ORDER : 1. Both-Civil Revision and Civil Misc. Appeal No. 5235/2024 arise out of one suit, were continuously listed together since last so many dates and with the consent of the parties, it was heard along-with the connected civil misc. appeal. The connected Civil Misc. Appeal No.5235/2024 is in regard to the order of temporary injunction and this revision petition is in connection with order on an application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. This revision petition which was heard along-with the connected civil misc. appeal is being decided by a separate order. 2. This civil revision petition has been filed by the defendant/ petitioner under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the order dated 18.10.2024 passed by the Court of learned Addl. District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan-I (Headquarter Sanganer) [for short ‘the court below’] in Civil Suit No. 124/2024 (In CIS No. 224/2024), Prakash Kumar Sharma & Anr. v. A.K.G. Affordable Housing Private Limited, whereby the court below dismissed the application filed by the defendant/ petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 read with section 151 CPC. 3. The facts borne out from the pleadings are that that the plaintiffs/respondents filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction along-with the application for temporary injunction before the Court below mentioning that that the land bearing Khasra Nos. 81 (0.08 H), 82/01 (0.01 H), 83 (0.72 H) and 95/01 (1.37 H), in all 4 Khasras measuring 2.18 Hectares situated in Village Chak Harbanspura, Patwar Halka Jaisinghpura, Tehsil Sanganer, District Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as the ‘subject land’) was purchased by the plaintiffs by a registered sale deed dated 24.11.2015 from Smt. Phooli Devi W/o Prabhu Narayan and since then they are in possession of the said land and mutation in their name was opened after demarcation of the land. An agreement to sell the subject land dated 11.02.2016 was executed by the plaintiffs/respondents in favour of the defendant/appellant. The consideration for the said land was Rs. 1,90,00,000/- per Bigha and, therefore, the total consideration agreed was Rs. 16,50,00,000/-. Out of the said amount, Rs. 1,00,00,000/- was paid by the defendant/appellant to the plaintiffs/respondents by cheques. It was further mentioned that a sale deed was executed on 18.04.2016 where the consideration amount was mentioned at DLC rates total amounting to Rs.9,50,00,000/-. 1,90,00,000/- per Bigha and, therefore, the total consideration agreed was Rs. 16,50,00,000/-. Out of the said amount, Rs. 1,00,00,000/- was paid by the defendant/appellant to the plaintiffs/respondents by cheques. It was further mentioned that a sale deed was executed on 18.04.2016 where the consideration amount was mentioned at DLC rates total amounting to Rs.9,50,00,000/-. An agreement was executed on 18.04.2016 in which it was mentioned that the cheques, 11 in numbers, for remaining amount of Rs.5,54,00,000/- had been given to plaintiffs/respondents which were dishonoured and the dispute arose between the parties. Subsequently, an agreement dated 20.09.2018 (02.03.2019) was executed in which 13 cheques of the outstanding consideration amount with interest as agreed of Rs.7,95,00,000/- were given to the plaintiffs. It was further also mentioned that the defendant/appellant stopped the payment of cheques and, therefore, the cheques were returned back by the bank to the plaintiffs/respondents. On this, the plaintiffs/respondents got the construction stopped at the site. On 07.08.2021 and thereafter on 25.11.2021, the defendant/appellant tried to raise construction by taking possession of the disputed land. On this, the plaintiffs filed a civil suit for permanent injunction in the court of Addl. Civil Judge No. 17, Sanganer, titled as Prakash Kumar Sharma Vs. AKG which is still pending. 4. After service of summons of the plaint, the defendant/ petitioner filed an application under Order VII Rule 7 read with section 151 CPC. Reply to the application was also filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents. 5. The Court below dismissed the application filed by the defendant/ petitioner under Order VII Rule 7 read with section 151 CPC vide order dated 18.10.2024. 6. Mr. R.K. Daga, Counsel appearing for the defendant/ petitioner has submitted that the suit has been filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents on 30.09.2024 for cancellation of the sale deed dated 18.04.2016 i.e. after expiry of 8 years, which is barred by limitation as per Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act. Counsel further submitted that admittedly the plaintiffs/ respondents have earlier filed a suit for injunction and without obtaining any leave as required under Order 2 Rule 2 (3) CPC to seek such reliefs as prayed in the present suit, the present suit is barred by law. 7. Counsel further submitted that admittedly the plaintiffs/ respondents have earlier filed a suit for injunction and without obtaining any leave as required under Order 2 Rule 2 (3) CPC to seek such reliefs as prayed in the present suit, the present suit is barred by law. 7. Counsel appearing for the defendant/ petitioner has also submitted that since the plaintiffs/ respondents have not sought relief of possession, therefore, the suit for declaration is liable to be rejected as per the provisions of Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT . 8. Counsel to support his submissions, has placed reliance upon following judgments:- A. Ramisetty Venkatanna & Anr. v. Nasyam Jamal Saheb & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 2717 of 2023), decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 28.04.2023; B. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust & Ors. v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 14807 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP © No. 18977 of 2016) decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 20.12.2024; C. Dahiben v. Aarvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) Dead through Lrs & Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 366 delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 9. Mr. R.K. Agarwal, Senior Advocate assisted by other Counsels appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents submitted that the plaintiffs/ respondents have made specific pleadings in the plaint as regards the cause of action and limitation period to commence. He further submitted that the earlier suit was in regard to injunction in view of the factual position on that date but in view of the subsequent developments, the fresh cause of action arose for filing the present suit. Therefore, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs/ respondents have omitted the claims while filing the earlier suit. 10. Senior Advocate further submitted that in a suit for cancellation of the sale deed, declaration and permanent injunction, the relief of possession is implied. 11. Considered the submissions made at bar and also perused the material available on record. 12. As per the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, for consideration of the objections for rejection of the plaint, the Court has to take into consideration the pleadings in the plaint only. If any ground for rejection of the plaint subsists from the bare pleadings of plaint then only plaint can be rejected. 12. As per the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, for consideration of the objections for rejection of the plaint, the Court has to take into consideration the pleadings in the plaint only. If any ground for rejection of the plaint subsists from the bare pleadings of plaint then only plaint can be rejected. The Court is not required to take into consideration the pleadings in the written statement or any other material which is not the part of the plaint. 13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P. Kumarakurubaran v. P. Narayanan & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 5622 of 2025 (Arising from SLP (C) No. 2549 of 2021) decided on April 29 2025 has observed as under:- “12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC: (i) Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai & Another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4105 “10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration. 11. 12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows: “15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The relevant portion is as follows: “15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us. … 19. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us. … 19. In the present case, we find that the appellant- plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.” ( ii) Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar & Others , (2021) 17 SCC 100 :- “11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [ (2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11. 12. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11. 12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar [ (2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold. 13… 14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a subsequent invention.” ( iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Another reported in (2020) 17 SCC 260 :- “6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC? 7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [ (2007) 10 SCC 59 ]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66) “13. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [ (2007) 10 SCC 59 ]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66) “13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be rejected in the following cases: ‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;’ 14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [ (2003) 1 SCC 557 ] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that: ‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power … at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560, para 9). 15. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560, para 9). 15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70 ] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code. 16. “The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.” (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [ (1977) 4 SCC 467 ] , SCC p. 468.) 17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [ (1982) 3 SCC 487 ], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected. 18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [ (1998) 7 SCC 184 ] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable. 19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [ (2004) 3 SCC 137 ] this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15) ‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. 19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [ (2004) 3 SCC 137 ] this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15) ‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’ 20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order.” 8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [ (2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) “10. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [ (2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) “10. … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial. 11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [ (2003) 1 SCC 557 ], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9) ‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.’ It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [ (1998) 7 SCC 184 ] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [ (2006) 3 SCC 100 ]. 12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [ (1977) 4 SCC 467 ], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p. 470, para 5) ‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’ It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’ It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 ], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.” 14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression “the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated”. This averment cannot be read in isolation. …. 22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9- 2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28- 11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2- 2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28- 11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2- 2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.” 