ORDER : K.S. HEMALEKHA, J. 1. The petitioner is before this Court seeking the following reliefs: “a. To Issue a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing Respondents No.1, 4 and 5 to pay the compensation/award amount to the Petitioner along with 18% interest for acquisition of petitioner schedule land as per Right to fair and compensation and Transparency in land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act 2013 in so for as the Petitioners schedule land is concerned. b. To directed to initiate departmental enquiry against the Respondent No.1 and 5 for dereliction of duty, inaction and willfully failed to pay the compensation amount to the Petitioner for acquisition his of schedule land. c. To issue mandamus directing the 2 nd Respondent and 1 st Respondent to consider the Representation given by the Petitioner on 25.04.2011 and final representation 25.10.2021 as per the Annexure-D & H. d. To Issue any other writ or order as this Hon'ble court deems fir under the facts and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity.” 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned AGA for respondent Nos.2 to 4 and learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 5. Perused the material on record. 3. The petitioner claims to be the absolute owner of land measuring 4 acres 38 guntas in Survey No.80, B Block, Nellorahalli Village, Krishnarajapura Hobli, Bengaluru Urban District, which was granted to him under Order No.LND SR 3028/1968-69 dated 15.10.1968 by the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru District. The Saguvali chit was issued on 17.09.1971, and the petitioner's name was duly entered in the mutation register (MR No.7/72-73) and revenue records. The petitioner, along with three others, namely, Ramaiah Reddy, Narayana Reddy and Narayanappa, owned the adjacent portions in the same survey number each measuring 4 acres 38 guntas. In 1993, 1994, and 1995, the Village Accountant failed to issue RTC extracts and the lands were wrongly shown as ‘Sarkari Gomal’. The petitioner and other three approached this Court in the writ petition and this Court allowed it, setting aside the Assistant Commissioner's rejection order and remanded the matter for reconsideration. 4. While the proceedings were pending, the Special Deputy Commissioner addressed a letter to the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru dated 30.10.1999, stating that the lands had already been transferred to the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB). 4. While the proceedings were pending, the Special Deputy Commissioner addressed a letter to the Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru dated 30.10.1999, stating that the lands had already been transferred to the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB). Thereafter, by order dated 06.07.2000, the Assistant Commissioner rejected the petitioner's claim, treating the lands as a Government property. 5. Challenging the Assistant Commissioner’s order, the petitioner and others filed W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000. This Court by order dated 12.09.2001, granted liberty to the petitioner to approach the competent Civil Court seeking declaration of ownership and observed that if the petitioner succeeds, they would be entitled to compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (‘LA Act’ for short notwithstanding that no acquisition proceedings were initiated under the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (‘KIAD Act’ for short) or the LA Act, 1894. 6. Pursuant to the said liberty, the petitioner instituted O.S. No.298/2002 which was decreed on 06.06.2009, declaring him the absolute owner in possession of the schedule property and restraining the defendants (Government) from interference. The decree has attained finality. 7. The State Government vide order dated 30.06.2000, had ordered transfer of 15 acres 16 ½ guntas in Survey No.80 of Nellorahalli Village and the adjacent lands to the KIADB. Pursuant to the Official Memorandum dated 17.04.2004, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB has deposited `1,03,91,779/- into the treasury on 18.05.2004 and possession was handed over to KIADB on 27.05.2004. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the Civil Court’s decree in O.S. No.298/2002 conclusively declares the petitioner's ownership and possession. That the decree passed in pursuance of the liberty granted by this Court in W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000 has attained finality and is binding on the respondents. It is submitted that the respondents have taken possession of the schedule property and transferred it to KIADB for industrial use without issuing any notification under Section 3 of the KIAD Act, or under the LA Act amounting to deprivation of property without authority of law, in violation of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. 9. The KIADB has already deposited `1,03,91,779/- with the State Treasury. The said deposit represents the value of the land transferred, including the petitioner's property. Despite the deposit and the acknowledgment of the petitioner's entitlement, the State and the Revenue Authorities have failed to release the amount to the petitioner, showing gross inaction and dereliction of duty. 9. The KIADB has already deposited `1,03,91,779/- with the State Treasury. The said deposit represents the value of the land transferred, including the petitioner's property. Despite the deposit and the acknowledgment of the petitioner's entitlement, the State and the Revenue Authorities have failed to release the amount to the petitioner, showing gross inaction and dereliction of duty. The petitioner, thus seeks for a compensation along with interest @ 18% for the acquisition of the petitioner's schedule land as per the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘2013 Act’ for short). 