JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR GARG, J. 1. Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the appellants against the judgment dated 19.03.2016 passed by learned Addl. Session Judge, Bali, District Pali, in Sessions Case No.44/2012 by which the learned Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants as under: S. No. Offence U/s Sentence Fine Sentence in default of fine 1. 302/34 IPC Life imprisonment Rs.2,000/- 6 months’ S.I. 2. 341 IPC 1 month S.I. --- ---- 2. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 3. Brief facts necessary to be noted for deciding the controversy are that on 24.08.2012, complainant Devi Singh gave a statement while admitted in Burn Ward of Mahatma Gandhi Hospital, Jodhpur to the effect that on 18.08.2012 he traveled from Bangalore and reached Ahmedabad on 20.08.2012, he proceeded to Falna where his wife Suman Kanwar had run away to, after leaving her six month old child. Thereafter complainant contacted his father-in-law, Himmat Singh and the complainant was asked to bring the child to Falna. Upon which, he reached Falna on 20.08.2012 at about 5:00 P.M. and went to his in-laws’ house, where he had tea. As he was about to leave, his mother-in- law Padam Kanwar and brother-in-law Yashpal caught hold his hands and his father-in-law was standing behind him. At that moment, someone poured petrol on him and lit fire with the intention to cause his death. Upon which, the neighbours intervened to rescue him and took him to the hospital. 4. On the said report, Police registered the FIR No.113/2012 against the accused appellants and started investigation. During the course of investigation, Police arrested the accused-appellants and on completion of investigation, police filed challan against them. 5. Thereafter, learned Trial Court framed the charges for the offence under Sections 302 /34 and 341 IPC to the accused appellants. They denied the charges and sought trial. 6. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as twenty-three witnesses and also got exhibited relevant documents in support of its case. 7. The accused-appellants were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in defence, no witness was produced. 8. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide judgment dated 19.03.2016 convicted and sentenced the accused- appellants for the offences as aforesaid. Hence, this criminal appeal. 9. The accused-appellants were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in defence, no witness was produced. 8. Learned trial Court, after hearing the arguments from both the sides, taking into consideration and appreciating the documentary evidence and the statements of witnesses, vide judgment dated 19.03.2016 convicted and sentenced the accused- appellants for the offences as aforesaid. Hence, this criminal appeal. 9. Counsel for the appellants vehemently submits that the deceased and Suman Kanwar had entered into a court marriage and following which they resided happily at Bangalore and one child was also born of their wedlock. Suman Kanwar came to her parental house to meet her parents for the first time. Upon examining the dying declaration, it is evident that the thumb impression of the deceased was not present on the dying declaration. Additionally, the Doctor did not specify whether the deceased was mentally and physically fit to give the statement. Earlier on 20.08.2012 Doctor explicitly stated that the patient was unfit to make any statement. The dying declaration was recorded only on 24.08.2012, after obtaining second medical opinion. The deceased ultimately succumbed on 28.08.2012 i.e. after about eight days of the incident. Counsel further submits that all the present appellants were also got burn injury in this incident, which shows that the appellants tried to save the deceased, therefore, they also received burn injuries. It is further argued that when the deceased reached at his in-laws’ house, he was in drunken condition and he himself poured petrol and lit fire. It is further stated that the deceased only mentioned that two persons caught hold his hand but he has not mentioned the name of person, who poured petrol on him and who lit fire. This shows that a false dying declaration has been recorded by the Police. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that no motive in this case has come out and the dying declaration was also not recorded in the presence of Magistrate so the veracity of the dying declaration is very much doubtful. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction being per se illegal and perverse deserves to be quashed and set aside. To buttress his contentions, counsel has cited the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Uttam Vs. State of Maharashtra , Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2012 & Dipak Bhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. Therefore, the impugned judgment of conviction being per se illegal and perverse deserves to be quashed and set aside. To buttress his contentions, counsel has cited the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Uttam Vs. State of Maharashtra , Criminal Appeal No. 485 of 2012 & Dipak Bhai Jagdishchandra Patel Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr. Criminal Appeal No. 714 of 2019. 10. Per-contra, the learned Public Prosecutor vehemently submitted that the occurrence took place in the house of the present appellants and initially the Doctor opined that the deceased is not fit for giving the statement but subsequently on 24.08.2012, the doctor opined that the deceased was fit for giving the statement, then the statement was recorded. Learned Public Prosecutor further argued that it might be possible that the deceased was in drunken condition but the incident took place at the house of the appellants, therefore, they are very much liable for the said incident. He also submits that the motive is also established because deceased and Suman Kanwar solemnized love marriage due to which the appellants were annoyed. It is further argued that after marriage, Suman Kanwar filed an FIR under Section 498-A IPC against the deceased and his family members. It is submitted that the learned trial court after meticulous examination of the evidence, oral as well as documentary, has rightly convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants for the offence under Sections 302 /34 and 341 IPC. They thus crave dismissal of the appeal. 11. We have considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties made at bar and perused the impugned judgment as well as record of the case. 12. As per prosecution, the deceased got his statement recorded by the police, during his treatment in which he stated that his mother-in-law Padam Kanwar and brother-in-law Yashpal caught hold of him and either his father-in-law Himmat Singh or Yashpal poured kerosene and lit fire. 13. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 32 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT which states as under: - “ 32. 13. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to Section 32 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT which states as under: - “ 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.— Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which, under the circumstances of the case, appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:— (1) when it relates to cause of death.— When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question.” Section 32 (1) of the Indian EVIDENCE ACT is a vital exception to the hearsay rule that admits statement made by a person who is dead and when such statements relate to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it. Its scope is broad, covering both homicide and suicide cases, but the admissibility hinges on the proximity, relevance, and trustworthiness of the statement. Courts scrutinize the circumstances under which such statements are made to ensure they are reliable and closely connected to the actual event, making Section 32 a powerful but carefully applied provision in criminal evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the EVIDENCE ACT , particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra , (1984) 4 SCC 116 , in which their Lordships have summarised the principles enumerated in Section 32(1) of the EVIDENCE ACT , including relating to circumstances of the transaction: “21. Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the EVIDENCE ACT , the following propositions emerge:- (1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian EVIDENCE ACT , in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the diverse nature and character of our people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice. (2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut- and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a straitjacket. Distance of time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death. It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over more than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32. (3) The second part of clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring. (4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide. (5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four corners of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.” 14. In the case of Sham Shankar Kankaria vs. State of Maharashtra , (2006) 13 SCC 165 , Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: "10. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence. 11. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which c ould be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 (SCC pp.480 -81, para 18) (Emphasis supplied) (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P., (1976) 3 SCC 104 ) (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, (1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar, (1983) 1 SCC 211 ) (iii) The Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, (1976) 3 SCC 618 ) (iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P., (1974) 4 SCC 264 ) (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P., 1981 Supp SCC 25 ) (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 654 ) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455 ) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P., (1981) 2 SCC 654 ) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1980 Supp SCC 455 ) (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar, 1980 Supp SCC 769 .) (ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P., 1988 Supp SCC 152 ) (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan, (1989) 3 SCC 390 ) (xi) Where there are more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 )" 15. In the case of Sampat Babso Kale and Anr. Vs State of Maharashtra , (2019) 4 SCC 739 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that:- 14. No doubt, a dying declaration is an extremely important piece of evidence and where the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is truthful, voluntary and not a result of any extraneous influence, the Court can convict the accused only on the basis of a dying declaration. We need not refer to the entire law but it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra2 held as follows: “11. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence………" 16. In the case of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2020) 11 SCC 489 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability as under: - 21. For what has been noticed hereinabove, some of the principles relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and reliability could be usefully summed up as under:- i) A dying declaration could be the sole basis of conviction even without corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the Court. ii) The Court should be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement; and that it was a voluntary statement, which was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. iii) Where a dying declaration is suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity such as want of fit state of mind of the declarant or of like nature, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. iv) When the eye-witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. iv) When the eye-witnesses affirm that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the statement, the medical opinion cannot prevail. v) The law does not provide as to who could record dying declaration nor there is any prescribed format or procedure for the same but the person recording dying declaration must be satisfied that the maker is in a fit state of mind and is capable of making the statement vi) Although presence of a Magistrate is not absolutely necessary for recording of a dying declaration but to ensure authenticity and credibility, it is expected that a Magistrate be requested to record such dying declaration and/or attestation be obtained from other persons present at the time of recording the dying declaration. vii) As regards a burns case, the percentage and degree of burns would not, by itself, be decisive of the credibility of dying declaration; and the decisive factor would be the quality of evidence about the fit and conscious state of the declarant to make the statement. viii) If after careful scrutiny, the Court finds the statement placed as dying declaration to be voluntary and also finds it coherent and consistent, there is no legal impediment in recording conviction on its basis even without corroboration. Now the question for consideration is, whether the statement of the deceased recorded by the police during the course of treatment is relevant under Section 32 (1) of the EVIDENCE ACT or not? 17. Admittedly, On 20.08.2012, after reaching Falna at about 5:00 P.M., the deceased contacted his father-in-law and requested him to bring his wife Suman Kanwar to the railway station. However, he did not arrive. When he made a follow-up call at approximately 8:30 P.M., his father-in-law, Himmat Singh, advised him to come to his residence. 