13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well- reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant’s assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the well-established principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable.” 14. One of the issue raised by the Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant/ petitioner is that the suit is barred by limitation. 15. The issue of limitation has also been raised by the defendant/ petitioner in the connected misc. appeal (appellant therein), wherein the Court has observed as under:- “33. One more issue was also raised that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents is beyond the limitation period for cancellation of the sale deed. 34. 15. The issue of limitation has also been raised by the defendant/ petitioner in the connected misc. appeal (appellant therein), wherein the Court has observed as under:- “33. One more issue was also raised that the suit filed by the plaintiffs/ respondents is beyond the limitation period for cancellation of the sale deed. 34. In the plaint the plaintiffs/ respondents have categorically averred that initially when the defendant/ appellant dispossessed them from the part of the subject land which was in their possession without even making the complete payment of the sale consideration amount as agreed in the agreement dated 11.02.2016, they filed the suit for injunction as they were in hope that the defendant/ appellant will make payment of the remaining sale consideration also. As regards the payment of remaining sale consideration is concerned, the defendant/appellant has also signed the agreements dated 18.04.2016 and 20.09.2018 (02.03.2019) and has also given the post dated cheques twice which were like the assurance by the defendant/ appellant for making the remaining sale consideration amount apart from the sale consideration mentioned in the registered sale deed. The plaintiffs/ respondents have also stated that when on 15.06.2024 the defendant/ appellant again threatened to dispossess the plaintiffs/ respondents from a part of the subject land without making the payment of the remaining sale consideration amount for which the defendant/ appellant has already issued the cheques and were dishonoured. It was specifically averred that the actual cause of action for filing the present suit for cancellation of the sale deed, declaration and permanent injunction arose in view of the threat given by the defendant/ appellant for dispossessing the plaintiffs/ respondents without making the payment of the remaining sale consideration. 35. It is well settled law that the issue of limitation in the suit proceedings is a mixed question of fact and law. The limitation period starts from the plaint where cause of action arose. Now it is to be considered by the Court on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties that what is the actual point from where the cause of action arose for the legal suit proceedings. Hence, the limitation can only be considered after recording of the evidence of the parties on that issue. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ghewarchand & Ors. Hence, the limitation can only be considered after recording of the evidence of the parties on that issue. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ghewarchand & Ors. v. M/s. Mahendra Singh & Ors., reported in 2018 (10) SCC 588 has observed in para 21 as under:- “21. In order to decide the question of limitation as to whether the suit is filed time or not, the Court is mainly required to see the plaint allegations and how the plaintiff has pleaded the accrual of cause of action for filing the suit. In this case, we find that the plaintiffs satisfied this requirement to bring their suit within limitation.” 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shakti Bhog Food Industries Limited v. Central Bank of India & Anr., reported in (2020) 17 SCC 260 has observed in paras 12 and 22 as under:- “12. From the averments in the plaint, if read as a whole, it would appear that the assertion of the appellant is that the respondents had extended financial facility with effect from 1.4.1997 till October, 2007, but somewhere in the month of July, 2000, the appellant noticed that the respondents were unilaterally charging interest/commission at the rate of Rs.4 per thousand rupees on local cheques and drafts in an arbitrary manner in violation of the assurance given to the appellant. Immediately thereafter, the appellant wrote to the respondent-Bank vide letter dated 21.7.2000 for taking corrective steps in the matter. Then correspondence ensued between the parties in that regard and the appellant was assured by the Regional Office of the respondent-Bank that an appropriate decision will be taken at the earliest. The relevant assertion in that regard is found in paragraph 11 of the plaint, wherein it is mentioned that the Assistant General Manager -Shri P.S. Bawa of Regional Office-B, Delhi, vide letter dated 9.7.2001 informed the appellant that comments from the concerned Branch Office have been invited and appropriate decision will be taken on its representation as early as possible. Thereafter, on 8.5.2002, the Senior Manager of the respondent-Bank informed the appellant that the cheques were being purchased at the prevailing rates; which plea, according to the appellant, was to deviate from the position stated by the Assistant General Manager of Regional Office in his letter dated 9.7.2001 referred to earlier. Thereafter, on 8.5.2002, the Senior Manager of the respondent-Bank informed the appellant that the cheques were being purchased at the prevailing rates; which plea, according to the appellant, was to deviate from the position stated by the Assistant General Manager of Regional Office in his letter dated 9.7.2001 referred to earlier. Resultantly, the appellant wrote to the officials of the respondent-Bank vide letters dated 12.7.2002, 22.9.2002 and 24.3.2003. 22. It is well established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order VII Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the Regional Office and the Regional Office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8.5.2002 followed by another letter dated 19.9.2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent-Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent-Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28.11.2003 and again on 7.1.2005 and then filed the suit on 23.2.2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.” Hence, the issue of limitation being the mixed question of facts and law is to be decided after the evidence of the parties.” 