10. Per contra, learned AGA for the State and learned counsel for the respondents-KIADB submit that the land in Survey No.80 was classified as Government land and transferred to the KIADB under the order dated 30.06.2000 for industrial purposes. Since the land is a Government land, no acquisition proceedings or award was required to be passed in respect of the petitioner’s claim, and the petitioner cannot claim compensation as if there had been a statutory acquisition. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB has already deposited the amount of `1,03,91,779/- in the State Treasury on 18.05.2004 and the possession was delivered to the KIADB on 27.05.2004. 11. It is submitted that the decree dated 06.06.2009 in O.S. No.298/2002 is an executable decree and the petitioner must work out his remedy in the execution proceedings against the judgment debtor. It is submitted that the KIADB was not made a party to the suit despite a specific order in the writ petition to implead all the parties, as such, the suit in O.S. No.298/2002 is not binding upon the KIADB. 12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the question that falls for consideration is: "Whether in the absence of any statutory notification under Section 3 of the KIAD Act and in light of the order in W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000 and decree in O.S. No.298/2002, this Court ought to direct the respondents to initiate acquisition proceedings and determine compensation in accordance with law? 13. It is an admitted fact that no preliminary notification under Section 3 (1) or final notification under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act has been issued in respect of the petitioner's land. 13. It is an admitted fact that no preliminary notification under Section 3 (1) or final notification under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act has been issued in respect of the petitioner's land. The record discloses only a Government order dated 30.06.2000 administratively transferring about 15 acres 16 ½ guntas of land in Survey No.30 of Nellorahalli Village to the KIADB. In W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000, this Court at paragraph Nos.12, 13 and 14 held as under: “12. If the petitioners institute such original suits, the competent civil Court will take up the original suits and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible, notwithstanding the fact the order dt.30.6.2000, at Annexure which is impugned in these petitions. Further the trial Court after affording opportunity shall conduct the trial and record a finding on the contentions that would be raised by the parties. If the petitioners establish their claim that there was a valid grant made by the competent revenue authority under the Land Grant Rules in their favour in respect of the lands in question, then an appropriate judgment and decree may be passed in their favour. If the plaintiffs succeed in the original suits, that would be filed availing the liberty given to their order, the plaintiffs are entitled to have their rights for getting the compensation determined under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, notwithstanding the fact that the acquisition has not been made by following the procedures either under the Karnataka Land Acquisition Act and Rules or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1984 or under the provisions of Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board Act, 1966. 13. It is needless to make an observation in this order that the land granted in favour of respondent No.6 by the KIADB and issuance of notification u/s.3 by the respondent No.5 in respect of the lands in question and impugned order challenged in these petitions at Ann-A will not be come in the way for determining the rights of the parties before the competent civil Court, in the event, if the petitioners file the original suits as per the liberty given to them in this order. 14. 14. It is further made clear that the liberty given to the petitioners to approach the competent civil Court to get their ownership rights declared in respect of the lands in question shall be only for the limited purpose of getting their compensation, if they establish their claim of ownership rights and title in respect of the lands in question before the competent civil Court.” (emphasis supplied) 14. This Court held that if the petitioner succeeded in establishing ownership before the Civil Court, he would be entitled to claim compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, ‘notwithstanding that the acquisition had not been made either under the KIAD Act or under the Land Acquisition Act’. The order nowhere restrains or prohibits the Government from initiating acquisition proceedings. On the contrary, it recognizes that no lawful acquisition existed and leaves it open to the State to regularize the situation. 15. The petitioner by availing the liberty granted, filed O.S No.298/2002 against the State and by the decree dated 06.06.2009, the Civil Court declared him to be the absolute owner in possession. That decree has attained finality and conclusively establishes the petitioner's ownership. 