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2025 DIGILAW 1484 (RAJ)

Ramesh S/o Shri Pyarelal v. State of Rajasthan

2025-08-20

ANAND SHARMA

body2025
JUDGMENT : ANAND SHARMA, J. 1. Petitioner has challenged order dated 30.06.1984 passed by Superintendent of Police, Jhalawar, whereby, the petitioner has been discharged from service after conducting enquiry and the remaining benefits of suspension period have also been forfeited. The petitioner has also assailed order dated 12.11.1984, whereby, appeal filed by the petitioner against penalty order has been dismissed by the appellate authority. Further, the petitioner has also prayed for direction against the respondents to reinstate him in service with all benefits in the light of judgment dated 31.03.2000 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhalawar (hereinafter to be referred as ‘criminal court’)acquitting the petitioner from all charges framed against him. 2. The facts giving rise to the instant writ petition are that the petitioner was initially appointed on the post of Constable in the year 1979. One criminal complaint was lodged by private persons mentioning therein that the petitioner was working with a fraud name of “Ramesh” in respondent-department whereas his actual name was “Mohan Lal”. It has been mentioned that the petitioner has misused certificates of his younger brother Ramesh for obtaining job in Police Department. It was further mentioned that pursuant to aforesaid complaint, the petitioner was initially suspended vide order dated 24.01.1984 and later on, dismissed from service, without conducting any enquiry or without affording any opportunity of hearing, vide order dated 30.06.1984. The petitioner submitted that thereafter, he filed appeal under Rule 23 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Rules of 1958’). However, appeal of the petitioner was also dismissed vide order dated 12.11.1984. 3. It has also been contended in the writ petition that with similar allegations, the petitioner had to face criminal trial before the criminal court and after full fledged trial, the criminal court has acquitted the petitioner vide judgment and order dated 31.03.2000. It has been submitted that after honourable acquittal from competent criminal court, the petitioner requested for reinstating him and also served legal notice, yet no action was taken for reinstating the petitioner. 4. It has been submitted that after honourable acquittal from competent criminal court, the petitioner requested for reinstating him and also served legal notice, yet no action was taken for reinstating the petitioner. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that firstly, order of dismissal dated 30.06.1984 was null and void for the reason that such major penalty was imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to charge sheet issued under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958, whereas under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958, procedure is to conduct enquiry for punishing the delinquent with minor penalty. Secondly, charges with regard impersonation as well as producing deceptive and wrong certificates was also basis of criminal trial launched against the petitioner, in which, after recording evidence, the petitioner has been acquitted of the charges framed against him for commission of offences punishable under Sections 419 , 465, 471 and 109 IPC. Thus, such acquittal by the competent court has washed out any delinquency attached to the allegations levelled against the petitioner and soon after the acquittal, the petitioner was entitled for reinstatement along with all consequential benefits. 5. Per contra, learned Additional Government Counsel appearing for the respondents opposed writ petition and submitted that the dismissal of the petitioner took place in the year 1984 and his appeal was also rejected immediately, however, thereafter, the petitioner did not take any step to challenge such dismissal order as well as order passed by the appellate authority. Instant writ petition has been filed after a delay of around 18 years and is apparently suffering from vice of delay and latches. The ground with regard to jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority to punish the petitioner pursuant to charge sheet issued under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 was available to the petitioner in the year 1984 itself, however, the petitioner has waited for 18 long years to file instant writ petition. Hence, at this stage, writ petition filed by the petitioner cannot be entertained. 6. It has also been submitted by learned Additional Government Counsel that the standards of proof in criminal trial as well as disciplinary enquiry are altogether different. In criminal trial, prosecution is required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt whereas the disciplinary enquiry is conducted on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. 6. It has also been submitted by learned Additional Government Counsel that the standards of proof in criminal trial as well as disciplinary enquiry are altogether different. In criminal trial, prosecution is required to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt whereas the disciplinary enquiry is conducted on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Hence, mere acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case would not ipso facto entitle the petitioner to seek reinstatement. More so, when the departmental authorities in quite independent and separate manner, on the basis of material on record, have already exercised their jurisdiction and have discharged the petitioner from service by imposing penalty. Learned counsel for the respondents, for the aforesaid reason, prayed for dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. 7. Learned Additional Government Counsel appearing for the respondents, in support of his arguments, has relied upon decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Airport Authority of India Vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee , Civil Appeal No. 8414 of 2017 decided on 04.02.2025 and State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. Surji Devi, Civil Appeal No. 6205 of 2021 decided on 07.10.2021. 