Order : (Arvind Kumar Verma, J.) 1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, against the order dated 28.12.2024, passed by Learned 10 th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur, in Criminal Appeal No. 471 of 2024, whereby the Learned Additional Sessions Judge has directed to deposit 20% of the amount of cheque within 60 days and then the appellant/accused may be released on bail after furnishing bail bond and surety of Rs. 10,000/-. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the complainant is a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, possessing a valid banking license under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, and engaged in all banking activities. The complainant provides various types of loans, including housing loans, as part of standard banking procedures. It is alleged that; the Applicant approached the complainant and requested a loan for expanding her transport business. Upon agreeing to the terms and conditions of the agreement, the complainant sanctioned a loan to the Applicant on 14.10.2011, and the Applicant maintained Loan Account No. 8734 (60803798717). In repayment of this loan, the Applicant issued Cheque No. 926864 (Axis Bank, Pandri Branch, Account No. 13901020027016) dated 18.11.2016 for ?3,12,000/-, duly signed by her. The complainant presented the cheque for clearance at HDFC Bank, Raipur, Sundar Nagar Branch, but it was returned dishonored BALANCE." on 23.11.2016 due to "INSUFFICIENT.” After receiving notice of the dishonor, the complainant sent a legal notice to the Applicant via registered post on 15.12.2016, demanding the payment of the dishonored cheque amount. The Applicant received the notice on 20.12.2016 but failed to make the payment to date. Therefore, charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was framed against the appellant and she was convicted in Criminal Complaint Case No. 451/2017 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act vide Order dated 29.11.2024. 3. After trial of the complaint case, the Learned Trial Court has convicted the petitioners for the offence under Section 138 of the NIAct and have sentenced them to simple imprisonment for 02 years with compensation of Rs.04,43,040/-, in default of payment of compensation amount, additional simple imprisonment for 30 days. 4. 3. After trial of the complaint case, the Learned Trial Court has convicted the petitioners for the offence under Section 138 of the NIAct and have sentenced them to simple imprisonment for 02 years with compensation of Rs.04,43,040/-, in default of payment of compensation amount, additional simple imprisonment for 30 days. 4. The petitioners have filed an appeal under Section 415 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 before the Learned 10 th Additional Sessions Judge, Raipur along with an application under Section 430(1) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for suspension of sentence and grant of bail. The said criminal appeal is registered as Criminal Case No. 471 of 2024. 5. On 28.12.2024, the Learned 10 th Additional Sessions Judge has passed the order of suspending the sentence and grant of bail to the petitioners on furnishing the bail bond and surety of Rs.10,000/- subject to the appellants’ depositing 20% of the amount of cheque within 60 days. This is the order under challenge in the present petition. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the order impugned with respect to deposition of 20% of the cheque amount is illegal, because the deposition of 20% is not mandatory, yet the Learned Appellate Court has directed to deposit 20% of the amount of the awarded compensation. The Learned Appellate Court is not empowered to impose condition to deposit 20% amount of the awarded compensation as the condition precedent for granting bail to the petitioners. No reason has been assigned by the Learned Appellate Court for directing to deposit 20% amount of the awarded compensation in the impugned order and direction could be made only in exceptional circumstances, which is lacking in the case and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the documents annexed with the petition. 8. From perusal of the order sheet dated 28.12.2024 (Annexure P/1),annexed with the petition, it appears that the appellants/petitioners were granted bail by the Learned Appellate Court subject to condition of deposition of 20% amount of the cheque i.e. Rs.88,608/-. The said deposition of 20% amount is the condition precedent in granting bail to the appellants/petitioners. 9. Section 148 of the NI Act empowered the Appellate Court to order payment during pendency of the appeal against conviction, which reads as under: “148. The said deposition of 20% amount is the condition precedent in granting bail to the appellants/petitioners. 9. Section 148 of the NI Act empowered the Appellate Court to order payment during pendency of the appeal against conviction, which reads as under: “148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent. of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court: Provided that the amount payable under this sub-section shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section143A. (2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant. (3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal: Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.]” 10. From perusal of the provisions of Section 148 of the NI Act as amended, the Appellate Court “may order the appellant to deposit such sum, which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the Learned Trial Court”. Thus, them amended Section 148 of the NI Act confers power upon the Appellate Court to pass an order to pending appeal and to direct the appellant to deposit the sum, which shall not be less than 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the Learned Trial Court. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining 'may' and 'shall in case of Bachahan Devi & another Vs. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining 'may' and 'shall in case of Bachahan Devi & another Vs. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur & another, (2008) 12 SCC 372 , has held that:- 18. It is well-settled that the use of word "may" in a statutory provision would not by itself show that the provision is directory in nature. In some cases, the legislature may use the word 'may' as a matter of pure conventional courtesy and yet intend a mandatory force. In order, therefore, to interpret the legal import of the word "may", the court has to consider various factors, namely, the object and the scheme of the Act, the context and the background against which the words have been used, the purpose and the advantages sought to be achieved by the use of this word, and the like. It is equally well-settled that where the word 'may' involves a discretion coupled with an obligation or where it confers a positive benefit to a general class of subjects in a utility Act, or where the court advances a remedy and suppresses the mischief, or where giving the words directory significance would defeat the very object of the Act, the word 'may should be interpreted to convey a mandatory force. As a general rule, the word "may" is permissive and operative to confer discretion and especially so, where it is used in juxtaposition to the word "shall", which, ordinarily is imperative as it imposes a duty. Cases however, are not wanting where the words "may" "shall", and "must" are used interchangeably. In order to find out whether these words are being used in a directory or in a mandatory sense, the intent of the legislature should be looked into along with the pertinent circumstances. 