16. The respondents have taken possession and utilised the petitioner's land for industrial purpose without following any statutory procedure. Such deprivation, unsupported by notification or award, amounts to a violation of Article 300A of the Constitution. It is pertinent to note that Section 30 of the KIAD Act was amended after the enforcement of the 2013 Act. By virtue of this amendment, the KIAD Act expressly adopted the provisions of 2013 Act in respect of the determination of compensation, solatium, rehabilitation and resettlement benefits. 17. Section 30 (2) of the KIAD Act, as amended, now provides that the amount of compensation payable for lands acquired under the KIAD Act shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the LA Act, for the time being in force. Since the LA Act has been repealed by 2013 Act, and 2013 Act is now the law in force, the compensation under the KIAD Act must be determined strictly in terms of 2013 Act, including Sections 26 to 30 and Section 80 along with Schedules I, II and III concerning rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements, for the acquisition that take place under the KIAD Act after 01.01.2014. 18. 18. In addition, by notification dated 28.08.2015 issued under Section 105(3) of the 2013 Act, the Central Government extended the compensation and rehabilitation framework of the 2013 Act to 13 special enactments, including the KIAD Act, thereby placing the matter beyond doubt. Consequently, all the acquisitions undertaken by the KIADB after 01.01.2014, whether initiated afresh or pursuant to the direction of this Court, must mandatorily comply with the compensation regime prescribed under the 2013 Act. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on series of binding precedents which unequivocally establish that the State cannot retain private land without lawful acquisition and is constitutionally obliged under Article 300A to pay just and fair and timely compensation. 20. In Vidya Devi vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others , (2020) 2 SCC 569 (Vidya Devi), the Apex Court has held at paragraph Nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 12.1. The appellant was forcibly expropriated of her property in 1967, when the right to property was a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 31 in Part III of the Constitution. Article 31 guaranteed the right to private property, which could not be deprived without due process of law and upon just and fair compensation. 12.2. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. 12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6) “6. 12.3. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property, without following due process of law, would be violative of a human right, as also the constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, wherein this Court held that: (SCC p. 634, para 6) “6. … Having regard to the provisions contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of its power of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation Iecognize must be paid.” 12.4. In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held that: (SCC p. 526, para 21) “21. If the right of property is a human right as also a constitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except in accordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protects such right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.” 12.5. In Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., this Court Iecognized the right to property as a basic human right in the following words: (SCC p. 379, para 30) “30. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured, else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed the view that property itself is the seed- bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish, is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.” 12.6. In Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 627, para 48) “48. … In other words, Article 300-A only limits the powers of the State that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” 12.7. There has to be no deprivation without any sanction of law. Deprivation by any other mode is not acquisition or taking possession under Article 300-A. In other words, if there is no law, there is no deprivation.” 12.7. In this case, the appellant could not have been forcibly dispossessed of her property without any legal sanction, and without following due process of law, and depriving her payment of just compensation, being a fundamental right on the date of forcible dispossession in 1967. 12.8. The contention of the State that the appellant or her predecessors had “orally” consented to the acquisition is completely baseless. We find complete lack of authority and legal sanction in compulsorily divesting the appellant of her property by the State. 12.9. In a democratic polity governed by the rule of law, the State could not have deprived a citizen of their property without the sanction of law. Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC wherein it was held that the State must comply with the procedure for acquisition, requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. The State being a welfare State governed by the rule of law cannot arrogate to itself a status beyond what is provided by the Constitution. 