16. The another issue which has been raised by the counsel appearing for the defendant /petitioner is that the plaintiffs/ respondents have also filed a suit for injunction, which is still pending for adjudication and they in earlier suit could have made a prayer for the relief sought in the present suit but the plaintiffs/ respondents omitted the relief. Therefore, without seeking any leave, the plaintiffs/ respondents cannot file a suit afterwards in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. 17. Therefore, without seeking any leave, the plaintiffs/ respondents cannot file a suit afterwards in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. 17. Counsel appearing for the defendant/ petitioner has also raised an issue that the plaintiffs/ respondents have filed the suit for cancellation of the sale deed, declaration and permanent injunction without seeking relief of possession. He submits that without seeking relief for possession, the suit for possession is not maintainable. Counsel in this regard has cited following judgments:- A. Association of Radha Swami Dera Baba Bagga Singh & Anr. v. Gurnam Singh & Ors., AIR 1972 Rajasthan 263 B. Mehar Chand v. Lal Babu Siddique, reported in Mannu/SC/7079/2007 (Civil Appeal No.6413/2000) decided on 17.01.2017 18. Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents submitted that the plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 7 CPC on the ground that Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT is merely because the plaintiff omits to seek decree of possession of some part of the suit property. He further submitted that the plaintiffs/ respondents are already in possession of the part of the subject land and relief of possession is implied, the plaint cannot be rejected under the provisions of Order VII Rule 7 CPC. To support the submissions, Senior Counsel has placed reliance upon following judgments:- A. Ranjeet Alias Bhaiyu Mohte v. Nandita Singh & Ors., 2025 Supreme (Online) (SC) 1781 B. Akkamma & Ors. v. Vemavathi & Ors., 2021 18 SCC 371 19. In the case of Association of Radha Swami Dera Baba Bagga Singh & Anr. (supra) , which has been referred by the counsel appearing for the defendant/ petitioner, the Rajasthan High Court in para 24 has observed as under:- “24. Counsel for the respondents in the last contended that in any event, the prayer for declaring the three documents namely Exs.1, 2 and 3 as void could at least be granted. This contention is also unacceptable to us inasmuch as the suit for bare declaration of this right without further relief for possession and other reliefs in the facts and circumstances is not sustainable in law. The reason is that a bare declaration of right will be within the mischief of Section 42 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , 1877, and Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , 1963. The reason is that a bare declaration of right will be within the mischief of Section 42 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , 1877, and Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , 1963. We are fully fortified in our view by the Supreme Court authority reported in M.K. Rappai v. John, (1969) 2 SCC 590 .” 20. In the case of Meharchand Das (supra) , the case law referred by the counsel appearing for the defendant / petitioner, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paras 8 and 9 as under:- “8. The High Court, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in not relying upon the decision of this Court in Vinay Krishna (supra). The said decision categorically lays down the law that if the plaintiff had been in possession, then a suit for mere declaration would be maintainable; the logical corollary whereof would be that if the plaintiff is not in possession, a suit for mere declaration would not be maintainable. 9. Furthermore, the institution of a civil suit was barred in terms of Section 18 of the Act. We may also notice that in terms of Section 17A thereof, the privileged tenant not having permanent tenancy in homestead is to hold the same under the State Government and the amount of rent payable to the landlord by the privileged tenant in respect thereof would become payable to the State Government. Once the defendant-appellant claimed title as a privileged tenant in terms of the provisions of the said Act, the relationship of landlord and tenant come to an end. It was, therefore, obligatory on the part of the plaintiff- landlord to file a suit in terms of Section 18 of the said Act. In absence of a decree passed in such a suit, which as noticed hereinbefore, would lie only on a limited group for want of jurisdiction or fraud, the plaintiff-respondent was not entitled to have a decree in his favour in a suit of the nature instituted by him and for the reliefs sought for by him.” 21. In the case of Ranjeet @ Bhaiyu Mohite (supra) referred by the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paras 18 and 19 as under:- “18. In the case of Ranjeet @ Bhaiyu Mohite (supra) referred by the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paras 18 and 19 as under:- “18. We are of the considered view that the High Court erred in rejecting the plaint in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because the Appellant had not, at the outset, sought the relief of possession for the small portion allegedly occupied by the Respondents. A plain reading of Section 34 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , 1963 (SRA) makes it evident that: “Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the 10 plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.” This provision empowers a person in possession of property to file a suit for declaration and protect that possession through an injunction. The requirement to seek “further relief” applies where a plaintiff, already “able to seek” possession or another substantive remedy, omits doing so. Consequently, where the plaintiff is in possession of the bulk of the suit property and only a minor portion is out of his immediate control, a simple omission to claim possession