8. I have considered rival submissions put forth by learned counsel for the parties and also meticulously examined the record. 9. Bare reading of penalty order dated 30.06.1984 would reflect that the penalty order has been issued pursuant to a charge sheet issued under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958. Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 is meant for conducting enquiry for imposing minor penalties. Here, in the instant case, the penalty of discharge has been imposed upon the petitioner. Although there is no such penalty of discharge defined under the Rules of 1958, nor reference of any such penalty finds place in Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958, yet in the facts and circumstances of the case, where the petitioner was initially appointed in the year 1979 on substantive post of Constable, from the nature of the penalty order dated 30.06.1984, the penalty awarded to the petitioner can be equated with penalty of removal from service. Explanation (2) appended to Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 also clarifies the position that under these circumstances, the discharge of the petitioner would fall within the purview of removal or dismissal from service, as the case may be. 10. Explanation (2) appended to Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 also clarifies the position that under these circumstances, the discharge of the petitioner would fall within the purview of removal or dismissal from service, as the case may be. 10. Thus, it can be gathered from the facts of the instant case that the petitioner was punished with major penalty and it is abundantly clear from perusal of the scheme of the Rules of 1958 that for the purpose of imposing major penalty, the disciplinary authority is required to follow the procedure as contemplated under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958, which provides for detailed enquiry against the delinquent, including recording of evidence and grant of opportunity of cross-examination. It would also reveal from bare reading of penalty order dated 30.06.1984 that no opportunity of hearing and leading evidence (either to the employer or even to the delinquent) was granted in the instant case. Simply, on the basis of the charge sheet and alleged reply to the charge sheet, without conducting any enquiry whatsoever, the disciplinary authority has directly passed penalty order dated 30.09.1984. It is not disputed that enquiry can be conducted by the disciplinary authority itself or through any other enquiry officer, but conducting enquiry as per the procedure encapsulated in Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 is must, before imposing any major penalty whatsoever. It is also settled proposition of law that the misconduct committed by an employee, may be howsoever grave or henious, yet granting him fair opportunity of hearing before imposing major penalty is essential element and violation thereof would be fatal. 11. In addition to above, penalty order dated 30.06.1984 would also reflect that during the enquiry proceedings, the delinquent requested to defer the enquiry proceedings on account of pending criminal trial in respect of similar charges, yet such request was not acceded to by the disciplinary authority. Thereafter, on being dissatisfied with the penalty, the petitioner filed appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958 and the appellate authority also acknowledged the fact that on similar charges, criminal case was also lodged in which charge sheet was filed against the petitioner-delinquent and the trial was pending before the competent criminal court. Thereafter, on being dissatisfied with the penalty, the petitioner filed appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules of 1958 and the appellate authority also acknowledged the fact that on similar charges, criminal case was also lodged in which charge sheet was filed against the petitioner-delinquent and the trial was pending before the competent criminal court. The appellate authority also did not notice the flagrant violation of the Rules of 1958 inasmuch as no enquiry whatsoever was conducted by the disciplinary authority, either by himself or through any other enquiry officer, no evidence was recorded, nor any enquiry report was prepared or served upon the delinquent. Ignoring such significant procedure and provisions of law, the appellate authority, in a quite mechanical manner, dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. 12. The respondents have emphatically objected that although penalty order as well as appellate authority’s order were passed way back in the year 1984, yet thereafter, the petitioner did not chose to challenge the penalty order as well as appellate order by way of filing writ petition or otherwise in any other legal proceedings and only after passing of judgment and order dated 31.03.2000 by the criminal court, instant writ petition has been filed after expiry of around 17 years. Hence, as per respondents, only on account of delay and latches, writ petition should ought not have been entertained by this Court. In this regard, it is not disputed that initially penalty order was challenged by the petitioner by way of filing departmental appeal in which he could not succeed. Apparently, the penalty as well as appellate order both are solely based upon the similar facts and allegations, which were pending trial before the criminal court. Thus, when after undergoing full fledged criminal trial and recording of evidence, the petitioner was acquitted by the court, it could be said that a fresh cause of action accrued to the petitioner for ventilating his grievances by way of filing instant writ petition. Under these circumstances, objection of delay and latches raised by the respondents is not tenable in the eyes of law, more particularly, when the penalty order itself suffers from flagrant violation of the Rules of 1958 as well as from lack of competence and jurisdictional error, inasmuch as the petitioner has been penalised with major penalty, without following the mandatory provisions contemplated under the Rules of 1958. 