12.10. This Court in State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar held that the right to property is now considered to be not only a constitutional or statutory right, but also a human right. Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc. Human rights have gained a multi-faceted dimension. 12.11. We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to “adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State, cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession, which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over 12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in the present case. 12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. 12.13. In a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, a constitutional court would exercise its jurisdiction with a view to promote justice, and not defeat it. 12.14. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. MIDC, this Court while dealing with a similar fact situation, held as follows: (SCC p. 359, para 11) “11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. The functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. 13. In the present case, the appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. 13. In the present case, the appellant being an illiterate person, who is a widow coming from a rural area has been deprived of her private property by the State without resorting to the procedure prescribed by law. The appellant has been divested of her right to property without being paid any compensation whatsoever for over half a century. The cause of action in the present case is a continuing one, since the appellant was compulsorily expropriated of her property in 1967 without legal sanction or following due process of law. The present case is one where the demand for justice is so compelling since the State has admitted that the land was taken over without initiating acquisition proceedings, or any procedure known to law. We exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution, and direct the State to pay compensation to the appellant.” 21. The Apex Court held that taking possession of land without initiating acquisition proceedings or payment of compensation is a constitutional wrong, and delay or ignorance on the part of the land owner cannot defeat the right to compensation. In the recent decision, the Apex Court in the case of Bernard, Francis Joseph Vaz and others Vs. Government of Karnataka and others (2025) 7 SCC 580 (Bernard, Francis Joseph Vaz), held at paragraph Nos.49 and 54 as under: “49. It cannot be gainsaid that the appellants herein have been deprived of their legitimate dues for almost 22 years ago. It can also not be controverted that money is what money buys. The value of money is based on the idea that money can be invested to earn a return, and that the purchasing power of money decreases over time due to inflation. What the appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that the determination of the award and disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made with promptitude. X x x 54. What the appellants herein could have bought with the compensation in 2003 cannot do in 2025. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that the determination of the award and disbursal of compensation in case of acquisition of land should be made with promptitude. X x x 54. In that view of the matter, we find that it is a fit case wherein this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution should direct shifting of the date for determination of the market value of the land in question of the appellants.” 22. The Apex Court held that inordinate and unexplained delay by the State in passing the award and disbursing compensation cannot prejudice the land owner and that to ensure fairness under Article 300A, the date of valuation may be shifted to a later date. 23. The judgments relied by the petitioner’s counsel establish that where no lawful acquisition has been undertaken, the State has to either restore possession or initiate fresh acquisition under the KIAD Act and determine compensation strictly in accordance with law. 24. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance upon the decision of the Division Bench in the case of The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) and another Vs. Sri V. Srinivas and others , W.A. No.1071/2022 & connect matters D.D. 21.02.2025 This Court framed the following points for consideration at paragraph No.25, which reads thus: “25. We notice that the appellants have raised several pertinent questions before this Court in this batch of Writ Appeals. They contend that many of those questions already stand answered in favour of the acquiring authorities and the beneficiaries by binding judgments of the Apex Court or by Bench decisions of this Court which have been affirmed by the Apex Court. From the pleadings and contentions raised, we find that the legal points which arise for consideration in this batch of appeals and petitions are as follows:- (i) Whether Section 30 of the KIAD Act prior to amendment, which makes the provisions of the 1894 Act applicable for particular purposes, is a legislation by reference or a legislation by incorporation? (ii) Whether the KIAD Act is a self contained Code? (iii) Whether the other provisions of the 1894 Act except in respect of passing of the award and payment of compensation are applicable to an acquisition under the KIAD Act? (ii) Whether the KIAD Act is a self contained Code? (iii) Whether the other provisions of the 1894 Act except in respect of passing of the