19. “17. The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the language depends upon the language couched in the statute under consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in the use of the word 'shall' or 'may' depends on conferment of power. Depending upon the context, 'may' does not always mean may. 'May' is a must for enabling compliance of provision but there are cases in which, for various 7 / 10 reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes [his] duty to exercise [that power]. Depending upon the context, 'may' does not always mean may. 'May' is a must for enabling compliance of provision but there are cases in which, for various 7 / 10 reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes [his] duty to exercise [that power]. Where the language of statute creates a duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty." 20. If it appears to be the settled intention of the legislature to convey the sense of compulsion, as where an obligation is created, the use of the word "may" will not prevent the court from giving it the effect of Compulsion or obligation. Where the statute was passed purely in public interest and that rights of private citizens have been considerably modified and curtailed in the interests of the general development of an area or in the interests or removal of slums and unsanitary areas. Though the power is conferred upon the statutory body by the use of the word "may" that power must be construed as a statutory duty. Conversely, the use of the term 'shall' may indicate the use in optional or permissive sense. Although in general sense 'may' is enabling or discretional and "shall is obligatory, the connotation is not inelastic and inviolate. Where to interpret the word "may" as directory would render the very object of the Act as nugatory, the word "may must mean 'shall'. 21. The ultimate rule in construing auxiliary verbs like "may and "shall is to discover the legislative intent, and the use of words may' and 'shall' is not decisive of its discretion ormmandates. The use of the words "may" and "shall' may help the courts in ascertaining the legislative intent without giving to either a controlling or a determinating effect. The courts have further to consider the subject matter, the purpose of the provisions, the object intended to be secured by the statute which is of prime importance, as also the actual words employed." 12. The courts have further to consider the subject matter, the purpose of the provisions, the object intended to be secured by the statute which is of prime importance, as also the actual words employed." 12. In the matter of Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Limited, (2023) 10 SCC 446 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that, when the Appellate Court considers the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail of an accused, who has been convicted for the offence under Section 138 of NI Act, it is for the Appellate Court to consider, whether it is an exceptional case, which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing condition of deposit of 20% of fine/compensation amount. In Para 6 to 10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that: “6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 NI Act. Hence, normally, the appellate court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the appellate court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded. 7. Therefore, when the appellate court considers the prayer under Section 389 CrPC of an accused who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 NI Act, it is always open for the appellate court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the appellate court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded. 8. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the original complainant is that neither before the Sessions Court nor before the High Court, there was a plea made by the appellants that an exception may be made in these cases and the requirement of deposit or minimum 20% of the amount be dispensed with. He submits that if such a prayer was not made by the appellants, there were no reasons for the courts to consider the said plea. 9. We disagree with the above submission. He submits that if such a prayer was not made by the appellants, there were no reasons for the courts to consider the said plea. 9. We disagree with the above submission. When an accused applies under Section 389 CrPC for suspension of sentence, he normally applies for grant of relief of suspension of sentence without any condition. Therefore, when a blanket order is sought by the appellants, the court has to consider whether the case falls in exception or not. 10. In these cases, both the Sessions Courts and the High Court have proceeded on the erroneous premise that deposit of minimum 20% amount is an absolute rule which does not accommodate any exception.” 13. In the present case, the order directing deposition of 20% amount of the awarded compensation is passed while considering the application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail to the appellants as the precondition of suspending their sentence and grant of bail. Learned Appellate Court has to consider that whether it is an exceptional case or not, which warrants grant of suspension of sentence with direction to deposit of 20% of the compensation amount. From perusal of the order dated 28.12.2024, it appears that there is no subjective satisfaction or consideration that, it is an exceptional case, which warrants passing of such direction to deposit 20% of the amount of cheque. 14. Therefore, from the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that before directing the appellants to deposit 20% of the amount of the compensation, the Learned Appellate Court should have record its subjective satisfaction, whether the case falls in exception or not, and may direct the 20% of the amount of awarded compensation. 15. In the result, the petition succeeds and impugned order dated 28.12.2024 to the extent of directing the appellants to deposit 20% of the amount of the cheque i.e. Rs. 88,608/- within 60 days is set aside. However, the complainant is at liberty to avail his remedy provided under Section 148 of the NI Act, and in such eventuality, the Learned Appellate Court shall decide the same in accordance with law. 16.With this observation, the petition is allowed.