from the start does not, in itself, mandate outright rejection of the entire plaint. Instead, as long as the plaintiff pleads possession of most of the property and seeks declaratory relief along with an injunction to protect that possession, the proviso to Section 34 is not violated. In such a situation, any partial lapse, like failing to claim possession over a small portion, may be cured by a suitable amendment, especially when the suit is at a preliminary stage. As the appellant has sought the consequential relief of injunction therefore the plaint is not barred by Section 34 which principle has been thoroughly expounded by this Court in Anathula 11 Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 in the following extract: “21. As the appellant has sought the consequential relief of injunction therefore the plaint is not barred by Section 34 which principle has been thoroughly expounded by this Court in Anathula 11 Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594 in the following extract: “21. To summarise, the position in regard to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property, is as under: (a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession. (c) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title (either specific, or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu Thevar [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal, (2005) 6 SCC 202 ] ). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the court will not investigate or examine or render a finding on a question of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction. (d) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach upon his property. The court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.” 19. In the present case, the Appellant explicitly pleaded that they hold possession over the agricultural lands 13 and most of “Mohite ki Bagiya.” The mere fact that Respondent No.1 occupies a single room within the house property cannot render the entire claim nonmaintainable, especially where an amendment to include a prayer for possession is feasible. A plaint need not be thrown out as a whole if it survives in respect of any portion or property. Even if the plaintiffs omit a specific prayer initially for the minor part in another’s possession, that shortfall can be rectified, particularly at a preliminary stage of the suit. Here, the Trial Court rightly permitted the Appellant to amend the plaint to seek possession of that lone room. Such an approach fosters the objective of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and ensures that substantive rights are determined on merits.” 22. In the case of Akkamma & Ors. (supra) , the case law referred by the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paras 15, 16 and 17 as under:- “15. Such an approach fosters the objective of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and ensures that substantive rights are determined on merits.” 22. In the case of Akkamma & Ors. (supra) , the case law referred by the counsel appearing for the plaintiffs/ respondents, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed in paras 15, 16 and 17 as under:- “15. We agree with that part of the decision of the High Court in which it has been held that possession of the suit property was not established by the plaintiffs and hence injunctive relief could not be granted. As we have already recorded, we are also in agreement with the High Court’s reasoning for rejecting the plea for amendment. But we do not agree fully with the entire reasoning of the High Court for dismissal of the appeal as spelt out in the said judgment. The bar contained in proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act, in our opinion, could not be applied in the case of the plaintiffs as consequential relief for injunction from interference with the suitland was claimed. The prohibition contained in the proviso to Section 34 would operate only if the sole relief is for declaration without any consequential relief. In the plaint of the 1987 suit, relief for injunction was asked for. Such dual relief would protect the suit from being dismissed on maintainability ground. It is a fact that the plaintiff ought to have had asked for recovery of possession, given the factual background of this case, but the plaint as it was originally framed reflected that the original plaintiff was in possession of the suit land. Such plea rightly failed before the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court. 16. The prohibition or bar contained in proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act determines the maintainability of a suit and that issue has to be tested on the basis the plaint is framed. If the plaint contains claims for declaratory relief as also consequential relief in the form of injunction that would insulate a suit from an attack on maintainability on the sole ground of bar mandated in the proviso to the aforesaid section. If on evidence the plaintiff fails on consequential relief, the suit may be dismissed on merit so far as plea for consequential relief is concerned but not on maintainability question invoking the proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act. If on evidence the plaintiff fails on consequential relief, the suit may be dismissed on merit so far as plea for consequential relief is concerned but not on maintainability question invoking the proviso to Section 34 of the 1963 Act. If the plaintiff otherwise succeeds in getting the declaratory relief, such relief could be granted. On this count, we do not accept the ratio of the Karnataka High Court judgment in the case of Sri Aralappa (supra) to be good law. In that decision, it has been held:- “31. Even if the plaintiff comes to Court asserting that he is in possession and that if it is found after trial that he was not in possession on the date of the suit, even then, the suit for declaration and permanent injunction is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable, as no decree for permanent injunction can be granted if the plaintiff is not in possession on the date of the suit. In such circumstances, it is necessary for the plaintiff to amend the plaint before the judgment and seek relief of possession. Therefore, a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction, by the plaintiff who is not in possession on the date of the suit, when he is able to seek further relief of recovery of possession also, omits to do so, the Court shall not make any such declaration and the suit is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable”. 