award and payment of compensation are applicable to an acquisition under the KIAD Act? (iv) Whether the provisions of the 2013 Act are applicable to a acquisition under the KIAD Act prior to the amending Act 20 of 2022? (v) What is the effect of the amending Act of 20 of 2022 on acquisitions under the KIAD Act? (vi) Whether the provisions of Sections 24 and 25 of the 2013 Act are applicable to an acquisition under the KIAD Act?” (emphasis supplied) 25. The Division Bench formulated the core legal questions arising for consideration, noting at the outset that the appellants had relied on several decisions of the Apex Court and earlier Division Bench of this Court, affirmed by the Apex Court to contend that 2013 Act has no application to the acquisition made under the KIAD Act prior to 01.01.2014. The Division Bench was concerned with the acquisition which had been lawfully initiated prior to 01.01.2014 by issuance of notifications under Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of the KIAD Act, and the challenge in relation to the questions of whether the compensation for such pre- 2014 acquisitions should be determined under the provisions of 2013 Act. The Division Bench held that the issue regarding applicability of 2013 Act to the acquisitions initiated prior to 01.01.2014 already stood concluded by binding precedents and allowed the writ appeal filed by the KIADB, leaving it open to the land owner to pursue appropriate statutory remedies under the KIAD Act for enhancement of compensation. Thus, the ratio in W.A. No.1071/2021 is confined to the acquisition where the process of acquisition was already in motion prior to 01.01.2014. 26. The present case stands on an entirely different footing. Here it is an admitted position that no acquisition whatsoever was initiated under KIAD Act, no preliminary notification under Section 3(1), no declaration under Section 28(4) and no lawful award prior to 01.01.2014. The only award passed is one rendered after the coming into force of the Act, 2013, but compensation was nevertheless determined by applying the repealed provisions of the LA Act. The only award passed is one rendered after the coming into force of the Act, 2013, but compensation was nevertheless determined by applying the repealed provisions of the LA Act. This action is contrary to the Amendment Section 30 of the KIAD Act, which mandates that the compensation shall be determined in accordance with the land acquisition law, ‘for the time being in force’, which, after 01.01.2014 is the 2013 Act. 27. In this context, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Bernard, Francis Joseph Vaz, clearly comes to the aid of the petitioner. The Apex Court has held that the State delays or fails to initiate acquisition proceedings and proceeds to take possession or determine compensation improperly, the valuation must be aligned with the law in force and constitutional mandate of the Article 300A, and the compensation cannot be pegged to outdated or repealed statutory frameworks. Thus, the reliance of the respondents on W.A. No.1071/2021 is misplaced, as that decision pertains exclusively to the acquisition which had commenced prior to 01.01.2014, whereas the present case concerns a situation where no acquisition was initiated and only an award was passed. 28. This Court, as stated supra in W.P. Nos.26883-886/2000, held that the petitioner may seek a declaration of ownership before the Civil Court. The suit filed in O.S. No.298/2002 was decreed in his favour on 06.06.2009. This Court also observed, as stated supra, the petitioner is entitled to have his rights for getting the compensation determined under the LA Act. However, despite the decree in favour of the petitioner in 2009, the respondent-State has not initiated any acquisition proceedings for determination of compensation. Mere deposit of compensation by the KIADB in the year 2004 would not hold the award valid in the absence of any lawful acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, the point framed for consideration is answered in favour of the petitioner, holding that the respondents are required to initiate acquisition proceedings under the 2013 Act. The petitioner is entitled for fresh acquisition proceedings and compensation under the 2013 Act and thus, this Court pass the following: ORDER i. The writ petition is allowed in part. It is hereby declared that no lawful acquisition has ever been initiated in respect of the petitioner's land. ii. The purported transfer to KIADB and the award passed under the repealed LA Act do not constitute acquisition in law. iii. It is hereby declared that no lawful acquisition has ever been initiated in respect of the petitioner's land. ii. The purported transfer to KIADB and the award passed under the repealed LA Act do not constitute acquisition in law. iii. The respondents are directed to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings in accordance with the KIAD Act by issuing preliminary notification under Section 3(1) followed by a final declaration under Section 28(4), and to complete all consequential steps strictly in accordance with law. iv. Compensation shall be determined strictly in accordance with the 2013 Act, in terms of amended Section 30 of the KIAD Act. v. The entire process shall be completed within six months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. vi. Any amount already deposited by KIADB shall be duly accounted for in the fresh award and differential amount shall be paid forthwith.