18. No doubt, the doctor had stated that he was in a fit state of mind but he himself had, in his evidence, admitted that in the case of a deceased with 80% burns, the shock may lead to delusion. Applying the relevant principles to the facts of the present case, the appellants cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the statements of the deceased Devi Singh, as recorded by police in presence of PW-14 Dr. Anuj Singh. Therefore, there is a need to look for corroborative evidence in the present case. Applying the relevant principles to the facts of the present case, the appellants cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the statements of the deceased Devi Singh, as recorded by police in presence of PW-14 Dr. Anuj Singh. Therefore, there is a need to look for corroborative evidence in the present case. The testimonies of PW-5 Babu Singh, the father of the deceased; PW-6 Jagdish Singh, the uncle of the deceased; and PW-7 Smt. Kaku Devi, the mother of the deceased, do not establish any motive or intent on the part of the accused appellants to set the deceased ablaze. Notably, these witnesses’ statements lack any indication of a prior altercation between the deceased and his wife. Furthermore, the independent witnesses, PW-1 Om Parkash, PW-3 Om Puri, PW-4 Madan Singh, PW-12 Bhopal Singh, and PW-21 Vikram Singh, have all turned hostile, failing to corroborate the version of events presented by the deceased. Additionally, it has been established that the deceased was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident, as confirmed by PW-15 Dr. Sanjay Bedi, who stated that the deceased was intoxicated. Given the deceased’s intoxicated state, his testimony cannot be deemed entirely reliable, and, in the absence of corroborative evidence, it would be inappropriate to rely solely on his statements to establish guilt. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the police were informed by the accused, Himmat Singh, who then arranged for the deceased to be taken to the hospital. This indicates that the police action was initiated upon the report of accused Himmat Singh, and not solely based on the deceased’s account. 19. There is another important aspect of this case. The accused Himmat Singh, Yashpal Singh and Padam Kanwar, all of them have sustained burn injuries in the incident. Himmat Singh and Yashpal Singh have sustained 9% burn injuries and Padam Kanwar has sustained 18% burn injuries. As per dying declaration of Devi Singh, Padam Kanwar and Yashpal had caught hold of him and Himmat Singh was standing behind. There is no explanation offered by the prosecution that if only two accused had caught hold of deceased, how all the accused had sustained burn injuries. 20. In the case of Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 2025 (2) ACR 804 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under :- “24. There is no explanation offered by the prosecution that if only two accused had caught hold of deceased, how all the accused had sustained burn injuries. 20. In the case of Aejaz Ahmad Sheikh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 2025 (2) ACR 804 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under :- “24. There are two other important aspects of the case. Co-accused Aslam, a cousin of the accused, also suffered burn injuries in the incident. He died on 2nd January 2009 with septicaemia. He suffered 40% burn injuries. The prosecution also suppressed the fact that the accused also suffered superficial to deep burn injuries on the face and both forearms to the extent of 20%. This fact was brought to the record by the accused by examining Dr. K.C. Rai as a defence witness. 25. According to the prosecution's case, after pouring kerosene oil on the victims, the accused and Aslam were standing outside the room and were not allowing anybody to enter the room. Co-accused Aslam is himself a victim of the fire. There is no explanation offered by the prosecution of how the accused and Aslam suffered burn injuries. The burn injuries to Aslam proved to be fatal. This also raises suspicion about the prosecution's case. 26. We are dealing with an appeal against acquittal. After reappreciation of evidence, we find that the view taken by the High Court that the guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record. Even assuming that another view is possible, that is no ground to overturn the order of acquittal. 27. It is true that the incident is very shocking in which a woman and her three daughters were burnt, and one of them died on the spot, the other three died after a few days. However, in the absence of legal evidence on record to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, we cannot interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court.” 21. Considering the totality of the evidence or the lack thereof, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and substantiate the charge of murder under Section 302 /34 and 341 of IPC. Considering the totality of the evidence or the lack thereof, it is evident that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and substantiate the charge of murder under Section 302 /34 and 341 of IPC. The absence of motive, the hostile and uncorroborated testimonies, and the deceased’s intoxicated condition collectively cast serious doubt on the prosecution’s case. Therefore, in the interest of justice and based on the principles of reasonable doubt, we are of the considered opinion that the accused appellants are entitled to be acquitted of the offence under Section 302 /34 and 341 of IPC. 22. Resultantly, the present criminal appeal is allowed. 23. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellants as recorded vide judgment dated 19.03.2016 passed by learned Addl. Session Judge, Bali, District Pali, in Sessions Case No.44/2012 is quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of offence under Sections 302 /34 and 341 IPC. Record of the learned court below be sent back forthwith. The Appellant No. 1- Himmat Singh and Appellant No. 3-Smt. Padam Kanwar are on bail, they need not be surrender. Their bail bonds stands cancelled. The Appellant No. 2- Yashpal Singh is in jail and be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 24. Keeping in view, however, the provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. the accused appellants are directed to forthwith furnish personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount before the learned trial court within a period of one month, which shall be effective for a period of six months to the effect that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the judgment or for grant of leave, the appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before Hon’ble Supreme Court.