17. So far as the reliefs claimed in the suit out of which this appeal arises, prayer for declaration was anchored on two instances of interference with the possession of land of the plaintiffs and injunctive relief for restraint from interference with the property was also claimed. But possession of the said property by the original plaintiff was not established. The alternative relief sought to be introduced at a later stage of the suit was also found to be incapable of being entertained for the reason of limitation. Thus, the foundation of the case of the plaintiffs based on these two factual grounds collapsed with the fact-finding Courts rejecting both these assertions or allegations. But that factor ought not to be a ground for denying declaration of ownership to the plaintiffs. There is no bar in the Special Relief Act, 1963 in granting standalone declaratory decree. Thus, the foundation of the case of the plaintiffs based on these two factual grounds collapsed with the fact-finding Courts rejecting both these assertions or allegations. But that factor ought not to be a ground for denying declaration of ownership to the plaintiffs. There is no bar in the Special Relief Act, 1963 in granting standalone declaratory decree. The Trial Court came to a positive finding that the original plaintiff was the owner of the suit property. But it held that in absence of declaration of relief of possession by the plaintiff, declaration of title cannot be granted. We have already expressed our disagreement with this line of reasoning. It seems to be a misconstruction of the provisions of Section 34 of the 1963 Act. The Trial Court and the High Court have proceeded on the basis that the expression “further relief” employed in that proviso must include all the reliefs that ought to have been claimed or might have been granted. But in our view, that is not the requirement of the said proviso. This takes us to the corollary question as to whether the 1987 suit could have been held to be barred under the principle contained in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In our opinion, the said provisions of the Code would not apply in the facts of this case, as the denial of legal right in the 1987 suit is pegged on two alleged incidents of 15 th and 25th February, 1987. These allegations can give rise to claims for declaration which obviously could not be made in the 1982 suit. The claim for declaratory decree could well be rejected on merit, but the suit in such a case could not be dismissed invoking the principles incorporated in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of 1908.” 23. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the plaintiffs/ respondents are in possession of the part of the subject land. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Meharchand (supra) , as referred by counsel appearing for the defendant /petitioner himself, observed that if the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property then the suit for mere declaration would also be maintainable. 25. While dealing with this issue in connected Civil Misc. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Meharchand (supra) , as referred by counsel appearing for the defendant /petitioner himself, observed that if the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property then the suit for mere declaration would also be maintainable. 25. While dealing with this issue in connected Civil Misc. Appeal No.5235/2024, raised by the appellant therein (petitioner in the present revision petition), the Court observed as under:- “37. Senior Counsel appearing for the defendant /appellant has also raised an issue that the defendant/ appellant has earlier filed a suit for permanent injunction, which is pending for adjudication and now has filed the new suit for cancellation of the sale deed, declaration and permanent injunction. The present suit is barred in view of the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC which speaks that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of cause of action. Senior Counsel also submitted that the plaintiffs/ respondents have filed a suit earlier for injunction and they could have included the prayer for cancellation of the sale deed and declaration in the relevant suit. Once the plaintiffs/ respondents omit such relief in the earlier suit, now they cannot file a fresh suit for the reliefs which they omitted earlier. 38. Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs / respondents submitted that earlier the suit was filed for injunction in view of the fact that that the defendant/ appellant has already signed the agreements for making the payment of remaining sale consideration as per the initial agreement dated 11.02.2016. However, when the defendant/ appellant tried to dispossess the plaintiffs/ respondents from a part of the subject land without making the payment, they filed the suit for injunction only for the reason that they were under an assurance by the defendant/ appellant for making remaining sale consideration and for that the defendant /appellant has already issued the cheques twice which lateron were dishonoured. Looking to the over facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is not convinced with the objections and submissions made on behalf of the defendant/ appellant.” 26. Hence, in view of the discussion made above, the Court finds no ground to interfere in the order passed by the court below. 27. Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed. 28. Looking to the over facts and circumstances of the case, the Court is not convinced with the objections and submissions made on behalf of the defendant/ appellant.” 26. Hence, in view of the discussion made above, the Court finds no ground to interfere in the order passed by the court below. 27. Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed. 28. Since the revision petition is dismissed, the stay application and pending application/s, if any, also stand dismissed. 29. The Registry is directed to send back the record of the case, if any, to the concerned court below forthwith.