13. 13. I have also examined the facts and evidence considered and findings recorded by the criminal court. In para 5 to 9 of judgment dated 31.03.2000 (Annexure-4), following points of consideration were framed by the criminal court: 14. After framing the aforesaid points of consideration, each and every point was decided at the strength of evidence led before the criminal court. After meticulous analysis of the evidence, the criminal court acquitted the petitioner of the charges framed against him for offences punishable under Sections 419 , 465, 471 read with Section 109 IPC. Such finding of acquittal has been recorded on account of the fact that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove any of the charge against the petitioner. Such acquittal was not on the basis of any benefit of doubt, but on failure of the prosecution to prove the charges and, therefore, in the light of findings recorded and observations made by the criminal court, acquittal of the petitioner can be said to be honourable acquittal. 15. Thus, under these circumstances where the sole reason for penalising the petitioner in departmental enquiry was alleged cheating and forgery and the charge sheet was also issued after registration of criminal case levelling charge similar to the allegations involved in the criminal case. Hence, it cannot be said that the acquittal by the criminal court cannot be made basis for re-examining the penalty imposed against the petitioner. Although, it is settled that the criminal trial is conducted on the basis of fundamental principle that the prosecution is required to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt; whereas on the other hand, the basis of departmental enquiry is preponderance of probabilities. But, under the aforesaid circumstances, the impact of acquittal cannot be ignored, more so, when the acquittal is based upon examination of witnesses and after analysing the evidence on record. Such findings can have material bearing, particularly under the circumstances where no witnesses whatsoever was examined by the disciplinary authority while passing the penalty order, where charges were quite similar to allegations levelled in criminal case. 16. In view of foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the respondent-department was bound to reconsider the penalty imposed on the basis of charges similar to the charges levelled in the criminal case. 16. In view of foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the respondent-department was bound to reconsider the penalty imposed on the basis of charges similar to the charges levelled in the criminal case. By not reconsidering the same, the respondents have deprived the petitioner of his right to fair consideration as also defeated his legitimate rights to continue in the service after acquittal in the criminal case. 17. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446 has also given guidelines for reconsidering the departmental penalties, where the delinquent has been acquitted in the criminal case by the criminal court. Hon’ble Apex Court has held held as under: "30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand." 18. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Others, (2024) 1 SCC 175 observed as under:- "28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used. 29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved” — in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P.). 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. 30. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the Appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand. The charges were not just similar but identical and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all the same. This is a case where in exercise of our discretion, we quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority as allowing them to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. This case is very similar to the situation that arose in G.M. Tank." 19. In the light of aforesaid discussion and after hearing arguments of both the sides, I am of the considered opinion that penalty order dated 30.06.1984 and order dated 12.11.1984 passed by the appellate authority are liable to be quashed and set aside on account of being passed in express violation of the Rules of 1958 and without following the mandatory procedure prescribed for imposing major penalty, as well as on acount of acquittal of the petitioner by the competent criminal court in criminal trial containing almost similar charges. 20. As regards the decisions relied upon by learned Additional Government Counsel in the cases of Airport Authority of India Vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee (supra) and State of Rajasthan & Others Vs. Surji Devi (supra), the same are having different facts and circumstances and not attracted in the instant case. 21. Writ petition filed by the petitioner is, hereby, allowed. Orders dated 30.06.1984 and 12.11.1984 are quashed and set aside. As the petitioner has crossed the age of superannuation, on account of quashing and setting aside penalty order as well as order passed by the appellate authority, he will be deemed to be in service up to the age of superannuation. Period from the date of passing of penalty order till the date of superannuation of the petitioner shall be counted for the purpose of granting pension and all other retiral benefits, however, no monetary benefit whatsoever shall be granted to the petitioner. The petitioner shall be entitled for all the notional benefits for the intervening period. The respondents are directed to make compliance of this order within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. 22. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.