fact, law does not mandate that a cheque shall be in the handwriting of the drawer/payer. On the contrary, a cheque can be written by anybody other than a drawer/payer and the only mandate of law is that holder in due course/payee has to prove the transaction and execution of the cheque to impose criminal culpability on the drawer/payer. In view of the above legal position, merely because the cheque was written by another person, instead the drawer himself, whether he is capable of writing himself or otherwise, would not make the cheque invalid or the prosecution case untrustworthy. In such cases also, when the transaction and execution of the cheque is proved by evidence, presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act would squarely apply. 18. In this case, as already argued by the learned counsel for the complainant, the place of transaction according to the complainant is Collectorate, Kottayam and when PW2 given evidence, he stated that the place of transaction is RTO Office, Kottayam. Even though, it is argued by the learned counsel for the accused that, Collectorate, Kottayam and RTO Office, Kottayam are in two different places, it is noticeable that Collectorate, Kottayam and RTO Office, Kottayam are situated in the same block of buildings. In such view of the matter, the trial court went wrong in finding contradiction in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 regarding the place of transaction. In fact, there is no serious anomaly in between the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 to find this as a contradiction to hold that the place of occurrence is contradictory. 19. Points 3 and 4:- On reappreciation of evidence, the conclusion of this Court is that, the trial court went wrong in finding contradiction in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in the matter of place of transaction and also finding fault with the case of the complainant for the reason that the cheque was written by PW2. As already pointed out, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 categorically proved the transaction and execution of Ext.P1 cheque, so as to canvas the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act by the complainant. As already pointed out, the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 categorically proved the transaction and execution of Ext.P1 cheque, so as to canvas the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act by the complainant. Though the accused could very well rebut the presumptions, in the instant case, the accused failed to rebut the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act in favour of the complainant. 20. Summarizing the discussion, it is held that the verdict rendered by the trial court acquitting the accused on the finding that he did not commit the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act is illegal and the same deserves interference. 21. In the result, this appeal stands allowed and the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court stands set aside. Consequently, the accused is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and he is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one day till rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs.2,25,000/- (Rupees Two Lakh Twenty Five Thousand Only). Fine shall be given as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. In default of payment of fine, the accused shall undergo default imprisonment for a period of six months. The accused is directed to surrender before the trial court to undergo the modified sentence positively on 27.06.2025 at 11.00 a.m. and on failure to do so, the trial court is directed to execute the modified sentence imposed by this Court, without fail. 22. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the trial court for information and compliance, within seven days.